Podcast: Death and diplomacy: A look at India-Canada tensions with Samir Saran

TRANSCRIPT: Death and diplomacy: A look at India-Canada tensions with Samir Saran

Samir Saran:

I think it is Trudeau government's perverse politics that is now being bought into the spotlight in this part of the world. I don't think this is about India or Indians having any problems with Canada.

Ian Bremmer:

Hello, and welcome to the GZERO World Podcast. This is where you'll find extended versions of my interviews on public television. I'm Ian Bremmer, and today we are taking a close look at a story that dominated headlines just before the deadly attacks on October 7th in Israel and the ongoing war since. In June, a Sikh leader was gunned down just outside of Vancouver, Canada. His murder sparked outrage and led Prime Minister Justin Trudeau to openly accuse the Indian government of orchestrating the assassination on Canadian soil.

India denies involvement, but the relationship between the two nations has deteriorated sharply, and also put the United States in a tough spot, stuck between an ally to the north and a nation that is becoming an increasingly important strategic partner against China. To help us understand the story better and what India's reaction has been, I'm talking with Samir Saran. He's President of the Observer Research Foundation, a Delhi-based think tank. Let's get to it.

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Ian Bremmer:

Samir Saran, so good to see you, my friend.

Samir Saran:

Good to see you, Ian.

Ian Bremmer:

Of course, I'm most interested in asking you about India and global geopolitics. And the story that's been making a lot of news has been this very significant diplomatic dustup that does not appear to be getting any better between your country and Canada. You want to give me your perspective on it?

Samir Saran:

Well, Ian, the short answer is that this has been in the making for a while, and this moment is just when it all blew up. You have clearly an Indian government that for the last few years has been telling the Canadians to stop supporting and fueling and incubating a movement that has deep repercussions for India's psyche. The Khalistani movement, which I'm referring to here, has cost us a prime minister, or the very significant challenge for India's territorial integrity in the-

Ian Bremmer:

A terrorist attack that cost you a prime minister, yes.

Samir Saran:

... A terror terrorist attack, yes. And of course, the bombing of an airplane, a Canadian airline in fact. So, a very serious terrorist group has been working with impunity in Canada, using the expression and freedoms that the constitution affords to every comer in Canada. And they have been using it in a manner that's inimical to India.

Now, this has been in the making for a while, and of course now the fresh allegation is that apparently a gang war or gangland killing in Canada is being blamed, or is being attributed to the actions of the Indian state. And that's what Trudeau's recent allegation is, which of course has been denied by the Indian government. But I think this is a great time for the Indian government to put on the screws, and actually to bring the core issue back to the center, which is the terror factories in Canada.

Ian Bremmer:

I noticed at the opening, that you said that the Canadian government was incubating and supporting this movement. Do you mean to say that your belief, the Indian government's belief, is that Canada is actively promoting terrorism against India inside Canada? Or are you saying they're allowing these radicals to persist unmolested? Those are two different things, of course.

Samir Saran:

Yes, absolutely. And I don't want to err to the side of actually saying that they are commissioning the acts. I don't think that would be proper without having more concrete evidence. But by their very omission or overlooking of what is happening there, they are abetting it.

Ian Bremmer:

Okay. So, clearly the Indian government, and this is not a new issue, has been deeply upset for a while about ongoing radicalism potentially supporting terrorism that has been happening in Canada. Now, we have heard from the Canadian government, from the US government and others in the Five Eyes, that this intelligence, credible intelligence from their perspective, that has directly linked the Indian government and its intelligence officers to this killing, before and after. Again, are you saying that what the Canadian government has presented to India, what the American government has presented to India, falls inadequate? That this is fully denied, that involvement, by the Indian government?

Samir Saran:

Ian, I am not privy to what they have spoken about. I know for sure that they've had a conversation, the Canadians and the Indians on this matter, more than once. I'm also pretty sure, and what has been reported in the newspaper, attributed to a Canadian official, that the evidence that was presented was oral. So obviously, no evidence has been given. Something has been narrated to the Indian government, which falls far short of the standards of evidence, and therefore, the gravity of the matter is still to be a certain in some sense. But I do know that on record, the Indian government has clearly stated that this is not our policy and we don't do this. So, there are two distinct sides to this.

