The conversation explores the Russian threat looming over the continent, from a battle-hardened army emerging from Ukraine to shortfalls in Western weapons production. Daalder also highlights the political and ideological dimensions: a potential ceasefire in Ukraine could be a “trap” driven by domestic US politics, and European officials are increasingly concerned about MAGA-aligned movements undermining unity across the continent.
From NATO’s evolving role to Europe’s own strategic reckoning, Ian Bremmer and Daalder examine whether Europe can stand alone, and what leadership will look like in the West in the near future.
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Transcript: NATO, Trump, and Europe’s wake-up call with Ivo Daalder
Ian Bremmer:
Hello and welcome to the GZERO World Podcast. This is where you can find extended versions of my interviews on public television. I'm Ian Bremmer, and I'm coming to you today from Munich, Germany, home of the 62nd Annual Munich Security Conference. World leaders, generals, CEOs and diplomats have gathered here, as they do every year, to confront the world's most pressing security challenges. But this year does feel different. The theme of the conference is under destruction, a nod to a growing sense that the political institutional foundations of the transatlantic relationship are being shaken. Not by Russia, not by China, but by the United States. President Trump in his second term, has acted both unilaterally and transactionally, rewriting long-standing assumptions about America's role in the world.
For many Europeans here in Munich, it feels as though the United States is swinging a wrecking ball at the global order it once helped build and defend. And yet, the political disenchantment across the west predates Trump. Majorities in many G7 countries believe their governments are not delivering for future generations. The frustration was already there. So what happens now? The United States remains the world's dominant military power, but Europe is openly debating how much it can and how much it should rely on Washington going forward. Who leads the so-called free world as America steps back? Can Europe act as a coherent geopolitical force? And where do rising middle powers in the global south fit into this emerging order? I was joined in Munich by former US Ambassador to NATO and senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, Ivo Daalder. Let's get to it.
Ivo Daalder, welcome back to the show.
Ivo Daalder:
Ah, it's great to be back.
Ian Bremmer:
So towards the close of the Munich Security Conference here and so much talk about whether or not the transatlantic relationship and NATO are going to persist in the form that they have in past decades. Your answer to that?
Ivo Daalder:
No, it's not going to be the same as it's been in the past decade. That's gone. But the transatlantic relationship in some form will continue. Not because Marco Rubio, the Secretary of State, said that it was, and that our future was intertwined with that of Europe. Something I strongly believe, but I don't believe his president believes. But because there is going to be a new kind of NATO, a rebalancing between European and American responsibilities for defense and security in Europe.
Timely, a good way, I would've liked to have seen it much more smoothly done than the way it was done, but perhaps the outcome is not going to be the worst thing at all. What struck me is that a year ago when we were sitting here, this was all about America. And now this meeting was all about Europe. What is Europe going to do and how is Europe going to stamp up and what are the Europeans prepared to do? And it really wasn't anymore about, "Are the Americans with us?" It was sort of like, "Yeah, maybe, but we're going to do our thing anyway." And I think that's an interesting development.
Ian Bremmer:
And in some ways it's a development that when you say you'd like it to be more smooth, I mean you could take away, you wish that the Trump administration handled it more diplomatically, more collegially. But you could also say you wish that the Europeans had started doing this in a serious way decades ago.
Ivo Daalder:
Absolutely. I mean, clearly, this rebalancing that is necessary is something that it should have happened a long time ago. Europe, 80 years after World War II, part of an organization that was set up to give Europe the confidence to rebuild and regenerate, which they did brilliantly through the European Union, in a whole variety of ways. But really since the end of the Cold War kind of assumed that we were living in a world in which defense was no longer possible over the last 25 years, with some exceptions, but really not with the big ones. Europe unilaterally disarmed, basically said, "We don't need-"
Ian Bremmer:
Don't need it.
Ivo Daalder:
"... defense." And the defense it did, importantly, was defense it did in favor of the United States, troops to Afghanistan, capabilities to Afghanistan. The one and a half percent or so was spent on operations in Afghanistan. Not a single one of these allies, many of who lost significant numbers of soldiers, did so because it was in their security. They thought it was important to show to the United States that they were good allies. So yes, they should have started a long time ago.
They're now starting. And now the question is can the machinery in NATO, which is a US-dominated machinery, in fact, we in the US created a NATO that put us at the center. Will that machinery be able to evolve smoothly enough to accommodate a greater and greater and greater role for Europe?
Ian Bremmer:
Now, when you say Europe, you could be forgiven for believing that the Europeans were actually doing something on defense. And yet, it's the Germans that are doing something. It's the Poles, it's the Balts. It's not the Spaniards. It's not so much the Italians. That's a big question too.
