We have updated our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for Eurasia Group and its affiliates, including GZERO Media, to clarify the types of data we collect, how we collect it, how we use data and with whom we share data. By using our website you consent to our Terms and Conditions and Privacy Policy, including the transfer of your personal data to the United States from your country of residence, and our use of cookies described in our Cookie Policy.
Results for China
FBI Director Christopher Wray has called out a Chinese cyber threat named Volt Typhoon that is targeting US water, power, and telecommunications companies, including 23 pipeline operators.
In an address at Vanderbilt University late last week, Wray warned that "Chinese government-linked hackers have burrowed into US critical infrastructure and are waiting for just the right moment to deal a devastating blow."
The goal? To induce panic and potentially deter the US from supporting Taiwan in the event of an attack on the island by China.
How might Volt Typhoon strike? "You might find your companies harassed and hacked, targeted by a web of corporate CCP proxies," Wray told world leaders earlier this year. “You might also find PRC hackers lurking in your power stations, your phone companies, and other infrastructure, poised to take them down ..."
An escalating threat. The FBI director has been warning about China’s cyber capabilities for months in speeches and in testimony before Congress, calling the Chinese Communist Party "the defining threat of our generation.” Chinese hackers, he says, outnumber FBI cyber personnel 50 to 1.
Beijing has denied state involvement in Volt Typhoon, attributing the hacking to criminal ransomware groups. However, Wray cites evidence of the operation using extensive botnets to mask its cyber trail, as well as investigations by Microsoft and Google tying the campaign to China.
During her weekend visit to Beijing and Guangzhou, US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen emphasized that the US-China relationship is on a "more stable footing" – but there are still imbalances to address.
Chief among them: China's industrial overcapacity and its effects on the global economy. Yellen and Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng agreed to kickstart formal talks to address China’s growing overproduction of electric vehicles and solar panels, which the US says is distorting global markets and undercutting American jobs.
“We can only make progress if we directly and openly communicate with one another,” Yellen said. Chinese Premier Li Qiang called for a market-oriented view of production capacity, including cooperation in the green and low-carbon energy transition and a potential partnership to address environmental challenges.
Tough talk on Russia: Yellen dropped the diplomatic gloves when it came to Beijing’s economic and military partnership with Russia.
"We've been clear with China that we see Russia as gaining support from goods that Chinese firms are supplying to Russia," she declared, warning of "significant consequences" for any material support lent to Russia’s war efforts against Ukraine.
We’ll see if this changes China’s tune like it did after Russia’s invasion in 2022, when US officials say their strong warnings prompted Beijing to walk back plans to provide military equipment to Moscow.The most geopolitically important relationship in the world is fundamentally adversarial and devoid of trust. Its long-term trajectory remains negative, with no prospect of substantial improvement.
And yet, ever since US President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping met at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Woodside, Calif., last November, US-China relations have looked comparatively stable amid a sea of chaos.
In the months that have followed, both sides have continued to seek steadier ties through frequent high-level engagement as well as new dialogue channels on a wide range of policy areas. In January, the US and China resumed military-to-military talks for the first time in nearly two years. On April 2, Biden and Xi spoke by telephone and ratified their ongoing commitment to manage tensions. The presidential call came after the third in-person meeting between US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in less than a year on Jan. 16-17. It set the stage for US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen’s trip to China this past week – where she met with senior Chinese officials, local and provincial leaders, and top economists – as well as US Secretary of State Antony Blinken's upcoming visit. Both militaries are currently in the final stages of preparation for a maritime dialogue and a likely ministerial meeting at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June.
However, while better managed than they have been historically, US-China relations are coming under stress from a number of flashpoints that threaten to disrupt the relative calm that has prevailed since Woodside.
Second Thomas Shoal. This is the most likely, imminent, and dangerous tripwire for US-China military conflict, following an incident on March 23 in which Chinese Coast Guard ships fired high-pressure water cannons on a Philippine vessel attempting to deliver construction materials to the rusting BRP Sierra Madre – a symbolic Philippine warship, home to a small detachment of Philippine marines, that was intentionally grounded by Manila in the South China Sea’s Second Thomas Shoal in 1999 to assert Philippine sovereignty over the disputed territory.
Beijing refuses to allow any construction materials to reach the Sierra Madre, and Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos feels he must continue sending materials to prevent it from sinking lest he renounce Manila’s claim. The latest run-in injured several Filipino sailors but stopped short of causing fatalities. US defense officials believe that if a Philippine sailor were to get killed, Manila would invoke its Mutual Defense Treaty with Washington, prompting the US to send military escorts for Philippine resupply ships. Chinese contacts say that if that happened, Beijing would consider towing the Sierra Madre off the reef, setting up a showdown between the US and Chinese navies.
