GZERO World with Ian Bremmer Podcast

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Unpacking Iran’s competing endgames with Brookings Institution’s Thomas Wright

Ian Bremmer sits down with Thomas Wright, Brookings Institution fellow and former Senior Director at the US National Security Council, to unpack the deepening war in Iran and the divergent strategies shaping it.

Listen: Ian Bremmer sits down with Thomas Wright, Brookings Institution fellow and former Senior Director at the US National Security Council, to unpack the deepening war in Iran and the divergent strategies shaping it.

What are the possible outcomes for the widening conflict in Iran? What began as a dramatic opening strike has evolved into a far more complex war, with Washington, Jerusalem, and Tehran all pursuing different aims. Wright argues this isn’t simply about degrading military capability; it’s about competing endgames that may pull the region in unpredictable directions.

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GZERO World with Ian Bremmer

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Tariffs: what comes next with Paul Krugman and Scott Lincicome

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Listen: While Washington has become more hostile to free trade, Americans continue to buy foreign goods in record numbers. Lincicome notes that economic nationalism is “about an inch deep,” with support collapsing when Americans face higher prices for domestic products.

The conversation also looks into the impact of tariffs on businesses and consumers. Lincicome explains that if certain tariffs are ruled illegal, companies could seek refunds totaling up to $175 billion, potentially through litigation rather than administrative action. Krugman emphasizes that while policy debates grab headlines, public perception and midterm politics may ultimately matter more than the details of trade law or corporate strategy.

From the immediate fallout of legal challenges to the broader question of how the U.S. navigates trade and globalization, Bremmer, Lincicome, and Krugman explore the delicate balance between politics, policy, and the economy—and what it could mean for American consumers, businesses, and the upcoming midterms.

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The Supreme Court curbs Trump’s trade agenda, but the administration is undeterred. So, what's next? Ian Bremmer sits down with economists Scott Lincicome of the Cato Institute and Paul Krugman to... More >

Iran at war with Carnegie’s Karim Sadjadpour

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Listen: Ian Bremmer sits down with Karim Sadjadpour of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace to examine Iran’s precarious position on the global stage and the forces shaping the country. At the heart of the discussion is the regime’s internal fragility. Sadjadpour explains that many inside Iran, including elements of the Revolutionary Guards, are “waiting for Ayatollah Khamenei to die.”

The conversation also explores Iran’s isolation in the international arena. While 90% of its oil goes to China at deep discounts, Sadjadpour points out that Chinese and Russian interests in Iran diverge sharply. Despite the pressures at home and abroad, Sadjadpour argues that many ordinary Iranians recognize that reconciliation with the United States is essential if the country is ever to realize its enormous potential.

Subscribe to the GZERO World Podcast on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Stitcher, or your preferred podcast platform, to receive new episodes as soon as they're published

The US and Israel have launched a series of strikes against Iran at a moment when the Islamic Regime is at its weakest. Ian Bremmer spoke with Iran expert Karim Sadjadpour in Munich earlier this... More >

French president Emmanuel Macron faces a European future without America as a safety net.

NATO, Trump, and Europe’s wake-up call with Ivo Daalder

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Transcript

Listen: At the Munich Security Conference, European leaders signaled a quiet but unmistakable message: they are ready to move forward, even as Washington’s role grows uncertain. Former US Ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder explains why this moment represents a permanent rebalancing of responsibilities, after a long-standing reliance on the US for defense. “No, it’s not going to be the same as it’s been in the past decades,” he says. “That’s gone.”

The conversation explores the Russian threat looming over the continent, from a battle-hardened army emerging from Ukraine to shortfalls in Western weapons production. Daalder also highlights the political and ideological dimensions: a potential ceasefire in Ukraine could be a “trap” driven by domestic US politics, and European officials are increasingly concerned about MAGA-aligned movements undermining unity across the continent.

From NATO’s evolving role to Europe’s own strategic reckoning, Ian Bremmer and Daalder examine whether Europe can stand alone, and what leadership will look like in the West in the near future.

Subscribe to the GZERO World Podcast on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Stitcher, or your preferred podcast platform, to receive new episodes as soon as they're published

Transcript: NATO, Trump, and Europe’s wake-up call with Ivo Daalder

Ian Bremmer:

Hello and welcome to the GZERO World Podcast. This is where you can find extended versions of my interviews on public television. I'm Ian Bremmer, and I'm coming to you today from Munich, Germany, home of the 62nd Annual Munich Security Conference. World leaders, generals, CEOs and diplomats have gathered here, as they do every year, to confront the world's most pressing security challenges. But this year does feel different. The theme of the conference is under destruction, a nod to a growing sense that the political institutional foundations of the transatlantic relationship are being shaken. Not by Russia, not by China, but by the United States. President Trump in his second term, has acted both unilaterally and transactionally, rewriting long-standing assumptions about America's role in the world.

For many Europeans here in Munich, it feels as though the United States is swinging a wrecking ball at the global order it once helped build and defend. And yet, the political disenchantment across the west predates Trump. Majorities in many G7 countries believe their governments are not delivering for future generations. The frustration was already there. So what happens now? The United States remains the world's dominant military power, but Europe is openly debating how much it can and how much it should rely on Washington going forward. Who leads the so-called free world as America steps back? Can Europe act as a coherent geopolitical force? And where do rising middle powers in the global south fit into this emerging order? I was joined in Munich by former US Ambassador to NATO and senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, Ivo Daalder. Let's get to it.

Ivo Daalder, welcome back to the show.

Ivo Daalder:

Ah, it's great to be back.

Ian Bremmer:

So towards the close of the Munich Security Conference here and so much talk about whether or not the transatlantic relationship and NATO are going to persist in the form that they have in past decades. Your answer to that?

Ivo Daalder:

No, it's not going to be the same as it's been in the past decade. That's gone. But the transatlantic relationship in some form will continue. Not because Marco Rubio, the Secretary of State, said that it was, and that our future was intertwined with that of Europe. Something I strongly believe, but I don't believe his president believes. But because there is going to be a new kind of NATO, a rebalancing between European and American responsibilities for defense and security in Europe.

Timely, a good way, I would've liked to have seen it much more smoothly done than the way it was done, but perhaps the outcome is not going to be the worst thing at all. What struck me is that a year ago when we were sitting here, this was all about America. And now this meeting was all about Europe. What is Europe going to do and how is Europe going to stamp up and what are the Europeans prepared to do? And it really wasn't anymore about, "Are the Americans with us?" It was sort of like, "Yeah, maybe, but we're going to do our thing anyway." And I think that's an interesting development.