Ivo Daalder:
It is a big question. So it's all the Nordics and the Balts and the Poles and the Germans.
Ian Bremmer:
The front-line states.
Ivo Daalder:
It's the Dutch, the French, and the Brits are not going to increase defense spending. They have, for a whole variety of reasons, that that's not going to happen anytime soon. But they didn't disarm, they continued to spend 2% of GDP. A good part of it on the procurement side for nuclear weapons, particularly in the British case. But they still have... They're not as big. They're not as ready. They're not as good as they used to be, but very different than the Germans who basically had no capability at all. So you're really talking about the Southern Europeans.
One way to look at it is the beer drinkers seem to be taking defense seriously, and the wine drinkers with the French kind of unique in there may be a little less worried about security and a little less willing to rejigger their budget.
Ian Bremmer:
Rejigger, that is an alcohol-related reference that you didn't even mean to make. That's very impressive.
Ivo Daalder:
I didn't. [inaudible 00:06:14].
Ian Bremmer:
That's very impressive, Ivo.
Ivo Daalder:
Yes, thank you.
Ian Bremmer:
Very well done. So what about... NATO, there is no existential threat to NATO today.
Ivo Daalder:
There's not an existential threat, but the Russian threat is real. And it's real, on the one hand, you're looking at Ukraine and say, "Listen, four years in, they've lost 1.2, 1.3 million men, both severely wounded and dead."
Ian Bremmer:
But 30,000, 35,000 a month casualties the Russians have taken in December and January. Those are, under any circumstances, just astonishing numbers.
Ivo Daalder:
They are astonishing. And the losses. So 1.2 million, 1.3 million now people, off the battlefield.
Ian Bremmer:
Battle losses.
Ivo Daalder:
A lot of them dead, a lot of them severely wounded. The replacement rate is now below the casualty rate. The number of people they're able to recruit with extraordinary amounts of money, sometimes 50, 60, $70,000 to sign up. They're not particularly good at what they're doing, they're fodder, literally fodder. It's extraordinary. But, and there is a but, the entire Russian economy is now a war economy. It's churning out more equipment; missiles, drones, not so much sophisticated tanks and that kind of things, at a rate that is faster than they've ever done before. Whole parts of the armed forces, much of the Navy, much of the Air Force has not been involved in this war.
So in the end, you will have a battle-hardened Russian army, you will have a war economy that really needs to continue to produce stuff, and you will have most likely a need by the leadership to demonstrate that whatever they got out of Ukraine was worth it, maybe by taking some other steps. So I do think the Russians are a serious threat. On the other hand, economically, militarily, and other than nuclear weapons, they're no match to what the Europeans could have and what NATO can have.
Ian Bremmer:
Now, the Americans are, with the exception of some intelligence support, and of course they're selling lots of weapons to the Europeans, but they're really not... They're kind of out of the game in terms of providing support to the Ukrainians at this point.
Ivo Daalder:
Totally. They're completely out of the game. And I was a little nonplussed by the fact that Secretary General kept on saying, "The Americans are providing all those weapons."
Ian Bremmer:
Of NATO, not [inaudible 00:08:38]. No, they're selling all those weapons.
Ivo Daalder:
Yeah, they're selling. They're making money as-
Ian Bremmer:
Capitalists do.
Ivo Daalder:
... as capitalists do, although certainly as Donald Trump does, it keeps on saying, "The great news is we're helping Ukraine and we're getting paid for it." Well, actually, that's not really helping Ukraine. That is making sure that the Europeans are paying for stuff that the United States should be giving. They are providing very important intelligence information that is crucial both to defend Ukraine against the missile attacks that are continuing, drone attacks, that are continuing to bombard cities throughout Ukraine. And for some of the battlefield logistics and ways, that's important, and frankly, the Europeans can't yet give, although they're trying to figure out ways to do that. So it's really the Europeans who are carrying the burden. And part of the reality is, we're running out of stuff, the US is running out of stuff to sell.
Ian Bremmer:
I hear that there are Patriot batteries right now that actually don't have missiles.
Ivo Daalder:
That's right.
Ian Bremmer:
So the Ukrainians aren't able to knock these Russian missiles out of the sky.
Ivo Daalder:
Yeah. So it's not a question of, you need to give us more Patriots because there aren't anymore. There are 600 PAC-3 Patriots produced a year. Most of the European inventories are below where they should be for their own defense. Some of them are, like the Danes, have given everything, the Dutch are getting very close to having given everything. The Norwegians are now discussing whether they might give everything on their NASAMS, which can't shoot down ballistic missiles, but can be pretty good against cruise missiles and other things.
