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Politics
Visite d’Etat de M. XI Jinping, Président de la République populaire de Chine, en France en presence de Ursula Von der Leyen
5: China lifted sanctions on five European Union lawmakers on Wednesday as Beijing seeks to balance the growing trade war with the United States by warming ties with Europe. The sanctions were originally imposed on members of the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Human Rights in relation to European condemnations of human rights abuses against Uyghur minorities in Xinjiang.
500: Two Harvard University reports on anti-Muslim and antisemitic sentiment on campus released Monday stretched to over 500 pages cumulatively, noting that sizable minorities of Muslims (47%) and Jews (15%) did not feel physically safe. The reports, which were commissioned before the Trump administration took office, also showed that 92% of Muslims and 61% of Jews feared professional and academic repercussions for expressing political beliefs.
18: Turkish police have arrested 18 municipal employees in Istanbul as part of a growing crackdown against city Mayor Ekrem Imamoğlu, who was imprisoned last month. Imamoğlu is widely considered the only opposition figure able to go toe-to-toe with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the next presidential election, but legal obstacles may effectively bar him from running. The municipal employees were among a group of 52 detained over the weekend, and are accused of taking bribes and participating in criminal conspiracy.
1 billion: Argentines deposited $1 billion in US dollars into their bank accounts over the last eight business after the government lifted restrictions on buying US currency following five years of strict controls. The dollar’s relative value has been sliding under the Trump administration and hit a three-year low last week after the president repeatedly criticized the chair of the Federal Reserve.
350,000: What stretchy inanimate thing killed 350,000 people in 2018? One word. Are you listening? Plastics. More specifically, chemicals that are added to the plastics that we encounter in everyday items like food packaging, lotions, and shampoos. A new study suggests that these “phthalates,” as they’re called, contributed to hundreds of thousands of deaths from heart disease, especially in emerging economies where middle-class consumption has grown rapidly in recent decades.
Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney speaks with members of the media as he walks into his office after the Liberal Party staged a major political comeback to retain power in parliamentary elections, in Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, on April 29, 2025.
Prime Minister Mark Carney may have won the battle for power in Canada, but his country’s war of words with US President Donald Trump is only just beginning. And before that all begins, the Liberal leader must form a government.
Carney has options. The Liberal Party is projected to fall just three seats shy of a majority. Even so, the former Bank of England and Bank of Canada governor is unlikely to seek a confidence-and-supply agreement, according to Eurasia Group senior analyst Graeme Thompson, even though Bloc Quebecois offered him a “truce.”
“If the Liberals fall short of a bare majority, they will be in a strong enough position to govern with a minority government, seeking ad hoc support from the NDP and Bloc Quebecois on specific issues,” Thompson said.
The elephant in the room. Once Carney forms a government, his principal test will be dealing with Trump. The aim for Carney, per Thompson, will be “to secure tariff-free (or at least low-tariff) access to the US market,” and the White House’s more dovish tone on trade over the last week suggests there might be an opening. The pair agreed to meet in person some time in the near future, according to a readout from the prime minister’s office, which comes after Carney insisted on Monday that he would only visit Washington to discuss trade agreements when there was a “serious discussion to be had.”
Ian Bremmer examines the future of the US-Canada relationship in his latest World in:60 here.
What’s next for Pierre Poilievre? The Conservative leader lost his own seat – a verdict that would consign you to reality television if you were in the United Kingdom. But he also led the Tories to their largest popular vote share since 1988, and expanded the right-wing coalition, so his political future may not be dead yet.
“He’s humbled,” Thompson said, “but likely to stay on to fight another day.”
April 29, 1975: Vietnamese refugees line up on the deck of USS Hancock for processing following evacuation from Saigon.
April 30 marks 50 years since North Vietnamese troops overran the capital of US-aligned South Vietnam, ending what is known locally as the Resistance War against America. Despite strong US-Vietnam reconciliation in recent decades, US President Donald Trump has forbidden American diplomats to observe the anniversary of this transformative moment — but those who survived the chaos that followed will never forget the trauma echoing down through the generations.
__________________
Saigon, April 29, 1975. For six weeks, South Vietnamese forces have been falling back in the face of a determined communist offensive. American troops have been gone for two years. The feeble government is in disarray. The people are traumatized by three decades of war and three million deaths.
Bing Crosby’s “White Christmas” begins playing on radios across the capital.
Some Saigonese know it’s a sign: It is time to run.
Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, now a Columbia University history professor, was just five months old, the youngest of nine children. After a failed first escape attempt by helicopter, her family heard about an uncle with access to an oil transport boat. More than 100 refugees crammed aboard the small vessel, where they waited for hours to set sail. Nguyen’s father nearly became separated when he dashed back into the city in a futile attempt to find more relatives.
At nightfall, they finally departed, crossing enemy-controlled territory under cover of darkness before being ordered onto an ammunition barge floating off the coast, bursting with over 1,000 refugees.
“When the sun rose the next day, April 30, we realized Saigon had fallen,” says Nguyen.
They were far from safety. The cable anchoring the barge in place severed, and they came under mortar fire as it drifted helplessly. Somehow, no one was killed in the shelling, but the refugees had no water and scant food, and they were baking under the unrelenting sun of the Mekong Delta.
Later that day, after dark, a US ship arrived to take on refugees, but as hundreds of bodies crowded toward their rescuers, they tipped the barge.
“People fell off, and it was in the middle of the night. Many drowned,” says Nguyen. “My brother watched a child fall in the water and then the father dive in after – they were never seen again.”
Baby Lien-Hang and her siblings all made it onto the second ship that arrived and transited through camps in Guam, Wake Island, and Hawaii, then a series of military bases on the US mainland. Months later, the family finally settled permanently in Pennsylvania. But for those who could not find a way out of Saigon that day, the odyssey is just beginning.
The revolution arrives
Americans often think of April 30, 1975, as the end of the Vietnam War. But for Vietnamese, “the fall of Saigon signals not just the victory of North Vietnam, but the peak of their revolution,” says Tuong Vu, a political science professor at the University of Oregon.
The Communist Party of Vietnam rapidly began purging society of threats to their regime, including former South Vietnamese officials and soldiers, capitalists, religious clergy, intellectuals, and ethnic Chinese and Khmer. The new government also seized property, collectivized agriculture, and removed hundreds of thousands of urban residents to the countryside for farming.
Erin Phuong Steinhauer, now the head of the Vietnam Society, was five years old when she watched North Vietnamese tanks roll down Nguyen Hue Boulevard and crash through the gates of the presidential palace. Her family were wealthy proprietors of camera shops, and her father was a former soldier for South Vietnam.
Shortly after the fall of Saigon, troops arrived at their home to take him away. He would spend the next four years in a re-education camp – a prison meant to indoctrinate and punish perceived enemies of the state – suffering extreme deprivations, forced labor, and brainwashing. The family’s property was confiscated, and Erin and nine of her siblings went to live with their grandparents.
“Then they arrested my mother, and interrogated her,” says Steinhauer. For a week, she slept in a corrugated panel box. “They kept her there and asked her over and over: ‘Where is your money? Where did you hide everything? What are your plans?’”
She returned deeply traumatized – but the family had a lifeline. Erin’s mother had hidden gold with relatives in the countryside, and over the next four years, the family used it to make risky escapes in small groups to Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore, where Erin arrived with her mother and sisters in 1979.
“It was a strange feeling when we escaped Vietnam. I remember my dreams before 1975 were in bright color,” says Steinhauer. “Afterward, they were in dull grey overtones.”
Overextension and reform
The Communist Party’s policies strangled economic growth, and Vietnam’s situation was further complicated by China’s split with the USSR. Hanoi sided with Moscow, which had provided advanced weapons and advisors during the war with the US.
Meanwhile, the Khmer Rouge regime in neighboring Cambodia leaned on Beijing for support. Vietnam invaded its neighbor in 1978 to remove Pol Pot’s regime after over a year of border conflicts and failed peace talks, leading to an 11-year-long occupation and a brief punitive war with China in 1979.
“The Soviet Union, with its weak economy, became totally exhausted because of overreach,” says Vu. Straining under the weight of the war in Afghanistan and the arms race with the US, Moscow “was forced to consider economic reform, and in turn, encouraged the Vietnamese to reform as well.”
In 1986, the death of Party Secretary Le Duan allowed new leadership to initiate the Doi Moi reforms, gradually opening Vietnam’s market and sending out political feelers to former enemies.
“After 1986, Vietnam engaged with the global community again, moving away from the Soviet orbit,” says Nguyen. “It is the end of the international marginalization that came about with its war against Cambodia and China.”
