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Indian PM Narendra Modi walks after inspecting the honor guard during Independence Day celebrations at the historic Red Fort in Delhi.
Gearing up for a third term, meet Modi 3.0
Narendra Modi, 72, is stronger than ever. Last week, the Indian prime minister claimed the top prize in a three-pronged election by keeping his home state of Gujarat. Nabbing one of India’s richest states a sixth time in a row may propel him into a likely third term.
Although headwinds are starting to pick up, the Indian economy remains the fastest growing in the world. And despite his right-wing BJP party being fueled by dangerously populist and divisive communal politics, Modi remains a darling of the West, a friend of Big Business, and Washington’s biggest regional bet to counter China.
But the Great Indian Political Equation has flaws: a Cold War-era proximity to Russia, a rough neighborhood which continues to get rougher, rising inequality at home, and a stubborn strain of Hindu chauvinism that is keeping India from firing on all social and economic cylinders.
So, two questions pop up. First, is Modi going to evolve beyond his limiting politics? Second, what should the world expect from New Delhi when India becomes the third-largest economy on the planet in 2027, in the middle of Modi’s probable next term?
Modi is the fairytale success story of Indian politics: the lowly tea vendor who became an abstinent political worker, who became a populist chief minister, who became one of the world’s most powerful prime ministers. But it wasn’t a smooth transition.
Two decades ago, when he was running Gujarat, Modi was blacklisted by the US State Department over his involvement in the deadly anti-Muslim pogrom of 2000. That was Modi 1.0: local, communal, and controversial.
But the 13 years of successful governance which saw the state propel economically became his launchpad into his own version 2.0. His alliance with corporate India was already sealed well before he arrived in New Delhi in 2014 as PM. But it was the big moves in international affairs — firming up a bipartisan bond with Washington, joining the right economic clubs and political groups, and boosting India’s economic momentum — that proved his international street cred.
Still Modi was limited. Bogged down by China, irritated by Pakistan, statically tied to Russia by defense ties and a longstanding tradition of non-alignment, he was criticized for not doing enough to bridge India’s massive income inequality gap, as well as possessing a heavy-handed authoritarian streak.
With a third term approaching, a Modi 3.0 is emerging. And some recent moves indicate that the Indian PM is moving away from previously dug-in positions.
In the fall, Modi turned heads when he scolded longtime pal Vladimir Putin about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Last week, India cancelled Modi’s annual huddle with Putin over Moscow’s nuclear saber-rattling. Both moves were carefully calibrated by New Delhi to tackle the impression that it is not a reliable partner of the West.
Still, the broad contours of Modi’s foreign policy won’t change in the run-up to the general election in 18 months, estimates Eurasia Group analyst Pramit Chaudhury.
On the one hand, “the slow drift toward the US will continue, though India’s will continue to keep hedging, as it’s not entirely sure about the US commitment to the Indo-Pacific, thanks to America's propensity for isolationism,” he says. On the other, the more private sector-driven, less state-owned, and digitally savvy India that Modi is trying to create makes it naturally compatible with the US economy.
Also, Modi will likely carry on “managing China, not getting any closer, while continuing to purge China’s economic influence within the Indian economy,” Chaudhury assesses. Meanwhile, Pakistan will be dealt with a firm hand, considering India’s old nemesis is dead broke and has no real solution to stop Modi from absorbing disputed Kashmir.
In the Middle East, India aims to leverage hard-earned relationships with the Saudis and the Emiratis to replace Islamabad as their favored South Asian partner — which would be a coup for New Delhi. Finally, the recently acquired G-20 presidency will test Modi’s international mettle on whether his pursuit of a green transition is in line with the West.
But what will an uber-powerful “Maximum Modi” look like at home? For Chaudhury, Modi’s latest tactics indicate that he is moving beyond “Hindutva” – the muscular brand of Hindu-first politics that he depends on – in order to tackle the flaws of his own machine. Since his cult of personality already cuts across India’s communal lines, the PM is beginning to reach out to poor Muslims to join his ranks.
Though it’s unclear how the old-school BJP apparatchiks will respond to this kindness, perhaps behind this rare show of inclusivity lies a cold rationale: to split the opposition, influence upcoming state elections, and bridge the massive inequality gap.
Remember: India has no term limits. Jawaharlal Nehru, the country’s first PM, ruled for 16 years. While Modi has professed to retire to a Himalayan ashram after his next term, his years in power have only strengthened his support.
Sure, India is richer and more powerful under him, but at great cost to its most sacred, progressive values. With no clear successors aligned, and the economic stakes involved, the biggest question in South Asia remains: what’s Modi actually thinking?Modi attends an innovation conference with Israeli and Indian CEOs in Tel Aviv.
The promise and peril of Modi’s success
Narendra Modi’s political juggernaut seems unstoppable.
