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Charu Sudan Kasturi
The US is scrambling to step up its diplomatic game with Pacific Island leaders following a breakdown of unity at a regional summit this week that analysts warn could weaken resistance to China’s plans for controversial security alliances.
Vice President Kamala Harris addressed the Pacific Islands Forum on Tuesday, announcing that the US would open embassies in Kiribati and Tonga and appoint its first-ever regional envoy. Washington will triple its annual funding to help the Pacific Island nations combat climate change and illegal fishing to $60 million a year for a decade, she said.
The flurry of announcements followed a decision by Kiribati, a nation of 120,000 people, that it was withdrawing from the PIF — a grouping that normally includes 17 other countries — on the eve of the body’s annual summit this week. The Marshall Islands opted out of the meeting, with its leader saying that he wanted to attend but that his parliament forbade him from participating.
The leaders of Nauru and Cook Islands also didn’t attend, citing domestic political reasons and COVID-19.
For half a century, the forum has relied on strength in numbers to argue globally for the shared concerns — from climate change to nuclear non-proliferation — of what are mostly small nations, plus Australia and New Zealand. But in recent years, the region has increasingly become a theater of geopolitical competition between the West and Beijing, as China has emerged as a top lender: By 2021, it had loaned $1.34 billion to the region, second only to the Asian Development Bank.
Those tensions came to a head earlier this year, when China inked a security pact with the Solomon Islands, sparking fears in Washington and Canberra that it was eyeing a military presence in the Pacific. Beijing then tried to prod all 10 Pacific Island countries that recognize it (and not Taiwan) into signing a regional security agreement during a May visit by Foreign Minister Wang Yi.
Countries pushed back, demanding that China bring the draft deal before the PIF. But the newly fractured forum hobbles the group’s authority to repulse external pressures, according to Peter Kenilorea Jr., an opposition member of parliament in the Solomon Islands and a former UN official who’s critical of his country’s embrace of China.
“Our strength lies in acting together,” said Kenilorea Jr., whose father was the first prime minister of the Solomon Islands after independence in 1978. “The Pacific region must think of its security collectively. Individually, each of us is much weaker.”
Already, Beijing is renovating a World War II airstrip in Kiribati. China and Kiribati have insisted that it will only be used for civilian use. But the opacity of China’s hush-hush security deal with the Solomon Islands has raised questions over Beijing’s true intentions in the region. The details of that pact haven’t been made public — but a leaked draft said it would allow China to send warships to the Pacific Islands region.
Officially, Kiribati’s decision to walk out of the PIF has to do with regional politics rather than a global scramble for influence. The grouping’s top post has traditionally rotated between the three sets of islands in the region: Micronesia, Melanesia, and Polynesia. It was Micronesia’s turn to lead the PIF last year. After voting led to a Polynesian candidate winning, Kiribati and other Micronesian nations — Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Nauru — declared they would quit the organization.
But a meeting last month in Fiji appeared to have quelled that rebellion, with a written commitment that the next leader of the PIF would be Micronesian. For the moment, Kiribati’s refusal to accept that assurance — the reason it has cited for its pullout from the group — is unlikely to trigger an exodus of other nations, said Larissa Stünkel, a research fellow at the Stockholm-based Institute for Security & Development Policy’s China Center. Other Micronesian nations appear satisfied with the agreement they arrived at in June, she said — though the Marshall Islands’ status is unclear, with its government keen to stay in the PIF but its parliament insisting on a walkout. “I doubt that we will see more surprise departures from the PIF.”
What is clear, though, is that Kiribati’s exit from the group weakens the PIF, said experts. The biggest beneficiary? Beijing, which denies any role in causing the fissures within the bloc. “A weakened forum would open the door to more overt great power maneuvering, especially on China’s part,” said Marc Lanteigne, an associate professor of political science at the Arctic University of Norway, whose work focuses on the Indo-Pacific region.
Individually, small Pacific Island nations are more vulnerable to the economic allurements China promises — and that the West has failed to match. China’s loans indeed lead to unsustainable debts: Samoa owes Beijing an amount equivalent to 30% of its GDP, while Vanuatu’s debt to China is nearly a quarter of its GDP.
