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Iranian election turnout could set new record low
Iranians will go to the polls on March 1 to vote for a new parliament, which will serve for a four-year term. They will also vote for members of the Assembly of Experts, a body of clerics that is tasked with selecting a new Supreme Leader and serves a six-year term. However, given that the Islamic regime now carefully manages election outcomes to protect its grip on power, voter participation is expected to plumb new record lows. We asked Eurasia Group analyst Greg Brew to explain the significance of this week’s polls.
What is the position of parliament in the Iranian system?
Iran’s constitution delineates legislative powers to the parliament, which also oversees the budget and cabinet appointments. However, parliament’s power is constricted by Iran’s powerful executive branch, particularly the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, as well as the Guardian Council, a small group of clerics and senior figures who sign off on all legislation and determine who is eligible to run for office. Given these restrictions, parliament is regarded by many Iranians as a rubber-stamp committee with little real control over government policy, a feeling that has only grown more pronounced since 2020, when elections were stage-managed by the Guardian Council to ensure hardliners dominated parliament. Authorities also carefully controlled the 2021 presidential election to ensure Ebrahim Raisi, an arch conservative with close ties to Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), was elected. (The next presidential election will be in 2025, when Raisi is expected to run for reelection.)
What steps is the regime taking to control the election outcome?
As with 2020, the Guardian Council has taken a heavy hand in vetting candidates: Out of the thousands of applications, many were disqualified from running for office, including most prominent reformists and moderates. This ensures the new parliament will remain dominated by hardliners with a strong affiliation with Khamenei, the IRGC, and the conservative clerical faction.
Is the sense of public alienation toward the regime growing?
Dissatisfaction with the regime is currently very high, owing to a variety of factors that include a weak economy, high inflation, widespread corruption, and ongoing and intensifying political repression. The fact that elections are now carefully managed by authorities has produced a broad view that they are sham affairs: as a result, participation in elections has dropped from over 70% to roughly 50%. It is expected to be even lower this year, perhaps the lowest on record. While the regime likely retains the support of some of the population, most Iranians view the Islamic Republic as an illegitimate government.
So, is there a chance of unrest around the vote?
Despite this widespread dissatisfaction, the circumstances don’t seem conducive to the kind of public protest that occurred in 2022, when thousands took to the streets following the death of Mahsa Amini at the hands of the morality police. The force of the government crackdown in response to those protests and the ongoing efforts to suppress new displays of discontent, as well as the generally bleak outlook for political reform, means most Iranians are averse to taking to the streets. Instead, citizens will express their dissatisfaction by staying at home and not participating in elections.
How worried is the regime about its legitimacy?
The Islamic Republic has held power for more than forty years. It possesses a large and sophisticated security apparatus and a toolkit of repressive measures that it uses to suppress public dissatisfaction. It is a government has proven, time and again, that it is willing to kill its own people in large numbers in order to remain in power.
That said, the regime has reasons to be worried about its position. Its credibility on a number of important issues, from the economy to terrorism, water scarcity and inflation, is in serious question. It is defined by self-dealing, with more and more of the nation’s wealth flowing to a small elite, particularly senior officers in the IRGC. Millions of Iranians are trying to leave the country, particularly educated members of the middle class.
What are the prospects for political change in the mid-to-long term?
The regime is confident it can hold on to power. It’s fixated on a potential succession crisis, given that Khamenei is eighty-four and in poor health, and the reason for stage-managed elections has been to ensure there’s a smooth transition from the current leader to a Khamenei 2.0. That’s why reformists and moderates have been squeezed out, with even former president Hasan Rouhani denied the opportunity to run for a seat on the Assembly of Experts. There’s virtually no chance the regime permits any reforms or positive political changes, at least not until after succession.
But this policy comes with its own dangers. The Iranian public appears unwilling to resume protests for the moment, but that could change. By refusing to reform, the regime has further undermined its legitimacy, and the transition to a new, similarly conservative Supreme Leader will only harden public dissatisfaction. Iran may be quiet, but it’s a powder keg that could go off at any time.
