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File Photo: Nigerien troops, May 23, 2022.
Niger wants US troops out
Niger’s military junta announced Saturday that it would end the agreement that allows US troops to operate in the country. Niamey said the pact was “profoundly unfair,” and cited a “condescending attitude” and alleged violations of diplomatic protocol during a high-level visit last week.
Washington has been trying to find ways to work with the military governments that have seized power in Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali to combat extremist militants in the region. But at the same time, the Biden administration has pressured Niamey to set a timeline to restore democratic control and reportedly raised alarm at a possible deal to sell uranium to Iran, which seems to have led to the rupture.
What happens now? The US has about 1,000 troops in Niger and operates a drone base monitoring suspected militants in the north of the country. The State Department is aware of the demand but has not commented on next steps.
If US troops do pull out of their base in Niger, it would remove a major obstacle for Niger to expand its relationship with Russia, as juntas in Mali and Burkina Faso have. The former Wagner Group mercenaries have been absorbed into Moscow’s Defense Ministry and rebranded the Africa Corps, which is expected to deploy on the continent this summer.
Members of a military council that staged a coup in Niger attend a rally at a stadium in Niamey, Niger.
Is West Africa headed for war?
Almost two weeks after a military junta seized power in the West African state of Niger, the situation is becoming increasingly unstable, and hopes are fading fast that constitutional order can be restored.
The latest. On Thursday, members of ECOWAS, a West African bloc of 15 nations currently led by Nigeria, announced that they had standby forces in place ready to intervene militarily to reinstate ousted President Mohamed Bazoum, who became Niger’s first democratically elected leader in 2021.
In response, junta militants, led by Gen. Abdourahmane Tchiani, said they would kill Bazoum, who’s currently under arrest, if ECOWAS dares to intervene.
Even before that, there were broad fears for the safety of Bazoum, and his family, who reportedly have scarce access to food, water, and electricity.
What’s more, in a sign that the junta has no intention of backing down, Tchiani announced that he is now the official head of state, tapping a new cabinet, made up of both civilian and junta representatives – though few people believe the noncombatants will have much sway.
But West African states aren’t the only ones deeply invested in Niger’s fate. Outsiders – like France and the US, as well as Russia – are keeping close tabs on the deepening disaster.
Why is this landlocked country of 25 million caught in the crosshairs of geopolitical tug-of-war?
The French Connection. Many countries in the Sahel are former French colonies, and so Paris, for its part, sees the unraveling of the region as an indictment of its colonialist past. Since granting these states independence, France has been invested in state-building programs aimed, in theory, at rebuilding capacity and industries it has long exploited.
When French troops were kicked out of neighboring Mali in 2022 after that country was taken over by militants in a coup, most of those troops were relocated to neighboring Niger, one of the last remaining Sahelian states sympathetic to Western interests. (Niger is the fourth state in the region to undergo a coup in the last few years.)
The US standpoint. Since 9/11, defeating Islamic terrorism has been a cornerstone of US foreign policy. The US has aided French missions in West Africa for the past decade, both to prop up a key ally and also to clamp down on al-Qaida-linked groups and the Islamic State, which have metastasized throughout the region. Still, Washington has mostly trained and bolstered local forces.
What’s more, some observers have expressed fear that these terror groups could join forces with other nefarious actors – like pirates! – to wreak havoc on the high seas and obstruct economic deliveries to the region, which could impact global supply routes.
To be sure, US national security officials have said that terror activities in the Sahel are not a direct threat to the US, but they are a threat to US partners and geopolitical interests – particularly as Russia and China look to expand their influence throughout Africa, the world's fastest-growing continent.
What Russia wants. Russia has long been trying to expand its footprint in Africa in general – and in the resource-rich Sahel in particular.
With the Kremlin’s backing, the Wagner Group, a private army with close ties to Moscow, got its first big bite at the apple when, in 2018, its mercenaries were invited to the Central African Republic by embattled President Faustin-Archange Touadéra to help stave off local insurgents. In exchange for protecting Touadéra, the group gained access to lucrative gold and diamond mines. Wagner recently played a key role in “keeping the peace” when CAR held a referendum abolishing presidential term limits.
Today, Wagner has a footprint in Mali, Libya, and Mozambique, and recently said it sent 1,500 mercenaries to Africa, though it’s unclear where they were sent.
Meanwhile, as one of the world’s largest uranium producers, Niger is a hot commodity, and there are reports that Wagner is already talking to the junta to see how it can be of service. Indeed, for Russia, these relationships with West African despots bolster diplomatic and economic relations while also helping to fuel anti-Western sentiment throughout the region – a win-win.
What comes next? For jihadists hoping to capitalize on the deteriorating economic and security situation, the coup might prove to be a handy recruiting tool.
What’s more, it’s hard to imagine that ECOWAS will intervene militarily given that the junta have vowed to kill the man they are hoping to save. For now, it seems like Niger could very well be set to join the ranks of other coup-plagued Sahelian states facing isolation and economic ruin as a result of ECOWAS and Western sanctions.A supporter of former President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva reacts as people gather after polling stations were closed in the presidential election in Sao Paulo, Brazil.