Reconciliation with Washington
Repairing relations with the United States remained a slow process, in large part due to an American embargo, and formal diplomatic ties were not fully reestablished until 1995. The relationship strengthened rapidly in the following years, including defense and diplomatic cooperation, but most crucially through trade. Access to US markets helped the Vietnamese economy grow at an astounding pace, with per-capita GDP in 2023 more than 14 times higher than it was in 1995, and total US trade volume over 248 times larger.
That close relationship is part of why many Vietnam observers were shocked when the Trump administration ordered its diplomats in Hanoi to avoid any ceremonies recognizing the 50th anniversary of the fall of Saigon.
“It’s a smack in the face,” says Steinhauer. Though a symbolic gesture, “It invalidates everything we have gone through – not just Vietnamese-Americans, but US veterans, and the people of Vietnam, and the hundreds of diplomats who worked to broker reconciliation over the past 30 years. All of that seems like it is meaningless to this administration.”
Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney speaks in the small hours of April 29, 2025, in Ottawa after his Liberal Party won the general election the previous day.
The Liberals have won the battle to lead Canada. On Monday, Prime Minister Mark Carney’s party completed a stunning turnaround, with projections showing it secured 168 of 343 parliamentary seats.
Just months ago, with Justin Trudeau at the helm, the Liberals — who have been in power for a decade — were underwater in the polls, down as far as 25 points compared to the Conservatives. But Carney, Conservative Pierre Poilievre, and New Democrat Jagmeet Singh all had a mutual opponent in Donald Trump, and a surge in Canadian nationalism helped flip the momentum for the Liberals. The US president’s trade war and threats of using “economic force” to push Canada into becoming the “51st state” fueled much of the “Canada Strong” and “Restore the Promise of Canada” campaign promises of the Liberals and Conservatives, respectively.
A closer race than expected. The Liberals and Conservatives both gained seats compared to the last race in 2021. Led by Poilievre – who notably lost his seat in Ottawa – the Conservatives did better than many predicted, winning roughly 42% of the vote share and at least 144 seats. But the New Democratic Party and Bloc Québécois (which only runs candidates in Quebec) saw their parties lose seats. The NDP secured only seven ridings, down from 25, while the BQ won 23 ridings compared to 32 the last time. Despite losing in his riding, Poilievre has said he will stay on as opposition leader, while Singh has resigned as party leader in the wake of Monday’s crushing results for the NDP.
With the Liberals coming up just shy of the 172 ridings needed for a majority government, they can forge a coalition with the NDP, Bloc Québécois, or the Green Party, or they can go it alone and simply seek votes from other parties on an as-needed basis, issue by issue. Historically, the NDP has collaborated with the Liberals in confidence-and-supply agreements, while the BQ has focused on one-off support for specific issues.
In his victory speech, Carney focused on unity. “Let’s put an end to the division and anger of the past. We are all Canadian and my government will work for and with everyone,” he said.
He also pointed to the job ahead: tackling US-Canada tensions. “When I sit down with President Trump,” Carney said, “it will be to discuss the future economy and security relationship between two sovereign nations.”
“It will be our full knowledge that we have many, many other options to build prosperity for all Canadians.”
US President Donald Trump returns to the White House from his New Jersey golf club to Washington, DC, on April 27, 2024.
President Donald Trump has claimed a broad mandate to pursue sweeping changes to US institutions and policies since he took office on Jan. 20. He has sought to overhaul the federal government by closing agencies and cutting thousands of jobs, restructure the economy by throwing up a tariff wall to force companies to base more of their operations in the US, reconfigure decades-old foreign alliances, and assert expansive powers in an illegal immigration crackdown.
With a cohesive team in the White House, Republican control of Congress, and a disoriented Democratic opposition, Trump has pushed ahead rapidly on many fronts. But opinion polls in recent weeks have shown a sharp decline in public support for the president, and the courts, financial markets, and other institutions have started curbing his actions. Eurasia Group’s Clayton Allen and Noah Daponte-Smith explain their shared insights on where things are likely to go from here.
What is your assessment of the strength of Trump’s starting position? Was it a “historic mandate,” as he has said? And where does he stand today?
Trump’s popular vote win last November gave him a mandate — not the historic romp that he claimed, but a clear signal from voters that they wanted to buy what he was selling. A hundred days in, a lot of voters are suffering buyer’s remorse. It’s been a rough 100 days, almost all self-imposed: The US economy is headed for much lower growth, if not contraction; negotiations are moving slower than the expectations Trump set for the Ukraine war and Gaza; and national polling shows Trump underwater in overall approval, his handling of the economy, management of foreign policy, inflation, even immigration in some polling.