Edited by Jonathan House, Senior Editor at Eurasia Group
Iran makes trouble as nuclear talks drag on
Iran was involved in two naval incidents in the Gulf of Oman in recent days. The US, UK, and Israel have blamed Iran for a drone attack that killed two European nationals. Iran has rejected the accusations. Iran is also suspected in the "potential hijack" of a tanker off the coast of the United Arab Emirates.
These provocations are happening just as Iran inaugurates a new president, Ebrahim Raisi, and as talks continue over the possible US re-entry into the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. What's the connection between these events? We asked Henry Rome, Eurasia Group's deputy head of research and a director covering global macro politics and the Middle East.
WS: Iran was involved in two naval incidents in the Gulf of Oman in recent days that have provoked anger and concern in Israel, the UK and US. This is happening at a time when negotiations over the revival of the 2015 nuclear deal is reaching a critical point. Are these two facts related? If so, how?
HR: The attack on the Israeli-linked ship appeared to be the latest salvo in the decades-long shadow war between Israel and Iran, which will proceed whether there's a nuclear deal or not. The second incident is murkier, but it appears that Iranian forces tried and failed to hijack the ship. This could've been aimed at somehow building leverage in the talks, or as a reminder to Iran's neighbors of its capabilities, or something else altogether. We just don't know at this stage.
WS: We know there are differences of opinion inside Iran's leadership over the nuclear deal. Are those opposed to the deal trying to provoke a response from the US, Israel, or UK that will kill the agreement?
HR: I don't buy the idea that there's a rogue faction within the Iranian state creating hostilities to undermine diplomacy. On matters of strategic importance, like the nuclear deal, the state acts as a unitary actor. And, as of now, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei remains publicly supportive of the agreement, with conditions. Now, is it possible these incidents create circumstances that end up making a revival of the deal impossible? Yes, absolutely.
WS: How might that happen?
HR: If a ship linked to the US is attacked, or if an American crew member on a ship is killed, the political space for the negotiations in Washington will evaporate, at least in the near term. It will be very challenging for the Biden administration to proceed with sanctions relief in the immediate aftermath of such an incident.
WS: Does Iran's new president change the dynamic here? Beyond his public statements, where do his interests really lie?
HR: On the nuclear issue, Raisi seeks refuge in the statements of [Supreme Leader Ali] Khamenei, and he and his team have refrained from going beyond vague comments. So, there's a lot we don't know at this point. But Raisi probably does have a real political interest in sanctions relief to give the economy some breathing room early in his term. Of course, the only way to get sanctions relief is to negotiate over the nuclear program.
WS: In one sentence, will there be a return to the nuclear deal? Why or why not?
HR: Yes, I think so; the path to a deal was never going to be easy or immediate, but the logic is compelling for both sides to get to yes eventually.What We’re Watching: Iranian inauguration, Taliban go urban, Belarusian activist dead, China’s hog hotels
Raisi won't have it easy: The newly "elected" president of Iran, Ibrahim Raisi, was officially endorsed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on Tuesday. In his inaugural address, the 60-year-old hardliner pledged to get US sanctions removed and to respond to rising socioeconomic grievances within Iran, but he warned that he wouldn't lash Iran's prosperity or survival to "the will of foreigners." In Iran, the president's role focuses mainly on domestic policy, but with the economy reeling one of Raisi's big early challenges will be to continue complicated talks with the Biden administration to renegotiate the 2015 nuclear deal, which would lead to the US lifting some of the harshest sanctions. Both sides say they want a new deal, and have gone through half a dozen rounds of negotiations already, but they remain at odds over who should make what concessions first. Raisi also pledged to restore Iranians' flagging trust in their government and to improve the economic situation, but in ways that are in line with "revolutionary principles." He'll have his hands full with that. And don't forget that the likely imminent (re)takeover of neighboring Afghanistan by the Taliban — whom Tehran don't like at all — will also occur on Raisi's watch. Good luck, Mr. President, you'll need it.