But Robert Sikol Bohn, a former member of Vanuatu’s parliament who now serves as an adviser to the country’s foreign ministry, said China’s money also results in visible infrastructure projects that local politicians can showcase to their electorate as achievements, whether it’s a soccer stadium in the Solomon Islands, an airstrip in Kiribati, or the Parliament building in Vanuatu. The Solomon Islands and Kiribati both dumped their recognition of Taiwan in 2019 to commit to ties with China instead.
“Australia and the U.S. focus their support on good governance and strengthening democracy,” said Bohn. “That’s just not as sexy for a politician to sell as ports, airfields, and buildings.”
The cracks in the PIF also threaten to undermine the region’s fight against climate change. The island nations face threats from illegal fishing by Chinese trawlers. But the West isn’t completely blameless either, said Stünkel, referring to former Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s support for coal. Bohn agreed. “Sometimes, I wonder about the West: Are they even listening to what we’re trying to tell them?” he asked.
It's a failing that Harris acknowledged in her address to the PIF. “We recognize that in recent years, the Pacific Islands may not have received the diplomatic attention and support that you deserve,” she said. “We are going to change that.”
This represents a shift away from Washington’s approach in recent years of letting Australia and New Zealand take the lead in managing the West’s ties with Pacific Island nations. There’s greater recognition that the U.S. needs to get more involved.
“Kiribati has served as a wakeup call for Washington,” Kenilorea Jr. said. “The big question is: How long will it stay awake?”
Charu Kasturi is a freelance writer specializing in foreign affairs. He is based in Bangalore, India, and often writes for outlets such as Al Jazeera and Foreign Policy.
Would the Narendra Modi of 2019 – the year his clampdown on Kashmir drew ire from human rights activists worldwide – have backed down on Prophet Mohammad-related gaffes made by members of his party? Pre-pandemic, would the bombastic Indian prime minister have missed a chance to forcefully weigh in on Sri Lankan domestic affairs amid a dire political crisis?
It wasn’t so long ago when former Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa alleged in 2015, just days after voters removed him from office, that India’s spy agency, the Research & Analysis Wing, had helped oust him from power. Now, the tone of Rajapaksa’s family toward India couldn’t be more different. Namal, Rajapaksa’s son, recently thanked Modi and “the people of India” for sending aid to his country at a time when Sri Lanka is battling its worst economic crisis since independence in 1948.
The Sri Lankan crisis has helped reveal a departure from Modi’s traditionally muscular foreign policy approach. This comes after a series of unrealistic promises, hyperactive diplomacy, and religious divisions in India have backfired on New Delhi globally. Modi’s newfound caution has potential implications for the United States as it presses India to play more of a leadership role in the Indo-Pacific.
Rajapaksa, who returned in 2020 as prime minister of Sri Lanka, went into hiding last month after being targeted by protesters. His younger brother Gotabaya, meanwhile, is grimly holding on to the presidency despite demands for his resignation amid a crisis that has seen him order the stockpiling of goods to avoid food shortages. That’s just the sort of messy situation where Modi would’ve once forcefully intervened – in keeping with his aspirations of projecting India as a rising global power. Instead, Modi is treading with care in Sri Lanka at a time when economic and political fires are erupting across South Asia, including in Pakistan and Nepal. While India has committed more than $3 billion in aid to Sri Lanka, it has carefully avoided any suggestion that it has a favorite among the political leaders vying to lead the island nation.
“It’s a very interesting shift,” said Michael Kugelman, deputy director of the Asia Program at the Wilson Center. “India is clearly being cautious politically in Sri Lanka, even though it is sending significant economic aid.”
Kugelman said that it might be premature to conclude a broader move away from Modi’s assertive diplomacy based just on the change in strategy with Colombo. But there are other signs that suggest Modi is on the defensive internationally in a way that hasn’t happened before.
This week, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Qatar, and Kuwait lashed out publicly against the prime minister’s Bharatiya Janata Party after its representatives made controversial comments about Prophet Mohammad. Modi, who has built a reputation as a leader who doesn’t buckle in the face of criticism, caved, and the BJP suspended one leader and sacked another for their comments.
In many ways, that caution echoes India’s low-risk foreign policy approach of old. During the Cold War, India was non-aligned, though it did lean toward Moscow starting in the 1970s. By the 1990s, India had adopted a relatively more sedate stance even in its neighborhood.