I would also argue that the Five Eyes have also been rather muted. I do not believe that either of the other countries hold this evidentiary claim of Canada to be anything more than preliminary, or perhaps pointing towards something that may or may not be true. And if you heard the British or the Americans or even the Australians, they have repeatedly said that the investigation must be supported. That's what they're saying. None of them have said that they already know what the outcome is. And I think that's the big claim. Why Trudeau has taken a preliminary finding and made it into a claim is something that wreaks on domestic political pressures that he might be facing.

And I think that is what is suspect, not the fact that there are radical movements in Canada. That is known. Our diplomats have been threatened visually on video, on recordings. It's known. Our embassy has been attacked. It is known. So, it's not as if any of this is not known. What is not known is whether this was pure simple gangland killing or was there something deeper to this? I think the deeper part is not yet been substantiated with anything more than just a claim made by Trudeau in the parliament.

Ian Bremmer:

So question two, Samir, if it is substantiated by the West, do you believe that the Indian government, at that point, it would be appropriate for them to proceed with an investigation?

Samir Saran:

Look, if it is substantiated, I think the Foreign Minister of India has gone on record, that of course, why will we not engage with it? If you are giving us something which is substantive, we will engage with it. But I do not believe the Canadians have thought it, deem it even fit to share that so-called purported evidence in any significant manner with the counterparts.

Ian Bremmer:

Understood.

Samir Saran:

So, I see there is an obfuscation of something, and I don't know why. I am worried about why now and for what purpose. Friends don't do this in public. The Canadian Foreign Mnister just said yesterday that we have to have private conversations. This was something that should have always been in the private conversation mode. It should never have been bought into the public domain. And that is why I think there is something more that is happening, which I'm not getting right.

Ian Bremmer:

My understanding is that both the Canadian National Security and Intelligence Advisor came to India, and then of course Trudeau as well, both trying to find an off-ramp privately before they went public, and they went public because it was going to go public through the criminal case. But be that as it may, so I do think there are plausible explanations for why this ended up blowing up in the headlines. It seems to me the Canadians did not want this fuss any more than the Americans did. But certainly, there are domestic politics at play here in Canada. There are also domestic politics in India. And I've noticed that Modi's response has been very widely and strongly supported in India, not just by his own party, but also by the Sikh community and also by the opposition, by the Congress party. So, I'm wondering if you can talk a little bit about that because politics are pretty divisive in India. It's unusual when you have everybody agreeing on something.

Samir Saran:

I mean, that's one good thing Trudeau has done through his many years of being the Prime Minister of Canada, created a moment of Indian unity. I think he doesn't have too much else to write home about. But having said that, look, I started by saying this is a deeply problematic movement for people in India, and this is something that troubles all of us across the length and breadth of this country. There is going to be no compromise on this matter. There is going to be no looking away from the challenge that this is posing to us. Let me try and give you two scenarios.

Ian Bremmer:

Sure.

Samir Saran:

If it is ever substantiated that there was some link to some Indian agency or some Indian agent who was, in this particular incident that happened, no one is going to lose points here. No one is going to lose public support here. Let's be very clear. It is that problematic. The public on the streets, the publics are actually going to be applauding, that finally they have done something that should have been done a long time ago. So I'm not talking about ancient history, I'm talking about Afghanistan and Pakistan and South Asia, right?

Ian Bremmer:

Yeah.

Samir Saran:

So, I don't think anyone is going to lose sleep over the elimination of someone if ever this was proven to be true, which I don't believe can be proven to be true because that is not how India operates. It is quite likely, this is nothing but gangland killings with one faction seeking to carry greater favor with some other actor who has the monies to support the cause. And I think that is possibly the simplest explanation. I have no doubt that multiple actors in multiple states may have been involved in those particular gangland incidents, but to suggest that this was an American or a Canadian or an Indian or a X, Y, Z operation just because they had met some Indians, Americans or Canadian, that some point of time in the past five years, would be preposterous.

So, in India, either way it goes, the Prime Minister has support. And I think that's important. He did not make this, he did not want this, but since it has come out, he is not going to lose anything from Trudeau going public. That's the point I'm trying to make.

Ian Bremmer:

So my last question on this before we move on to bigger geopolitics is, we have seen the Indian response escalate, including now some 42 Canadian diplomats that have been asked to leave. How far might this go? Because again, as you say, the domestic politics only point in one direction. Do you think that we could end up with cutting off of diplomatic ties between Canada and India? A severing of the economic relationship? It's not the biggest in the world, but there's a lot of portfolio investment as well. I mean, where do you see this going?

