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Where the US is gaining and losing influence
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi everybody, Ian Bremmer here and a happy Monday from Vancouver. I'm here for the TED Conference. I've never done the main TED conference before, believe it or not, but giving a speech tomorrow and so came in a little early to meet some of all of these crazed public intellectuals and see what they have to say about the world. Should be kind of interesting, kind of fun.
But thought I would talk a bit about where US relations are with other countries in the world. I got a question from someone over the weekend that said, "Are there any countries where the United States actually has better relations today than they did ten years ago?" And I think this reflects, this wasn't an anti-Biden or pro-Trump sensibility, it's more the world feels like it's heading in a difficult direction, America losing influence. How do we think about that?
And it's mixed, right? It's mixed. It's very clear that China is much more commercially and economically powerful than it has been at any point in modern times. And it's also more willing to use its diplomatic leadership as well as the consistency of a single president, Xi Jinping, for eleven plus years now and going on however long he's alive. And so that I think makes people, especially that grew up in a time of more consistent global leadership from the United States, more discomforted or more excited, depending on their background. I think that also the United States is more, and we're looking it's some more divided, there are a lot of questions of why the United States would want to be the world's policeman, would try to drive global trade agreements when people inside the United States don't feel it necessarily benefits them. But the outcomes are a little more varied than that story would give you as a headline.
So for example, it is pretty clear that there's a lot of architecture being built by the United States with its allies in Asia. It's true that the US didn't get the Trans-Pacific Partnership done, and that was Obama's alleged pivot to Asia, never really happened. But now when you look at the Quad, you look at AUKUS, you look at the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework and you look at the CHIPS 4. And then you look at all of the alignment of countries that rely on the United States, particularly for national security in Asia and the backlash that you see from a China that is increasingly dominant militarily in some Asian security conflicts and Asian security areas. And as a consequence you have Japan, South Korea, improving their relations with each other and with the United States, you have the Australians much more aligned. You have New Zealand joining AUKUS as a non-NATO nuclear member and much more hawkish towards China than they would've been even two years ago, nevermind ten.
The Philippines pivoting into that direction, Indonesia concerned. So there are some countries that are really dominated by China and Asia. I'm thinking about Laos, Cambodia. But those aren't the countries with geopolitical heft. And for the rest they're more aligned with the United States. In Europe, you'd certainly say that most Europeans are more aligned with the US and yes, you'd probably even say that about France. Now, again, not necessarily Macron-Biden or Macron-Trump, given the personalities of all involved, but the fact that the French have voted along with every other EU country for ten rounds of sanctions against the Russians and to invite Ukraine into the EU and are decoupling their economies from Russia. That is a level of very significant alignment that we weren't seeing over the last five or ten years. And some countries in Europe may not like it, may be discomforted, but they don't necessarily have good alternatives.
And then Mexico and Canada where a level of economic integration, political integration and security integration with the US is just overwhelming. So those are all places where I see the relationship with the US as either as strong or getting stronger, getting more aligned, at least for the present and not really mattering hugely just on leadership, also mattering structurally with what's happening in the world. Then you have the Middle East and you have emerging markets around the world. You have the so-called Global South, and that's where I think the US is really and rapidly getting displaced, particularly in the Middle East where the US is not as focused on fossil fuels from there. And where the security relationship has been more challenged, Congress less interested in allowing the most advanced weapons to go to some of these countries. Some focus on human rights and just less engagement given how much more the Asian and the European environments are just sucking up all the airspace for the US diplomatically.
So there, I think China is displacing the United States in influence and countries in the Middle East are feeling like they need to do everything themselves. In terms of the Global South, also lots of countries that feel a level of hypocrisy from the United States, don't feel aligned, feel that the revealed preferences of US policy are really not supporting what these countries need. Whether it's in response to the pandemic or response to big inflation or response to the Russian invasion. Anything else, climate change, thinking that their relationship with the US is becoming less important. And meanwhile, globalization is less of a benefit for them as Americans focus more on nearshoring and on providing jobs for Americans in the middle and working classes. And this will even speed up with AI developments. Finally, and most dangerously, rogue states, North Korea, Russia, Iran, these are countries that have relations which are not just badly broken with the US but increasingly dangerous.
