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Results for Israel’s political crisis, explained
What happened, exactly?
Since taking office last December, the far-right coalition led by Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin “Bibi” Netanyahu had been trying to get legislation passed that would give the executive full control of the supreme court’s composition and allow the Knesset (Israel’s parliament) to overturn supreme court rulings with a simple majority.
While many of the reform’s proponents are motivated by a desire to check what they’ve long viewed as an overly activist, liberal, and anti-democratic judiciary, Bibi himself primarily saw it as a means to stay out of prison and in power.
The judicial overhaul was met with unprecedented opposition, with hundreds of thousands of Israelis across the political and social spectrum taking to the streets nationwide for 12 consecutive weeks. Thousands of mission-critical soldiers and reserve forces said they wouldn’t report for duty if the legislation passed, and several diplomats resigned from their posts in protest. The country’s business community and tech sector threatened to paralyze the nation’s economy if the government didn’t recalibrate, with hundreds of international economists, leading banks, credit rating agencies, and even Israel’s central bank chief warning the overhaul would seriously harm the nation’s business and investment climate.
Still, Bibi refused to back down.
The showdown came to a head over the weekend when Bibi summarily fired Yoav Gallant, Israel’s defense minister and a member of his own Likud Party, for publicly warning that the legislation would be detrimental to national security.
Mass spontaneous demonstrations erupted almost immediately across the country. Critically, Israel’s largest labor union, representing nearly a quarter (!) of the total workforce, announced a general strike for the first time in its history, shutting down everything from Ben Gurion Airport to shopping centers, hospitals, universities, local governments, and every McDonald’s in the country (they were … not lovin’ it). This prompted more Likud members to speak out against the bills, raising concerns that they would not get enough votes to pass.
Bibi finally blinked on Monday night, delaying a vote on the legislation until the Knesset’s summer session (which starts after Passover and goes until July) in what he called “a timeout for dialogue.” By Tuesday morning, the trade unions had called off the strike.
And so, the crisis was defused — for now.
Who wins and loses from the suspension?
After three months of ceding no ground despite the damage done to Israel’s social, economic, and military fabric, one could be tempted to see Bibi’s announcement as a climbdown or a concession. It’s not. The pause is a pit stop, a tactical breather to lower tensions and deprive the opposition of momentum that doesn’t commit the government to any genuine concessions in return.
Bibi hasn’t canceled the legislation. On the contrary, he has promised his far-right coalition partners that he will still ram it through, and with his own physical freedom on the line, there’s every reason to believe it’s only a matter of time until he tries again.
His pledge to hold good-faith negotiations with the opposition is made more challenging by his using the same speech to blame the pro-democracy “extremists” for inciting civil strife. There’s nothing to prevent the prime minister from announcing a breakdown in talks at a time of his choosing, leaving the government days away from being able to pass the legislation.
In fact, Bibi’s only material concession was not to the bill’s critics but to the hard right, which got promised a brand-new national guard under the direct command of Israel’s extremist national security minister, Itamar Ben-Gvir, to help tackle rising crime in mixed Jewish-Arab cities. Given the police force’s reluctance to repress pro-democracy protests in recent weeks, a private militia may even prove an asset to Netanyahu when the time comes to push the reform through once and for all.
Would the judicial reforms spell the end of democracy?
A political system as fragmented as Israel’s, where no one party can ever control the government and where coalitions are incredibly hard to put together and even harder to maintain, has an inbuilt structural check on all power: division.
This informal but deeply entrenched check is more binding than the formal check that is separation of powers, and it makes Israel’s democracy more resilient than Hungary’s or Turkey’s. There’s nothing Bibi or anyone can do to change that.
Yes, the proposed overhaul would in theory empower the executive and parliament to constrain the judiciary, but political division would limit how strongly any governing coalition could constrain judiciary independence in practice. In fact, the very reason why the judiciary is so strong in Israel is precisely because of how structurally weak Israeli governments are.
The idea that any one side or leader could suddenly and irreversibly take control of the supreme court, when you have 15 political parties and it’s almost impossible to get a majority to agree on anything and any government can fall apart overnight, begs credulity.
That doesn’t mean the judicial reform is a good idea — it isn’t. Israel’s democracy would take a hit, as would its economy. But it wouldn’t be the catastrophe or “attempted coup” its opponents claim.
What does this all mean for Bibi?
Like Donald Trump, Bibi is a political animal. Unlike Trump, he is an incredibly skilled tactician. These two features have allowed him to hold Israel’s highest office for 15 years despite countless scandals and challenges to his rule, defying all predictions. But he’s neither infallible nor invincible.
Dismissing his defense minister for warning about a potential national security threat — literally in his job description — was a lapse in judgment, prompting trade unions, the entire security apparatus, and some senior members of his party to lose confidence in him. So was attacking patriotic reservists as refuseniks and saboteurs in a country where virtually every citizen serves in the military. He definitely underestimated the degree of popular backlash the judicial overhaul would face.
Are these missteps enough to end his political career?
Perhaps. The Gallant episode has forced some of the more establishment-minded Likud members to see Bibi for who he has become: a man desperate to avoid jail no matter the cost to the nation. More damningly, his Monday “capitulation” is leading the hardliners to start questioning his worth as a partner. For a leader like Bibi, the only thing worse than looking incompetent is looking weak.
True, the government still commands a slim majority in the Knesset, and Bibi will probably manage to keep his fragile coalition together for at least a few more months. But he could easily lose the support of several Likud MPs if the legislation proceeds in the summer as he’s promised the far right, and he could easily lose the far right if he reneges on his promise — or if he can't muster the votes from his own party to get it passed.
To be clear, it’s entirely possible this isn’t the issue that ends the Netanyahu government. But sooner or later, something will break the coalition. And when voters head to the polls next, they will remember that it was Bibi who pushed the country to the brink for personal gain.
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Hamas’ unprecedented terrorist attack on Israeli soil on Oct. 7 left many with two burning questions: Was Tehran behind it? And if so, would the war between Israel and Hamas expand to include Iran?
Iran had a lot to gain but even more to lose
So far, the answer to the first question appears to be no.
The day after the Hamas attack, citing Hamas and Hezbollah sources, the Wall Street Journal reported that Iran not only gave Hamas the green light but in fact helped the terrorist group plan the operation. However, a few days later the New York Times reported that Tehran was actually surprised by the attack, citing US intelligence. Washington and Jerusalem, meanwhile, have denied having hard evidence of direct Iranian involvement in the Oct. 7 operation.
The strongest argument in favor of Iranian complicity is that Iran has backed Hamas for decades, supplying it with an estimated $70 million a year in funding along with weapons, training, and logistical aid. There’s no doubt that Hamas wouldn’t have been able to carry out an operation of this magnitude without Iranian military and financial support. It’s also likely that members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had a hand in training the terrorists who carried out the attacks. So it’s not like Iran had nothing to do with it.
However, as of now, there is no evidence tying Iran directly to this specific Hamas operation. Yes, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei celebrated Hamas’ success, but that was to be expected irrespective of direct Iranian involvement, and he unambiguously denied Iran’s participation. The Wall Street Journal report has been broadly disputed, with certain details — such as the alleged involvement of Iran’s foreign minister, who normally has no role in coordinating military operations with regional proxies and who is under close American and Israeli surveillance — casting doubt on its accuracy. By contrast, US intelligence showing that Iranian leaders were themselves caught off guard by the attack is credible.
While it’s true that Hamas’ capabilities rely on Iranian support, the group operates with a broad degree of autonomy and has its own agenda independent of (albeit usually aligned with) Tehran’s. In fact, plausible deniability is a design feature of the proxy relationship between Hamas and Iran, allowing the latter to pressure Israel without becoming involved.
