Riley is a writer and reporter for GZERO. When she isn’t writing about global politics, you can find her making GZERO’s crossword puzzles, conducting research on American politics, or persisting in her lifelong quest to learn French. Riley spends her time outside of work grilling, dancing, and wearing many hats (both literally and figuratively).
Earlier this week, Hamas freed the remaining 20 living hostages who were held in Gaza, while Israel released nearly 2,000 Palestinian prisoners — the first step in their ceasefire deal. As Israeli troops pull back to the agreed-upon line inside Gaza, the next and perhaps most difficult phase begins: Hamas is expected to disarm, relinquish control, and make way for a two key elements of the transition: on the civilian side, a “temporary technocratic government”; and on the military side, an international security force to take Hamas’s place.
Sustaining the peace will require a confluence of factors: real Hamas disarmament; an effective interactional security force, most likely drawn from the Arab world; a civilian, technocratic Palestinian government; and the emergence of a clearer long-term governance plan for Gaza. There are many questions that will need to be addressed between here and there.
First, how strong is Hamas? The war decimated Hamas’s leadership and infrastructure. Many of its top commanders are dead or in hiding, and its political wing has been forced to the shadows. Inside Gaza, many civilians blame Hamas for provoking a war that left the territory in ruins. Meanwhile, clan militias and rival factions are trying to fill the power vacuum.
But Hamas is reasserting control, “deploying thousands of security personnel, especially in key areas like Gaza City, in an effort to uphold security and consolidate its authority,” according to Dr. Reham Owda, an expert on Palestinian politics.
Hamas has also begun executing rivals to exert its military authority over the strip. Among those killed have been members of the powerful Doghmosh clan, long at odds with Hamas. Since Monday, at least 10 members of Hamas’s security forces and some 20 fighters from rival Palestinian groups have died in the internecine clashes, according to the New York Times.
Will Hamas disarm? Despite US and Israeli pressure, the group has shown a reluctance to disarm, fearing it amounts to political suicide. What Hamas may aim for instead is partial disarmament: giving up heavy rockets and tunnels while evolving its internal security wing into a police force. For Israel, given Hamas’s continued calls for the destruction of their state, keeping them in military power is a nonstarter.
What would an international security force look like? A central pillar of Trump’s ceasefire plan is the creation of an international security force to stabilize Gaza during the transition. Owda says that without this force, the conflict will persist on two fronts, “a war between Hamas and the Israeli army, and an internal war between Hamas and family militias.” But she cautions that international troops will only be accepted by Gazans if they are from Arab and Islamic countries. “Palestinian factions will not accept forces from Western countries and may clash with them.”
So far, no country has made a firm commitment to provide troops to the force, but Indonesia, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan are currently in negotiations. The US has said no American troops will be inside Gaza.
Meanwhile, Israel is wary of an international stabilization force in Gaza, which would restrict its freedom of military action — a central tenet of its security doctrine — and might set a precedent for similar arrangements in the West Bank.
Can a technocratic government be established? The recent ceasefire deal called for a “technocratic” Palestinian administration to run Gaza until elections can be held. The plan, championed by Washington and Egypt, would install a committee of non-partisan experts — business leaders, doctors, engineers — to manage day-to-day affairs under the oversight of an international board, with Tony Blair seemingly in the lead — see our recent coverage of his role.
Speaking of a possible technocratic Palestinian administration, Owda says, “These individuals represent the business and civil society sectors, are independent, and mostly hail from prominent Gazan families.” She adds, “However, without international forces, these members will face significant security challenges and lack the capacity to govern the Gaza Strip, as no national government can function effectively without security stability.”
In theory, this model offers a clean slate. It avoids empowering Hamas while ensuring basic services are being provided. But in practice, pulling it off will require a well-armed international security force being installed to keep Hamas at bay.
Longer term, can the Palestinian Authority (PA) return? “Yes, eventually,” says Atlantic Council’s Middle East expert Gina Abercrombie-Winstanley. “The current violence among the remnants of Hamas and other gangs in Gaza is a stark reminder that there must be a clear and strong Palestinian hand in charge in the strip.”
But the PA is also very weak and unpopular. It has been unable to protect Palestinians in the West Bank from the incursions of Israeli settlers, and it has been 20 years since President Mahmoud Abbas last called for elections. Polling conducted in May 2025 by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research found President Abbas's approval rating at just 19%, though satisfaction was slightly higher in Gaza at 29%.
As imperfect as the PA is, it does have credibility as a governing body and is best placed to attract wide support among Gazans,” says Abercrombie-Winstanley, noting that elections are key to building trust and sustaining the Palestinian Authority’s credibility.
The ceasefire is only the beginning. Gaza’s future will be defined by whether Hamas relinquishes power, whether technocratic governance can be effective, and whether international forces can maintain security without inflaming local tensions. Every element of the plan faces resistance in some quarter, and any backsliding could reignite violence. For Gazans, the stakes are high: a stable, functioning government could finally bring reconstruction and relief, while failure risks another cycle of destruction.At the World Bank-IMF annual meetings this week, GZERO’s Tony Maciulis spoke to Rania Al-Mashat, Egypt’s Minister of Planning, Economic Development, and International Cooperation, about the enormous task of reconstruction in Gaza and the impact of the war on the region. Watch that conversation here
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