Modi promised to change that with a “Neighborhood First'' policy. He became the first Indian leader to visit Nepal in 17 years. “At that time, we used to joke that Modi would win elections in Nepal too — that’s how popular he was because he said the right things,” said Santosh Sharma Poudel, co-founder of the Kathmandu-based Nepal Institute for Policy Research. Modi held one-on-one summits with Chinese President Xi Jinping to try to build a personal relationship. And addressing the U.S. Congress, he said New Delhi and Washington had finally overcome “the hesitations of history.”
But Modi has struggled to live up to many of his bombastic commitments, forcing New Delhi to confront the re-emergence of doubts about India’s role in its neighborhood and the world.
In April 2015, Modi claimed it was his tweet that told Nepal’s prime minister about the earthquake that had just devastated the Himalayan nation. Then, his government boasted about aiding Nepal. As a backlash started in that country, he asked Ranjit Rae, India’s ambassador to Kathmandu: “Why don’t they like us?”
Yet only a few months later, India tried to pressure Nepal to pause on adopting a controversial new constitution, setting the stage for a border blockade that strangled the smaller landlocked nation’s economy. Kathmandu blamed New Delhi and pulled closer to Beijing.
Now, as Nepal faces a foreign exchange crisis — it banned the import of cars, alcohol, and luxury items last month to maintain its remaining reserves — India has been more careful with its words and actions. “A big part of why India is disliked by many in Nepal is because it is seen as trying to interfere at the micro-level,” said Poudel.
That’s true in Sri Lanka too, where “India often gets blamed for everything,” said Asanga Abeyagoonasekara, a senior fellow at the Washington-based Millennium Project. Still, Rajapaksa’s claims in 2015 came at a particularly fraught moment in relations. Colombo had drifted too close to Beijing for New Delhi’s comfort. India was widely believed to have helped unite a fractured Sri Lankan opposition that then defeated Rajapaksa. But his return in 2020 forced New Delhi to reconcile with its former nemesis in Colombo.
Globally, India also has had to sheepishly walk back some of Modi’s boldest promises. Amid disruptions to global food supplies because of the war in Ukraine, Modi said India would boost its wheat exports. Instead, it has had to ban wheat exports because of a poor harvest. Last summer, India had to ban the export of COVID-19 vaccines after Modi promised to produce enough shots to meet the world’s needs — because his government failed to order enough doses. “There’s a lesson here on how it's probably wise to be more careful about what you promise,” Kugelman said.
Meanwhile, in Sri Lanka, India needs to walk a tightrope, said Abeyagoonasekara. Protesters appreciate the economic help from their northern neighbor, he said. But already, New Delhi is having to fend off criticism – this time that it’s helping the Rajapaksas. It has rejected claims that Mahinda Rajapaksa has escaped to India and rumors that the government in Colombo has bought water cannons directed against protesters using an Indian loan.
At a time when Western officials believe that China is establishing a military base in Cambodia, Modi’s reticence to insert India more proactively in Sri Lanka sits uneasily with his previous claims that New Delhi would serve as a “net security provider” in the Indo-Pacific.
But India can’t afford to sit on the fence too long. “This [the crisis in Sri Lanka] could become a national security challenge for India too,” Abeyagoonasekara warned.
Charu Kasturi is a freelance writer specializing in foreign affairs. He is based in Bangalore, India, and often writes for outlets such as Al Jazeera and Foreign Policy.
Shortly after Russia invaded Ukraine, Russians were seen scrambling for packets of sugar at supermarkets. It was the first sign that Western sanctions meant to punish President Vladimir Putin for the war might actually be having a serious impact. Stores imposed limits on the purchase of some products, and Putin's government rushed to reassure Russians that they would have enough to eat.
Russians are facing shortages of everything from smartphones and cars to paper, but experts say there’s one area where the country might be able to largely insulate itself from the sanctions that have otherwise ravaged the economy: food security.
Since 2014, when Russia’s annexation of Crimea triggered a wave of targeted sanctions, the Kremlin has been preparing for the possibility of more wide-ranging economic punishment from the West. Through a massive program of import substitution, it has tried to reduce the dependence of Russia’s economy on imports by developing domestic industries across sectors over the past eight years. While those efforts have failed in most fields, they have yielded some success in food and agriculture.