To be sure, Tehran stands to benefit from the ensuing chaos in three ways. First, the attack will keep Israel distracted and focused on domestic security concerns, temporarily limiting its ability to project power regionally. Second, the attack has for now scuttled negotiations for a Saudi-Israeli normalization deal that would have included an implicit commitment to containing Iran. And third, the attack undermines Israel’s image as a military power, while the humanitarian toll of Israel’s devastating response in Gaza will turn global public opinion against the Jewish state.
But Tehran benefitting from the attacks is a far cry from Tehran orchestrating the attacks and risking a war with Israel — and, potentially, the US — at a time when the strategic environment was getting somewhat more constructive for them. Israel had been deterred by the US from attacking Iran, and Netanyahu was distracted by domestic politics. Commercial and diplomatic ties with Beijing and Moscow were booming. Oil exports were flowing again. They had just signed a China-brokered breakthrough agreement to restore full diplomatic relations with their longtime foe Saudi Arabia. They were even days away from receiving $6 billion in frozen funds as part of a prisoner exchange with the US amid a broader de-escalation effort over the past six months. None of these actions and developments implied a desire on the part of Iran to destabilize the region.
No one is interested in a bigger fight … for now
At this point, the likelihood that Iran gets directly involved in the war seems very, very low to me — at least in the near term.
Iran has much to gain from allowing events to play out while keeping its own involvement relatively limited given the risks of disrupting its broader foreign policy strategy, which includes normalization with the Gulf states and a de-escalatory understanding with the US. Case in point: Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi had his first direct call with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman on the back of the attack, where they both called for short-term containment and de-escalation.
Iranian officials did warn that a full ground offensive by Israel into Gaza could elicit a response from proxies like Hezbollah, the Houthis in Yemen, and other groups in Syria and Iraq, with Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani visiting Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq to coordinate among allies. But there are no major drills or troop movements going on among its own forces, so it does not seem like Iran is gearing up for a big fight beyond training or supplying its proxies.
Absent Iranian escalation or conclusive evidence of direct Iranian involvement in the Oct. 7 operation, neither Israel nor the US will take action to expand the crisis with an attack on Iran. Israel will be focused on containing the immediate security threat from Hamas and managing the offensive in Gaza, while the US will support Israel but push back in private against any move to broaden the conflict. (The Biden administration did announce on Oct. 12 that it had “re-frozen” the $6 billion in Iranian funds previously released following significant bipartisan political pressure to get tougher on Iran, but this move was intended for a domestic audience and does not signal more escalation to come.)
Both Israel and the US will remain reluctant to broaden the conflict while the crisis in Gaza is ongoing. If Israel does retaliate against Iran, it will likely do so through covert operations (e.g., sabotage, cyberwarfare, assassinations) at a time and place of its choosing. For its part, the US has limited options to escalate beyond slapping additional (largely symbolic) sanctions on Iranian officials short of clamping down on Iran’s oil exports, which would cause a spike in the price of oil (in turn raising US inflation) and provoke a strong response from Tehran and potentially Beijing (because China refines the bulk of Iranian crude). The risk of the conflict turning into a general war between Iran and Israel and/or the US is therefore low.
In the short term, the biggest risk of the conflict escalating comes not from Iran but from Hezbollah, the crown jewel of Iran’s proxy network. For now, the Lebanon-based group — already in a vulnerable domestic position as Lebanon’s economy remains weak and its public support has suffered — seems uninterested in opening a second front in the war beyond some symbolic strikes and skirmishes along the Israel-Lebanon border. But that could change if Hezbollah and Iran become concerned that Hamas will be completely wiped out.
And if Iran feared both its major proxies in the Levant were about to be destroyed … well, there’s no telling what they might do to avert that.
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It's been two years since Russia's invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022, and the war is still raging. GZERO looks back at the pivotal moments of the past 24 months.
The Latest:
Listen:
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Feb. 24, 2022: Russia launches “special military operation” in Ukraine
On Thursday, Feb. 24, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin launches a large-scale invasion of Ukraine, labeling it a "special military operation." The aim? The "demilitarization and denazification" of Ukraine, according to Putin, who warns of inevitable clashes between Russian and Ukrainian forces. Any bloodshed, he says, would be on Ukraine’s hands.
- Ian Bremmer: This is a turning point in the global order
- Russia-Ukraine crisis: What you need to know
Feb. 28, 2022: The ruble nosedives
Days after Russian troops invade eastern Ukraine, the country's currency plummets, shedding up to 30% of its value against the US dollar. This drastic decline follows allied sanctions, specifically targeting Russia’s central bank and major lenders. Such a sharp depreciation of the ruble has occurred only twice before: during the 1998 Russian financial crisis and again in late 2014.
March 2022: Putin = Common denominator
Putin Past the Point of No Return | Putin's Europe Problem | GZERO World with Ian Bremmer https://www.gzeromedia.com/gzero-world-with-ian-bremmer/putins-europe-problem
While NATO forces aren't directly engaged, the US and its allies support Ukraine through arms, financial aid, and stringent sanctions against Moscow. Vladimir Putin's approach, reminiscent of past-century warfare, falters in the modern era of global PR and social media dominance. The repercussions extend far beyond Ukraine, capturing the attention of countries like Finland, transitioning from neutrality to NATO hopeful. Former Finland PM Alexander Stubb, reflecting on Putin's stance and China's hesitance to fully support Russia, highlights the evolving geopolitical dynamics. On this award-winning episode of GZERO World, Ian Bremmer talks to Stubb, who once helped broker Russia's 2008 cease-fire with Georgia and believes Putin has backed himself into a corner but won't back down on Ukraine.
- Putin only understands power and force, says Finland’s former PM
- Civilians gear up: “This is not a suicide mission” – the Wolverines of Ukraine
April 2022: Russia retreats from Kyiv, Bucha massacre uncovered
Is Putin's war in Ukraine genocide? https://www.gzeromedia.com/by-ian-bremmer/is-putin-s-war-in-ukraine-genocide
As Ukrainian forces retake Kyiv and Russian troops begin retreating to eastern and southern Ukraine, gruesome images surface from Bucha, a Kyiv suburb, revealing that civilians – women, children, and elderly – lay dead in the streets. Ukrainian officials and independent sources share horrific accounts of rape, torture, and execution by Russian soldiers, and hundreds of victims are found in mass graves. Russia denies responsibility and instead points fingers at Ukraine.
- Is Putin's war in Ukraine a genocide?
- The price of Russian defeat
- Zelensky wants justice over Russian war crimes
- Russian military on the ropes
June 2022: Russia withdraws from Snake Island
Russia retreats from Snake Island, with the Kremlin calling it a "gesture of goodwill" to disprove the hindrance of Ukrainian food exports, but Ukrainians credit their missile strikes. The blockade disrupted Ukraine's monthly grain exports of five million metric tons, spiking global food prices and sparking famine fears in Africa. Zmiinyi Island, 22 miles off Ukraine's coast, offers strategic advantages, but its capture hindered Kyiv's defense of the southwestern coast and Odesa port. While a Ukrainian victory, naval weakness hampers food export resumption, underscoring Kremlin's Donbas focus.
August 2022: Fighting around Zaporizhzhia power plant raises fears
Ukrainian Nuclear Power Plant in Peril | US Energy Secretary Granholm | GZERO World https://www.gzeromedia.com/gzero-world-clips/us-en...