Ian Bremmer:

And in some ways it's a development that when you say you'd like it to be more smooth, I mean you could take away, you wish that the Trump administration handled it more diplomatically, more collegially. But you could also say you wish that the Europeans had started doing this in a serious way decades ago.

Ivo Daalder:

Absolutely. I mean, clearly, this rebalancing that is necessary is something that it should have happened a long time ago. Europe, 80 years after World War II, part of an organization that was set up to give Europe the confidence to rebuild and regenerate, which they did brilliantly through the European Union, in a whole variety of ways. But really since the end of the Cold War kind of assumed that we were living in a world in which defense was no longer possible over the last 25 years, with some exceptions, but really not with the big ones. Europe unilaterally disarmed, basically said, "We don't need-"

Ian Bremmer:

Don't need it.

Ivo Daalder:

"... defense." And the defense it did, importantly, was defense it did in favor of the United States, troops to Afghanistan, capabilities to Afghanistan. The one and a half percent or so was spent on operations in Afghanistan. Not a single one of these allies, many of who lost significant numbers of soldiers, did so because it was in their security. They thought it was important to show to the United States that they were good allies. So yes, they should have started a long time ago.

They're now starting. And now the question is can the machinery in NATO, which is a US-dominated machinery, in fact, we in the US created a NATO that put us at the center. Will that machinery be able to evolve smoothly enough to accommodate a greater and greater and greater role for Europe?

Ian Bremmer:

Now, when you say Europe, you could be forgiven for believing that the Europeans were actually doing something on defense. And yet, it's the Germans that are doing something. It's the Poles, it's the Balts. It's not the Spaniards. It's not so much the Italians. That's a big question too.

Ivo Daalder:

It is a big question. So it's all the Nordics and the Balts and the Poles and the Germans.

Ian Bremmer:

The front-line states.

Ivo Daalder:

It's the Dutch, the French, and the Brits are not going to increase defense spending. They have, for a whole variety of reasons, that that's not going to happen anytime soon. But they didn't disarm, they continued to spend 2% of GDP. A good part of it on the procurement side for nuclear weapons, particularly in the British case. But they still have... They're not as big. They're not as ready. They're not as good as they used to be, but very different than the Germans who basically had no capability at all. So you're really talking about the Southern Europeans.

One way to look at it is the beer drinkers seem to be taking defense seriously, and the wine drinkers with the French kind of unique in there may be a little less worried about security and a little less willing to rejigger their budget.

Ian Bremmer:

Rejigger, that is an alcohol-related reference that you didn't even mean to make. That's very impressive.

Ivo Daalder:

I didn't. [inaudible 00:06:14].

Ian Bremmer:

That's very impressive, Ivo.

Ivo Daalder:

Yes, thank you.

Ian Bremmer:

Very well done. So what about... NATO, there is no existential threat to NATO today.

Ivo Daalder:

There's not an existential threat, but the Russian threat is real. And it's real, on the one hand, you're looking at Ukraine and say, "Listen, four years in, they've lost 1.2, 1.3 million men, both severely wounded and dead."

Ian Bremmer:

But 30,000, 35,000 a month casualties the Russians have taken in December and January. Those are, under any circumstances, just astonishing numbers.

Ivo Daalder:

They are astonishing. And the losses. So 1.2 million, 1.3 million now people, off the battlefield.

Ian Bremmer:

Battle losses.

Ivo Daalder:

A lot of them dead, a lot of them severely wounded. The replacement rate is now below the casualty rate. The number of people they're able to recruit with extraordinary amounts of money, sometimes 50, 60, $70,000 to sign up. They're not particularly good at what they're doing, they're fodder, literally fodder. It's extraordinary. But, and there is a but, the entire Russian economy is now a war economy. It's churning out more equipment; missiles, drones, not so much sophisticated tanks and that kind of things, at a rate that is faster than they've ever done before. Whole parts of the armed forces, much of the Navy, much of the Air Force has not been involved in this war.

So in the end, you will have a battle-hardened Russian army, you will have a war economy that really needs to continue to produce stuff, and you will have most likely a need by the leadership to demonstrate that whatever they got out of Ukraine was worth it, maybe by taking some other steps. So I do think the Russians are a serious threat. On the other hand, economically, militarily, and other than nuclear weapons, they're no match to what the Europeans could have and what NATO can have.

Ian Bremmer:

Now, the Americans are, with the exception of some intelligence support, and of course they're selling lots of weapons to the Europeans, but they're really not... They're kind of out of the game in terms of providing support to the Ukrainians at this point.

Ivo Daalder:

Totally. They're completely out of the game. And I was a little nonplussed by the fact that Secretary General kept on saying, "The Americans are providing all those weapons."

Ian Bremmer:

Of NATO, not [inaudible 00:08:38]. No, they're selling all those weapons.

Ivo Daalder:

Yeah, they're selling. They're making money as-

Ian Bremmer:

Capitalists do.

Ivo Daalder:

... as capitalists do, although certainly as Donald Trump does, it keeps on saying, "The great news is we're helping Ukraine and we're getting paid for it." Well, actually, that's not really helping Ukraine. That is making sure that the Europeans are paying for stuff that the United States should be giving. They are providing very important intelligence information that is crucial both to defend Ukraine against the missile attacks that are continuing, drone attacks, that are continuing to bombard cities throughout Ukraine. And for some of the battlefield logistics and ways, that's important, and frankly, the Europeans can't yet give, although they're trying to figure out ways to do that. So it's really the Europeans who are carrying the burden. And part of the reality is, we're running out of stuff, the US is running out of stuff to sell.

Ian Bremmer:

I hear that there are Patriot batteries right now that actually don't have missiles.

Ivo Daalder:

That's right.

Ian Bremmer:

So the Ukrainians aren't able to knock these Russian missiles out of the sky.

Ivo Daalder:

Yeah. So it's not a question of, you need to give us more Patriots because there aren't anymore. There are 600 PAC-3 Patriots produced a year. Most of the European inventories are below where they should be for their own defense. Some of them are, like the Danes, have given everything, the Dutch are getting very close to having given everything. The Norwegians are now discussing whether they might give everything on their NASAMS, which can't shoot down ballistic missiles, but can be pretty good against cruise missiles and other things.

So yeah, the fight is hard because the Ukrainians are running out of stuff and the support is there, the willingness is there, the money is there, but the capabilities aren't there, which is kind of, when you think about it, four years into this war, we haven't figured out how to increase production of basic capabilities that everybody knows we will need in any future work? Really raises questions about the US, Europe defense preparedness and have we actually taken the world as it is seriously?

Ian Bremmer:

And you would think if anyone would get that right, it would be the companies who have a fiduciary responsibility to maximize their ability to make revenue. Why do you think they haven't?