In the Silver Bulletin polling average, Trump had a 52% approval rating (with +12 net approval) on Jan. 21. His approval has since declined to 44%, with a -9 net approval.
The big question for Trump is if, or when, the negative views on the economy and general exhaustion with volatility begin to weigh on his GOP support. His approval among GOP voters is still robust in the mid-80s, but it is showing signs of weakening on the issues. A Gallup poll over the weekend, for example, found that 36% of Republicans believe that tariffs — one of the administration’s headline policies — will “end up costing the US more money than they bring in.”
What signs of Trump’s support will you be focusing on in the months ahead?
Two things – Trump’s approval ratings on the economy and his approval ratings among Republicans. Economic performance polling is a traditional source of strength for Trump, but the economy is where he has shown his sharpest and most notable decline, largely stemming from the tariff rollout. According to the Economist/YouGov survey, Trump’s net approval on the economy was -5.8% as of last week. That is lower than at any point in his first term when he reached a nadir of a net -2%. If Trump is losing support on one of his traditionally strongest issues, that suggests he will be somewhat politically weakened in the latter half of 2025 and beyond.
Trump’s approval ratings among Republicans will be another key sign to watch. The president’s ability to command an unruly Republican conference in Congress depends in large part on his unquestioned popularity within the party. So far, that has held up: He’s still above in the mid-80s% approval among Republicans. But if that dips below 80%, Trump may no longer appear the invincible figure in the party that he does today.
What do you see as the biggest risks for Trump and his ability to advance his agenda?
Recession, market blowback, and the courts. After a big sell-off in early April, markets have stabilized somewhat following Trump’s decision to pause some of his most expansive tariff measures. But with no imminent trade deals on the horizon to clarify tariff levels, one wonders how long that confidence can hold. Similarly, a recession – beginning in the second half of the year, or potentially backdated to the first – would severely disrupt his tax cuts-and-tariffs agenda.
The courts are the biggest source of procedural risk for Trump, especially on the deportation of illegal immigrants and the spending cuts made by Elon Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency. We have already seen strong pushback from the courts in both areas. That pushback may extend to tariffs as well, with court cases in the pipeline over the legality of the emergency authorities claimed to enact them. In all these areas, the courts’ skeptical postures toward the Trump administration’s more disruptive actions will be a major source of conflict between the branches of government over the next year.
How do you think Trump will react if some of these risks materialize? Change approach? Lash out against institutional checks on his power?
Lashing out against institutional checks is more likely. A Trump who can no longer marshal the Republican congressional conference at his will probably seek to expand executive power so that he can act without Congress. Key members of the administration have already pointed in that direction. Even with Musk poised to scale back his involvement with DOGE, the administration is claiming broad powers to reshape the federal government under the so-called unitary executive theory. Similarly, pushback from the courts will likely lead Trump to further test the exact bounds of the courts’ power, as in his moves to skirt rulings related to deported immigrant Kilmar Abrego Garcia’s case. And if an economic downturn materializes, Trump will likely blame it on the policies of the Federal Reserve and its Chairman Jerome Powell.
Edited by Jonathan House, senior editor at Eurasia Group.
President Donald Trump raises a fist during a ceremony where he signs two executive orders that will lead to reciprocal tariffs against other countries that charge tariffs on US goods.
What’s the old line about there being decades where nothing happens and weeks where decades happen?
Quoting Vladimir Lenin may not be the wisest move in today’s America, but it’s an apt description of the (second) first 100 days of Donald Trump’s foreign policy.
In barely three months, he’s bashed America’s closest European allies, spooked NATO into worrying about its survival, taken a chainsaw to US foreign aid programs, pulled the rug out from under Ukraine, threatened to expand US territory for the first time since the 19th century, and started a global trade war that’s pushed protectionism to its highest levels since the Great Depression.
Not bad for 100 days! But is there a method to what seems – to horrified defenders of the “US-led world order” – like so much madness? “Method” is a risky word to use with a figure as famously capricious as Trump, but there are a few basic aspects of his worldview and commitment to “America First” that are consistent and worth understanding.
No new friends (also no old friends)
First, Trump believes that the world is a place where all countries are just trying to “screw” each other. This is true not only of adversaries but, especially, of allies. (Tell me you’re a New York real estate developer without telling me you’re a New York real estate developer.)