Artillery duels erupt at Europe’s largest nuclear power station in Zaporizhzhia, southern Ukraine, now under Russian occupation. Both sides accuse the other of instigating the conflict. The IAEA raises concerns over the potential for a nuclear catastrophe, as shelling severely damages radiation sensors near a spent fuel storage unit. President Volodymyr Zelensky condemns the situation as “Russian nuclear terror.”
Sept. 11, 2022: Ukraine pushes back, reclaims over a thousand square miles
On the 200th day of the war, the Ukrainian military achieves its most significant gains against Russia since the invasion began. President Volodymyr Zelensky declares the liberation of over 1,000 kilometers of territory, pledging to "de-occupy" completely.
Sept. 21, 2022: Russia calls up reservists
Russia calls up reservists https://www.gzeromedia.com/what-we-re-watching-iran-protests-spread-putin-mobilizes-ny-sues-trumps-china-faces-slow-growth
Vladimir Putin dramatically ups the ante and orders the partial mobilization of up to 300,000 reservists for the war in Ukraine. Ukrainian defiance persists, with Western leaders, including US President Joe Biden, reaffirming their commitment to pressure Putin's government and military. Meanwhile, Russia grapples with internal unrest, evident in protests and a surge of draft-age men fleeing the country. While Putin stops short of full mobilization, ongoing setbacks in the "special military operation" raise concerns about future escalations.
- The script for conscripts: Inside Putin’s (partial) mobilization
- QuickTake with Ian Bremmer: Putin cornered
- António Guterres: Ukraine war united NATO but further divided the world
Sept. 26, 2022: Who blew up Nord Stream?
Who blew up Nord Stream? Ian Bremmer
The controversial Nord Stream gas pipelines connecting Russia to Germany and Europe are sabotaged, leading to multiple investigations into whodunnit.
- Did someone blow up the Nord Stream pipelines?
- Another Baltic pipeline whodunnit
- Who blew up Nord Stream?
September 2022: Russia holds referenda in occupied parts of eastern Ukraine
Russian annexations https://www.gzeromedia.com/what-we-re-watching-russian-annexations-the-india-pakistan-us-tango
Putin’s sham referenda in four regions of Ukraine officially moves forward to annexations. Yet, with ongoing clashes, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson remain battlegrounds. Securing control amid Ukrainian resistance could provide Putin with a strategic land bridge from southeastern Ukraine to Crimea, annexed in 2014. While Russia holds Luhansk and Kherson, and portions of Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk, Ukrainian forces persist in gaining ground. The referenda offer Putin a pretext, framing Ukrainian/Western attacks as assaults on Russia. Amid a faltering war, Putin terms it an "anti-colonial movement." In response, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky seeks accelerated NATO accession.
Oct. 8, 2022: Kerch Bridge blast
Russia launches a series of airstrikes targeting major Ukrainian cities: Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, and even Lviv, previously deemed a haven. The attacks, hitting civilian areas during rush hour, inflict considerable damage to infrastructure, causing power outages and driving civilians into bomb shelters. While the death toll remains unconfirmed, casualties are expected to be substantial. This military escalation follows Saturday's explosion on the Crimea-Russia Kerch bridge, which Putin attributes to Ukrainian "terrorists." The strikes were ordered before Putin's National Security Council meeting, suggesting retaliation planning. Though the Kremlin has yet to comment officially, Putin ally Ramzan Kadyrov expresses satisfaction, advocating for reprisals against Ukrainian infrastructure.
- Putin lashes out after Crimea bridge blast
- Russian revenge vs. Ukrainian resolve
- Following Ukraine’s Crimea bridge attack, expect Putin to escalate "until he collapses"
January 2023: US and Germany offer tanks
Ukraine tanks up https://www.gzeromedia.com/ukraine-tanks-up
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announces Germany's decision to send Leopard 2 battle tanks to Ukraine, following pressure from NATO countries led by Poland. Berlin initially resisted, concerned about antagonizing Russia and awaiting US action on supplying Abrams tanks. Two tank battalions, totaling roughly 80 Leopard 2 tanks, will be deployed to Ukraine, with training for Ukrainian soldiers commencing in Germany. However, US tank shipments may not arrive until spring, as the Ukrainian military lacks Abrams operation knowledge and maintenance supply lines and faces fuel consumption concerns.
- Ukraine tanks up
- Ukraine's killer dune buggies
- Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant at risk of disaster, says top nuclear watchdog
- Putin’s war crimes solidify West’s military support for Ukraine
- Russian unpredictability & Finland's border threat
February 2023: Biden visits Kyiv
Biden’s visit to Ukraine signals US commitment, but war gets tougher | Quick Take | GZERO Media https://www.gzeromedia.com/quick-take/biden-visit-to-ukraine-signals-us-commitment-but-war-gets-tougher
President Biden makes a surprise trip to Kyiv, just before the first anniversary of Russia's invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24. It's significant as the first visit by an American president since Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and intervention in Southeast Ukraine. This underscores continued US commitment symbolically, boosts Ukrainian morale, and reassures NATO of America's unwavering prioritization of Ukraine, despite substantial aid and a year of conflict. The trip holds immense importance for diplomatic relations, emphasizing the enduring support for Ukraine amidst ongoing tensions with Russia.
June 8, 2023: Ukraine launches counteroffensive
Ukraine ups the ante https://www.gzeromedia.com/ukraine-ups-the-ante
The New York Times reports that Ukraine's nearly two-month-old counteroffensive is ramping up in the southeast, per two anonymous Pentagon officials. Thousands of previously held-back reserves are now deploying to the front lines. Both Ukrainian and Russian reports corroborate this escalation. Whether Ukraine gains strategic ground or not marks a pivotal juncture in the war.
June 24, 2023: Prigozhin stages mutiny
Russia’s aborted coup, explained https://www.gzeromedia.com/by-ian-bremmer/russias-aborted-coup-explained
Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin stages a failed mutiny against Vladimir Putin. Ian Bremmer predicts the move will be the beginning of the end of Prigozhin. According to Bremmer, Prigozhin, in the lead-up to his mutiny, had become increasingly erratic, indicative of his declining political influence. What's more, he directed fury at Russia’s Ministry of Defense, accusing them of sending thousands of soldiers to their deaths due to corruption, incompetence, and cowardice.
- Russia’s aborted coup, explained
- Former Russian intelligence officer: Prigozhin's threat to Putin is “ludicrous”
July 2023: Russia’s exit from the Black Sea Grain Deal
Russia's exit from Black Sea grain deal will drive up food prices | Europe In: 60 https://www.gzeromedia.com/in-60-seconds/europe/russias-exit-from-black-sea-grain-deal-will-drive-up-food-prices
Russia announces its exit from the Black Sea grain deal, a move GZERO's Europe In :60 host and former Sweden PM Carl Bildt predicts would have severe consequences on global food prices. Continuous attacks on grain terminals near the Ukrainian-Romanian border aggravate the situation. Meanwhile, the progress of the Ukrainian counteroffensive slows down due to extensive Russian fortifications and mines. The Ukrainian army, largely composed of mobilized individuals with limited training, faces significant challenges.
Aug. 23, 2023: Prigozhin dies in plane crash
Wagner's Prigozhin dies https://www.gzeromedia.com/wagners-prigozhin-presu...
Russian state media reports a private aircraft crash outside Moscow, killing all 10 aboard, including Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Wagner Group warlord behind a failed mutiny against the Kremlin in June.