Samir Saran:

No, I think that would be disastrous for both countries. I hope there's a off-ramp, and I think rather than Five Eyes in this case behaving like the eyes, they should be actually investing in finding a way to pacify the situation and move on, and try to get both parties to get into a side room and find ways of dealing with this situation. Canada is a very big investor in India. Canadian pension funds have invested in our roads and highways and ports, and something that has been one of India's stellar successes in the last decade. And Canada has been a part of that story. And I don't think this is about India or Indians having any problems with Canada. I think it is Trudeau government's perverse politics that is now being bought into the spotlight in this part of the world.

Canada and Canadians have very deep relationships, family ties, diasporic ties, people to people links. It's not just the Sikh communities in Canada, it's all communities in Canada. It's a very deep Indian diasporic link that defines the partnership. And for me, I don't see this as anything more than a troubled period of a few weeks, maybe a few months, before we actually see a new renewed vigor in the bilaterals. I think perhaps we have ignored each other's concerns, and perhaps this is that moment which may make us more empathetic to what bothers the other. So-

Ian Bremmer:

Okay.

Samir Saran:

... for me-

Ian Bremmer:

Let's hope you're right about that.

Samir Saran:

... I hope this a turning point. I hope this is the turning point.

Ian Bremmer:

Let's hope you're right about that. Let's move on to a relationship that is not at a turning point. The India-China relationship. Of course, India has just completed a very successful chairmanship of the G20, including a summit in Delhi that Xi Jinping very notably did not attend. I'm wondering, sort of since that, and that's clearly a snub, it's a slight at the Indian government, is there any effort to try to reach out from either side? And where do you see the state of play more broadly geopolitically between India and China?

Samir Saran:

I think, Ian, this relationship, again, the bilateral between India and China are at a precarious stage. At one level, you still have thousands of troops barely few meters from each other on the Himalayas. And no one is talking about it, but it's a tense battlefield in the Himalayas with lots of soldiers with great disregard and dislike for each other facing off. I think that's on one end of that relationship. The other end of the relationship is that, in some paradoxical manner, we are still growing the trade partnership, and the Chinese are still having a perverse trade benefit from us. They have $100 billion trade surplus vis-a-vis India. So, you have Chinese troops that are seeking to redraw the map, and you have Chinese trading relationships that are favoring Beijing significantly, and it's only becoming worse in the last few years.

So, I think we have a double challenge for the Indian establishment, that how do you continue to flex your muscles on the borders to prevent expansionism of the Beijing variety? And on the other hand, how do you rebalance your economic ties with them so that it is a more natural trading relationship rather than this perverse one? And in many ways, China is unrelenting on both fronts. Neither is it willing to course correct it's trading engagement with us, which means allow more Indian goods into the marketing, and in a sense, import more from our part of the world. And neither is it showing any signs of a thaw on the Himalayan borders.

And therefore, I think, in some sense, a dangerous stalemate persists of epic proportions. It can go south very quickly. And I think the only reason why we are currently seeing, say three years of relative calm since that incident three years ago, is because India is maintaining a very harsh and strong posture on the borders, right? And that is costing both sides' soldiers, and as well as money. And it is unsustainable for either side, and it is not something that should continue for too much longer. The problem is EMML end here. The problem here is that we are not Xi Jinping's biggest problem today. So, perhaps he is not even spending time to find a solution to this, or he is trying to fight the fires within China.

Ian Bremmer:

So, I mean, the biggest challenges right now, of course, are that China's economic growth is nowhere close to where it wants to be. Their indebtedness, their real estate challenges are very, very significant. And absolutely, youth unemployment in particular, which they just stopped publishing the data because the numbers were too high, though that's cyclical and in part it would be the highest you'd see right now with all the kids having graduated looking for jobs. But no, unemployment is clearly much higher than they want. Now given all of that, we've seen in the United States, in the run-up to the Biden-Xi meeting in November, also the Europeans have seen this, the Japanese and the South Koreans with a trilateral, the Chinese say they're going to go to South Korea. We've seen a little bit of a warming, or should I say at least a little bit of a thaw because the Chinese, it's not a charm offensive, but they want to make sure their economic relations are normalized. Have you seen any of that on the China-India front?