Ivo Daalder:

Well, because we have defense budgets that need to be improved year-after-year. And they say, "I'm not going to spend any more money on production capabilities until I get paid." And so they could actually expand their production capabilities, but they're going to be paid year-by-year, and they don't know whether the money will be there next year or whether there will be a government shutdown, they won't get any money. So they're not willing to take risks.

Now, I would argue that they should. They look at the world geopolitically in the way that you and I do. We see a much more dangerous world. You say, I say, "This is the most dangerous period in our lifetime." The likelihood of great power war is probably higher now than any time since 1945. So the reality is we're going to need a lot of stuff. And why they're not doing it, that's a good question for them to answer.

Ian Bremmer:

One of the things I've heard on the sidelines of Munich this year, which surprised me a little bit, was that if there were a ceasefire, given the Trump administration and the lack, the desire, to open up with the Russians immediately on the back of that, that many front-line states would be much more vulnerable to a false flag attack from the Russians. That a ceasefire might not be in the interests of the Baltic states, of others. I've actually heard that from several leaders. I was surprised by that.

Ivo Daalder:

A ceasefire is not in the interest of Ukraine. Remember, the Ukrainians didn't want a ceasefire, the Europeans didn't want a ceasefire.

Ian Bremmer:

They now do. The Ukrainians now do.

Ivo Daalder:

Well, they want a ceasefire because they know that Donald Trump wants a ceasefire. I mean, much of the negotiations that have been going on is a negotiation between the Ukrainians and the United States, not between the Ukrainians and Russia. And the US is trying to get Ukraine to accept something that the Russians are willing to accept, and they're pushing Ukraine. And it started with the ceasefire. The ceasefire was-

Ian Bremmer:

And Trump literally just said that. He said, "The Ukrainians better step up because they're Russians are ready for peace." He said that yesterday.

Ivo Daalder:

Exactly. But this has been the entire pattern. I mean, when the blowup happened a year ago in the Oval Office, just after Munich, when he was there, the big blowup was there, and the Europeans then came to Zelensky and said, "The one thing you can give, accept a ceasefire." A ceasefire is not a good thing. A frozen conflict maybe. If a ceasefire leads to the deployment of the security guarantee, if the Europeans start putting forces in there and the Americans are willing to provide a backstop, then I think it's okay. But if a ceasefire means that the United States is opening up economic and other kinds of relations with the Russians, we can sanction, start pushing the Europeans to release the Russian frozen assets and give them back to Russia. All of which, the indication is, is where the Trump administration would like to go.

Ian Bremmer:

And many Europeans would follow the United States in that case, Not all, but many would.

Ivo Daalder:

Not all under the ability to maintain, let alone get new sanctions, is going to be much, much more difficult. And so yes, the deterrent effect starts to unravel. And frankly, unravels only because of one reason, because Donald Trump wants to be seen as the man who brought-

Ian Bremmer:

That brought peace.

Ivo Daalder:

... brought peace to this war.

Ian Bremmer:

Or at least that brought a ceasefire.

Ivo Daalder:

Yeah, exactly, end the war. And this is a trap. And I think it's interesting that people are now starting to react to that. That's what you're hearing. Because it is a trap, potentially. It doesn't have to be. A real ceasefire that creates a frozen conflict in which the Europeans are willing to back up the Ukrainians to the hilt. Where Ukraine moves forward rapidly on EU membership, I would argue rapidly on NATO membership, but that's not going to happen. That's fine. Right now, I think that's what the Ukrainians are happy with. They're much more worried about a ceasefire that isn't real, isn't followed up, that leads to the unraveling of everything that was there. Because that's neither a just nor a sustainable peace. Two words, by the way, that Marco Rubio used today. These are European stock phrases, just, sustainable, peace. Marco Rubio used them. Good for him.

Ian Bremmer:

He did. He did. And Marco Rubio got a standing ovation from the European crowd. From a European crowd that was stunned by JD Vance a year ago. You and I saw it. That basically called out the Europeans as the problem. Now, his speech was certainly much friendlier, much more cordial, much more engaging. But the policies of the United States have not changed one iota toward Europe in the last year. So were you surprised by that reaction?

Ivo Daalder:

Well, I think, Wolfgang Ischinger, the chairman of the MSC, put it exactly right. I think they rose because of the relief that it wasn't another tongue-lashing that they got a year ago.

Ian Bremmer:

Oh my God, not another tongue-lashing. Is that-

Ivo Daalder:

But on the other hand, I think if, on reflection, part of the speech was incoherent and part of the reason it was incoherent is, it was trying to speak to the audience in a reassuring manner while at the same time speaking to that other audience, which is the audience of one back in the White House, to make sure that he maintains the big line.

And the other one is this deep uncomfortable argument that the entire administration making on civilizational erasure, that the fact that if you have immigrants coming to your country that don't look like you, all of a sudden you become different. That is just not how Europe thinks. By the way, it's not how most Americans think. It's not how America used to think. This white Christian nationalism that is now infusing MAGA is being exported by the United States. Not surprised that Rubio's next two stops are Slovakia-

Ian Bremmer:

And Hungary.

Ivo Daalder:

... and Hungary

Ian Bremmer:

Also, for his audience back in the United States. Not really for the Hungarians and Slovaks.

Ivo Daalder:

But I don't think the European should take this, oh my God, the US has turned a corner. They're back, we're back in business.

Ian Bremmer:

Well, the other weird thing about the civilizational point is that the Europeans were getting harder on their own border security and migration before the Americans. I mean, Angela Merkel understood that when she was going to take a million Syrian refugees, that her population was not having it.

Ivo Daalder:

Right.

Ian Bremmer:

So there's actually more alignment on that.

Ivo Daalder:

There's much more alignment on this. And there's much more alignment on the security threat. But MAGA has gone further, right? I mean, MAGA looks at Russia, some part of MAGA, as an ally because of the church, because Putin is anti-gay and LGBTQ+, I guess, Putin is anti-DEI. I mean, all those things that MAGA has now incorporated, that's just not how Europeans think. They still think that climate change is important. I think Merz made that point. The strongest point in his speech was when he said that our values, there are difference in our values. JD Vance talked about differences-

Ian Bremmer:

Yeah, Merz came out anti-MAGAs. The first time I'd seen a major European leader do that.

Ivo Daalder:

I thought, well, so what I heard in the corridors from a lot of people, they're shocked by the fact that the State Department is spending money supporting MAGA-aligned think tanks. Think tanks that are extraordinarily pro-Russian, by the way, think tanks that may not be pro-American, although when the money flows, they'll probably become more pro-American. And that they're actively undermining the civil structure of our societies. It's remarkable that that's happening from your long-standing ally across the Atlantic. There's a deep worry that the ideological attack on Europe from the United States is actually more important than the disagreement they're having over the defense burden.

