Is Trump about to strike Iran (again)?

Iran is not in the Western Hemisphere. It’s not a vital US security interest, and most Americans don't especially care about what happens in the Middle East. But it may well be the next theater where President Donald Trump tries to reshape reality with military force – and unlike his quick win in Venezuela, this one could spiral.

The US president has made his position clear: Iran can do this the easy way or the hard way. The easy way means a deal, one much tougher than the JCPOA nuclear agreement he walked away from during his first term: surrender the stockpile of highly enriched uranium, agree to halt enrichment indefinitely and dismantle what's left of the nuclear program (already set back by last June’s strikes), accept limits on Iran's ballistic missiles with full inspections, and end support for regional proxies such as Hezbollah and the Houthis. The hard way means military strikes. Big ones.

This isn't idle talk. Trump came within a hair's breadth of ordering attacks just weeks ago, after the Iranian regime killed thousands – possibly tens of thousands – of protesters in a brutal crackdown. What stopped him wasn't second thoughts but insufficient US military capacity in the region to shield Israel and American bases if Iran retaliated hard. Trump wanted to do more than just send a message with a symbolic show of force. Evidently, he was contemplating strikes big enough to provoke a significant Iranian military response.

Now the United States is putting the pieces in place. A carrier group, roughly ten destroyers, dozens of F-15s and other strike aircraft, plus a THAAD battery and Patriot air defense systems requiring about 200 US personnel to operate. The goal is to cover the entire region with a defensive umbrella (…an iron dome?) so there's little risk of mass casualties if Iran hits back.

Regional powers are scrambling to avert a wider war, with Turkey, Qatar, Oman, and Egypt trying to broker talks currently set for Friday in Muscat – though they could easily collapse (and be revived) over disputes about venue, format, and scope between now and then. Trump claims diplomatic progress is being made, but the fundamental problem remains: His demands still go well beyond what Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is prepared to give. The Islamic Republic may be willing to make concessions on its nuclear program to avoid strikes and ease the domestic economic crisis – a bitter pill, but survivable. Iran will not, however, formally surrender the right to enrich uranium domestically. And Iranian officials have made abundantly clear that ballistic missiles – Iran’s sole remaining deterrent – are off the table. The maximum Tehran can offer doesn't meet the minimum Washington has been willing to accept. Military threats alone, no matter how credible, won’t change that.

So either Trump backs down and takes a much smaller deal he can spin as victory, or we're looking at military action. Given he's already hit Iran twice without blowback, and given he walked away from a nuclear deal once before because he thought it was inadequate, it seems unlikely that he would settle for a nuclear-only arrangement now.

Though Trump could probably sell one if he wanted to. Forcing Iran to surrender its uranium would neutralize the immediate nuclear breakout threat. Trump could pocket that win, point to Israel's degradation of the missile program and regional proxies, and declare he solved the nuclear problem his predecessors couldn’t after bombing Iran into submission last year – all while reserving the right to go after missiles and proxies later if needed. Or letting Israel do it.

But with the military buildup accelerating, it’s more likely Trump is pursuing both tracks at once: testing whether maximum pressure can force Iran into major concessions while getting the pieces to strike into place in the likely event that it can't. And a real possibility this time isn't just strikes on nuclear or missile sites. It's a Venezuela-style decapitation: taking out Khamenei himself. The bet is that pragmatic conservatives within the Supreme National Security Council and IRGC commanders would take control after the Supreme Leader’s death, prioritize regime survival, and retaliate just enough to save face while avoiding further escalation.

Trump's team is emboldened by recent experience. Venezuela's success is fresh in mind. The assassination of Qasem Soleimani in 2019 drew minimal Iranian retaliation against American targets. So did the joint strikes with Israel last year. That pattern has the president convinced that he can do it again. To be clear, this isn't about toppling the entire regime – that would require a sustained military campaign Trump won't commit to. The goal is more limited: eliminate Khamenei, work with whoever takes over, and avoid getting dragged into a prolonged conflict. Intelligence efforts have been underway to cultivate senior figures in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Khamenei’s inner circle – regime insiders who might cooperate with the decapitation strike and helm a successor government Washington could live with.