Samir Saran:

Chinese have not added any additional vigor in their pursuit of being part of the India story. In fact, they have always wanted us to lift certain prohibitions that we had imposed certainly on the app economy and on the tech side of things. And they continue to make a case that those should be rescinded. But I have not seen any warming up of ties other than Chinese embassy inviting scholars and media folks for junkets through the country. So other than very limited Chinese public diplomacy efforts that seeks to carry public opinion in their favor, I have really not seen outreach to the government or to a big industry or to big institutions, and that is something that is missing. But like you just said, I think they may be busy with bombing America up and EU up and Japan and South Korea, and we might be lower in the pecking order in their calculus.

Ian Bremmer:

So, over the last 10 years, China, which used to be very much a, "We are still growing up, we're not mature, we don't want global leadership, we're still a poor country." Now of course, they're talking about global leadership, they're building global architecture. India historically was, "We're not picking any favorites, we're not playing any sides. We don't do any global geopolitics." India is now coming out not only as increasingly a leader of the global south, but also leaning more heavily into the relationship with Japan, with the United States, the quad and the rest.

Samir, how much of this in your view is a reaction to China and how much of it is a natural evolution of India's growth and opportunities? I understand it can be both, but if you had to weight that for me, what would you say and why?

Samir Saran:

So Ian, it is both, and I would lean towards a natural evolution and a natural progression rather than too much of a China hand in what's happening. India was already so deeply integrated with the West even before the Berlin Wall fell down. So we were already, through our people, through our institutions, through our education, through even our industry and Green Revolution, we were already far more inclined to partner with the United States, France, the UK, and other Western capitals than we were with Beijing, and perhaps in relative terms, even with Moscow. So I think there was already something happening over the decades that was moving India into the same ecosystem of growth and future development with the Western powers, and I think that has really catalyzed post India's economic liberalization, late '90s, early 2000s, through three prime ministers, Vajpayee, Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister Modi, all three of them have made the big bet on America, have made America their priority over the last 20 odd years and we see the results today.

Now of course, what China has done has infused an element of strategic coordination within this relationship. So the economic and trade ties were already growing on their own. China has put an urgency on security coordination, on security partnerships, on sharing of information and intelligence. By the way, that's happening in the Himalayas even now. And of course, the induction of key American strategic weapons in India's arsenal. So I think the Chinese may have catalyzed the security and defense element of it. And by the way, not through its actions against India. I would say, even its expansive nature in the East China and South China seas. So, even Americans were looking at, or building a coalition or a new sort of an arrangement to manage that Chinese politics. So I think the growth is natural. The Chinese have certainly catalyzed the security and defense partnership to a great extent.

Ian Bremmer:

How do you relate to the bricks, where China has been looking very strongly to expand it? They certainly have conceived of the bricks as a natural counterbalance to the G7, the advanced industrial economies. They're expanding it. India supported that expansion. Several additional countries, mostly Middle East and North Africa have now been invited, said that they're going to join at the end of the year. But of course, India is not interested in a counterweight to the West. They're also working with the West. So, how does India navigate China and what China would like to see with the bricks?

Samir Saran:

So Ian, I think there's a misconception here. I was told by reliable folks that, at the final summit where the expansion was announced, days leading up to it when the ministers and the shapers and others were negotiating what was likely to happen, the largest list of countries to act to the bricks came from India, not from any other. And in fact, I suspect India decided that it was impossible to stop the expansion.

Ian Bremmer:

And so, India... What you're saying is India was really looking to dilute the anti-Western sentiment that was growing in the bricks by actually expanding to more countries?

Samir Saran:

Even in the academic forum where I lead the Indian delegation each year, let me tell you, the Chinese and Americans, and to some extent even the South Africans, they see this as an alternate to a new world order, right? That's something, as an alternative to the world order that exists today. Can we be seeding a new non-Western future? That's not how we see it, and neither India nor Brazil. And I can tell you this, that in the Track 2, in the academic forum where we have free open discussion that we write, so all of this is available in the public domain, I think that's true even in the political track. That China and Russia see this as this big anti-Western, anti-US moment, where we can bring together a club that can challenge the hegemony, what they believe is the hegemony of Western institutions, the dollar and many other instruments that have defined globalization over the past few decades.