So yeah, the fight is hard because the Ukrainians are running out of stuff and the support is there, the willingness is there, the money is there, but the capabilities aren't there, which is kind of, when you think about it, four years into this war, we haven't figured out how to increase production of basic capabilities that everybody knows we will need in any future work? Really raises questions about the US, Europe defense preparedness and have we actually taken the world as it is seriously?
Ian Bremmer:
And you would think if anyone would get that right, it would be the companies who have a fiduciary responsibility to maximize their ability to make revenue. Why do you think they haven't?
Ivo Daalder:
Well, because we have defense budgets that need to be improved year-after-year. And they say, "I'm not going to spend any more money on production capabilities until I get paid." And so they could actually expand their production capabilities, but they're going to be paid year-by-year, and they don't know whether the money will be there next year or whether there will be a government shutdown, they won't get any money. So they're not willing to take risks.
Now, I would argue that they should. They look at the world geopolitically in the way that you and I do. We see a much more dangerous world. You say, I say, "This is the most dangerous period in our lifetime." The likelihood of great power war is probably higher now than any time since 1945. So the reality is we're going to need a lot of stuff. And why they're not doing it, that's a good question for them to answer.
Ian Bremmer:
One of the things I've heard on the sidelines of Munich this year, which surprised me a little bit, was that if there were a ceasefire, given the Trump administration and the lack, the desire, to open up with the Russians immediately on the back of that, that many front-line states would be much more vulnerable to a false flag attack from the Russians. That a ceasefire might not be in the interests of the Baltic states, of others. I've actually heard that from several leaders. I was surprised by that.
Ivo Daalder:
A ceasefire is not in the interest of Ukraine. Remember, the Ukrainians didn't want a ceasefire, the Europeans didn't want a ceasefire.
Ian Bremmer:
They now do. The Ukrainians now do.
Ivo Daalder:
Well, they want a ceasefire because they know that Donald Trump wants a ceasefire. I mean, much of the negotiations that have been going on is a negotiation between the Ukrainians and the United States, not between the Ukrainians and Russia. And the US is trying to get Ukraine to accept something that the Russians are willing to accept, and they're pushing Ukraine. And it started with the ceasefire. The ceasefire was-
Ian Bremmer:
And Trump literally just said that. He said, "The Ukrainians better step up because they're Russians are ready for peace." He said that yesterday.
Ivo Daalder:
Exactly. But this has been the entire pattern. I mean, when the blowup happened a year ago in the Oval Office, just after Munich, when he was there, the big blowup was there, and the Europeans then came to Zelensky and said, "The one thing you can give, accept a ceasefire." A ceasefire is not a good thing. A frozen conflict maybe. If a ceasefire leads to the deployment of the security guarantee, if the Europeans start putting forces in there and the Americans are willing to provide a backstop, then I think it's okay. But if a ceasefire means that the United States is opening up economic and other kinds of relations with the Russians, we can sanction, start pushing the Europeans to release the Russian frozen assets and give them back to Russia. All of which, the indication is, is where the Trump administration would like to go.
Ian Bremmer:
And many Europeans would follow the United States in that case, Not all, but many would.
Ivo Daalder:
Not all under the ability to maintain, let alone get new sanctions, is going to be much, much more difficult. And so yes, the deterrent effect starts to unravel. And frankly, unravels only because of one reason, because Donald Trump wants to be seen as the man who brought-
Ian Bremmer:
That brought peace.
Ivo Daalder:
... brought peace to this war.
Ian Bremmer:
Or at least that brought a ceasefire.
Ivo Daalder:
Yeah, exactly, end the war. And this is a trap. And I think it's interesting that people are now starting to react to that. That's what you're hearing. Because it is a trap, potentially. It doesn't have to be. A real ceasefire that creates a frozen conflict in which the Europeans are willing to back up the Ukrainians to the hilt. Where Ukraine moves forward rapidly on EU membership, I would argue rapidly on NATO membership, but that's not going to happen. That's fine. Right now, I think that's what the Ukrainians are happy with. They're much more worried about a ceasefire that isn't real, isn't followed up, that leads to the unraveling of everything that was there. Because that's neither a just nor a sustainable peace. Two words, by the way, that Marco Rubio used today. These are European stock phrases, just, sustainable, peace. Marco Rubio used them. Good for him.
Ian Bremmer:
He did. He did. And Marco Rubio got a standing ovation from the European crowd. From a European crowd that was stunned by JD Vance a year ago. You and I saw it. That basically called out the Europeans as the problem. Now, his speech was certainly much friendlier, much more cordial, much more engaging. But the policies of the United States have not changed one iota toward Europe in the last year. So were you surprised by that reaction?