These are countries willing to be hostile and take risks with their relations with the US and allies. And China, which is not a rogue state, but is a country where there is zero trust between them and the US. And the relationship is at its worst it's been in decades. So if you were to put all of that together and say which world is more stable, definitely not where we are today. Is global power at largely shifting towards the US, away from the US or pari-passu, staying the same? I'd say it's very mixed, but slightly away from the US if you add all of those things up. Still, lots of areas where the Americans have a lot of power, but also a lot of areas where the world and its geopolitical balance is shifting far faster than the Americans and its allies can effectively respond to it.
So that's a little bit of the big picture for me. Seems like the thing one to talk about at TED. We'll do more of that tomorrow and I hope everyone's doing well. Talk to you soon.
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The future of globalization
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi everybody, Ian Bremmer here, and a Quick Take to get us kicked off this Monday morning. I thought I'd go a little macro today and talk about the future of globalization, because I hear so many people talking about the last 30 years of being this unprecedented period of goods and services and people and ideas and capital moving faster and faster across borders all over the world. And now, not anymore. Now, it's all about my country first and it's nationalists and it's insourcing and it's decoupling. And so we've hit this tipping point. Or have we? I don't quite buy this narrative that globalization is over. Rather, I think it's not being driven. I think people are angry about it and it's being fought over, but that's very different from saying that spikes are being put into it.
And let me explain what I mean. I do think that the era of globalization, where the United States as a singular country with its allies was driving, actively leading, and driving a system where tariffs were being reduced and institutions were being created to ensure freer and more efficient trade. That was unique. It was something that we experienced in the world, basically from the seventies, picking up momentum through the nineties, with the Chinese particularly getting much, much bigger, with the Soviets then collapsing and most of those economies getting integrated into a more global order.
Right up through the last, say, 10 years, that let's say almost half a century if you look at global human development indicators like expansion of lifespan or reduction of infant mortality or education rates or average income levels, just an unprecedented improvement across the world. And most importantly, if you were an alien looking down on the planet, what you'd see is the emergence of a global middle class. And you'd see immense reduction in human poverty.
Now, the fact that a lot of that within the United States and other countries driving it was also accompanied with policy failures, with a lack of change of institutional reforms inside the countries, with social safety nets that were eroding meant that there was much greater levels of inequality, of outcome and of opportunity inside those countries and a lot of people got angry and angrier with globalization. At the same time, over the last few years, post the 2008 financial crisis, post the pandemic, with increasing impact globally of climate change and now with the Russia-Ukraine war, all of those things are driving much greater instability and inequality, not just in the advanced industrial economies, but in the developing world as well. And that's creating a lot more anger and pushback against the process of globalization.
Where I want to be clear is that's not suddenly making the Americans turn against globalization. Rather, it's making the Americans not sure where they want to go. It means that the United States aren't leading further globalization going forward, and no one really is. So you had 30 to 50 years where the Americans and increasingly everyone on that boat were saying, "Yes, let's push hard to have more and more open markets." And now you have governments all over the world saying, "We're not really sure what we want, where we want to go." That's very different from the idea of deglobalization.
Deglobalization would be the United States stands up and says, "We're going to tear down these institutions. We actually don't want to be as engaged in international trade. We're going to pull out of existing trade agreements." That's not what's happening. Not under Trump, not under Biden. I mean, in fact, you'd say the record is mixed. Trump pulled out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, but that was a new multilateral trade organization the US would've joined to increase globalization, to increase integration. But actually, the overall record under Trump with the US-Mexico-Canada agreement, with the US-South Korea agreement, with a first phase US-China trade deal, but then no second deal, not full implementation, increased tariffs, on balance, you'd say under four years of Trump, the US globalized a little bit more, but not much more, and certainly wasn't driving or leading globalization anymore.