But Iran isn't Venezuela. The regime has more capacity to hit back, deeper internal loyalty, larger and more capable security forces, and succession is far less likely to go smoothly. Khamenei isn't just Iran's supreme leader; he's a spiritual figurehead for Shia Islam. His death would shock the system in ways that might not produce the orderly transition Washington is counting on. Even if Iran's leaders want to avoid escalation, Khamenei's stature would require a sizable retaliation to save face, including strikes on US bases and ships in the Gulf. If that attack causes significant American casualties, the situation could easily spiral. And if hardliners seize control instead of pragmatists (a real possibility) or if the succession fractures, we could see massive retaliation not just against US bases and ships but against tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.

Oil prices have already ticked up despite ample global crude supply and tepid demand growth. If Trump actually strikes Khamenei, expect a bigger spike – $5-10 per barrel, possibly more if the transition goes badly. That means inflation at home, exactly what Trump wants to avoid less than nine months before the midterm elections, and the sort of market disruption he cares most about.

Even if the transition went smoothly, Iran has threatened to strike Israel regardless of who leads the attack. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu initially urged Trump to hold off on strikes in January, worried Israel couldn't handle the blowback. But with US military assets now flooding the region, both governments are ready for action. If Iran retaliates against Israel and causes significant civilian casualties, Netanyahu will be compelled to respond. That would open a second front in an already dangerous confrontation, risking another tit-for-tat escalation between Tehran and Jerusalem.

Then there's the great power dimension. Unlike Venezuela – where Moscow and Beijing mostly grumbled as Trump installed a friendlier government – regime change in Iran would cross a line both countries care deeply about. Tehran supplies drones to Russia and oil to China, not to mention geopolitical alignment across the Middle East. Taking down Khamenei would set a precedent neither wants normalized: that the United States can topple leaders they're aligned with anywhere in the world, not just in its own hemisphere. Which raises an awkward point for those still insisting Trump is Vladimir Putin's puppet: a Russian asset wouldn't have ousted Maduro – bad for Moscow – and wouldn't be threatening Tehran with regime change. Trump is willing to cross Moscow and Beijing when it suits him.

How might they respond? Options range from stepped-up material support for whatever regime emerges in Tehran to asymmetric attacks against US interests in the region. China could freeze economic and military engagement channels with Washington or even cancel Trump's planned visit to Beijing in April. Neither wants to signal that aggressive American revisionism comes without a cost. They'll want Trump to feel some pain, if only to deter similar moves in their own spheres of influence.

The risk of a wider war with real consequences for oil and regional stability makes a diplomatic climbdown more attractive than in Venezuela, where the downside was minimal. This helps explain why Trump is giving talks a runway. But a breakthrough remains unlikely, and momentum for military action is still building. After initially lobbying against strikes, over the weekend the Saudis flipped, suggesting the Iranian regime would look "emboldened" if Washington backs down. Translation: they see strikes as inevitable and don't want to be on the wrong side. And Europe just designated the IRGC as a terrorist organization, providing useful political cover for targeting its leadership.

The decision point is weeks, not months, away. Maybe Trump will accept a limited deal that punts on missiles and keeps the regime intact, but I wouldn't bet on it. The president has shown he believes audacity pays off. Venezuela worked, after all. The question now is whether the Iran gamble will, too.

The answer matters well beyond the Middle East. If Trump pulls this off, he’ll come out the other side ever more convinced that raw American power can solve any problem and achieve any goal. Each success raises the stakes for the next gamble. If it goes sideways – if Hezbollah and the Houthis coordinate attacks across the region, if hardliners take over and close Hormuz, if oil hits $90 and stays there, if Russia and China impose real costs – we'll find out just how dangerous these bets really are.