Taliban capture key city: After taking over most of rural Afghanistan, the Taliban are now closing in on Afghan cities. This week, an Afghan general told residents to evacuate Lashkar Gah, the capital of southern Helmand province, after the Taliban seized most of the urban area. This is a big blow for the government because it promised to defend provincial capitals. (Helmand witnessed back in 2009 one of the US/NATO military's most successful campaigns against the Taliban, although NATO forces always failed to stop the Taliban from using the province's poppy fields to fuel their lucrative opium trade.) Meanwhile, the Biden administration now says it'll expand US visa eligibility for Afghans fleeing the Taliban takeover. But, but, but… they'll need to apply outside the country, and Washington doesn't intend to help them get out. Afghanistan's neighbors could step in, but the last thing they want is a refugee crisis on their borders.
Belarus targets dissidents: Two days after a Belarusian sprinter sought refuge in Poland because she feared for her life after criticizing her country's government at the Tokyo Olympics, a prominent Belarusian dissident in exile has turned up dead in Ukraine. People close to Vitaly Shishov, head of a Kyiv-based NGO that helps Belarusians escape persecution, believe his death by hanging was carried out by hitmen sent by strongman President Alexander Lukashenko. Shishov is one of many young Belarusians who left the country a year ago following the regime's crackdown on mass street protests after Lukashenko's victory in the August 2020 presidential election, which outside observers say was rigged. If it's true that Lukashenko had Shishov killed, the Belarusian leader is clearly upping the ante on targeting his opponents abroad, just months after grounding an EU-bound flight to arrest an anti-government journalist. And there's not much Brussels can — or will — do about it.
China's pig hotels: If you're a Chinese pig, you're in luck. The state plans to house about 10,000 of you in a luxury condo with 24-hour security, veterinarians on call, gourmet meals, and health monitoring. This doesn't mean they don't want to eat you anymore (they do!), but rather, that they aim to keep you safe from all sorts of viruses — especially the devastating African swine flu, which wiped out half of all Chinese hogs in 2018. So say goodbye to eating scraps on a family farm, you now live in the lap of luxury. The catch is that you'll still be expected to get plump and juicy for char siu.
Iran's opposition in exile goes on offense
Next week, Ebrahim Raisi, a hardliner who is ideologically and personally close to Iran's 82 year-old supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, will be inaugurated as Iran's president. This power transition comes as the country experiences a fresh wave of protests that started in Iran's southwest over water shortages earlier this month and has since spilled over into dozens of provinces.
Some close observers of Iranian society and politics say that popular discontent there is now more widespread than it has been in years, making the Iranian regime more vulnerable than ever.
To unpack recent events, GZERO Media interviewed Ali Safavi, a longtime member of the National Council of Resistance of Iran — the main political opposition group to Iran's theocracy — whose leaders have lived in exile for decades. Safavi has taught at several American universities and has been an analyst for Western media outlets. He was also involved in the campaign to remove the Mujahedin-e Khalq movement — which the NCRI is closely linked to — from the lists of terrorist groups in the US (2012) and Europe (2009).
The MEK was formed in the 1960s by leftist-student groups to overthrow the American-backed Shah. While its supporters view it as a freedom movement advocating democratic reform in Iran, its detractors condemn the MEK's militaristic past. Indeed, many Iranians shunned the group for joining forces with Saddam Hussein against Tehran during the brutal Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988). (Meanwhile, accusations of cult-like tendencies plague the group today.)
This conversation with Ali Safavi has been edited for length and clarity.
GD: What do you make of the latest protests in Iran and what, if anything, makes them different from previous mass demonstrations?
AS: I think the recent protests have to be seen in the context of the developments of the past few months in Iran. Obviously what has happened is the continuation of four nationwide uprisings that erupted in Iran since 2017. And if anything, it goes to show that despite all the repressive measures that the regime has put in place, particularly since November 2019, that it cannot extinguish the flames of resistance and opposition to the regime.