What We're Watching: Brazilian runoff, Burkina Faso coup 2.0, Ukraine's response to Russian annexations
Lula’s bittersweet first-round win
Left-wing former President Luiz Inácio "Lula" da Silva won the first round of Brazil's presidential election on Sunday but fell short of the outright majority needed to avoid an Oct. 30 runoff that might now be tighter than expected. With almost 97% of the ballots counted, Lula got 47.9% of the vote, 4.2 percentage points more than his nemesis: the far-right incumbent President Jair Bolsonaro. Although Lula is still favored to also win in the second round, the result is good news for Bolsonaro because he outperformed the polls, which had him trailing Lula by a wide margin and led many to believe his rival could win it all in the first round. Some experts think that Bolsonaro is consistently underestimated because many Brazilians are hesitant to admit they vote for him — a theory pollsters deny. Lula's narrower-than-expected victory might give Bolsonaro even more fodder to claim that the surveys are rigged against him. Brazil's president has spent months firing up his base with baseless doubts about the integrity of the election process, and no one would be surprised if he tries to pull a 6 de Janeiro if he loses the runoff.
Coups and counter-coups in Burkina Faso
Coups are always messy affairs, but the West African nation of Burkina Faso is taking it to a whole new level. Late on Friday, Col. Ibrahim Traoré announced the removal of Lt. Col. Paul-Henri Damiba — who ousted democratically elected President Roch Kaboré in January — for failing to defeat an Islamist insurgency. The next day, Traoré claimed Damiba was planning a counter-coup with help from former colonial power France. Pas moyen, says Paris, as protesters attacked French interests in the capital, Ouagadougou, before Damiba agreed to step down on Sunday. Meanwhile, Traoré's junta is reaching out to "new partners" to fight the jihadists — possibly code for Russian mercenaries employed by the notorious Wagner Group, already active in neighboring Mali. The Sahel remains a hotbed for Islamist insurgents despite almost a decade of French military presence, which has hurt France's reputation in many of these countries. A Russian-propagated conspiracy theory that the insecurity is a ruse by Paris to protect its interests is also fueling anti-French sentiment in the Sahel, where coups are making a comeback.
Ukraine won’t give up
Ukraine is claiming a strategic victory in one of its four regions recently annexed by Russia. Lyman, a logistical and railway base in the eastern Donetsk province, has been cleared of Russian forces, President Volodymyr Zelensky said on Sunday. Meanwhile, US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin blasted Vladimir Putin’s recent nuclear threats, calling them “irresponsible” and “nuclear saber-rattling.” As for the Russian president and his recent land grab of Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk, interesting times are ahead: after holding a ceremony to sign accession treaties, Moscow is expected to process the documents through its parliament, after which Russia will consider the annexations complete. Next up? Russian laws and prosecutors would be imposed on the regions; militias fighting for Russia in Donetsk and Luhansk would be incorporated formally into the Russian military; the Russian ruble would be made the only legal currency; and after an oath of loyalty, residents would officially become Russian citizens. Meanwhile, the leaders of nine NATO countries issued a joint statement on Sunday condemning Russia's annexation of Ukrainian territories and pushing NATO to increase military assistance to Kyiv.
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Junta announces on TV it has taken power in Burkina Faso.
West Africa needs a fresh approach to democracy
A recent string of coups in West Africa has sent a troubling sign about the health of democracy in the region. Can anything be done to reduce the likelihood of future military takeovers? According to Amaka Anku, head of Eurasia Group’s Africa practice, the situation requires new approaches to governance and institution-building. We sat down with Amaka to learn more about her views.
Why so many coups?
A lack of state capacity to protect citizens and provide them with services is the main factor. Other problems such as the Islamist insurgency in the Sahel have also contributed — especially in Burkina Faso and Mali — but they are symptoms of this deeper issue, not its cause. National governments in Africa are relatively weak and have limited clout outside of capitals and major cities, constraining their ability to serve their citizens. This makes it difficult for the state to fulfill its end of social contracts, undermining its legitimacy. The international response to the coups, which has typically taken the form of calls for fresh elections and a quick return to flawed constitutional orders, does not address this underlying weakness. Elections alone do not guarantee a strong state. On the contrary, holding elections without supporting the development of a coherent national identity and competent bureaucracy increases the likelihood of future military interventions.
So, what should the international community be doing?
The main regional body, the Economic Community of West African States, has traditionally emphasized maintaining the appearance of democracy and ignored broader governance problems. For instance, it was silent when former President Alpha Condé controversially amended Guinea’s constitution in 2020 to secure a third term despite nationwide protests against his plans. But when a military junta seized power in September 2021, ECOWAS was quick to impose sanctions. This apparent lack of interest in checking misconduct if states regularly hold elections feeds into perceptions among ordinary citizens that the regional body and its allies are part of the problem, hurting its credibility as an impartial actor.