Tech competition. Xi views Washington’s ever-expanding restrictions on China’s advanced semiconductor and artificial intelligence industries – and its pressure on US allies like Japan, the Netherlands, Germany, and South Korea to follow suit – as an effort to curb his country’s technological and economic development. More than ordinary trade barriers, tech restrictions get under Xi’s skin because they hit at the heart of his strategy to shift the sources of Chinese growth away from real estate and infrastructure investment toward “new productive forces.” Insofar as the US containment policy persists – and it will, as it is driven by a bipartisan national security consensus to “de-risk” – Beijing will eventually be compelled to retaliate.
Trade. A sticking point for labor unions in an election year, Chinese industrial “overcapacity” was a central theme of both Biden’s call with Xi and Yellen’s China trip. Washington’s core contention is that China accounts for a third of global production but only a sixth of global consumption. As a result, China’s heavily subsidized (or outright state-owned) firms are flooding Western and global markets with low-cost goods, especially in key sectors such as electric vehicles (EVs), batteries, and solar photovoltaics, benefiting consumers worldwide through lower prices – and reducing emissions by increasing the adoption of renewables – but hurting the less competitive American manufacturers.
American accusations ring hollow in Beijing when the US is simultaneously granting TSMC, the world’s leading producer of semiconductors, billions of dollars in subsidies to expand chip manufacturing in America. Separate but related, the irony of the US (and Europe) complaining about China making the global energy transition cheaper while at the same time chastising the country for not doing enough to decarbonize their economy is not lost on the Chinese and many in the global South. But I digress.
From Washington’s perspective, overcapacity is a problem at the core of China’s industrial policy model that will be made worse by Xi's aversion to boosting domestic consumption. Given the election-year politics of the issue for Democrats, at least some market access barriers before November are likely – whether through the Section 301 review of China’s steel industry, the Chinese EV data security probe, and/or the likely realignment of Trump-era tariffs on EVs and other imports. Still, anything Biden might do on trade pales in comparison to the risk of major tariff escalation that Beijing will face if Donald Trump returns to the White House.
Taiwan. China’s leadership has concluded that Taiwanese President-elect William Lai is an irredeemable separatist, and Lai sees little upside in trying to persuade Beijing otherwise. Xi’s embrace of Lai’s Kuomintang predecessor, Ma Ying-jeou, in a high-profile meeting on April 8 didn’t help defuse tensions. Lai’s inaugural address on May 20 will accordingly set the stage for a gradual erosion of cross-strait ties over the next four years. The pressure will start as soon as this summer when China begins to regularly enter Taiwan’s contiguous zone, “erasing” the island’s territorial waters and airspace. While these moves will be calibrated and telegraphed to Washington through backchannels to limit retaliation, Lai could escalate and force Biden to respond with a show of resolve in support for Taipei that risks a dangerous cycle of escalation.
But while these irritants will strain the bilateral relationship, there are still plenty of reasons for both leaders to want to maintain relatively stable ties, at least through the US elections.
Biden can’t afford to start a new war when he’s already managing two abroad – one in Ukraine, one in the Middle East – and fighting another at home. Xi continues to face major domestic economic challenges that require him to be much more geopolitically cautious than he would otherwise. Tensions are further constrained from spiraling out of control by enduring interdependence between the world’s two largest economies, neither of which would benefit from faster decoupling let alone military conflict.
Of course, as we saw both in 2022 with former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan and in 2023 with the Chinese surveillance balloon incident, accidents and miscalculations can easily overwhelm leaders’ ability to manage the tensions. But the communications channels established since November make such flare-ups less likely.
Neither the US nor China want a free-fall in their relationship this year, and thanks to Woodside, they now have the tools to avoid one. The Woodside truce may bend, but it won’t break.
On Saturday, a Chinese coast guard vessel blocked two Philippine government ships near the country’s coast for over eight hours. The incident occurred at the boundary of the nine-dash line, a demarcation Beijing uses to assert its claims to the waters but which was dismissed by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague in 2016.
This latest dustup appears to be Beijing’s response to last week’s high-profile Washington summit between US President Joe Biden, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, and President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. of the Philippines. The three leaders expressed “serious concerns about the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) dangerous and aggressive behavior in the South China Sea,” and Marcos Jr. stressed the trilateral relationship would “change the dynamic” in the region.