Over the past year and a half, the most effective and closest ally of the Iranian regime has been the coronavirus. The regime has basically invested in the strategy of mass casualties — it is not providing the necessary assistance to the people. It seems that the Iranian people are emerging from the burden of the coronavirus and expressing their pent up anger and their demands for freedom and liberty.
The scope of the uprising this time is also different. Already there have been protests in 14 different provinces. And the interesting feature of all of these protests is the unanimity in the slogans that people express: "down with the dictator," "down with absolute rule of the clergy," and "down with Khamenei."
GD: Are those slogans new? Have they not been used before?
AS: Yes they have. But I think what is important is that, ostensibly, the protest in Khuzestan was over water shortage, but it quickly became political. The protest yesterday in Tehran was because of electricity cuts. So yes, people have different and specific grievances, but at the end of the day, the root cause of all of these calamities is the regime in Tehran. Today is the 13th or the 14th day of what began in Khuzestan in early July. And so it goes to show that the regime clearly cannot contain the protests; the regime is at its weakest and most fragile state in its 40-year history.
GD: Realistically, what role can the NCRI play in affecting change considering that your group is not actually in the country?
AS: While of course it is true that the leadership of the NCRI has been in exile, that is not to say that its network has been absent within the country. In every city that you see protests now, there have been hundreds of MEK members or sympathizers who have been executed by this regime in the past. And of course these people have families and many of them have children who are now grown up. And so the people that you see out in the streets, the fact that they repeat the very slogans that the MEK or the NCRI have been promoting for years goes to show the effectiveness of our movement.
GD: What do you think the Biden administration should be doing now vis-à-vis Iran policy?
AS: The Democratic Party and President Biden's platform during the election was that human rights and democracy will be front and center [in his administration]. He [Biden] should remain true to that pledge. And I think, for example, what happened in Khuzestan with eight people being killed, according to Amnesty International, required a decisive condemnation on the part of the administration. But what do we see? They are observing. Observation is not enough. You have to condemn Iran. Iranian people need to know that the Western world and particularly the United States stands with them in the real struggle for emancipation and freedom.
This whole JCPOA discussion is fruitless and helpless and is to the detriment of the Iranian people. Are they really going to lift the sanctions against Khamenei, the man who is responsible for, among other things, the 1988 massacre?
GD: What about the argument that these economic sanctions hurt ordinary Iranians?
AS: I think this is a false narrative that the pro-Iran lobby propagates in Western capitals. Remember, during Ahmadinejad's presidency Iran had $600 billion worth of oil revenues. Where did that money go? Why are 12 million Iranians hungry every night? Iran is a country with the second largest gas reserves in the world. Giving concessions to this regime has not improved the lives of average Iranians, and giving concession to this regime has not empowered the so-called moderates within this region.
GD: What's your response to detractors who say the NCRI, formerly designated a terror group by the US State Department, has a violent past, and that there isn't a constituency today in Iran that supports the group?
AS: When [former Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah] Khomeini declared a reign of terror in June 1981, basically eliminating the last vestiges of peaceful political activity, the MEK had no choice, but to defend itself. And of course, that right is recognized even by the Catholic Church, that whenever you have no other means of defending yourself, you can use whatever means are necessary. Nobody welcomes violence, but it is not we that dictate the form of this struggle. It is the enemy that does that.
We have always said to all of those who say we don't have any semblance of support inside Iran: Okay. Let's have a free election and see who the people of Iran will vote for. If they vote for us, fine. If they don't, that's also fine. We have been an opposition movement for 56 years. We're perfectly willing to be an opposition movement for another 56 years.
The Graphic Truth: Who votes in Iran?