And you'd say the same thing under Biden. You could point to the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, which has marginal increase in economic integration on rules and standards. For example, you can talk about "Build Back Better", which isn't really funded, but provides more outreach of the United States towards international investment together with allies around the world, some reduction in tariffs between the United States and Europe. Not yet between the United States and China, though it's fairly likely. Again, the US isn't leading globalization anymore, but it's not unwinding globalization either. And "Make America Great Again", as well as a new foreign policy for the American foreign middle class, which is sort of the Trump headline and the Biden headline. If you say, "Well, what are the takeaways?" The takeaways are not a lot of policy that's actually really moving towards insourcing production. A little bit of a shift away from the promotion of more globalization, and on balance, a little more globalized than before now.
The big hit, of course, in the last two years has been the pandemic, which stopped people from traveling, and which really shut down a lot of international supply chain for a period of time that largely has gone away in most of the world. China's the big exception because of zero-COVID, but even there, they're working hard to try to get through zero-COVID relatively quickly. And I expect they will be mostly there by the end of 2023, because it's such a drag on Chinese growth, but it's a blip. It's a blip from a longer term environment where what we see between the United States, China and the Europeans and the Japanese and the developing world is kind of a bit of a drift.
In the same way that NATO has been adrift over the last 20 years without much of a mission, now we're seeing globalization is drifting. It's not falling apart, but no one's driving the bus. And there is some decoupling that's going on, most notably between the G7 and Russia. So Russian's being forcibly cut off from the advanced industrial economies. And of course, some of that is sticky, like gas between Russia and Europe. And that diversification is taking time and the Russians are threatening to shut it down.
Then you have some decoupling happening at the national security level between the United States and China, but it's limited. It doesn't affect most US-Chinese trade. TikTok. It's what all the young kids are on. That's Chinese, by the way, right? No one's about to shut that down. And other countries around the world don't want a cold war between the US and China, and they're ramping up their investment in exposure to the US and to China. And then you also have some level of growing protectionism in countries around the world saying, "We want more support for our workers," but it's halting, it's stagger step. And it's also in fights inside these countries with business interests and financial interests that want more exposure to global markets.
So the point here is not the end of globalization. The point is that globalization is at drift. The point is that globalization is now being fought over. It's become a political football. And where that's going to go? The answer is, it's messy. It's complicated. Maybe that's not the easy headline answer that people want, but maybe that's why my Quick Takes take 10 minutes as opposed to two.
Anyway, that's it for me at the start of this week. Something to chew over for a few days. Hope everyone's doing well. I'll talk to y'all real soon.
For more of Ian Bremmer's weekly analyses, subscribe to his GZERO World newsletter at ianbremmer.bulletin.com
Japan’s “JFK” moment: Shinzo Abe assassinated
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi, everybody, Ian Bremmer here. And I'm very sad to be talking about this shocking tragedy in one of the world's most stable democracies, the assassination of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.
Gun violence in a country that experiences virtually none of it. The assassination of the country's longest serving prime minister. It is a JFK moment for Japan, maybe even bigger.
I've known Prime Minister Abe for well over a decade. And I will tell you, he is unusually charismatic for a Japanese leader. Open and friendly and put his hand on your shoulder, on your back when he talks to you. I mean, frankly, almost Clintonian in that regard in a Japanese context. And also willing to push ideas in ways that other leaders have not been. Without question, one of the most popular leaders I've ever encountered from Japan. Known for all sorts of things. Abenomics everyone talked about coming from this old Japanese proverb that when one arrow would be broken, three arrows wouldn't fail. So the three arrows of Abenomics, the monetary easing where the yen fell massively, fiscal stimulus and then growth strategy where you focus on private investment and personal consumption in a country that was having its demographics shrink. Not an easy thing to do.
Abe was particularly proud of pushing for women in positions of power alongside his Abenomics, what he called Womenomics. And it's kind of critical. In a place where you'd go to business meetings and the only women you'd see all week were the ones that were serving you tea, Japan desperately needed to push to bring women into positions of respect and authority. And Prime Minister Abe was really the first PM that I encountered that was willing to do something about that. You also saw it in his personal life with an outspoken wife, Akie, who was very much involved in politics. I remember when Abe was pushing for nuclear power in Japan and it was deeply unpopular in the country. It was one of these things that you would actually see people demonstrate against and his wife was publicly opposed.
