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Trump trial: How would a conviction hurt his reelection bid?
Ian Bremmer shares his insights on global politics this week on World In :60.
How would a conviction in his hush money trial impact Trump in the 2024 election?
At least a little bit at the margins. And certainly that's the reason why Biden and the White House campaign are now working to pay attention to it, to get people down there in front of the courthouse where the media is located and talk about Trump as a criminal. Of course, could backfire on them, especially if it's a hung jury. But if he's convicted, while Republicans aren't going anywhere, there are a lot of independents that have consistently said that they are less willing to vote for Trump. Of course, this conviction comes in the lowest stake of the cases that are being presently pursued against the former president. This isn't the case on the insurrection and this isn't the case even on the classified documents being obscured, mishandled. And so as a consequence, I suspect at the end of the day, if you get a conviction, it's not going to matter much. But in a very, very close election, which is all about swing states and turnouts, it could hurt with getting independents to turn out for Trump.
Is Iran's emergency presidential election really about who will eventually succeed as supreme leader?
A little bit. This is my week of “a little bit” answers, in the sense that it's going to reveal who the Iranian supreme leader wants, what kind of a character he wants as president, an important position in terms of consensus policy execution going forward, how much of a hardliner, how close to the IRGC, how close to the Basij? In other words, you know, just how much are you going to see someone who has the ability to play to the audience, the masses a little bit, is a bit of a technocrat, or is someone that is truly going to be a theocratic dictator on every issue with very little wavering, to the extent that it's the latter of the next Supreme leader is likely to follow those steps. So that is certainly worth watching.
How will Mexico's presidential election reshape its relations with the United States?
Almost not at all. Claudia Sheinbaum, overwhelmingly likely to win. Not likely to get a supermajority, which means that López Obrador is going to have a hard time seriously changing the Constitution, undermining checks and balances in the country before he leaves. But he's still going to have an awful lot of influence, slightly more technocratic government, more focused on renewables and transition energy, but overwhelmingly focused on making sure that the relationship with the US is better. The one thing that I would say is important about Sheinbaum is, López Obrador traveled almost nowhere, didn't go to the G20 meetings, didn't go to UNGA, United Nations high level week, didn't go to the COP summits, just didn't travel, traveled around Mexico. Sheinbaum will go everywhere and will travel to the United States a lot, will travel to Canada, too. And I think that ultimately matters. So Mexico is going to have a higher priority at the presidential level on foreign policy, and especially in a relationship that can be tricky if Trump wins, for example, come next January. That's going to be at the margins, useful for the Mexicans.
- Optimism about Mexico's political and economic future ›
- Why Mexico is a key issue in the 2024 US election ›
- This man will be Iran’s next president. Who is he? ›
- Graphic Truth: How will Trump's hush money trial end? ›
- What the Trump trial circus is missing ›
- Trump has been found guilty. Will voters care? - GZERO Media ›
- Ian Bremmer on Trump's guilty verdict - GZERO Media ›
Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei speaks during a meeting with the families of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Tehran, Iran May 19, 2024.
Iranian president’s death complicates a “Supreme” problem
While Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s death may not have much immediate impact on Iran’s foreign policy – Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei runs that business himself – it could shake things up for a more fundamental question: Who’s going to run the place after the 85-year-old Khamenei dies?
Some background: The Supreme Leader is chosen by an opaque council of high-ranking clerics. While the president, elected in a heavily managed popular vote, doesn’t have direct say, the presidency is still a powerful and public platform.
Raisi, an arch-conservative ally of Khamenei’s, was installed to sideline reformist figures who, in recent years, have gained popularity as the Iranian revolution struggles to find new sources of legitimacy after 45 years in power. Raisi himself was even considered a possible successor to the Big Man.
“With Raisi gone, the hardliners lose one of their key assets,” says Eurasia Group’s top Iran analyst, Gregory Brew. “That creates more uncertainty about the regime’s ability to smoothly manage the transition amid broad public discontent, an anemic economy, and a burgeoning regional crisis.”
The first signs of how Khamenei plans to deal with this will come soon – a new presidential election must be rigg-, er, held within 50 days.
A helicopter carrying Iran's President Ebrahim Raisi takes off, near the Iran-Azerbaijan border, May 19, 2024. The helicopter with Raisi on board later crashed.
Iranian President, FM die in helicopter crash
Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian died when their helicopter crashed on Sunday in northwestern Iran. No signs of life were found at the crash site, which was discovered Monday by a search crew in rough weather.
Who is Ebrahim Raisi?
Raisi, 63, was a hard-line cleric who ran Iran’s judiciary before being elected president in 2021. Under his tenure, Iran expanded its regional influence, supported militant proxies, and stepped up its nuclear program. His administration was marked by significant anti-government protests following the 2022 death of Mahsa Amini in state custody, as well as economic decline due to sanctions. Raisi was accused of authorizing the execution of thousands of political prisoners in the 1980s as part of Iran’s notorious “Death Committee” and was viewed as a potential candidate to follow Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
What happens if Raisi dies?