Iranians head to the polls on June 18, in what's widely perceived to be a foregone outcome. Analysts predict that popular disillusionment with Iran's political class will make this one of the lowest turnout elections in Iran's post-revolution history. According to one poll taken by the Iranian Students Polling Agency, as few as 42 percent of the eligible voting population is expected to show up. We take a look at contemporary Iran's demographics, and how this year's vote turnout might compare to previous elections.
Who will change Iran?
Iranians head to the polls on Friday to vote for president, and it appears a foregone conclusion that hardliner Ebrahim Raisi, the nation's top judge, will win.
Outsiders, and many Iranians, roll their eyes at the predictability of this vote. Iran's Guardian Council, a dozen clerics and judges who answer only to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, has cleared the field for Raisi by ruling all of his credible challengers ineligible. The fix is in, and Iranians are now preparing for a moment when anti-reform conservatives, those who oppose social change inside Iran and deeper engagement with the West, will for the first time ever control the country's presidency, parliament, courts, and much of the media.
But simmering beneath the cynicism and predictability of this event is a deepening anxiety over Iran's future as it enters a potentially momentous period in the Islamic Republic's 42-year history. The Supreme Leader, in power for 32 years, is now 82 years old. Very few people know the true state of his health. Even if he outlives Raisi's presidency, which could last four or eight years, preparations for a historic, uncertain, and potentially dangerous leadership transition will intensify soon.
In fact, Khamenei has gone to extraordinary lengths to ensure Raisi's win, according to Eurasia Group senior analyst Henry Rome, precisely because he considers Raisi a "safe pair of hands" in the presidency — a predictable and loyal leader — at this crucial historical moment.
As we approach just the second transition from one Supreme Leader to another in the Islamic Republic's history, no Iranian under the age of 45 will have any memory of the 1979 revolution that gives him his legitimacy. About 70 percent of Iranians are under 40. If a growing population of young people is less likely to accept the Supreme Leader's right to rule, no one can say much violence and upheaval this coming moment of change at the very top could create.
Some of Iran's people are desperate for change. They want more personal freedom, and many of them believe that greater engagement with Europe and the United States is essential if Iran's economy is to create opportunity and prosperity. Other Iranian voters fear that a more relaxed attitude toward religious values and rules, and greater contact with the West, would be toxic for Iranian society and could create chaos in its politics. Both sides are bracing for a fight.
We asked Henry Rome what all this means for Raisi and Iran's immediate future. You can read the full text of Henry's thoughts here.
Who is Raisi? Raisi is "ideologically very close to Khamenei," who has "elevated [him] to positions of national prominence throughout his career," Rome told us. But he's also a "poor politician… uninspiring, uncharismatic, with only a tenuous grasp on issues facing average citizens." Rome says the decision to clear the field for Raisi is "a back-handed vote of confidence: It reflects a strong desire to elevate Raisi but real doubts about whether he could win on his own."
What can we expect from his presidency? "Raisi is a firm believer in Khamenei's notion of a 'resistance economy' in which Iran builds up domestic capacity and self-reliance at the expense of broader global integration, especially with the West. But this strategy has very significant limitations. Iran's industrial sector, including automotive and energy, needs foreign inputs and investment to grow in a sustainable way. A more closed economy would struggle to create jobs, combat corruption, and raise living standards. And it would ignore the desire of many Iranians for closer ties with the West and for access to Western consumer goods."
Could that spell trouble for him? "Unmet popular expectations would leave Raisi exposed to popular discontent, especially once the initial economic benefits of a return to the nuclear agreement wear off. If Raisi gets roughed up in the presidency, the whole state may suffer further dents to its credibility."
If Rome is right, we'll be watching to see whether Raisi's "safe pair of hands" creates conflict inside the Islamic Republic at one of the most dangerous moments in its history.
This man will be Iran’s next president. Who is he?
Iranians will go to the polls on Friday to vote for president. While surprises are possible, it's very likely that Judiciary Chief Ebrahim Raisi will win, succeeding current President Hassan Rouhani, who is stepping down because of term limits.