Ian Bremmer:

Yeah. The final point here is that it's an interesting tension that on the one hand, the Americans, under Trump, do not want to see a united Europe. They are spending money and engaging politically in ways that would undermine that strength. And yet they're pushing much harder than Biden or Obama had been for the Europeans to more effectively arm themselves, to become more productive, to actually have more economic growth, which would make them stronger. So there is this very unusual tension in the policy.

Ivo Daalder:

That wouldn't be the first time that Donald Trump is pursuing policies that are not mutually inclusive. I mean, his entire trade policy, which is what drives them to wanting Europe to be broken up, the European Union, so he could pick them off one by one, it's a lot easier than having to pick off one big 450 million market, is not succeeding. Completely succeeding more, better than I thought, better than I'd hoped. I think the Europeans have much more power to push back.

But I think the strength argument is to say, you need to do it because we're no longer doing it. I mean, we're leaving, and I think Rich Colby who said, "We want a stronger NATO, and we want..." But behind that, Rich Colby, the undersecretary of defense who was at the defense ministerial, and here, rather than Pete Hegseth, he's a nicer guy, he's intellectually more coherent than his boss. But the message is the same. We have interests elsewhere that are more important both in the Western Hemisphere and in the Pacific than Europe. And so if you care about security in Europe, you need to take care of that so we can take care of our own things. That's a very consistent message.

Ian Bremmer:

Ivo Daalder, thanks for joining.

Ivo Daalder:

Always a pleasure to be here.

Ian Bremmer:

That's it for today's edition of the GZERO World Podcast. Do you like what you heard? Of course you do. Why not make it official? Why don't you rate and review GZERO World five stars, only five stars, otherwise don't do it, on Apple, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts. Tell your friends.

Ian Bremmer sits down with former US Ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder to unpack a historic shift in the transatlantic alliance: Europe is preparing to defend itself without its American safety net.... More >

President Trump's power-first foreign policy with CFR's President

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Listen: From sweeping tariffs to threats of military action and withdrawal from international institutions, Trump has demonstrated a willingness to break with the United States' approach to international relations. When the US shifts from global order architect to challenger, what kind of system emerges and how do other countries react? On the GZERO World Podcast, Ian Bremmer sits down with former US Trade Representative and Council on Foreign Relations President Michael Froman to discuss.

Michael Froman tells Ian Bremmer that under Trump's second term, he’s been less surprised by a single policy shift than by how quickly other countries have adapted to them. As allies hedge and adversaries like China step into new leadership roles, they unpack how the world order is evolving and discuss the most pressing issues.

Subscribe to the GZERO World Podcast on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Stitcher, or your preferred podcast platform, to receive new episodes as soon as they're published

Transcript: President Trump's power-first foreign policy with CFR's President

Ian Bremmer:

Hello and welcome to the GZERO World Podcast where you can find extended versions of my conversations on public television. I'm Ian Bremmer, and today I'm going to try to make sense of President Trump's chaotic foreign policy approach a little over one year into his second term. It would be an understatement to say that Trump 2.0 has little in common with the President's first term in office. Back then he touted an America first foreign policy that was focused on securing the border, ending forever wars and letting the world sort out its own problems.

This time around President Trump has leaned into the kind of presidency he once spurned. He carries around a list of all the wars he's ended. He wants to turn Gaza into a Beach side resort, and he has talked openly about colonizing Panama and Greenland. He bombed Iran, well that one, he is done before too, and he even captured Venezuela's leader. This is not a president who is stepping back from the world stage. This is the president who wants to turn it to his will, and he has cast aside eight decades of global rules and norms in the process.

But will he succeed? Joining me to discuss all that and more is former U.S. trade representative and the current president of the Council on Foreign Relations, Michael Froman. Let's get to it.

Mike Froman, thanks for joining the show.

Michael Froman:

Thanks for having me.

Ian Bremmer:

We talk about big global issues, and I guess I want to start with the what is surprising you most now from America's foreign policy in the world that you really didn't think you would've been saying just a year ago?

Michael Froman:

Well, just a year ago, I probably would not have said that Greenland would've been the most significant foreign policy issue discussed in January at Davos, but President Trump certainly put that on the agenda and made it major issue...

Ian Bremmer:

And he took it off the agenda.

Michael Froman:

And then took it off the agenda. And when it was on the agenda, it squeezed out just about everything else, Ukraine, China, Venezuela, anything else going on in the world.

Ian Bremmer:

Yeah, okay. That was absurd. But nonetheless, how about something that's sustainable, something that you think is going to actually persist?

Michael Froman:

So, think I am surprised by how much the world is adjusting to Trump's view of globalism and they are incorporating it, they're not happy necessarily about it, but they are adjusting and they are responding to the Trump administration's exercise of power.

Ian Bremmer:

Exercise of power in a more transactional and unilateralist way?

Michael Froman:

Yes, exactly.

Ian Bremmer:

And how do you see them responding?

Michael Froman:

Well, I think right now Iran responding by engaging further in negotiations with the US, with the threat of further military action. If you look back at the trade wars of 2025, US imposing very significant tariffs on the rest of the world then as a starting point for negotiation. But the rest of the world, with the exception of China and maybe a little bit Canada, didn't retaliate, sort of adjusted to it, and I found that they were more concerned about the relative tariff rates than they were about the absolute rate. So Malaysia cared a lot about not having a significantly higher rate than Vietnam.

Ian Bremmer:

Which is a fair thing for them to be concerned about right?

Michael Froman:

Absolutely, absolutely. But I think, had you asked me a year and a half ago, I would've said if the US imposes somewhere between 10% and 50% tariffs in other countries we're likely to face a lot of retaliation. And the reality was, China just had to show that they could retaliate and the US back down and the other countries didn't really retaliate, they adjusted to it.

Ian Bremmer:

And is that because the United States is just so big and credible and hitting you unilaterally that if you're not China, you feel like you've got nowhere to go?

Michael Froman:

I think President Trump established credibility that he was willing to use tariffs as much and as often and as far as he needed to. And if they were welcome to retaliate, he would just raise the tariffs even further and they would become prohibitive at some point.

Ian Bremmer:

So, Mike, before running the Council on Foreign Relations, I knew you as US trade rep, right? And so if I think about that role in the Obama Administration, you looking back on Trump now and saying, geez, because you were thought of as a fairly tough guy, the Japanese, I remember when they were talking about it first, they're like, he's hitting us really hard. Are you looking back and saying, I didn't actually beat these guys up nearly as much as I should have?

