The politics of population

Last week, US President Donald Trump unveiled the “Trump Accounts” – government-seeded investment accounts for children born during his second term – at an event featuring Nicki Minaj and Kevin O’Leary, two celebrity business figures from very different corners of the marketplace. The idea was straightforward: the government contributes $1,000 at birth, and gains can grow tax-free. The money remains under parental control until age 18, when it can be used for any purpose, including college or a home, or left to continue growing.

The program was promoted as “jumpstarting the American Dream,” a way to build financial literacy and expand participation in the stock market. But it also advances a deeper political goal: making parenthood feel less financially daunting. The program is part of a suite of pro-natalist policies touted by Trump. In a speech at a Women’s History Month event at the White House last year, he even dubbed himself “the fertilization president” for taking action to make fertility drugs more affordable.

Global baby bust. Why the fixation on babies? First, there’s economics. America’s birthrate has been on the decline for nearly two decades. At the same time, Census projections show the share of Americans over 65 rising from 17% in 2022 to 23% by 2050. That means fewer working-age people paying taxes, but supporting more retirees, which could put immense strain on Social Security.

The US is not alone:the IMF estimates G20 economies will need to spend 20% of their GDPs on retiree health care and pensions by 2050, up from 14% in 2015. While the world’s population is still increasing – thanks to growth in developing countries in Africa – it’s expected to peak before the end of the century. According to the United Nations, women in countries that account for the majority of the world’s GDP are having too few babies to maintain a stable population.

The repercussions could be huge: a slowing population could lead to economic stagnation. Aging societies tend to be less innovative, and their potential workforce is shrinking, which could leave them at a disadvantage in tomorrow's industries.

Then, there’s a cultural agenda. Since 2020, America’s declining birthrate (the number of children an average woman will have in her lifetime) has been offset by immigration. That cushion is now deflating: between July 2024 and July 2025, the US populationgrew by an anemic 0.5%, largely due tofewer newcomers. Pro-natalist think tanks argue domesticbaby-boosting policies must fill the gap. They promote doubling tax credits for married couples and encourage traditional family formation, and – as the conservative Heritage Foundation’s proposal asks – affordable housing for young families and research on reproductive health to “repopulate the playground.”

Natalist nations. Many of these policies are already in play around the world.Hungary offers child tax credits, subsidized housing, and lifetime income tax exemptions for moms of two or more children. Japan – which has one of the lowest birthrates in the world – has expanded tax incentives, cash payments, and subsidized fertility treatments. China, after decades of a “one-child” policy, now promotes them with subsidies and pro-natal propaganda, including billboards showing a family playing under a blue sky with the tagline, "Siblings are the greatest gift parents can give their child.”

Do these efforts work? Yes and no. Areview of 61 programs worldwide found that cash benefits – such as payments at birth, allowances, and maternity leave – along with service benefits and tax refunds were the most effective tools for lifting fertility rates in high-income countries. But their overall effect was described as “modest” – enough to slow decline, but rarely enough to reverse it.

Two case studies: Canada and France. Canada illustrates the limits of such policies. Since the 1970s, it has offered tax-free accounts to help families save for higher education, and in 1998, the government began offering annual $500 contributions for children aged 15 – a model that resembles Trump Accounts. Canada later introduced generous monthly allowances for low-income families and, in 2015, rolled out a national $10-a-day daycare plan based on a similar system in Quebec. Despite these efforts, fertility rates have largely declined over the past 10 years, reaching an “ultra-low” level average of 1.25 births per woman in 2024.

France tells a similar story. For decades, it was touted as a model among European nations, with income splitting for families, generous parental leave for mothers, and cash support for health and housing. Until the 2010s, the country maintained a fertility rate of 2 births per woman. By comparison, 2.1 is considered “replacement level,” the rate needed to keep a population stable over time. Those gains have since slipped: France’s fertility rate hit 1.56 in 2025 – the lowest since the end of World War I – approaching the European average.

Why aren’t these policies more effective? In France, a government study last year found that 28% of people said the financial costs of raising and caring for children were an obstacle to having children. But the barriers were not only financial: 15% of respondents cited difficulty balancing family needs with work.

Similar dynamics are on display in Canada. University-educated and working women are the least likely to have or want children, and only half of women aged 20 to 49 who are not mothers want children someday. A study by the think tank Cardus found that women under 30 cited several reasons for not planning to have children in the next two years: a desire to grow as a person, to save money, and to focus on their careers. Many also believed that kids required intensive care, lacked a suitable partner, or wanted more leisure time.

Buying time, not babies. As with similar efforts abroad, natalist policies may help stave off a population slowdown. However, examples from abroad suggest that programs like the Trump Accounts might make parenthood slightly more attractive, but they won’t reverse the US’s demographic trajectory on their own, because the decision to have a child isn’t limited to dollars and cents.

Rather than trying to slow the decline, countries could find new ways to adapt to aging societies. Japan, for example, where roughly one in seven workers is 65 years or older, is actively boosting opportunities for older employees. Perhaps it is time for countries to face the music – or face the grays, if you like – and learn to live with aging populations.