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U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin speaks at a joint press conference with South Korean Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup in Seoul, South Korea, 31 January 2023.
What We’re Watching: Pentagon leak fallout, Manhattan DA sues House Republicans, new source of tension in Ethiopia
The fog of leaks
Fallout continues from the leak of secret US documents related to the war in Ukraine. The leaked info suggests that Egypt, one of the world’s largest recipients of US military aid, planned to secretly supply Russia with tens of thousands of rockets for use in Ukraine and that the United Arab Emirates, also a key US ally, would help Russia work against US and UK intelligence. Egypt and the UAE say these reports are false.
Another document suggests that US eavesdropping on its ally South Korea indicated that aides to South Korea’s president had discussed sending artillery shells to the US or Poland for use by Ukraine, a move that would violate South Korea’s policy of refusing to export weapons to any country at war.
US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin has claimed that “quite a few of the documents in question were fabricated,” but he isn’t saying what’s true and what isn’t. The world may never know who leaked these documents, why they were leaked, and which parts of them, if any, were entirely fabricated or partially altered. But the headaches for those who must now repair damaged international relationships are real, and the domestic political fallout for leaders of some of these countries, particularly South Korea, will continue.
Manhattan DA sues House Republicans
Manhattan District Attorney Alvin Bragg announced Tuesday that he’s suing House Republicans for allegedly interfering in the criminal case against former President Donald Trump.
Bragg’s lawsuit is focused on the actions of Congressman Jim Jordan of Ohio, who chairs the House Judiciary Committee. In the 50-page suit, Bragg accuses Jordan of “a transparent campaign to intimidate and attack” the district attorney as his office pursues criminal charges against the former president for allegedly breaking campaign finance laws by making a hush-money payment to a porn star.
House Republicans have demanded that Bragg’s office hand over documents and testimony related to the Trump case, insisting that the committee has oversight rights. Crucially, Jordan had issued a subpoena for Mark F. Pomerantz to deliver a closed-door deposition. Pomerantz is a former assistant DA who left his job last year after Bragg reportedly opposed a wider tax-and-insurance fraud prosecution of Trump, which Pomerantz favored.
Bragg has sued to block the subpoena saying it amounts to “an unconstitutional attempt to undermine an ongoing New York felony criminal prosecution and investigation.”
Whatever happens, as this case makes its way through the courts, Jordan will be delayed in getting his hands on the documents and testimony he is seeking.
Fresh unrest hits Ethiopia
For almost a week now, protests have raged in the Ethiopian region of Amhara over a federal government plan to absorb local security forces into the national army.
The tensions are only the latest example of how fragmented Africa’s second most populous country has become. It was just months ago that the government finally reached a peace deal with separatist militants from the region of Tigray, ending a gruesome civil war that had displaced millions.
In that conflict, as it happens, Amhara’s local forces fought alongside the government, pursuing long-standing grievances and territorial claims against their Tigrayan neighbors.
Now Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed wants to eliminate all regional forces of that kind. For Abiy, it’s necessary to strengthen national unity. He won’t back down, he says, even if a “price needs to be paid.” But the Amharas worry that without those forces, they’ll be vulnerable to fresh attacks from other ethnic groups or the federal government itself.
That puts Abiy in a familiar bind. Five years after popular protests swept him to power with a mandate to liberalize Ethiopia’s political system, he is still struggling to master the country’s ferocious ethnic and regional rivalries.
Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed attends his last campaign event ahead of Ethiopia's parliamentary and regional elections scheduled for June 21, in Jimma.
Ethiopia’s PM wanted legitimacy – did he get it?
The ballots are still being counted in Ethiopia's national elections, which were held on June 21. The vote marks the first time that Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has faced voters directly since coming to power in 2018, when mass protests ousted his predecessor.
Early in his term, Abiy was lauded for liberalizing the economy, freeing political prisoners, and ending a decades-long war with neighboring Eritrea. But he also has struggled to contain rising ethnic tensions: since November, Ethiopian forces have been warring with local militants in the region of Tigray.
International aid groups have warned of famine there and accused Abiy's forces of war crimes. Tigray did not participate in the election, and many opposition groups boycotted it.
To help us understand what the vote means for Ethiopia, Tigray, and the wider region, we spoke with Connor Vasey, the lead Ethiopia analyst at Eurasia Group.
So, who is going to win this election?