Michael Froman:

Well, I think back then we were focused on what could we get through negotiations. And I was hitting them hard in previous USTRs, hit them hard in terms of what our demands were of them and the hard things we wanted them to do. This administration's hitting them hard by hitting them hard and raising tariffs. And I sometimes joke with my successors that it would've been a really easy job to be USTR if I could have used tariffs like this with credibility and to impose them on other countries because they have successfully brought them to the table.

Ian Bremmer:

And that was something you wouldn't have even considered?

Michael Froman:

Correct.

Ian Bremmer:

Because?

Michael Froman:

Because we had international obligations, in some of the cases we have bilateral free trade agreements and we're raising tariffs on those countries. In other cases we have, well, in all cases we have World Trade Organization, WTO commitments, and we've broken those commitments and raised tariffs on other countries. And so yeah, the Trump administration has basically said they're willing to break agreements, break commitments, to use tariffs as a tool for just about everything. For trade purposes, to talk about fentanyl, to talk about migration, to talk about political issues, to retaliate against European countries potentially for sending a small contingency of military forces to Greenland, to shore up NATO's role in Greenland.

Ian Bremmer:

So my presumption is that you are challenged by these strategies, if we can call them that, because you think it's going to cause a lot of damage long term.

Michael Froman:

So, I think that there have always been a role for tariffs when, for example, there've been unfair trade practices, and you go through the process of determining what those unfair trade practices are, what the level of retaliation ought to be and impose them. The Trump administration has ignored all that and just jumped to using them whenever they needed any degree of leverage over another country.

Ian Bremmer:

And not just on economic issues, on any issue, on a political issue, on a security issue, you name it.

Michael Froman:

Bolsonaro been treated, how India buying Russian oil, it could be any number of issues, it is the president, he made that clear. In his words, the most beautiful word in the English dictionary and a tool that he can use for just about any purpose because it's easy to ratchet up and ratchet down. You don't have to think about going through dispute settlement processes and getting an outcome from the World Trade Organization or from some panel of experts. You just ratchet it up or ratchet it down as you see fit.

Now the question is, to your point, long-term, what are the ramifications of this? I think most trade experts worry that well, we've created a permission structure more generally for countries to act unilaterally regardless of their international obligations. Sometimes that might be through the use of tariffs or other trade actions. Sometimes that might be through the use of military force as we've done vis-a-vis Venezuela and what kind of world will we live in if other countries in fact copy our approach.

Because for a long time we were the defenders. We helped create the world system after World War II, we defended it, we promoted it, we got other countries to agree to it, and when countries would try to challenge it, we would take action to ensure that the rules were upheld. Now we are seen as one of the challengers, and does that create a permission structure for other countries to challenge it as well?

Ian Bremmer:

So, if you were outside of the United States right now looking in, would you describe the United States as a revisionist power today?

Michael Froman:

Look, I think we've gone from being the defender of the system to the challenger of the system. I'm not sure revisionist is the right way of looking at it, because that suggests we have some new world order that we want to impose. And I'm not sure we've thought through it completely. In fact, I'm pretty sure we haven't. What we have said is that the old rules don't necessarily need to apply to us in every instance.

Ian Bremmer:

You would've called the Russians revisionist over the course of the last 10, 20 years right?

Michael Froman:

I think China has been a revisionist power in part because they've put forward alternative models, the Global Civilization Initiative, Global Security Initiative, Global Economic... They're trying to put forward a different model of world order than existed since the second World War. I think Russia's been sort of a challenger, yeah, they've gone back and they've revisited certainly the notion that Ukraine as being an independent country separate from Russia, separate from the former Soviet Union or the Russian Empire. So they have revisited that question, but I don't think they have a revisionist view of the world as a wholeness.

Ian Bremmer:

So Mark Carney came out during Davos, you and I were there, we were in the same room with him on several occasions with the whole rupture speech. Now, French president, Emmanuel Macron has gone farther talking about the United States directly as an adversary, wants to basically dismantle Europe. Again, if you were a European leader today, if you were a Canadian leader today, would you see the United States as an adversary?

Michael Froman:

I think Prime Minister Carney was right to call it a rupture because it is a big disruption of everything we have known for the last 80 years purposefully to raise questions that heretofore have been closed that we thought were solved, and now we have to wrestle with those questions again. I think President Macron probably goes too far. He does go too far to view the US as an adversary. The French, the Europeans may not like everything that this administration is doing, but their national interests, including their security interests, are still quite well aligned with the United States.

And I think the fact that just last week there was a ministerial in Washington of countries coming together to talk about critical minerals, just shows how countries are willing to hold their nose, come to Washington, work with the United States because it's in their national interest to do so. They're not doing it to do anybody a favor, they're doing it because they recognize that they need to reduce their dependence on China as well. I think when it comes to Europe, I think the president's been pretty clear, he actually would like a strong Europe. Now, his view of what a strong Europe is, is perhaps different than some of what the current leaders think it is. But he's been...

Ian Bremmer:

He does not want a strong European Union.

Michael Froman:

Correct. He views the whole European project of giving up sovereignty in various areas to Brussels, for Brussels to regulate behavior within the nation state as anathema. I think he feels, he believes very much in the nation state and deals with Europe oftentimes on a nation state basis, but he wants him to be stronger on defense.

Ian Bremmer:

Defense, yes.

Michael Froman:

He wants him to be more productive. He wants their economy to grow and to be a strong market for US exports among other things. He has a different view on some of the issues around free speech and the role of right-wing parties in Germany and places like that. But I think it's not that he's anti-Europe, he is skeptical and critical of the European project as it's been known for the last three or four [inaudible 00:11:28].

Ian Bremmer:

But, the United States is a state of scale, checks and balances, but nonetheless, China is a state of scale, lots of power, not so many checks and balances. Trump does not want Europe to be a state of scale.

Michael Froman:

I don't know about that.

Ian Bremmer:

That would be a strong competitor, no?

Michael Froman:

I don't know about that. No, I think he wouldn't mind it being an entity of scale, for example, on defense, not just spending 2% or 3.5% or 5% on defense, but spending it well. Spending it on scalable defense industries, which is going to require very hard decisions in Europe about national interests and where they could be combined in order to reach scale. So that not every country needs its own tank, not every country needs its own air defense system. They need to have rationality across their defense space. And so, I think that's an area where he'd like to see [inaudible 00:12:20].

Ian Bremmer:

You want to see comparative advantage in defense.

Michael Froman:

Well...

Ian Bremmer:

You sound like a trade guy.