First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber will temporarily assume the presidency, while Deputy Foreign Minister Ali Bagheri Kani will become FM, and the country will undergo five days of mourning. The constitution says an election should be held within 50 days. Don’t expect major foreign policy shifts or the regime to fall — Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps have firm hands on the reins.“An election is likely to be stage managed by authorities, including Khamenei, to ensure a smooth transition to a new hardliner that matches Raisi's profile and has close ties to the IRGC and Supreme Leader,” says Eurasia Group analyst Greg Brew. “The election is sure to feature low turnout and will likely reflect ongoing public dissatisfaction with the the regime — there may be some fireworks, but any drama is more likely to play out behind the scenes.”We will keep you updated on this developing story.An Iranian man walks past campaign posters for the parliamentary election in Tehran, Iran, February 27, 2024.
Iranian election turnout could set new record low
Iranians will go to the polls on March 1 to vote for a new parliament, which will serve for a four-year term. They will also vote for members of the Assembly of Experts, a body of clerics that is tasked with selecting a new Supreme Leader and serves a six-year term. However, given that the Islamic regime now carefully manages election outcomes to protect its grip on power, voter participation is expected to plumb new record lows. We asked Eurasia Group analyst Greg Brew to explain the significance of this week’s polls.
What is the position of parliament in the Iranian system?
Iran’s constitution delineates legislative powers to the parliament, which also oversees the budget and cabinet appointments. However, parliament’s power is constricted by Iran’s powerful executive branch, particularly the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, as well as the Guardian Council, a small group of clerics and senior figures who sign off on all legislation and determine who is eligible to run for office. Given these restrictions, parliament is regarded by many Iranians as a rubber-stamp committee with little real control over government policy, a feeling that has only grown more pronounced since 2020, when elections were stage-managed by the Guardian Council to ensure hardliners dominated parliament. Authorities also carefully controlled the 2021 presidential election to ensure Ebrahim Raisi, an arch conservative with close ties to Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), was elected. (The next presidential election will be in 2025, when Raisi is expected to run for reelection.)
What steps is the regime taking to control the election outcome?
As with 2020, the Guardian Council has taken a heavy hand in vetting candidates: Out of the thousands of applications, many were disqualified from running for office, including most prominent reformists and moderates. This ensures the new parliament will remain dominated by hardliners with a strong affiliation with Khamenei, the IRGC, and the conservative clerical faction.
Is the sense of public alienation toward the regime growing?
Dissatisfaction with the regime is currently very high, owing to a variety of factors that include a weak economy, high inflation, widespread corruption, and ongoing and intensifying political repression. The fact that elections are now carefully managed by authorities has produced a broad view that they are sham affairs: as a result, participation in elections has dropped from over 70% to roughly 50%. It is expected to be even lower this year, perhaps the lowest on record. While the regime likely retains the support of some of the population, most Iranians view the Islamic Republic as an illegitimate government.
So, is there a chance of unrest around the vote?
Despite this widespread dissatisfaction, the circumstances don’t seem conducive to the kind of public protest that occurred in 2022, when thousands took to the streets following the death of Mahsa Amini at the hands of the morality police. The force of the government crackdown in response to those protests and the ongoing efforts to suppress new displays of discontent, as well as the generally bleak outlook for political reform, means most Iranians are averse to taking to the streets. Instead, citizens will express their dissatisfaction by staying at home and not participating in elections.
How worried is the regime about its legitimacy?
The Islamic Republic has held power for more than forty years. It possesses a large and sophisticated security apparatus and a toolkit of repressive measures that it uses to suppress public dissatisfaction. It is a government has proven, time and again, that it is willing to kill its own people in large numbers in order to remain in power.
That said, the regime has reasons to be worried about its position. Its credibility on a number of important issues, from the economy to terrorism, water scarcity and inflation, is in serious question. It is defined by self-dealing, with more and more of the nation’s wealth flowing to a small elite, particularly senior officers in the IRGC. Millions of Iranians are trying to leave the country, particularly educated members of the middle class.
What are the prospects for political change in the mid-to-long term?
The regime is confident it can hold on to power. It’s fixated on a potential succession crisis, given that Khamenei is eighty-four and in poor health, and the reason for stage-managed elections has been to ensure there’s a smooth transition from the current leader to a Khamenei 2.0. That’s why reformists and moderates have been squeezed out, with even former president Hasan Rouhani denied the opportunity to run for a seat on the Assembly of Experts. There’s virtually no chance the regime permits any reforms or positive political changes, at least not until after succession.
But this policy comes with its own dangers. The Iranian public appears unwilling to resume protests for the moment, but that could change. By refusing to reform, the regime has further undermined its legitimacy, and the transition to a new, similarly conservative Supreme Leader will only harden public dissatisfaction. Iran may be quiet, but it’s a powder keg that could go off at any time.
Edited by Jonathan House, Senior Editor at Eurasia Group