I don't think India sees it that way, and I don't even believe Brazil sees it that way. And I believe half of South Africa also does not see it in that way. So, two and a half out of the bricks certainly don't see this grouping as something that is going to be anti-Westerns. And I think India did the wise thing by actually bringing UAE, Saudi Arabia and a few others who are fundamentally not anti-Westerns. They may be disaffected by the current systems of global governance, but Ian, even Washington has that problem, right?

Ian Bremmer:

Yes, that's absolutely true. That's well said, Samir. Before we close, I want to ask you about a topic that weighs on all of this, but we haven't discussed yet, which is of course global climate. And in terms of being disaffected with existing institutions and with the West, India is among a great many countries that is increasingly suffering the ravages of climate change, having not yet taken advantage fully of the industrialization that brought it on. India's ostensible net-zero goal for carbon emissions is 2070, which is obviously a pretty serious problem for the planet.

On the other hand, we've got a COP 28 summit coming up in the Emirates, and most people that are involved that are focused on climate are expecting not enough movement, not enough momentum, a country hosting it that's still expanding their petroleum investments and expected exports. How does India think about the global response and what it means for India's role in the world on climate change?

Samir Saran:

So first, a quick prediction. The COP in UAE is going to be significant and is going to be substantial. I have a sneaky feeling that we actually might see more progress in the region, which is predominantly linked to hydrocarbons delivering an ambitious climate agenda for the future.

Ian Bremmer:

Okay. I will take the under on that bet, and you and I will come back maybe in Davos and talk about it. Absolutely.

Samir Saran:

I suspect that might happen. But now, on India.

Ian Bremmer:

Yeah.

Samir Saran:

Look, Ian, you're right. We have not benefited from the carbon excesses of the past, so we did not grow our economy even as the world was burning the planet, and we have to do it differently. I think for us in India, this has become the mantra, that we are in some sense burdened by having to grow in a manner that compensates for behavior of the West, as well as creates a new pathway for the South. So, we are having to do two things at the same time. Two government walk at the same time, as the Americans say, right?

But I think this is an opportunity, and the Indian leadership sees this as an opportunity that we are, at $3.5 trillion, we are at two tons per capita emissions. At $5 trillion, I suspect we'll still be at two tons per capita. We are going to chart the greenest roadmap for 5 trillion, 10 trillion and 15 trillion dollars economy. No one would've done this before. We are going to create jobs. We are going to create our industrial model, which is going to be primarily green. What we really need right now is to unlock global capital flows. If one-third of future emissions, business as usual future emissions are going to emanate from India, then for climate capital, one-third of all global climate capital must flow towards India to mitigate it.

Ian Bremmer:

And we're not remotely close to that. Yeah, we're not remotely close to that.

Samir Saran:

75% of climate capital remains at home. It does not leave the border, right? So, we have to look at it, we to create the largest war chest and take it to the frontline states and deploy it there, India being one of the largest among those. But I think our battle, even in the G20 presidency was to unlock the powers of the MDB, the World Bank and other institutions, so that we could galvanize and mobilize private capital and crowd it in using the development banks and the international financial institution architecture, right?

So, that is the challenge that is before us. That 2070 is, as far as I'm concerned, the bogey. Please watch our 2030 commitment. If we are able to meet our 2030 commitment and move half our energy to green, 50% of energy to green, 2070 is just a negotiating point with those who we want to travel every time we get down to signing a document. So, for me, if we get to what we have promised by 2030, 2050 should be easy to do. And we are not talking about 450 gigawatts of green. We are talking about 4,500 gigawatts of green in the next 20 years. That is the Indian mission on green. We don't negotiate that position away, but that is what we want to achieve in the end of it.

Ian Bremmer:

Samir, that is the most optimistic thing that you've actually said this entire show, and I'm really glad to hear it. No, I mean, climate's a hard conversation and the Indians are certainly taking it much more seriously. Samir Saran, thanks so much for joining us.

Samir Saran:

Thank you.

Ian Bremmer:

That's it for today's edition of the GZERO World Podcast. Do you like what you heard? Of course you did. Then why don't you check us out at gzeromedia.com and take a moment to sign up for our newsletter. It's called GZERO Daily.

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The GZERO World podcast is brought to you by our lead sponsor, Prologis. Prologis helps businesses across the globe scale their supply chains with an expansive portfolio of logistics real estate, and the only end-to-end solutions platform addressing the critical initiatives of global logistics today. Learn more at prologis.com.