September 2023: Peace in Ukraine is world's priority, says UN chief António Guterres
November 2023: US govt avoids shutdown, cuts Ukraine funding
Shutdown averted, but deal contains no aid for Ukraine https://www.gzeromedia.com/gzero-north/shutdown-averted-but-deal-contains-no-aid-for-ukraine
Ukraine's funding struggle continues as a divided US House finally reached an agreement to avoid a government shutdown but notably did not include military aid for either Ukraine or Israel. Democrats had tried to lump aid for Israel - which received bipartisan support - together with that of Ukraine, which faced resistance from Republicans. The decision is a significant blow to Ukraine, whose somewhat successful resistance against the Russian offensive relied heavily on US funding. What's more, their hopes of getting assistance from the EU face threats from Hungary's Prime Minister Viktor Orbán—an ally of Vladimir Putin.
February 2024: Russia recaptures Avdiivka
Pro-Russia blogger commits suicide, Russia recaptures Avdiivka https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/hard-numbers/hard-numbers-pro-russia-blogger-commits-suicide-uk-nuclear-missile-test-fails-biden-slashes-student-debt-iran-gives-russia-missiles
In mid-February 2024, Russian forces in Ukraine scored their first major victory in months, taking the strategic town of Avdiivka. A pro-Russian blogger who reported that 16,000 Russian troops had died in the effort faced a huge backlash and committed suicide.
Ian Bremmer, president and founder of Eurasia Group and GZERO Media, delivered his landmark State of the World speech at the annual GZERO Summit Japan in Tokyo, hosted by Eurasia Group, the world’s leading geopolitical risk firm. In the speech, streamed live on GZERO’s website and on social media, Ian presented his vision for where the world is headed in 2024 and outlined the major themes and forces shaping the geopolitical landscape.
Watch the full speech in the video above and read his full remarks below.
State of World Summit speech 2023
At last year’s summit, I warned that our G-zero world, the lack of leadership in today’s international order and the geopolitical conflict that grows as a consequence, was gathering speed. That acceleration is only increasing today while international cooperation – multinational institutions, the alliances, the global supply chains that we all rely on – are losing their ability to absorb shock.
Today, when we speak of war, I have to specify which war we’re talking about. Is it the war that is remaking the security architecture of Europe? Or is it the war that is destabilizing the Middle East, and threatening global religious conflict? Or is it the war that the Americans are fighting among themselves? I have to be clear. We don’t want that.
Also, serious doubts have emerged about the economic well-being of China, the nation that along with the United States has done most in recent decades to power our global economy. Just how problematic is China’s post-pandemic recovery, and how are the anxieties in China from that weakness changing their already assertive foreign policy?
Serious doubts have emerged about the political well-being of the United States. People no longer look surprised when I warn that the world’s most powerful country has become the most politically divided and dysfunctional democracy of all the G7,though the United Kingdom is still competitive. For the US, 2024 is like Voldemort, it’s the year that we really don’t want to talk about. But it’s coming.
I’ll open this morning with these urgent challenges for the coming year and the unprecedented—in my lifetime at least—dangerous state of global politics.
All that said… there’s more good news than you’d expect. We just have to look for it. Opportunities created by new international players and by new technologies. They all deserve our attention. And I’ll get there.
But first, let’s start with crisis. And let’s start with the Middle East.
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Israel vs. Hamas
When we talk about Israelis and Palestinians, we have to decide how deep in the earth we want to dig to expose the conflict’s roots.
Since we’re talking about 2024, I’ll resist going back decades and centuries.
I will start with the terrorist attacks of October 7 and the now two-month war that has followed and is expanding, without guardrails. They come from two central realities. You will rarely hear people talking about both of them, they usually mention one…
One, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu knows he can’t remain Israel’s prime minister without active support from political parties who believe God intends for Israel’s Jews to live on land still settled by and legally claimed by Palestinians. He has governed his country accordingly.
Two, a total failure of leadership on the Palestinian side, aided by the Arab world more broadly and most every international actor engaged in the Middle East conflict, has allowed Hamas – a terrorist organization – to act on behalf of the Palestinian men, women, and children that they use as human shields.
Hamas is responsible for the murder of 1,200 Israeli citizens, more than 90 percent of them civilians. In response, Netanyahu’s government feels entitled to eradicate Hamas… with little regard for the more than 2.3 million Palestinians who can’t escape the line of fire.
Israeli Defense Forces are today fighting across the entirety of Gaza, and the killing continues.
The United States government has at least little leverage over Israel – they are the most important ally of the US in the Middle East – though, given political challenges at home, less than many would think, to influence the conduct of the war and the scale of its carnage. The Biden administration, working with Qatar and the United Nations, has helped finally bring humanitarian aid to the Palestinians as well as securing the release of some, though not many, Israeli hostages and the Palestinians in Israeli custody have also been released.
The US has also pressed Israel to minimize civilian deaths as it works to destroy Hamas. But for most of the world, these moves are too little too late, and the United States government today finds itself nearly alone in supporting the continued war. It’s shocking to say, the US today is as isolated on this issue globally as Russia was when Putin invaded Ukraine two years ago.
President Biden has had more success, at least so far, in avoiding a massive expansion of the war beyond the borders of Israel and Gaza. That work will become more difficult as the next phase of the war in Gaza advances and as we have just seen, the Houthis in Yemen are expanding their attacks on American military vessels and commercials transit.
The US officials know that Iran has leverage too… in its material and moral support for Houthi fighters in Yemen, for Hamas, for Hezbollah in Lebanon, for militant groups in Iraq and Syria. Iran is funding, training, and arming these forces. It isn’t directly ordering these attacks but it certainly appears happy to see them. And when it comes to Israel, there are no differences of opinion between Iran and these terrorist groups—none of them recognize the right of Israel to exist.
Under no circumstances will President Biden renounce the US alliance with Israel–but Israel has permanently lost some of its traditional support inside the United States. American public opinion has shifted with the nation’s demographics. Younger voters increasingly supporting Palestinian position. More Americans are publicly questioning its continuing occupation of the West Bank and even Israel’s basic commitment to democracy. These concerns will grow.
This morning, we are not close to any resolution of this war or of the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Indeed, for now the war is set to further escalate.
Russia vs Ukraine
Then there’s the Russia-Ukraine war that no one asks me about anymore. Have to say I’m a little annoyed about that—I wrote my dissertation on Russians in Ukraine back in 1994. So, you’ll all have to humor me.
At last year’s summit, I noted that Russia controlled about 20 percent of Ukraine’s territory, and that Ukrainian forces were unlikely ever to evict Russian fighters fully. Today, twelve months later, very little has changed—that which has, has been negative. Again, a conflict that, for now, does not have guardrails.
In the past year, Vladimir Putin followed through on threats to exit a deal, agreed with the United Nations, that allowed Ukraine to export grain through the Black Sea. He also formally annexed some of this occupied land into the Russian Federation, though almost nobody in the world actually recognizes it.
Ukraine’s counteroffensive has moved the front line less than 25 kilometers since the operation began this past summer—and with Ukraine’s installation of defensive fortifications, it’s safe to say the counteroffensive is over.
While in Russia, a sudden failed mutiny aside—I’ll say the name Prighozin, only because we’ll never have to mention it again—Putin’s strategic position has improved over the past year—and especially over the last two months.
New questions have emerged about the staying power of Ukraine’s main backers in America and Europe. In the US, in particular, the Kremlin is encouraged that Republicans increasingly do not want to spend money on Ukraine, and that’s particularly true when Trump gets the nomination, and when the Republican party gets behind him. Zelensky, not Putin, now faces increased pressure to move toward a negotiated settlement.
Putin’s international standing is now less isolated. The Gaza war has helped Moscow argue that Americans are hypocritical neocolonialists who care more about power than about the lives of innocent people. This message plays very well across the Global South. It also threatens to create divisions in the transatlantic alliance, which rallied so effectively in the early stages of the war.