The ruling Prosperity Party is in the strongest position by far, and will likely reconfirm Abiy Ahmed as the country's Prime Minister. Ethiopia's opposition is for the most part fragmented and weak, and at the national level has largely failed to sell a better narrative than the government's. Meanwhile the PP enjoys all the benefits of incumbency: that is, a pervasive government presence right down to the village level. And boycotts by some opposition parties and the detention of key opposition parties and leaders has limited the competition the government faces.
Briefly, who boycotted this election and why?
Major parties like the Oromo Liberation Front, Oromo Federalist Congress and Ogaden National Liberation Front pulled out of the ballot earlier this year. They pointed to arbitrary arrests of their leaders and supporters, forced closures of party offices, and unwillingness by electoral staff to register some of their candidates.
Will Abiy's victory be seen as legitimate?
Yes and no. This election was certainly a step up from previous years in terms of opposition space and the independence of the electoral commission. And we'll likely see an elected opposition in parliament for the first time in more than a decade. That alone will be enough to 'redeem' Abiy for some Ethiopians.
On the other hand, the parties given the most room to campaign are viewed as close to or at least ideologically aligned with the government on key issues. This, combined with opposition boycotts by parties that have huge influence in some regions, will make millions of voters feel that the options on the table did not accurately reflect the 'political spirit' of their communities.
And, of course, there are many people who have been unable to cast their vote yet. Logistical and security challenges forced the electoral commission to delay voting for dozens of parliamentary seats until the fall. This included the entire Somali and Harari regions, as well as pockets across the country.
As for Tigray's 38 seats, no news on when voting would be feasible.
All in all, voters more sympathetic to Abiy will likely be content with how the election proceeded. But it will not convince those looking for reasons to challenge his legitimacy, and that will continue to underpin some of the instability we see today.
Tell us about Tigray. What does this election result mean for the ongoing conflict there?
Very little. The heart of the conflict there is about political power distribution, federalism, concerns over minority protections, and rights to self-determination. All of these are still at play, regardless of the election. Recently the violence has gotten worse and each side's conditions for dialogue are still untenably high. Though there are competing demands on both sides, the Tigrayan leadership wants a return to the pre-war status quo while Addis wants them arrested and a more cooperative administration installed.
On June 28, even as votes were still being counted, government forces withdrew from the Tigrayan capital and declared a ceasefire — is there any connection? And what happens next in Tigray?
Well, Abiy's election campaign relied in part on alliances with other political leaders who strongly supported the government's campaign in Tigray — so now that the election is done, he may feel a little freer to open up a dialogue with the Tigrayans. Still, the main reason for the ceasefire is probably the military situation on the ground: in recent days, the Tigray Defense Force made significant gains, particularly to the northwest of Mekelle, the Tigrayan capital. Ethiopian forces were losing ground fast.
In terms of what's next, the ceasefire is expected to last through the summer planting season, which ends in September. It will open the door to some very difficult, stop-start talks. One thing in particular to watch is how outside players like Eritrea react to the ceasefire and any talks.
The US and Europe have downgraded ties with Addis Ababa over the Tigray war. Is that likely to affect things?
It initially helped to improve humanitarian and media access to Tigray, which has brought more transparency to the conflict. The government's admission that Eritrean troops are present in Tigray came as a result of significant international pressure, for example.
But Western calls for unilateral ceasefires and an inclusive national dialogue are aiming too high at the moment. As mentioned before, the drivers of the conflict remain completely unresolved.
Likewise, Addis Ababa is clearly aware that some western governments worry about losing access to Abiy if they press him too hard. Ethiopia is an important player in the wider East African and Middle East security landscape.
Lastly, Ethiopia has friends elsewhere – Russia, China, Turkey – which have defended the government's 'right' to non-interference in its domestic affairs. Where the Europeans and Americans have, for example, restricted their financial support to Ethiopia, both China and Russia have stepped up to offer assistance in rehabilitating Tigray. So western partners would also be reluctant to take action which could further destabilize an already shaky Ethiopia or cede influence to their rivals. And Addis knows that.
When Abiy came to power, in some ways he seemed to pull the lid off of long-simmering ethnic tensions. Is Ethiopia as a unified, multi-ethnic state still... viable?
Fault lines in Ethiopia are cross-cutting: religion, class, culture, different versions of history and, yes, ethnicity. In fact, the protests that brought Abiy to power in 2018 were about some of these issues. And as you point out, these issues predate Abiy's premiership, but some of them have gained fresh momentum since he took office in 2018.
But, interestingly, when you discount Tigray, Ethiopia has seen comparably high levels of instability before and has remained intact. Say, between 2010-12 when unrest in the Somali Region and within Muslim communities was extreme.