Soon after the Crimea invasion, Moscow banned the import of food from countries that imposed sanctions on Russia. At the same time, it unveiled major subsidies for domestic farmers and agri-tech firms to build up the country’s food manufacturing capacity. The result: In 2020, Russia’s need for meat imports was 62% lower than in 2014, while fish imports were down 35%, according to United Nations Comtrade data. The world’s largest wheat exporter, Russia has also temporarily banned the sale of grains to neighboring nations, further bolstering stocks for its domestic consumption.
“Today, Russia produces enough basic foods to avoid significant shortages,” said Denis Davydov, a senior lecturer in accounting and finance at the University of Vaasa, Finland, who has closely followed the Russian economy over the past decade.
That’s a major change for a country that — throughout its modern history — has suffered from desperate famines, food shortages, and bread lines, which weakened the authority of both Czar Nicholas II and the subsequent Soviet regime. Putin appears to have learned at least some lessons from the follies of his predecessors, say analysts.
The first seeds of Russia’s move toward agricultural self-sufficiency were planted in 2010, when the country introduced a food security doctrine that laid out targets for domestic production of everything from salt and sugar to meat and potatoes. But that document wasn’t translated into actual policies at the time, said David Laborde and Joseph Glauber, researchers at the International Food Policy Research Institute.
The economic penalties Russia faced in 2014 proved a turning point. The Kremlin’s subsequent focus on reducing Russia’s reliance on food imports reflects its careful preparation for even tougher sanctions of the kind that the country today faces, said Stephen Wegren, a political science professor at Southern Methodist University, whose research focuses on the political economy of post-communist states. “I think a big factor has been the goal to make the Russian agriculture sector sanctions-resistant,” Wegren said. “National security has been a driving force.”
The weather has helped Russian agriculture in recent years, said Wegren. Warming temperatures because of climate change have allowed farming in parts of the country that were previously too cold for cultivation. Meanwhile, the devaluation of the Russian ruble following the 2014 sanctions “simply made any remaining imported food product uncompetitive relative to domestic analogs,” further helping the homegrown agriculture sector, said Davydov.
But it wasn’t just luck: The Putin administration has also proactively worked to get Russians to change their palate, said Laborde and Glauber. Instead of rapeseed oil, which is partially imported, Russia has encouraged the use of sunflower oil — the country is behind only Ukraine in the production of sunflower seeds. Similarly, beer — which relies on cereals that Russia produces — is replacing imported wine, they said, even as Russians are on the whole turning away from alcohol. “There is an economic rationale justifying these successes,” said Laborde and Glauber.
To be sure, Russia’s successes in food security have serious limitations, and the country faces challenges in the coming months. It is still dependent on the import of some key foods. By 2020, the country had managed to reduce its spending on imported fruits by only 20% compared to 2013, according to the National Rating Agency, an independent Moscow-based ratings institution. Russia is also the world’s fourth-biggest importer of butter.
In time, sanctions could start hurting even those parts of Russia’s food industry where it has dramatically increased domestic production because the country’s agricultural sector “is heavily dependent on imported equipment and farming machinery,” said Davydov. “The efficiency and costs of food production will depend on whether it will be possible to continue importing this equipment or re-channel imports from other countries.” Where imports are still possible, they’ll be costlier in the future if the ruble — which has stabilized for now after plummeting in February and March — takes further hits.
Meanwhile, the Russian Central Bank’s decision to raise interest rates to an all-time high of 20% in order to tame inflation will adversely affect lending rates for firms that need to borrow money to purchase or service equipment. “More expensive financing will obviously transfer into higher product prices,” Davydov said. Already, the absence of foreign competitors has in recent years led to sharp increases in food prices: Beef today costs four times as much as it did in March 2014. Experts are convinced that this trend will continue.
Still, Russia’s self-sufficiency in many basic food commodities means it can always import the rest from “friendly” nations, said Wegren. China, one of the world’s largest agricultural exporters, is unlikely to impose sanctions on Russia.
“There may be localized shortages, but I do not expect mass hunger,” Wegren said.
That’s good news for Putin. In February 1917, food riots over bread shortages were catalysts for the Russian Revolution later that year, in which the Bolsheviks dethroned the tsar. Whatever happens to Russia’s current autocrat, food likely won’t bring him down.
Charu Kasturi is a freelance writer specializing in foreign affairs. He is based in Bangalore, India, and often writes for outlets such as Al Jazeera and Foreign Policy.