In recent weeks, Russia has expanded missile strikes across Ukraine to the highest levels we’ve seen this year. Higher oil prices have helped boost Russia’s domestic production of missiles to greater levels than before the war started. North Korea is helping supply more of both, which China is not happy about, and Iran continues to provide drone aircraft on the ground in Russia. An additional troop mobilization in 2024 (that Ukraine will struggle to match) might even help Russia take more territory.
In Europe, support for Ukrainian refugees remains high, but countries now have much less capacity to absorb refugees or pay for financial help for the war effort. That means that Europe is becoming less certain for its economic support for Ukraine just as the United States is becoming less certain in its military support for Ukraine. And if Donald Trump is again elected president of the United States next November, right now a coin flip, Putin’s hopes for success in Ukraine will grow greater.
We know what the outcome is. Partition. Ukraine can’t get their land back. Nobody is going to formally announce that, of course. It’s unacceptable to the United States, Europe, and most of all the Ukrainians. But we live with lots of things that are unacceptable—a North Korean nuclear arsenal, Assad in power in Syria, the end of democracy in Venezuela. The critical question in the coming months is can the US and Europe provide enough security and economic guarantees that they can continue to plausibly be aligned with each other, with Zelensky and the Ukrainian government, creating a European and a NATO future for the majority of Ukraine that they still have control over.
I want to be clear, none of this will resolve the war. Ukraine risks losing, but Russia doesn’t “win.”
Whatever longer-term gains Russia’s forces can make on the ground in Ukraine, NATO is expanding. This month, the EU will open a process for Union membership for Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, also an option that wasn’t on the table before Putin ordered his invasion.
Russia has faced 11 rounds of sanctions from the European with more coming. Half of its sovereign assets have been frozen. Europe will not buy Russia’s commodity exports, which must still be sold to China, India, and others at discounted prices. Moscow will be left much more deeply dependent on China. All this damage for pieces of eastern and southern Ukraine that will take years to consolidate.
It leaves us with a bigger problem. Russia remains on the road to permanent rogue state status. Seriously in decline and seriously angry at the West. The first time that’s ever been true of a G20 economy...never mind one with 6,000 nuclear weapons. We won’t be talking as much about Ukraine in another year, I’ll have to get over it. But I fear we’re going to be talking a lot more about Russia.
China’s challenges
Now we turn to China. The economic situation in China is very serious and it’s very easy to explain: The “China Growth Engine” no longer works the way it used to. The 40 years of economic expansion are over.
Youth unemployment stands at record highs. Manufacturing activity is contracting. The property sector, making up a fifth of the economy (not to mention 2/3 of China’s household wealth and about 40% of the collateral held by its banks), is in serious trouble. Exports have declined on the back of inflation and historically high interest rates in the US and Europe. Foreign investment has turned negative for the first time since we’ve recorded the data.
Property prices are declining, household wealth is contracting, and borrowers are no longer willing to underwrite property construction. That triggers a wave of defaults from developers and lenders. Revenues for local governments are drying up even as their debt servicing costs rise. Domestic demand is stagnant, slowing growth further. China’s government has responded with limited stimulus, but large-scale bailouts are off the table for now.
Headline growth may well come in at 5 percent this year, but the economy faces deflation created by persistently weak consumer spending, slowing private investment, overcapacity and mounting financial stress. Next year’s growth target might be high, but the leadership is right to focus more on the quality of the growth than its absolute level. The IMF now expects the Chinese economy to grow under 4% a year for the coming years; absent reform it could go lower. Unfavorable demographics, chronically high debt, and intensifying geopolitical competition with the United States and its allies have made a bad situation worse.
The Chinese people are worrying if the next generation will be better off than the present one for the first time since the 1980s. The increasingly centralized, opaque, and capricious nature of Chinese policymaking – and a series of disruptive domestic policies – tech crackdowns, the zero-COVID lockdowns and abrupt exit from them, and raids on foreign firms – has undermined confidence.
The positive story is that China remains a highly competitive economy, with advantages in manufacturing, renewable energy, and electric vehicles as well as leading-edge innovation in frontier industries like advanced computing, AI, and biotechnology. It has an educated workforce, increasingly world class infrastructure, and an innovation ecosystem that is a major source of strength.
China is also politically stable. Which allows President Xi to avoid the temptation to revert to debt-fueled growth if he chooses. Only a systemic financial contagion or mass protests, neither of which looks likely in 2024, could force his hand. Instead, he will simply add stimulus at the margins and call on China’s people to persevere.
The risk is that the wrong policy choices could leave China’s economy in a scenario of prolonged deflation, stagnant growth, and high indebtedness Japan faced in the 1990s, but at a much lower level of development.
A silver lining: All of this has fostered the charm offensive we’ve witnessed in past months is likely to remain strong...even if it’s only a “tactical” retreat, because China’s economic problems aren’t going to be resolved anytime soon. The question is how much the Smile Diplomacy can accomplish, and where a “thaw” opens up short term opportunity for both governments and businesses.
The fentanyl deal is one of the biggest positive stories that we’ve seen between the US and China in decades. We had a very productive meeting between Xi and Biden at the APEC Summit, and the Chinese officials are hopeful that this momentum will continue. So, unlike the conflicts that I just talked about in the Middle East and between Russia and Ukraine, the US-China relationship has interdependence and does have guardrails. In the environment of great instability, that is meaningful for the world.
The two countries are still continuing down the path toward a technology cold war, with Americans using export controls to limit China’s development of world-class semiconductors and artificial intelligence, while the Chinese use critical minerals and green tech for much the same purpose.
But the Biden-Xi meeting, and the months of careful diplomacy that led up to it, reminds that the governments of both countries are geopolitical adults. Both prefer stability to chaos. Each has tried to contain the damage from international emergencies.
So, while the United States and China have very different views of the war in Ukraine and Israel’s war with Hamas, both Washington and Beijing have carefully avoided action that might expand the fighting’s fallout. Especially with the economic challenges I’ve described, Beijing remains geopolitically risk averse. China’s approach to the rest of the world is still driven mainly by economic, not political, or ideological, incentives.
The exception is in areas Beijing considers to be within China’s sphere of influence, most critically in Taiwan. Voters on the island will elect a new president in January. If they choose William Lai, the candidate Beijing warns will harm cross-Strait relations—and that looks more likely than not--tensions will rise between China, Taiwan, their neighbors, and the United States. But no matter the outcome, China is in no position to start a destructive and unpredictable war in a time of economic anxiety. Overall, 2024 looks comparatively benign for the US-China relationship (yes, in part, because lots of other things look worse).
America’s political dysfunction
Even though the economy is doing well in the US, the system is in crisis.
How dysfunctional is it?
Earlier this year, personal rivalries among Republican lawmakers left the US House of Representatives without a leader – and, therefore unable to pass legislation – for the longest period in 160 years. The last time divisions within the House stopped business in this way, the main issue dividing them was the legal status of slavery.
Now we face the 2024 presidential election. I can’t avoid it, much as I’d like to. We’re on track for a rematch: President Joe Biden vs former president Donald Trump.
Polls paint a bleak picture: just 37% of Americans approve of Biden’s performance as president. About 65% of voters don’t want him to be president again. More than 70% of likely voters say the 81-year-old Biden is too old for the job.
On the other side, there is the twice-impeached, twice-acquitted Trump. Let’s review the record.
After he was defeated for re-election in 2020, Trump refused to concede his loss, created a plan to remain in power that has now landed him in court, and incited a violent insurrection to stop the formal certification of Biden’s victory.
He has been indicted in four separate criminal cases and, unless he’s elected next year, faces prison. In a civil case, a jury found charges that Trump had raped a woman in the mid 1990s to be “substantially true.”