Through a series of maneuvers — some of them questionable, if not illegal — Modi’s Hindu nationalist BJP party last week took the reins of Maharashtra, India’s richest state. It was yet another victory for Modi in the run-up to elections in 2024, when he is expected to secure a third term.
But Modi’s take-no-prisoners style of governance, coupled with a weak opposition, a compliant judiciary, a supine press, and a society struggling with weakened civil liberties, is increasingly threatening the pillars of the world’s largest democracy.
What happened: The BJP regained its foothold in Maharashtra, home to Mumbai, by allying with about 40 “rebel” lawmakers who broke away from the state government of another right-wing party, the Shiv Sena. Though long deemed as a natural ally to the BJP, Shiv Sena’s leader, Uddhav Thackeray, had led a “secular” coalition that included opposition parties unaligned with Modi’s brand of Hindu supremacy.
Thackeray’s progressive moves triggered a schism within his ranks, which Modi then exploited.
“[The] BJP under Modi used the combination of ideology and realpolitik to bring down the existing coalition government” led by Thackeray, says Ashutosh Varshney, director of the Center for Contemporary South Asia at Brown University. Thackeray’s crime? He “was moderating Hindu nationalism” and running “India's most financially powerful city in a way that was hurting the BJP.”
The stakes:Smashing the coalition run by Thackeray — a conservative, albeit more moderate than Modi — took a few weeks. But the BJP is now back in control in the state where most of India’s business is conducted, making no apologies for fracturing a former ally’s ranks with Machiavellian precision.
Also, Maharashtra is a political trophy.
Its state capital, Mumbai, is the 20-million-strong financial and cultural hub that’s home to Bollywood. Maharashtra is also India’s second-most populous state and has drawn almost a third of all foreign direct investment to the country since 2018. It’s responsible for a fifth of India's sales tax revenue, and the single-largest contributor to GDP. Finally, Maharashtra accounts for nearly one-tenth of MPs in the lower house of parliament.
In short, Maharashtra has what every Indian politician wants: votes, money, and Bollywood dreams.
What this means for Indian politics: The BJP now is directly governing or partnered to rule 18 of India’s 28 states, including Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Bihar. With the opposition Congress party — which ruled India for much of its 75 years since independence — essentially dead in the water with a leadership crisis, it is regional parties that pose the main threat to the BJP. Shiv Sena was one such threat, which is why Modi took aim.
This targeting will continue because “the regional parties are the most important opposition today to the BJP,” says Varshney. Governance, he says, is less important than ideology for Modi. Despite ruling Maharashtra well during the pandemic and even experimenting with environmental policies, Shiv Sena was singled out because it was not “ideologically pure enough” for the even more Hindu nationalist BJP.
Shiv Sena’s fracturing will now serve as a template Modi can use against other regional players who pose a threat to his leadership, Varshney adds.
Rapid growth, but with rising inequality and intolerance: Boasting the world’s fastest economic growth rate, there is no doubt that India is doing well. Last month, it reached the $3.3 trillion mark, surpassing the UK as the world’s fifth-largest economy. But as Indian billionaires rise up, exports boom, and stock markets surge, so do joblessness and inequality.
The same parallel can be drawn to India’s polity. Modi’s BJP used scorched-earth tactics to get elected in 2014 and 2018. His hard-nosed campaigning, combined with cutting-edge PR, helped the BJP secure votes. However, while the party grows electorally, it does so not just at the expense of the opposition — but also by undermining India’s progressive democratic values.
Recent examples of targeting civil society, muzzling the press, even persecuting Bollywood stars suggest that if you investigate Modi or fail to fall in line with his communal politics, you’re out. These tactics also show that the Indian judiciary — with a proud history of checking executive authority — is increasingly compliant with Delhi, according to Varshney. This threatens the secular ethos of the Indian republic and its constitution, especially as Modi looks poised for a third term.
“It is a very, very difficult moment for the polity,” says Varhsney. The 1950 constitution, which guarantees rights for all, “will come undone if Modi wins in 2024,” he predicts. While there are no constitutional grounds upon which he can declare India a Hindu state, Modi is transforming India into a de-facto one, Varshney argues.
“India will not come undone with another Modi victory,” says Varshney. “India will just become a very different place.”
The coup in Maharashtra and the latest crackdown against his critics were conducted while Modi was in Europe last week, hobnobbing with the global elite at the G7 summit in Germany. India isn’t a G7 member, but Modi was there because India is increasingly important for the West’s grand plans, especially the role it could play in checking the rise of their common strategic rival, China. But amid all the jet setting and handshakes, G7 leaders — all democratic countries — must understand the stakes of betting on Modi.
He might play their game, as he does his own thing at home, but it will be at the larger expense of democracy’s most sacred ideals.