Michael Froman:

I think he would rather have them be able to bear a bigger portion of their own defense, including by spending the right amount of money, but also on buying the right things. And so, that's going to come from us, particularly in the short run when they don't have the capacity to produce a lot of these weapons. But over time, I think having a strong Europe is in the United States interest even in Trump's world. Now, he has, again, different views than President Macron and several other European leaders when it comes to certain of the values and the European project of giving up sovereignty and regulating.

But to be fair, within Europe, look at the Draghi report, look at the Letta report. There's a lot of discussion within Europe about the need to deregulate, to devolve, to deal with some of these issues as well as to combine where it makes sense to combine for scale like capital markets, which they've never really been able to do.

Ian Bremmer:

Because the big geopolitical story of the last 20 years that people haven't talked enough about is Europe's getting weaker?

Michael Froman:

I think that's right, I think that's right. They face a demographic challenge as do a lot of industrialized countries, including the United States without sufficient immigration. But on productivity, on innovation, the fact that so much of the innovation, let's say in the digital sphere is done in the US to a certain degree in China, not in Europe, is astounding. Europe is still strong in certain areas, Pharmaceutical innovation, areas like that, and the question is what does Europe need to do to be really a driver of global innovation? And that's in all of our interests.

Ian Bremmer:

Now, I'm surprised that you said so much of the innovation is done in the United States to a certain degree in China that implied that China was, it's there, but it's kind of marginal and innovation compared to the United States. You wouldn't say that.

Michael Froman:

No, and I think it depends sector by sector. So for example, in the biotech area, we've seen very significant increases in innovation coming out of China in a relatively short period of time. If you go back five or 10 years, none of the major new patents in biotech were coming out of China, and now it's about 30%. And they're investing a tremendous amount in the sector and they've got a lot of innovation and they're capable of doing clinical trials much more quickly and much cheaper than we're able to do it here in the United States. And so, I think there's an area where we need to watch because it's been an area of advantage for the United States, and to a certain degree Europe, and China is well on the march. When it comes to Semiconductor chips, I think they're still behind the United States when it comes to innovation.

Ian Bremmer:

Clearly. Why they need the H200 from Jensen.

Michael Froman:

Exactly. And while they're working hard and investing a lot to build their own indigenous capacity there, I think we still very much have an advantage. And, if you look at the major platforms, I mean, they've got their own indigenous platforms, but when we look at some of the global platforms, they tend to be from the United States.

Ian Bremmer:

Now, we've talked a lot about comparative economic power. We haven't talked as much about some of the geopolitical conflicts that we're seeing in the world right now. There's so many to discuss. I want to leave Greenland aside, but I do want to ask for example about Venezuela, about Iran, about Russia, Ukraine, maybe go through them quickly. Venezuela, so far, only a few weeks in seems to be going okay for the Trump administration. Is that reasonable to say?

Michael Froman:

I think that is reasonable because we can analyze whether it was worth devoting this amount of military activity. First of all, we should commend the military for incredibly successful action, really an awesome use of force and on the ground and creative ways, innovative ways of using cyber attacks and other ways to execute this without the loss of any American soldier. But a lot was put at risk to arrest somebody. We've left the regime largely in place, and the regime is the same criminal regime, corrupt regime that existed before. What we have done is get control of their oil exports. And if that's the limited... If the mission is defined as arresting Maduro and taking their oil exports to where we want to get them, and we will sell them.

Ian Bremmer:

There's some broader political leverage as well, clearly.

Michael Froman:

Yes, but I think in terms of moving them towards reform, domestic reform, democracy, it's a longer term project.

Ian Bremmer:

Clearly.

Michael Froman:

Secretary Rubio has laid that out.

Ian Bremmer:

He has said that.

Michael Froman:

And by the way, I think that's not unreasonable. They didn't want the de-Baathification of Venezuela, whether they did enough or whether they empowered or disempowered the opposition, I think time will only tell, but hopefully over time we'll see Venezuela return to a real democracy, and the Venezuelan people will have an opportunity to speak, to vote and take their country in the direction that they want to take it in. So there's a lot more work to be done. But for right now, Maduro is in jail, oil is being controlled, and thus far I think I agree with you that the Trump administration's limited short-term objectives are being achieved.

Ian Bremmer:

Because the Democrats immediately we're talking about, oh, regime change and they shouldn't be doing that, and of course, this isn't regime change at all.

Michael Froman:

No.

Ian Bremmer:

It's a very different kind of exercise of military power, much more limited, no boots on the ground, much less expense, but use your power to try to get what you want.

Michael Froman:

Well, quite a bit of expense for the arrest of one person. Now, for example, if this regime stays forever or this kind of regime stays forever, I think we can ask ourselves, well, was that the right use of American power? What did we get out of this? If Venezuela is still a highly corrupt country involved in criminal action, whether it's coming to the United States or going to Europe, it's still bad for the system. I think we have to ask ourselves whether the outcome was worth it.

Ian Bremmer:

Now, if I were to compare the amount spent to bring Maduro to justice with say, I don't know, Osama bin Laden, seems low

Michael Froman:

Compared to a 10-year war or in, 15-year war in...

Ian Bremmer:

Exactly. No, I'm just thinking about regime change in the American conception of we don't like what that regime is doing. Here's what the decision is, and the blood and treasure, the loss of human lives on both sides.

Michael Froman:

I think we have learned a lot from the Iraq and Afghanistan examples about what we don't want to do. And the question is now what do we want to do? So for example, does this increase pressure that will be created on Cuba? Lead us to take action in Cuba, on Cuba or wait for Cuba to collapse on its own? And what will happen then and how will the US make sure that it's interesting?

Ian Bremmer:

And that's where I was about to go because with Venezuela, illegitimate election steals power, seen as an international terrorist, exporting instability across the region, none of those things have that truth in Cuba.

Michael Froman:

No, there hasn't been an election to speak of, free and fair election in Cuba for some time. No democracy there to speak of, and they do export, on one hand, they export a lot of nurses and doctors around the world. They also export a lot of military and intelligence officials around the world, as we saw in Venezuela.

Ian Bremmer:

Yes, indeed.

Michael Froman:

Many of them...

Ian Bremmer:

A lot of them were killed in the...

Michael Froman:

Lot of people killed. A lot of the 100 that were killed were Cubans. And so I don't think they are without responsibility for exporting instability. But, I think the question is over this long period of time that we have hoped that the Cuban regime would change, it's only been 65 years or so, are we on the verge of something meaningful happening in light of this happen now in Venezuela?