Just 38% of Americans approve of his four years as president, 60% don’t want him back in the White House. And he now leads all other Republican 2024 presidential candidates by more than 30 points.
Can Trump be president again? Absolutely. If the election were held today, Trump would win. The outcome now looks like a coin toss.
Biden does have one important advantage: There has never in American history been an election in which the challenger’s reputation matters at least as much as the incumbent president’s. And that will make this race unusually – perhaps uniquely – difficult to forecast.
For now, we can say that an economic slowdown in 2024, further age-related decline for Biden, deeper fractures over Israel among Democrats, or early court victories for Trump would further reduce Biden’s chances.
But a US economy that avoids recession, clearer signs of age-related decline for Trump, policy overreach (especially on abortion) from congressional Republicans, or an early criminal conviction in one of Trump’s several trials would tip the scales further in Biden’s favor.
In the meantime, other governments – allies and rivals of the United States – are already calculating the opportunities, costs, and risks that US elections might create for them. In Beijing, in Tel Aviv, in Brussels, and here in Tokyo, policymakers must reckon with an unprecedentedly uncertain US election outcome that will impact the global role of the world’s most powerful country.
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As we turn to 2024, there are also positive emerging stories that deserve much more attention than they receive, trends that promise both more stability in geopolitics.
India
I’ll start with India.
For all its many shortcomings, India is a politically stable democracy, and the stall of China’s growth has made India’s historic economic expansion that much more important for the global economy. But this isn’t India’s most important contribution to the world in 2024.
Instead, I’m highlighting India today because of its emerging role as crucial bridge between the Global South on one side and the United States, Japan, and Europe on the other. It’s hard to overstate the geopolitical importance of this leadership role for Delhi.
Today, much of the developing world feels ever more alienated by the role the United States and advanced industrial economies more broadly play in international politics and the global economy.
The pandemic, climate change, Russia-Ukraine, the Middle East. They endured all the challenges, they see that the industrialized countries do not pay attention to them; they see how much the Western powers care about Ukrainian refugees and how little they care about people in other parts of the world.
But when India, the biggest, strongest economy in the developing world, a country whose independence of thought and action is not in question, works to strengthen its relations with the United States and its G7 allies, that’s a strong recommendation for pragmatic relations with the West.
India’s role as bridge makes existing global architecture both more stable and more inclusive. It helps prevent a China-led and still-expanding BRICS partnership from becoming a geopolitical counterweight to the G7.
Further, India is one of the very few countries in the world—certainly the largest—where the implications of the 2024 US election don’t particularly matter. Modi has proven he can get along with both Biden and Trump.
Will India’s current foreign-policy direction outlive Modi and the growing pains it will surely face? We can’t yet say. But for 2024 and the foreseeable future, the world has picked up surprising geopolitical resilience from India’s new role.
Europe
Next up, the European Union.
No question, Europe faces strong economic challenges in 2024, not to mention the rise of populism in countries across the continent, low economic growth.
But a series of crises over the past decade—the pandemic, climate change, the Russian invasion and Brexit—has solidified the multinational political commitment to the world’s most ambitious experiment in supranational governance—the European Union is strengthening as an institution.
The EU now has a more centralized authority over fiscal and economic challenges, climate and energy policy, data policy, health policy, and other critical aspects of state governance.
A stronger EU leaves euro-skeptics in France, Italy, and other EU states groping for new political arguments. Italy’s prime minister Georgia Meloni has moderated her country’s budget-busting economic populism. Voters in Poland have pushed out their country’s Brussels-defying illiberal government. Fist-shakers like Hungary’s Viktor Orban are left without leverage to extort concessions from EU institutions.
And though populists have scored recent gains in the Netherlands, Slovakia, and Germany, none of this has undermined the strength of the European Union—and they won’t matter to EU elections next year.
There is still plenty of anger directed at Brussels bureaucrats and much resistance to more centralized EU decision-making. But as we enter 2024, the European Union’s social contract has never been stronger, more resilient, and more necessary.
Mexico
There’s Mexico. Like India and the EU, Mexico will hold elections in 2024, but here a term-limited leader must step aside.
Mexico is an increasingly dynamic economy that is strongly integrated into the new US-Mexico-Canada agreement and a lead beneficiary of a growing trend of nearshoring of investment and production. It helps, of course, to be lead trade partner of the world’s largest economy, but the country’s political predictability is helping it capture more benefits from that relationship.
Likely incoming president Claudia Sheinbaum has the backing of enormously popular outgoing leader Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, but she’s also a committed technocrat and former climate scientist with strong relations with the business community built through her work as mayor of Mexico City. In a country with one of the largest and most talented bureaucratic classes in the developing world, it’s hard to overstate the value of those connections.
Just as India can bridge Global South and the G7, Sheinbaum can create better opportunities for new links between North, Central, and South America—the most geopolitically stable region of the world (something that increasingly matters when you’ve got wars raging and defense spending skyrocketing most everywhere else).
This push for greater hemispheric integration in the world’s most stable region will be important for years to come. The domestic and regional politics won’t favor a new multilateral trade deal for the foreseeable future, but we’re liable to see something stronger and more durable here than the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, because the public-private partnerships can help create something increasingly close to a regional US-led Belt and Road-style project for the Americas. It will be bolstered by new tech and energy investments and alignment, with support from the World Bank.
The Divided States of America
And while we’re in the Western hemisphere, I’m glad to have some good news to report on political culture in the United States.
Not about Washington, to be sure.
But… though Americans hold their national political institutions in historically low regard, that’s not true at the local level. In fact, the decentralization of US politics has allowed for a free market of political strategies driving some of the most remarkable growth and human capital attraction in the developed world.
Among so-called blue states, those that favor Democrats, the Bay Area in Northern California, home to Silicon Valley, leads the way in global artificial intelligence development. That, in turn, has led a startling economic turnaround in San Francisco, a city long home to one of the country’s worst examples of wealth inequality and urban blight.
The greater New York City area is arguably the world’s most global metroplex for its availability of capital and its power to attract diverse top-level talent. It also remains the epicenter of global finance.
Among red states, those that support Republicans, Texas has not only rebounded to hit record levels of fossil fuel production, but has also seen genuinely explosive growth in post-carbon energy production and supply chains. This state now leads the country in both.
And south Florida’s ability to attract and drive finance, banking, and tech has powered one of the most remarkable surges in inbound investment growth in the country.
It’s important to remember the economic scale here. Florida’s economy is larger than Turkey’s. New York’s economy is larger than South Korea’s. Texas’ economy is the same size as Italy’s. California’s economy is larger than Britain’s.
Blue and red states represent radically different growth models, but the decentralization of political and economic power nationally allows the United States to become a laboratory of competing geopolitical and socioeconomic experiments on the scale of major industrialized countries.
Add record levels of federal infrastructure investment, the impact of industrial policy from the Biden administration, and US job creation through the pandemic, and there’s good reason to believe the United States will have plenty of growth despite the increasingly alarming dysfunction in the nation’s capital.
Japan
You’ll note Japan isn’t on this list.
I’ve honestly been surprised at how low Prime Minister Kishida’s popularity is here right now, given how well he’s respected in government and among the business community in the United States. We need more of Japan – in my speech and in the world.
A lot of people in the United States criticize the United Nations. I think it’s because we’re a little ashamed that when we look at the UN, we see that the US doesn’t reflect a lot of the values that we built in 1945.
Japan reflects those values. It reflects those values today as the largest, most powerful country in the world that reflect the values that the Americans stood for so proudly at the end of WWII: rule of law, transparency, multilateralism, the desire to consider wellbeing of 8 billion on the planet, not just a small number of citizens that we connect with every day on social media.