Raisi is a true hardliner, and while Iranian presidents have a constrained role, he will leave an important mark on both foreign and domestic policy. Eurasia Group senior analyst Henry Rome explains who Raisi is, how he became the frontrunner, and what his election would mean for Iran.
Who is Raisi?
Raisi is ideologically very close to Khamenei, who has elevated Raisi to positions of national prominence throughout his career. Raisi has unimpeachable hardline credentials; he is well known in Iran as a participant in the 1988 "death commission," in which thousands of political prisoners were executed after summary trials. Yet Raisi is also a poor politician — uninspiring, uncharismatic, with only a tenuous grasp on issues facing average citizens. Rouhani beat him decisively in the 2017 election.
What does being the frontrunner mean in the Iranian context?
Iranian elections are historically neither free nor fair, but they are usually competitive and offer citizens real, if limited, choices. This year, the state took its electoral control to a new level. The Guardian Council, which vets candidates for national office and is closely aligned with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, disqualified several candidates who posed a potential challenge to Raisi, such as former parliament speaker Ali Larijani. The council's arbitrary disqualifications drew rebukes from across the political spectrum (and even half-hearted concern from Raisi himself). But Khamenei, who calls the shots at the end of the day, endorsed the council's actions.
Does Raisi have any competition?
Raisi has three competitors, including one moderate figure (six competitors were approved, but three have already dropped out; additional ones may pull out ahead of the race as well). Aside from Raisi, none of the remaining candidates has a national profile or base of support. With a lack of real options, most Iranians will likely sit out of the election. Only about 40 percent of Iranians have told pollsters they will vote, which would be the lowest turnout in the history of the country.
This will deprive Raisi of a real popular mandate and undermine the legitimacy of the election broadly.
Given the damage to its legitimacy, why is the state putting its thumb on the scale in favor of Raisi?
The state's intervention on behalf of Raisi is essentially a back-handed vote of confidence: It reflects a strong desire to elevate Raisi but real doubts about whether he could win on his own. Another electoral defeat would likely doom his career.
The broader context is quite important. Khamenei, who has led Iran since 1989, is 82, and concerns about succession have loomed large in the background of this campaign. Raisi is on a shortlist of people that Khamenei appears to be grooming for the top job, although he is not a shoo-in. Whether he succeeds Khamenei when the leader dies, Raisi is presumably a safe pair of hands during a potentially tumultuous leadership transition.
What would Raisi's election mean for the nuclear deal and relations with the US?
Khamenei is the ultimate decision-maker on issues like the nuclear agreement, but Raisi has publicly supported the deal and has pledged to get the US sanctions removed as quickly as possible. Raisi wants to benefit from the economic boost of a deal while blaming his predecessor for negotiating the uncomfortable and unpopular compromises that will make it possible. So if the parties reach a deal before the presidential inauguration in August, Raisi would likely honor it.
If they don't, he will likely help bring it quickly to a conclusion. Yet despite a nuclear deal, US-Iran relations will probably worsen in the coming years, given Raisi's staunchly anti-American stance and toxic history.
Iran has experienced period violent protests, largely focused on economic issues. What can Raisi offer on the economy and what is the risk of future unrest?
Raisi is a firm believer in Khamenei's notion of a "resistance economy," in which Iran builds up domestic capacity and self-reliance at the expense of broader global integration, especially with the West. But this strategy has very significant limitations. Iran's industrial sector, including automotive and energy, needs foreign inputs and investment to grow in a sustainable way. A more closed economy would struggle to create jobs, combat corruption, and raise living standards. And it would ignore the desire of many Iranians for closer ties with the West and for access to Western consumer goods.
Could that spell trouble for him?
Unmet popular expectations would leave Raisi exposed to popular discontent, especially once the initial economic benefits of a return to the nuclear agreement wear off. If Raisi gets roughed up in the presidency, the whole state may suffer further dents to its credibility. If Raisi is president that would mean that for the first time in the Islamic Republic, the presidency, judiciary, parliament, much of the media, and the security and intelligence services would all be in the hands of hardliners.