And it's something that he would talk about almost sheepishly occasionally when it was an issue of debate in society. He was a strong ally of the United States of course. He pushed hard for the Trans-Pacific Partnership, even when it was pretty clear that Obama couldn't get it done. And he's one of the reasons why there now is the CPTPP, which is the biggest high standard international trade deal that's been done recently. Abe's free and open Indo-Pacific strategy was a focus on democracies across the region and including the United States. And was really the catalyst for the Quad that we have today. And Abe had the best personal relationship with the Narendra Modi back when Modi was running Gujarat and Abe went to visit him. Very unusual for sitting prime minister to do that with a governor. And India's already announced a national day of mourning on the back of that relationship. And also a strong ally of the United States. And by the way, even with President Trump, who Abe personally could neither understand and he didn't really like him. And certainly, I mean, they were all walking on eggshells before meetings and Abe would laugh about how he would show up and Trump would have all of these numbers that made no sense to him, but he understood how to manage that personal relationship. And did a better job of it frankly, than just about any other leader internationally. Certainly among the advanced industrial democracies.
You'd have to look to the Saudis or the Israelis to find leaders that had better personal relationships forged with Trump.
And I think that helped stabilize and strengthen the Japan-US relationship a great deal. Abe had his share of controversies. To be clear, he was from the more nationalist wing of the party.
He visited the as Yasukuni War Shrine, which caused trouble for Japan relations with China in particular. He wanted to change the constitution of the country to build up the military beyond self defense. He was in some ways kind of like Olaf Scholz of Germany, but without the Ukraine invasion, right?
And it was all about China. And I remember when I would bring up China with him, it was the one time that you would see his pulse race. I mean, you could see his eyes flashing, even the vein on the side of his neck stand out when suddenly China was the topic of conversation in a briefing. And he was convinced that China wanted supremacy in the region and the world, eventually. And that while it was a near-term danger to Taiwan, it was eventually a critical national security danger to Japan. And I would say that one of the biggest dangers here is that if there's any sign of happiness or good riddance from China's leadership on the back of Abe's assassination, that will be met with an extremely sharp and even dangerous reaction from Japan. I note there's already a lot of that kind of response on Chinese social media and the Chinese government needs to be very careful about how they tread here.
But at home, I should be clear that the Japanese nation is not just stable, it is unified. There will be an extraordinary outpouring of sympathy for the prime minister. It will certainly help Prime Minister Kishida and his Liberal Democratic Party in upcoming parliamentary elections.
Kishida was already the domestically strongest leader on the G7 stage in the summit a week ago.
And since then, of course, Boris Johnson has resigned and now this. Most importantly, I guess I should just say my sadness. I'd like to share with all of my friends and colleagues in Japan.
So many of whom I saw just last week in what seems like much happier times in Tokyo.
I had great respect and admiration for Abe Shinzo and will miss him. Thanks.
For more of Ian Bremmer's weekly analyses, subscribe to his GZERO World newsletter at ianbremmer.bulletin.com
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South Korea President Moon Jae-in shows interest in joining CPTPP mega trade deal
TOKYO - South Korean President Moon Jae-in on Tuesday (Dec 8) mooted the idea of his country entering the revised Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal, joining China in expressing interest in a pact that Japan is credited for leading to fruition.
The Graphic Truth: Asia's mega trade deals — RCEP vs TPP
On Sunday, 15 Asia-Pacific countries inked the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, considered the biggest regional trade agreement ever signed. The RCEP includes China, which was left out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, another mega regional trade deal pushed by the Obama administration in the US... until President Trump walked out of it on his first day in office in 2017. While the RCEP is a much wider agreement, covering more countries and around 2.2 billion consumers, it lacks the depth of the TPP, which carried strong protections for labor, the environment, and intellectual property. With the US, it would also have accounted for a larger share of global GDP than today's RCEP. Here we compare the RCEP to the current TPP, and to what the TPP would look like if the US had stayed in it.