If ECOWAS really wants to deter future coups, it should move more quickly to punish leaders who subvert constitutional order — whether or not that is by a military takeover. But punishment must not come in the form of broad sanctions that ultimately hurt citizens more than the erring political or military leaders, because the latter have access to state funds.
ECOWAS should also consider leading a more coordinated response to the problems of insecurity across the Sahel. Closer collaboration among intelligence and security forces across the region could help strengthen governments’ abilities to assure the safety of their citizens, which would in turn boost perceptions of state legitimacy.
What sort of political changes would help?
Contemporary political systems in West Africa often strive to meet Western models of governance without adequate consideration of domestic peculiarities and local customs. In part as a result, they have failed to adequately support the development of the state. African intellectuals must now dig deeper to craft governance models that are more suited to domestic realities. That means prioritizing the well-being and dignity of citizens, while emphasizing African values such as freedom of speech and association, diversity, and inclusion. It also means focusing less on copying processes and customs that formed in advanced democracies following centuries of political settlement there and spending more time figuring out how to formalize local structures of power like traditional and religious leadership — something Botswana has done successfully with its House of Chiefs. Countries should also make plans to improve the quality and reach of local governance a priority. That could mean barring individuals from seeking national office until they have had experience in local government, something that would both mitigate the problem of vast ungoverned spaces in many African countries and prepare a class of future national leaders with experience dealing with policy challenges at the local level.
What about socio-cultural changes?
The arbitrary nature of African state formation by colonial powers created countries with high levels of ethnic tensions. Consequently, ethnic loyalties often take precedence to national identities. To bolster state legitimacy, governments should build a clear and dominant messaging campaign around a national purpose to drive broad acceptance of a common set of organizing principles. This, if successful, could form the basis of a social contract that clearly defines the relationship between citizens and the state.
Putting an end to a culture of impunity in government and among elites is another important step. A zero-tolerance approach to corruption or other forms of wrongdoing, especially among political appointees, is necessary to build trust in national institutions. Finally, encouraging a culture of transparency in government based on timely, aggressive communication of government actions and priorities would encourage participation in the political process by average citizens.
A group of military widows in Mali show their support for the armed forces during a demonstration.
Why West Africa might see more coups
Guinea-Bissau had a failed coup attempt on Tuesday, less than two weeks after the military seized power in nearby Burkina Faso. In just a year and a half, West Africa has seen four successful coups and two failed bids.
While we’ve been seeing fewer armed takeovers of governments in the region in recent years, West Africa was once known as the continent’s “coup belt.” Do recent rumblings signal a comeback for military coups in the region?
Here are three reasons why more might be on the way.
First, the recent coups have proven popular.Malians were fed up with rampant corruption under ousted President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, as were Guineans with deposed President Alpha Condé, who skirted constitutional term limits to stay in power.
More broadly, most West African countries have overwhelmingly young populations that resent their leaders for failing to create enough jobs or deliver public services such as education, health, or justice.
Second, their governments look weak in the face of a big threat. Jihadist insurgencies have mushroomed across the Sahel region. Eurasia Group analyst Tochi Eni-Kalu says Burkinabé President Roch Kaboré was toppled because his government was seen as “inept” at fighting Islamic State-linked militants.
Although jihadism took root in the region a decade ago, it's now spread to vast swaths of the Sahel, and there’s no end in sight. Governments unable to control vast swaths of their territory are being exposed as vulnerable.
What’s more, national militaries feel civilian leaders are not giving them the tools they need to combat heavily-armed jihadists. Some feel they’re better off taking the reins themselves.
Third, France is in retreat. As the legacy colonial power, it’s long been a major player in the region, and since 2014 has spent over $1 billion to quash the Sahel insurgency with French troops in Operation Barkhane. But with low French public support for the mission and rising anti-French sentiment in the region, Paris has pulled back, and wants the EU’s Takuba task force to have a bigger role in the Sahel.
Eni-Kalu says that Barkhane’s dismal track record fighting jihadists further tarnished France’s reputation among West Africans. Many are increasingly buying into the conspiracy theory — reportedly pushed by Russia — that France is to blame for instability in the Sahel, and that the conflict is a ruse to safeguard French interests.
And no one else is really engaged to stop the region’s descent into coup life. Not Russia, despite rumblings about Russian mercenaries operating in Mali to thwart jihadists.
ECOWAS has some leverage, but Eni-Kalu says the 15-member regional economic bloc lacks the power to do more than slap sanctions and demand that new juntas call elections. Other global powers see little upside to getting entangled in West Africa’s problems.
So, where might the region’s next coup take place? One prime candidate is Niger, which just 10 months ago suffered a failed putsch days after its first-ever peaceful transfer of presidential power.
With soldiers now becoming more popular than politicians, an Islamist insurgency still raging and outside players looking the other way, another military takeover in West Africa may come sooner than you think.