“Any attack on Philippine aircraft, vessels, or armed forces in the South China Sea will invoke our Mutual Defense Treaty,” Biden said.
Beijing has already engaged in risky blockings and using water-cannon attacks that have injured sailors. The Philippines has become increasingly vocal about its sovereignty claims, especially around strategic areas including Second Thomas Shoal, a point of recurring friction between Philippine forces and the Chinese Coast Guard. On Thursday, China’s foreign ministry accused Marcos of reneging on a bilateral understanding on the Second Thomas Shoal issue, setting the scene for Saturday’s standoff – and, no doubt, more to come in future.The US, Japan, Australia, and the Philippines banded together Sunday for their first joint naval exercises in the South China Sea to push back against Beijing’s aggression and territorial claims in the region. A recent op-ed published in the state-owned China Daily drew parallels between current tensions with the Philippines over the disputed maritime zone and the “Sarajevo gunshot” that preceded World War I. This view is echoed by China expert Gordon Chang, who told Fox News that “it’s more likely that the fight starts over the Philippines than it starts over Taiwan or Japan.”
Cue the cavalry: These drills, including anti-submarine warfare training, are designed to uphold the rule of law and freedom of navigation, according to a joint communique. China said it conducted its own military drills in the region in response. The drills come just ahead of a meeting between US President Joe Biden, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, and Filipino President Ferdinand Marcos on Wednesday, when the allies will discuss further cooperation in the South China Sea — with bigger ambitions on the horizon.
The AUKUS alliance is also flirting with the idea of inviting Japan to be a new partner in countering China's assertiveness. Japan would engage in “Pillar Two” of the Alliance, which commits members to jointly developing quantum computing, undersea, hypersonic, artificial intelligence, and cyber technology. (Pillar One, which will deliver nuclear-powered attack submarines to Australia, will not include Japan. Before JAUKUS is born, however, experts say Japan must enhance its cyber defenses and better protect sensitive information. We’ll be watching for an impending announcement at the summit on Wednesday.Are the US and China frenemies now? Perspective from Nicholas Burns, US Ambassador to China
Listen: US Ambassador to China Nick Burns joins Ian Bremmer on the GZERO World Podcast to look at the complex and contentious state of the US-China relationship. What do the world's two biggest economies and strongest militaries agree on, and where are they still miles apart? After Presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping met at a summit in San Francisco last November, it seemed like frosty relations were starting to thaw. But while China and the US have committed to re-engage diplomatically after the 2023 Chinese spy balloon low-point, there is still a lot of daylight–and no trust–between the two. So how stable is the US-China relationship, really? Are we adversaries? Frenemies? Toxic co-dependents? Burns and Bremmer discuss Taiwan, aggression in the South China Sea, China’s economic woes and national security push, and where one of the most consequential bilateral relationships between any two countries in the world goes from here.
China shouldn’t “coerce or intimidate” the Philippines in the South China Sea, says US Ambassador
Tensions are rising between China and the Philippines over control of the South China Sea, which Beijing sees as its territory, and Manila as its exclusive economic zone. On GZERO World with Ian Bremmer, US Ambassador Nick Burns explained the US position that it is concerned about China’s aggression in the South China Sea, particularly at Second Thomas Shoal, a submerged reef where Manila deliberately beached a ship in 1999 and has used as a military outpost ever since.
“China should not seek to coerce or intimidate the government of the Philippines at Second Thomas Shoal,” Burns stresses, “The Philippines has an absolute right to resupply their forces.”
Burns emphasizes broad international support for the Philippines’ rights in the area, referencing the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty between Washington and Manila. Tensions in the region have escalated sharply since Chinese and Philippine coast guard vessels collided in early March, injuring four Filipino crew members. Burns says China needs to act responsibly and commit to a peaceful resolution on the issue.Catch GZERO World with Ian Bremmer every week on US public television (check local listings) and online.
Chinese researchers at the Beijing Academy of Artificial Intelligence have reportedly issued a warning to Chinese Premier Li Qiang that the country is falling far behind the United States when it comes to artificial intelligence.
The researchers said there’s “a serious lack of self-sufficiency” in the Chinese technology space, especially since researchers are dependent on open-source large language models like Meta’s LLaMA.
China is already playing catch-up when it comes to chips and the technological infrastructure necessary to train and run generative AI models, but this reporting sheds new light on the technical struggles to build capable models. The US is seeking to cut off China from as much AI technology as it can, but its aim is ultimately more about limiting its enemy’s military prowess rather than restricting its access to perhaps relatively harmless language models.