Ivo Daalder:
Well, I think, Wolfgang Ischinger, the chairman of the MSC, put it exactly right. I think they rose because of the relief that it wasn't another tongue-lashing that they got a year ago.
Ian Bremmer:
Oh my God, not another tongue-lashing. Is that-
Ivo Daalder:
But on the other hand, I think if, on reflection, part of the speech was incoherent and part of the reason it was incoherent is, it was trying to speak to the audience in a reassuring manner while at the same time speaking to that other audience, which is the audience of one back in the White House, to make sure that he maintains the big line.
And the other one is this deep uncomfortable argument that the entire administration making on civilizational erasure, that the fact that if you have immigrants coming to your country that don't look like you, all of a sudden you become different. That is just not how Europe thinks. By the way, it's not how most Americans think. It's not how America used to think. This white Christian nationalism that is now infusing MAGA is being exported by the United States. Not surprised that Rubio's next two stops are Slovakia-
Ian Bremmer:
And Hungary.
Ivo Daalder:
... and Hungary
Ian Bremmer:
Also, for his audience back in the United States. Not really for the Hungarians and Slovaks.
Ivo Daalder:
But I don't think the European should take this, oh my God, the US has turned a corner. They're back, we're back in business.
Ian Bremmer:
Well, the other weird thing about the civilizational point is that the Europeans were getting harder on their own border security and migration before the Americans. I mean, Angela Merkel understood that when she was going to take a million Syrian refugees, that her population was not having it.
Ivo Daalder:
Right.
Ian Bremmer:
So there's actually more alignment on that.
Ivo Daalder:
There's much more alignment on this. And there's much more alignment on the security threat. But MAGA has gone further, right? I mean, MAGA looks at Russia, some part of MAGA, as an ally because of the church, because Putin is anti-gay and LGBTQ+, I guess, Putin is anti-DEI. I mean, all those things that MAGA has now incorporated, that's just not how Europeans think. They still think that climate change is important. I think Merz made that point. The strongest point in his speech was when he said that our values, there are difference in our values. JD Vance talked about differences-
Ian Bremmer:
Yeah, Merz came out anti-MAGAs. The first time I'd seen a major European leader do that.
Ivo Daalder:
I thought, well, so what I heard in the corridors from a lot of people, they're shocked by the fact that the State Department is spending money supporting MAGA-aligned think tanks. Think tanks that are extraordinarily pro-Russian, by the way, think tanks that may not be pro-American, although when the money flows, they'll probably become more pro-American. And that they're actively undermining the civil structure of our societies. It's remarkable that that's happening from your long-standing ally across the Atlantic. There's a deep worry that the ideological attack on Europe from the United States is actually more important than the disagreement they're having over the defense burden.
Ian Bremmer:
Yeah. The final point here is that it's an interesting tension that on the one hand, the Americans, under Trump, do not want to see a united Europe. They are spending money and engaging politically in ways that would undermine that strength. And yet they're pushing much harder than Biden or Obama had been for the Europeans to more effectively arm themselves, to become more productive, to actually have more economic growth, which would make them stronger. So there is this very unusual tension in the policy.
Ivo Daalder:
That wouldn't be the first time that Donald Trump is pursuing policies that are not mutually inclusive. I mean, his entire trade policy, which is what drives them to wanting Europe to be broken up, the European Union, so he could pick them off one by one, it's a lot easier than having to pick off one big 450 million market, is not succeeding. Completely succeeding more, better than I thought, better than I'd hoped. I think the Europeans have much more power to push back.
But I think the strength argument is to say, you need to do it because we're no longer doing it. I mean, we're leaving, and I think Rich Colby who said, "We want a stronger NATO, and we want..." But behind that, Rich Colby, the undersecretary of defense who was at the defense ministerial, and here, rather than Pete Hegseth, he's a nicer guy, he's intellectually more coherent than his boss. But the message is the same. We have interests elsewhere that are more important both in the Western Hemisphere and in the Pacific than Europe. And so if you care about security in Europe, you need to take care of that so we can take care of our own things. That's a very consistent message.
Ian Bremmer:
Ivo Daalder, thanks for joining.
Ivo Daalder:
Always a pleasure to be here.
Ian Bremmer:
That's it for today's edition of the GZERO World Podcast. Do you like what you heard? Of course you do. Why not make it official? Why don't you rate and review GZERO World five stars, only five stars, otherwise don't do it, on Apple, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts. Tell your friends.