I can’t say how important that is. It makes me very proud to have started our GZERO Summits here in Tokyo. We’ve worked here for a long time with so many of you, as partners and friends, and we’re not going anywhere, we’re here to stay.
On that note, I want to thank you all for listening, for joining us, and I think we will have a very exciting day.
Thank you very much!
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Four days ago, on Oct. 7, Hamas, the Islamic fundamentalist group that has controlled the Gaza Strip since 2006, launched a surprise invasion of Israel by land, sea, and air, killing over 1,300 Israelis, injuring over 3,000, and taking more than 150 to Gaza as hostages. This was the most significant attack on Jews worldwide since the Holocaust.
For the first time, Hamas managed to attack deep into Israeli territory, overrunning two military bases and terrorizing countless towns and neighborhoods. For a country of under 10 million, the 1,300 killed are the equivalent of over 45,000 in the United States, dwarfing 9/11’s toll. Unlike in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, civilians rather than soldiers accounted for nearly all Israeli deaths.
The trauma is only made worse by the shock that millions of Israelis feel after the worst intelligence and security failure since 1973, when Egypt and Syria simultaneously invaded Israel from the Suez Canal in the south and the Golan Heights in the north without warning. Israel’s national security apparatus, laser-focused on threats to the homeland particularly from Palestinians in the occupied territories, had since come to be seen as the gold standard on surveillance, intelligence, and border security. No one remotely thought something like this could happen there in 2023. Much like America’s before 9/11, Israel’s weakness was to a large extent a failure of imagination. This failure is all the more surprising given the history of the Jewish people, who have been under nearly continuous existential threat since biblical times.
While Israeli society’s fragile sense of security has been shattered, the one solace is that unlike in 1973, Israel’s existence is not threatened today. Yes, Hamas has proven more formidable than anyone thought possible, but it is still a militia, and the IDF is one of the most advanced militaries in the world. Although this will be of no comfort to the families of the hundreds of Israelis already killed and kidnapped, or to those who will be caught in the crossfire from this point onward, Israel’s overwhelming military superiority over its enemies guarantees that it will live to see another day.
Why Hamas attacked now – and why Israel was taken by surprise
There are two big questions to unpack here: why Hamas chose this moment to start a suicidal war that Palestinians will pay dearly for, and why Israel was caught off guard by it.
The answer to the first question is that as carefully planned and deliberately executed as Hamas’ terrorist operation was, the decision to carry it out was a desperate one, driven by an increasingly untenable environment – considerably of Hamas’ own making – that had left the group in a no-win situation.
The Gazan economy was terrible and getting worse. Israeli settlements in the West Bank were expanding. Geopolitics were turning against Palestinians, and even the Arab world had largely moved on from their plight. While Hamas continued to deny Israel’s right to exist and refused to moderate, Israel was in the strongest diplomatic position it’d been in decades, having normalized relations with the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco and being on the verge of doing the same with Saudi Arabia. Well served by the status quo, the Israeli population no longer felt any urgency to engage with the Palestinians. In short, Hamas was fast becoming irrelevant and took a desperate gamble to change that, their own lives and the Palestinian people’s be damned.
To be clear, none of the above remotely justifies Hamas’ murderous actions, which are unjustifiable. Nor do I seek to explain the inexplicable. After all, Hamas has always been committed to the destruction of Israel; its foundational documents state those goals explicitly, and their statements and actions to date have been consistent with that agenda. All I’m trying to explain is the strategic logic behind this attack: why they chose to launch an operation of this nature at this particular moment in time.
A separate question is how could Israel let something like this happen to them? The answer is that they got complacent and distracted.
The country’s political and military leaders were lulled into thinking Hamas had been successfully deterred from attacking Israel by “the consequences of further defiance.” Instead of looking for confrontation, they believed Hamas was focused on governance. Sure, there’d be periodic outbreaks of violence, but Israel could always rely on the Iron Dome missile defense system to suppress rocket fire; on border security measures to prevent raids; on targeted assassinations and air strikes (euphemistically referred to as “mowing the grass”) to prevent escalations from spiraling.
Successive Israeli governments got addicted to this relatively quiet status quo, which allowed them to ignore the need for diplomacy. Going back further, Israel’s strategy of avoiding a negotiated solution to the long-running occupation – a solution that would require politically costly concessions – by strengthening the irredentist Hamas and weakening the more moderate Fatah backfired spectacularly last Saturday.
The current Israeli government bears especially great responsibility for the debacle, having taken its eye off the ball due to two domestic preoccupations of its own making.
First, Israel’s domestic political crisis, caused by Netanyahu’s insistence on a controversial judicial reform despite unprecedented mass opposition, had an impact on Israel’s national security readiness. The government ignored and even ridiculed repeated warnings from the IDF that the far-right coalition’s polarizing assault on institutions was eroding social cohesion, fueling public distrust in the government, and undermining the military’s readiness.
Second, the coalition’s hardline annexation policies and coddling of Jewish extremists fueled settler violence against Palestinians in the West Bank (which in turn provoked Palestinian retaliation) and led the government to deploy most of the regular IDF forces to that sector. As recently as last week, the IDF transferred three battalions from Gaza to the West Bank to reinforce the troops there over the Sukkot holiday weekend. This left the Gaza border lightly guarded, creating favorable operational conditions for Hamas to pull off its attack.
What’s next
Hamas is holding more than 150 Israelis hostage and threatening to execute them. As if that wasn’t evil enough, Hamas is also holding far larger numbers of Palestinians hostage.
Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s immediate declaration of war will mean unrestrained air strikes against Hamas targets in Gaza (population 2.3 million). Given the gruesome nature of the Hamas attack, a ground invasion of the Strip seems inevitable to neutralize the threat posed by the group once and for all. That means Israel will probably have to occupy the densely populated territory until all Hamas leadership has been removed, their operational capabilities dismantled, and their militants disarmed. Such an operation would take months to complete and inflict high casualties on both sides, with no guarantee of success.
Throughout, Hamas will continue to use Palestinian civilians (as well as Israeli hostages) as human shields to maximize the casualties of Israeli retaliation and turn public opinion against Israel. With no way to escape, tens of thousands of people, most of them innocent civilians, will be killed or wounded. Those who are lucky will face unfathomable deprivation under Israel’s and Egypt’s blockade, which will prevent them from getting access to food, fuel, electricity, water, and goods.
In turn, Israel’s response and the ensuing humanitarian disaster will provoke an outcry across the region and the “global South” more broadly. The “Arab street” (aka public opinion in the Arab world) will erupt in fury at the cautious response of their own governments. Violence against Jews will spike around the world. The Saudi Arabia-Israel normalization, which was months away from a breakthrough agreement, will remain off the table.
Domestically, though, Israel will be politically unified to a degree we haven’t seen in decades. Earlier today, Netanyahu agreed to form an emergency unity government with centrist opposition leader and former defense minister Benny Gantz. All of the anger over Netanyahu’s hyper-polarizing judicial reform will be suspended until the security situation is brought under control. Make no mistake: Israeli domestic political polarization will return, and demand for a reckoning for the spectacular failures that led to this debacle will play out for years to come. No matter how hard he tries to shift the burden of blame to the IDF or the protest movement, the self-proclaimed Mr. Security owns this crisis. Just like Golda Meir and her Mapai party after the Yom Kippur War, Netanyahu and the far right will pay a political price for it. But as long as shock and fear continue to grip the country, Israel will shrug off internal division and external criticism and remain as unified as any country in the world.