The mutual screwing occurs in an endless chain of zero-sum transactions between countries in which hard power and cold cash are all that matters. Deficits or defense umbrellas are ripoffs. Alliances based on “values” are silly. Soft power is a useless conceit, a virtue signal, a kind of “Geopolitical wokism.”
It’s a (multipolar) jungle out there
Second, there are various great powers in this world, and each has its own sphere of influence. The largest of these are the US and its chief rival China, but Russia is up there as well. You do not, in Trump’s view, mess with another power’s sphere of influence, and you do not waste time trying to win over countries of marginal economic or strategic value beyond your neighborhood. You put your country, to borrow a phrase Trump uses a lot, “first.”
Once you grasp that, for Trump, the world is a transactional and increasingly multipolar jungle, it actually explains a lot about his foreign policy.
It tells you why he doesn’t seem to care that much about Ukraine (he sees it as Russia’s sphere) or Taiwan (ditto for China) or why he’s OK slashing foreign aid (soft power is silly). It explains why he wants a piece of Greenland, Canada, and the Panama Canal (all have immense strategic and economic value within Washington’s own sphere of influence, especially if conflict is coming with other powers.) And of course, it tells you why he loves to love tariffs – a crude but effective tool for unleashing America’s immense economic power
Hard power dreams, soft power missteps
All of this is a big rupture with the longstanding idea that the US, as a hegemon, gets more than it gives by providing security, market access, or development assistance to vast parts of the world.
But taken on its own terms, is Trump’s foreign policy ... working? The evidence is mixed. Many of his objectives – restore America’s lost manufacturing capacity, confront China, and force Europe to carry its share of the defense burden – can make sense on their own. But, taken together, the overall policy is still a mess of conflicting impulses.
Trump wants to isolate and pressure China, but he’s simultaneously wrecking relations with Europe, Washington’s most natural ally against Beijing. He wants to maintain technological supremacy over China, but his immigration and education policies are scaring the world’s best minds away from America.
He wants to use tariffs to restore manufacturing – which, by definition, almost requires leaving them in place for a long time. But he also wants to use them to extract tactical concessions on trade and defense – which means not leaving them in place for a long time. Which is it?
And while he is right to force the West to confront the problems of Biden’s well-intentioned but poorly defined Ukraine policy, his pledge to end the war “within 24 hours” is already 2,376 hours overdue. Browbeating Ukraine while pleading with Vladimir Putin on social media is not exactly a foreign policy to be reckoned with.
It’s still early days to be sure. But whether the decades that have happened in these 100 days are a real revolution against the long-established order of US foreign policy, or a a tangle of disruptive but ultimately confused impulses remains to be seen.
Members of the M23 rebel group stand guard at the opening ceremony of Caisse Generale d'epargne du Congo (CADECO) which will serve as the bank for the city of Goma where all banks have closed since the city was taken by the M23 rebels, in Goma, North Kivu province in the East of the Democratic Republic of Congo, April 7, 2025.
The Democratic Republic of the Congo and an alliance of militias led by the notorious M23 rebels announced a ceasefire on Thursday after talks in Qatar and, after three years of violence, said they would work toward a permanent truce. Meanwhile, Congo will reportedly sign a broad declaration of principles on a minerals deal with Rwanda on Friday in Washington, DC. The UN, US, EU, and other governments accuse Rwanda of using M23 to control valuable mines in Congo, but Washington is in the midst of talks with Congo to secure access to those same minerals, for which a deal with Rwanda is a necessary first step.
M23 recently seized the two principal cities in northeastern Congo, Goma, and Bukavu. At least six previous ceasefires in the long-running conflict have failed, turning hundreds of thousands of people into refugees and exposing them to violence, hunger, lack of shelter, and pervasive sexual exploitation.
Poorly trained and equipped Congolese troops have proven ineffective at fighting the rebels, and UN peacekeepers in the region are widely distrusted — even hated — by locals. A South African-led multinational force that held Goma for over a year was surrounded and pushed back in January; by March, they had completely withdrawn.
With Congo’s military situation in such disarray, a truce may be President Felix Tshisekedi’s only option, but his former ally-turned-archrival Joseph Kabila is proving a thorn in his side. Kabila, who ruled the DRC as president from 2001 to 2019 before going into exile in 2023, has reportedly been spotted in M23-controlled Goma. He has long accused Tshisekedi of mishandling the M23 situation — and we’re watching whether he uses this opportunity to launch a play for power.