That said, Tigray has undoubtedly become a rallying point for bigger questions about Ethiopia's future. Particularly for those concerned about potential constitutional changes that could rework Ethiopia's regional structure: there's concern that this could on the one hand undermine the country's smaller ethnic groups, while also pitting larger groups against one another. How well Abiy navigates that process will determine the viability of Ethiopia as a multi-ethnic state.
How does a crisis in Ethiopia reverberate into the world beyond?
Ethiopia is the Horn of Africa's hegemon — a mantle that, say, neighboring Kenya never really rose to take on. Ethiopia has been a key actor in peacekeeping or counter-terrorism missions in Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan, and has participated in the political transitions of all three.
Because of its influence and willingness to collaborate it has — for better or worse — become an anchor state for international partners seeking to engage with the Horn of Africa.
But of course, current events are challenging countries' view of Ethiopia as a reliable partner in the region. If there is instability or isolation in Ethiopia, it would bode poorly for resolving key regional issues like Ethiopia's border dispute with Sudan, or the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam dispute with downstream partners on the Nile.
Finally, given its sheer size — 115 million people — Ethiopia's neighbors in the Horn and across the Mediterranean will rightly worry about what an unstable Ethiopia could mean for migration flows.
Anything else that I haven't asked that you think is an important angle here?
Well one thing is that with the election done, the government will now want to move ahead with pre-existing plans for a constitutional reform process.
That could entail some pretty radical changes to how Ethiopia's regions are organized and how Ethiopians choose their leaders. This is in fact a far more serious arena of political contestation than the election was, and it will serve as a vehicle for different groups to advance their interests.
The road there, the amendment process, and the final product are all potential flash points. Don't expect that headline within the next few weeks, but when it drops you should pay attention.
OK one last thing, can't resist: what's your favorite Ethiopian dish?
I'm embarrassed to admit in front of our climate team, but as a South African I am a big carnivore. So gored gored is my favorite — spiced and marinated cubes of raw beef!
That is hardcore, man. We're over here with the sega tibs. Thanks for your insight on all this. Cheers.
What We're Watching: Chile's new constitution, Bibi hangs on in Israel, Ethiopia's violent vote
Who will write Chile's new constitution? Nineteen months after Chileans flocked to the streets to protest rising inequality, the country's constitution, which dates from the 17-year dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet, is finally set to be rewritten. And this weekend, Chileans will vote to elect the 155 representatives who are responsible for doing that. The constitutional convention group, which will include dedicated seats for indigenous community representatives and must be at least 50 percent female, will likely include right- and left-leaning representatives who will need to find common ground on revising the neoliberal, free market economic model that has long been the law of the land in Chile. Indeed, privatization of education and healthcare helped Chile become one of the most prosperous states in the region — and also one of the most unequal. Meanwhile, codification of women's rights, a flashpoint issue in Latin America, will also be on the table. The representatives will have nine months to rewrite the document, which will then need to be approved in another referendum.
Israel's "change camp" collapses: In a massive upset for Israel's "change camp" — the anti-Netanyahu bloc led by the centrist Yair Lapid of the Yesh Atid party — Naftali Bennet, who heads the right-wing Yamina party, said Thursday that he will no longer seek to form a unity government with the centrist bloc. This comes amid massive clashes between Jews and Arabs across Israeli cities, and the worst escalation between Israeli forces and Hamas militants in the Gaza Strip since 2014. This development is a massive boon for incumbent PM Benjamin Netanyahu, who has been desperately seeking to scuttle the formation of a unity government that would oust him from power after 12 years. Netanyahu could try and strike a deal to merge his Likud party with Bennet's Yamina, but it seems unlikely that Netanyahu will be able to cobble together the 61 seats needed to form a coalition government. Israel is now likely headed to another round of elections — its fifth since April 2019. If that happens, Netanyahu will be running his next campaign while facing corruption charges that could send him to jail.
Ethiopia braces for violent elections: In less than a month, Ethiopians in some regions will go to the polls in regional and municipal elections. The votes were delayed last year due to COVID, and come amid rising sectarian violence all over the country. As the civil war in Tigray rages on, all eyes are now on Oromia, Ethiopia's most populous region. Opposition nationalist parties there are boycotting the election because they say Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is harassing them. Despite being an Oromo himself, Abiy is deeply unpopular with Oromo nationalists who say that his political reforms opened a Pandora's box that hurt their interests. The PM's crackdown on protesters demonstrating against the murder of an Oromo nationalist singer last summer didn't help matters. In short, Abiy's ruling party and its allies will win, but many Oromos will consider the result illegitimate, and the political unrest will get worse in this ethnically divided country.