For now, outsiders, including the Biden administration, will work hard to keep this conflict contained within Israel’s borders. Iran, Hamas’ crucial patron and arms supplier, has celebrated the attack with criminal glee, but it has been careful not to accept any direct responsibility for orchestrating it, which would trigger massive retaliation from Israel. All eyes are now on Hezbollah, the much more capable Iranian proxy to Israel’s north in Lebanon, to be sure they don’t try to open a second front in the conflict. So far, they have been careful not to involve themselves in the fighting beyond limited strikes against an Israeli military outpost, but it’s too early to tell whether this will remain the case. Should the war expand, the consequences could be far-reaching and catastrophic.
This wildfire is raging, and it will take tremendous international effort to put it out. Many innocent people on both sides will find themselves trapped inside the inferno. This war is a tragedy that no one will bring under control for some time to come.
It’s now been exactly two weeks since Hamas militants broke out of the Gaza Strip on Oct. 7 and went on a murderous rampage in southern Israel, killing more than 1,300 Israelis, most of them civilians, and kidnapping more than 200.
Israel’s resulting siege of Gaza and ongoing airstrikes have killed at least 3,000 people, including hundreds of children, and wounded thousands more. Nearly a quarter of Gaza’s two million people have fled their homes in the densely packed enclave, and the UN warns of a desperate humanitarian crisis there.
Now the conflict is set to get worse. Israel is preparing a massive ground invasion of the Gaza Strip, which could begin at any moment. The stated aim is to remove Hamas from power, but experts say this will entail gruesome urban combat, and it’s not clear what Israel’s political strategy for Gaza will be afterward. Israel's Defense Minister on Friday suggested it would be to renounce any "responsibility for life" in a post-war Gaza. With views on both sides of the Israel-Palestine now hardened into a new “holy war” (see our viewpoint on that here), it is hard to imagine any path to peace in the near future.
At the same time, the war has shattered the notion – increasingly taken for granted by Israeli and Arab leaders alike in recent years – that the Palestinian issue could simply be contained and forgotten. As recent mass protests have shown, Arab capitals must reckon again with popular anger about Palestinian suffering in a way that they have not had to for many years. There is no more talk, for example, of that Saudi-Israel normalization deal.
Now, as the conflict moves to a different phase, here are a few things to keep an eye on:
Will it become a regional war? Despite cheering on their Hamas protégés, Iran has shown no interest in entering the war, as Ian Bremmer pointed out this week. Israel and the US, meanwhile, have downplayed Iran’s involvement in the Oct. 7 attacks as well. That’s all good. But Iran’s proxies are a different story.
Israeli forces in the north have already had limited clashes with Hezbollah, the powerful Iran-backed Lebanese militant group that is also part of the Lebanese government. And on Thursday, Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen reportedly launched several missiles toward Israel.
For now, watch Hezbollah. It has signaled solidarity with Hamas and warned of an “earthquake” if Israel invades Gaza. But the group also has to tread carefully: Lebanon is already wracked by economic crisis, and a full-scale war with Israel could inflict even deeper pain – especially since the US now has two carrier groups bobbing off the Israeli coast, ready to intervene if the fighting spreads. For a look at how people in the Lebanese capital of Beirut are feeling, see our special report here.
Families of Israelis held hostage by Hamas militants in Gaza set a Shabbat table with more than 200 empty seats for them at the "Hostages Square" outside the Art Museum of Tel Aviv, on Oct. 20, 2023. Gili Yaari/NurPhoto
Watch the occupied West Bank too. Violence between Israel and Palestinians was already at multi-year highs even before the Hamas rampage. Since then, protests have spread, and clashes have intensified: Settlers have opened fire on civilians, while Israel launched airstrikes on a refugee camp that it said was home to militants. More than 70 Palestinians have been killed, and hundreds have been arrested over the past two weeks. Aging Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas – who governs the West Bank – is struggling to master the situation, and the threat of a new intifada (mass uprising) is real.
The US role. President Joe Biden – who made at least half a trip to the region this week – has signaled strong moral, military, and financial solidarity with Israel, while also demanding humanitarian relief for Gaza. A deal to get aid in via Egypt was close on Friday, but Israel was seeking further assurances that any aid trucks wouldn’t include fuel or smuggled weapons for Hamas.
Biden returned home to deliver a prime-time foreign policy speech, framing Ukraine and Israel as part of the same US-led fight against “terrorism” and “dictatorships.” The upshot? He wants $105 billion from Congress for Ukraine, Israel, Gaza, and the US border. How much of that he’ll get will become clear in the coming weeks.
For a look at the challenges facing US policy towards Israel right now, this week's episode of GZERO World with Ian Bremmer features interviews with Democratic Senator Chris Murphy of Connecticut, and Republican Representative Mike Waltz, of Florida.
Speaking of Congress, by the way, the House of Representatives is still without a speaker – we’re just happy that with Jim Jordan seemingly out of the race, we won’t be confused by headlines that seem to suggest King Abdullah is meddling in US politics.
The real costs of fake news. This war, like all conflicts in the social media age, is being fought not only on the ground but on the web, where the fog of war is as thick as cotton candy.
The costs of misinformation became clear this week when the Al Ahli Arab hospital in Gaza City was struck by a munition of some kind on Tuesday night. International media initially reported Hamas claims that it was an Israeli bomb and that 500 were dead. Mass riots across the Arab world caused King Abdullah to cancel a scheduled summit of Arab leaders with Biden, which was meant to focus on humanitarian relief for Gaza.
Subsequent analysis of the hospital damage, including by open source investigators, seemed to lend credence to Israeli claims that it was a misfired or damaged rocket from within the Gaza Strip.
As of this writing, we still don’t know what happened, and with Israel preventing journalists or investigators from entering Gaza, we likely won’t for some time. But still, the lesson was clear: Think before you tweet.
See all of our coverage of the Israel-Hamas war here, including explainers of who Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad are, our wildly popular map of Palestinian refugees, and our interview with a former US Green Beret about how to rescue the US citizens currently held hostage in Gaza.
Listen: "We are coming out of a period of uncertainty," says David Bailin, Chief Investment Officer at Citi Global Wealth. "We've all been thinking it would go much faster than it has, but in the event we get to a more normal economy in 2024, given how vastly impactful COVID was, I think that that's a pretty fast outcome."
In the latest episode of Living Beyond Borders, a podcast produced in partnership between GZERO and Citi Global Wealth Investments, Bailin is joined by Eurasia Group President Ian Bremmer to discuss what's happened so far on the economic and political stage, and what we might look forward to in the back half of the year and into 2024.
From the ongoing conflict with Russia, to interest rates and government regulation, to tensions with China, Bailin and Bremmer talk through the biggest risks and opportunities they see in the next six months. They also discuss the rapid rise of artificial intelligence, political polarization, and more.
This episode is moderated by Shari Friedman, Eurasia Group’s Managing Director of Climate and Sustainability.
Shari Friedman
Managing Director of Climate and Sustainability, Eurasia Group
David Bailin
Chief Investment Officer, Citi Global Wealth
Ian Bremmer
President, Eurasia Group and GZERO Media
Podcast: Why Netanyahu critic Ehud Barak calls Israel's government "clearly illegitimate"
Listen: As Israel grapples with political and social turmoil, the debate over judicial reform has become a crucial battleground for the country's future direction. In a conversation with former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, they delve into the implications of Prime Minister Netanyahu's proposed reforms that would give the executive branch sweeping control over the composition of the Supreme Court and allow parliament to overturn court rulings with a simple majority. Despite Netanyahu's decision to postpone the vote on these controversial reforms, protests have continued to rage across the country — with big potential consequences for Israel's democratic system and social stability.