Ian Bremmer:

But I guess what I'm asking is if the Americans had a shot of taking out senior leadership in Cuba the way they did in Venezuela, do you believe that the ramifications of that, in terms of the legitimacy of the action, in terms of the regional response, are they likely to be far greater than in Venezuela where let's face it, I mean both given the military success but also given the nature of the regime and the nature of the individual, the blowback has not been very significant.

Michael Froman:

It has not been very significant. And I think you're right, there are other countries that would question the credibility of a US action there. On the other hand, I think this has been such a long-standing issue that this has been a regime that has been deeply oppressive of any opposition, has really eliminated any opposition, has expropriated property, et cetera. That there's a lot of, I think, reason to say, okay, this is unfinished business of the Cold War, and I could see the Trump administration saying, we want to finish it.

Ian Bremmer:

Well, I could see the Trump administration saying a lot of things. I mean, go to Greenland, go to Panama, but I'm just again wondering about the international reaction, to domestic reaction for all of these things.

Michael Froman:

Well, domestic reaction I think would be largely positive.

Ian Bremmer:

Because of Miami and Florida, [inaudible 00:21:10] community.

Michael Froman:

And I think just in the US lexicon here, the US history, that Cuba has been a sore that has been out there that has never been fully addressed.

Ian Bremmer:

So, let's then go to Iran where, seems to be a little bit more urgent for the Trump administration right now. In the last few days, if you just listen to Trump, it seems like he is getting more optimistic about negotiations bearing fruit. Many administrations have found that that's more challenging than they've initially thought. Right now, does it look like to you that we are heading towards military action?

Michael Froman:

Well, on one hand he's expressing optimism. On the other hand, they announced, I believe that they're considering setting a second...

Ian Bremmer:

Considering, carrier group.

Michael Froman:

Second carrier group there because if the negotiations don't proceed sufficiently well, they want to be prepared to take whatever action they're planning to take. Look, I think that there's an existential issue for the Iranian regime as to whether they are willing to give up enrichment completely. They weren't willing to give it up before.

If they give it up now, they are admitting that they have, their strategy and their allocation of resources for the last 30 years has been mismanaged, and that's going to further undermine the credibility of the regime. Maybe they're under such threat of military action and their proxies are weakened, they have no air defenses, their missile program has been hurt.

Ian Bremmer:

They were blown up last year and they couldn't do very much exactly.

Michael Froman:

They've shown that the United States and Israel are willing to take action that previously had not been taken. They may feel so much under pressure to consider something they've never been willing to consider before, but they may not be. And if the agreement turns out to be not much better or more than the JCPOA that Trump tore up, then one's going to ask, what was this all for?

Ian Bremmer:

So, your best guess right now, do you think it's likely that there will be a negotiated agreement or that it's going to be a military action?

Michael Froman:

My guess is there may be a limited military action. I'm sure I'll be wrong about this in one form or another.

Ian Bremmer:

Doesn't matter I want to...

Michael Froman:

My best guess is there may be a limited military action not to decapitate.

Ian Bremmer:

But to create more leverage?

Michael Froman:

But to create more leverage. That at some point there may be an agreement. I'm wondering what the face-saving measure on enrichment is for the regime, and I'm not sure what that looks like. Whether there is some Gulf enrichment mechanism or something that they're able to offer that allows them to save face.

Ian Bremmer:

Because Mike, additional support for that argument is that the Israelis are saying how important it is that the ballistic missile program is on the table. That's hard to get done, but if that were part of those limited initial strikes, you do potentially square that circle.

Michael Froman:

That's right, that's right. And the Israel has been very concerned that that missile program is being rebuilt after the attacks of last year. I think there's less concern that the nuclear program has been significantly rebuilt after the attacks, but the ballistic missile program is an area of concern.

Ian Bremmer:

Okay. Russia, Ukraine only been going on for almost four years now. Continued efforts primarily by the United States to get to a ceasefire. Trump is now saying got to be done by June, which is not quite the 24 hours he initially thought.

Michael Froman:

Or the two weeks that it always seemed to be, two weeks away.

Ian Bremmer:

Yes, so he's kicking the cans. It's getting harder obviously, he's getting more frustrated, he's sharing that frustration publicly.

Michael Froman:

Yes.

Ian Bremmer:

The Ukrainians are having a harder time fighting. They're having a harder time raising resources. The Russians should have a harder time fighting given what they're throwing at it so far, it doesn't seem to be affecting them domestically. Do you think that we are heading towards an inflection point or is it just generally grinding on and grinding on for the foreseeable future?

Michael Froman:

Well, it is grinding on, but hopefully towards an inflection point. So it's a non-answer to your question.

Ian Bremmer:

Well, it's an answer.

Michael Froman:

I mean, I think week by week, there will be continuing to be huge casualties, particularly on the Russian side, but on both sides. I think you're right, the Ukrainians are tiring of war, they very much want to reach a peace agreement. They've wanted that for some time and I think they're quite willing to make territorial compromises de facto, if not de jure, to secure a real piece provided they've got the necessary security guarantees that have credibility on the other side. I think this mechanism that we have in place where the Europeans use the loan against the Russian frozen assets to buy American equipment to provide to the Ukrainians is a pretty good one. It's sort of a win-win-win for the United States.

Ian Bremmer:

Yeah, no American taxpayer dollars are going towards that.

Michael Froman:

No American taxpayer dollars, good exports. I guess we're reducing our trade deficit in that regard and support for our military industrial complex as well, and support for the Ukrainians very importantly. But, whether or not that's going to secure any real change on the ground remains to be seen. As you said, the Russians seem to have really, quite a strong appetite or ability to absorb pain.

Ian Bremmer:

The Biden administration really did believe that these sanctions were going to have a much greater impact on them in short term, they were wrong.

Michael Froman:

Now, when people look under the covers, there is reason to believe the economy is in more dire shape now than it was a year ago. But Russia's gone through a lot of dire straits in its history economically and I'm told, I haven't been to Moscow in a long time, but I'm told if you go to Moscow or St. Petersburg, you wouldn't know that there's a war going on, the stores are filled, the people are walking around.

Ian Bremmer:

Tucker Carlson brought all that news to us.

Michael Froman:

Indeed, indeed. So, the sanctions aren't having necessarily the debilitated effect that I think the West had hoped. And the casualties don't seem to be having the political ramifications that you alluded to, and that happened in the Afghan war ultimately, that led to Russia's withdrawal from Afghanistan. And so, it's a little hard to see how any of that is going to change Putin's calculation. And that's the remaining issue, is that Trump is increasingly realizing that Putin doesn't really want to end this war anytime soon and is willing to sacrifice men and treasure and the state of the economy and his standing in the world to keep it going.