If and when things go wrong, it will be more difficult to point fingers elsewhere.
Iran's presidential race: A choiceless choice
The field has narrowed in Iran's highly-anticipated presidential elections set for next month. The powerful Guardian Council has given a handful of candidates the go-ahead to compete for the presidency. But critics of the regime say it's barely a competition at all. What's happened so far, and what does this tell us about the state of Iran's domestic politics?
The process. Iran's electoral process is tightly controlled by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has been in power since 1989 and calls all the shots in Iran. (Though Iran's president is head of the executive branch, he still answers directly to the supreme leader, who has the final say on foreign and domestic policy.)
The Guardian Council — made up of 12 appointees, half of whom are clerics handpicked by Khamenei himself, while the other six are judges or lawyers tapped by the head of Iran's judiciary — ultimately decides who can run for president. Of the 592 Iranians who put their hats in the ring this cycle, the Guardian Council narrowed the list down to just seven.
Analysts say this list is the least ideologically diverse in history. Most of those on the ballot are deemed "hardliners" — a faction that asserts Islamic law over personal freedom inside Iran and opposes engagement with the West.
"Raisi vs Raisi." Since former parliamentary speaker Ali Larijani — a candidate with significant name recognition — didn't make the cut, it's all but certain that Ebraim Raisi, a conservative cleric and the country's top judge, will secure the presidency. (Since 2019, Raisi has led the judiciary that selects Guardian Council members who… select presidential candidates.)
For months, the supreme leader and relevant government institutions have been tacitly pushing Raisi's candidacy, leading observers to muse that the race can be summed up as "Raisi vs Raisi." The other candidates are no-hopers, they say, several of whom have run for the presidency in previous years and barely made an electoral dent.
There are several discernible takeaways from the Iranian leadership's brazen attempt to fix the outcome of the race.
Risk vs reward. It's clear that Khamenei wants to remove any hurdles that could stand in the way of Raisi clinching the job. Many say that's because Raisi — an uncompromising hardliner who, as Deputy Tehran prosecutor in the 1980s, signed off on the execution of thousands of political prisoners after the Iran-Iraq War — is being groomed to replace the all-powerful supreme leader.
Raisi already lost one presidential race in 2017, and losing a second time would undermine Khamenei's attempt to market him as a successor with popular appeal. With the stakes this high (after all, Khamenei is 82) that's not a risk the supreme leader seems willing to take.
But the strategy could backfire. Disillusionment with a perceived rigged election is likely to depress voter turnout. Low participation would be extremely embarrassing for Khamenei, whose regime's domestic credibility has suffered significantly in recent years amid a spiraling economic downturn imposed by crippling US sanctions. Popular boycott of the election would give hardliners full control of government but little mandate to govern.
And from the regime's perspective, the only thing worse than voter apathy is voter anger. Iranians have a tradition of mass mobilizations to express discontent with economic stagnation and lack of political representation. (After a disputed election in 2009, for example, the Green Movement took the streets in massive numbers, posing the biggest threat to the regime since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.) This sort of upheaval would be disastrous for Khamenei and his cronies — and even Raisi has called for more candidates to be allowed to run, saying he hoped this year's race would be more "competitive and participatory."
Nuclear deal in limbo. Less clear, however, is how this all might affect the recently-resumed talks in Vienna with six world powers. It surely doesn't make them any easier. The Biden administration, for its part, says that it will only lift economic sanctions if Iran stops enriching uranium in compliance with the accord, but hardliners say that after former president Trump abandoned the deal in 2018, Washington can't be trusted. Indeed, reviving the deal will be harder if Iran's current President Hassan Rouhani is replaced with an ideologically intransigent hardliner who campaigns actively against compromise.
What can we expect now? A Raisi triumph. But as Ahmad Zeidabadi, an Iranian journalist and former political prisoner told the Financial Times:"A victory of Raisi after the elimination of his rivals would be nothing but winning a running race with turtles."