Ian Bremmer:

Which creates the really saddest conclusion, which is that the President Trump recognizing that is now putting much more pressure on Ukraine because he sees that they're the weaker ones that are more likely to capitulate, irrespective of how courageous or how unjust...

Michael Froman:

Or the meritocracy, the merits of the arguments.

Ian Bremmer:

Absolutely.

Michael Froman:

No, I think that's right. And look, I think Ukrainians are willing to make certain compromises. I think it's gone on so long and there's been so little progress on the battlefield, so little positive progress. If anything, they're losing a little bit of land each week or each month that they're willing to make certain compromises if they can get the security guarantees. Now, I think the burden shifts to Europe and the United States to make those security guarantees as meaningful and as credible as possible to help the Ukrainians get to a position where they're willing to compromise on territory.

Ian Bremmer:

And getting the Americans to be a part of that continues to be a challenge.

Michael Froman:

Yes, and whether the Americans are on the ground or not, or providing support from beyond intelligence support other kinds of support or permission for the use of our weapons in various ways. I think that all I think is what to be worked out. I don't expect American troops to be on the ground in Ukraine under this administration, but Europeans, there seems to be a coalition of the willing within the European forces to deploy troops as a tripwire.

Ian Bremmer:

And to be fair, Biden would've had a hard time deploying troops as well.

Michael Froman:

I think that's probably right. I think if there was a NATO contingency, it would be one thing. This is going to be a coalition of the willing of some other sort, but I think there might've been more willingness in that context to deploy American troops in some way or another.

Ian Bremmer:

Okay. We'll push Jake on that. So, end with the big Kahuna here, which is the US and China. Obviously everyone's excited in the Trump administration about the upcoming trip to Beijing. They've just announced that Xi Jinping is going to come to Washington by the end of the year. Most challenging, most fraught, most important bilateral relationship seems to be more stable for now.

Michael Froman:

Correct.

Ian Bremmer:

How short is the for now in your view?

Michael Froman:

I think there's an interest on both sides for extending it as long as possible. Get through this year, maybe get through the next year. I think on the US side, having realized how much leverage China has in its choke points over critical minerals, and that's just really one of several sectors where they have...

Ian Bremmer:

Pharmaceuticals.

Michael Froman:

Pharmaceuticals.

Ian Bremmer:

Critical infrastructure, you name it.

Michael Froman:

Yeah, exactly. So, it's one of many. But that I think caught the attention of the administration and the desire not to escalate at the risk that the Chinese could have escalation dominance here. And so, keep things on as steady a path as possible on the economic side. And you saw in the national defense strategy words like balance of power, good strong economic relationship, all really relatively positive language about where they wanted to see the US-China relationship go emphasizing stability even as they reinforce the defense of the first island chain, and stated that the US was committed to that.

So no change of policy in that regard, but the language towards China has evolved quite substantially from it being the pacing threat for our US military, or even as the Trump administration characterized it in the first term as a potential adversary. So, there's a pretty significant evolution there. And I think China has every interest in maintaining stability as it continues to build out its military. Its economy is doing just fine, it's got a $1.2 trillion trade surplus with the rest of the world. It's exporting less to the United States, but it's managed to make up for that and more in other markets around the world. And so it's feeling pretty confident right now.

Ian Bremmer:

And so when you think about the longer term Taiwan question, where do you go?

Michael Froman:

Well, look, I think China would rather not have to attack Taiwan in order to absorb it, but I think we have to take President Xi as it were, to take him seriously that he wants this resolved during his tenure. Now, I guess the bad news is, the good news is his tenure is...

Ian Bremmer:

Extended.

Michael Froman:

It's infinitely extendable or extendable for some period of time. And so I don't think the 2027...

Ian Bremmer:

That was why he ended term limits, is he didn't want to have to go to war over Taiwan, he's a peacemaker.

Michael Froman:

He's a man of peace.

Ian Bremmer:

There you go.

Michael Froman:

A man of peace. Maybe we should put him up with a Nobel Peace Prize.

Ian Bremmer:

It wouldn't be the first time something has happened in that direction, yeah.

Michael Froman:

But I do worry over the long run what the commitment of this administration is to Taiwan. You've got a lot of China Hawks in the administration, whether it's Secretary Rubio, Bridge, Colby, others who have long been strong defenders.

Ian Bremmer:

But the president is not one of them.

Michael Froman:

He's not been out there in the same way, his rhetoric has been quite subdued on the subject. And I worry that at some point when the issue of a grand bargain comes up, that the US might be willing to evolve in its language about what its commitment to Taiwan is and provided that it gets either something else very significant on critical minerals or on exports, or that it gets some secure access to semiconductor chips over the long run.

Ian Bremmer:

Okay. Quick lightning round for you. I just want to get your quick reactions on a couple quick questions that is coming out of my head. What is the country right now that is not getting the attention that it really should be globally for the work that they are doing to improve their lie internationally?

Michael Froman:

Singapore.

Ian Bremmer:

Because?

Michael Froman:

So Singapore always...

Ian Bremmer:

They used to get a lot of attention, obviously.

Michael Froman:

What's that?

Ian Bremmer:

They used to get all sorts of attention.

Michael Froman:

They used to get a lot of attention and for good reason because I think they punch above their weight for such a small country. They contribute very significantly, intellectually to thinking through where should the international system go, whether it's trade or security, and certainly the whole evolution of the Indo-Pacific region.

Ian Bremmer:

But now the Gulfies are outshining them, is that the point?

Michael Froman:

Yeah, I think that's right. They don't have, while they're a very wealthy country, it's very small and it certainly doesn't have the wealth of the Gulfies.

Ian Bremmer:

Okay. Last, the tougher one. Who is the leader out there that has so much more potential that they're not living up to?

Michael Froman:

I think the new prime... Not relatively new, prime minister of Japan could prove to be a major global leader. And she, I think, she's just gone through an election where she's gotten a very significant mandate domestically and I think now has the potential to play a much bigger role internationally.

Ian Bremmer:

Massive majority now for the LDP.

Michael Froman:

Super majority.

Ian Bremmer:

Yeah, super majority. Quite surprising. Mike Froman, thanks so much for joining us.

Michael Froman:

Thanks for having me.

Ian Bremmer:

That's it for today's edition of the GZERO World Podcast. Do you like what you heard? Of course you do. Why not make it official? Why don't you rate and review GZERO World five stars, only five stars, otherwise, don't do it. On Apple, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts. Tell your friends.

When the US shift from defending the postwar rules-based order to challenging it, what kind of global system emerges? CFR President Michael Froman joins Ian Bremmer on the GZERO World Podcast to... More >