As expected, Friedrich Merz is set to become the next German chancellor after his conservative Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) won one of the tightest and highest-turnout elections in the country’s postwar history.
But the 28.5% earned by Merz’s CDU/CSU was the party’s second-lowest tally ever – hardly a mandate. Not to be outdone, outgoing Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s center-left Social Democrats (SPD) came third with just 16.4% – their worst defeat in 137 years. The moderate Greens led by economy minister Robert Habeck lost ground, too, scoring a disappointing 12.5%.
By contrast, extremist parties had a great night on Sunday. The far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) came in second place, doubling its vote share since the 2021 elections to 20.8% on the back of large gains with previous nonvoters, in the poorest districts, and across eastern Germany. The former communist Left Party (Die Linke), meanwhile, secured 8.8% of the vote by mobilizing younger women.
Neither the liberal Free Democrats (FDP) nor the far-left Alliance Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW) were able to clear the 5% threshold needed to enter parliament, increasing the number of seats allocated to the larger parties. The CDU/CSU and SPD’s combined allocation of 328 of 630 seats in the Bundestag will allow Merz to form a two-way coalition with the Social Democrats, avoiding the worst-case scenario of a weak, unwieldy, and unstable three-party coalition like Scholz’s ill-fated government with the Greens and the FDP (before it collapsed).
Though the CDU/CSU and SPD have real differences on immigration, social spending, and taxation, and their presumptive 13-seat majority won’t be large, so-called “grand coalitions” between these rival establishment parties have a long history in Germany and are popular with voters for their track record of delivering moderation and stability. Merz’s predecessor as party leader, former Chancellor Angela Merkel, presided over three of them.
But the inevitable alliance this time around is a flashing warning sign of Germans’ fading patience with the political center – and, conversely, of their growing appetite for radical movements – in a fragmented party landscape. The AfD won enough seats to make a two-way coalition with the CDU/CSU mathematically possible, but it is considered a neo-Nazi party by the entire German political establishment. Merz has made it clear that, despite his flirtation with them over migration and the recent embrace by Elon Musk and US Vice President JD Vance, the “firewall” keeping the extremists out of power will continue to hold – for now at least.
Yet as mainstream parties continue to lose voters to the far right, they will be increasingly forced into forming ever weaker and more ineffective coalitions just to stay in power. Alice Weidel, the AfD’s leader, has set her sights on the 2029 elections, hoping that the AfD can capitalize on – and nudge – the failure of yet another disappointing centrist government to become Germany’s strongest party and kingmaker. Over the next four years, it will aim to use its much-strengthened position to dominate agenda-setting and sabotage the new government as much as possible.
One weapon the AfD may be able to wield to hamstring Merz’s coalition is the so-called “blocking minority” it’ll form with the hard-left Die Linke, given the radical parties’ combined 216 Bundestag seats – just above the 210 seats needed to thwart constitutional reforms like the loosening of Germany’s strict fiscal rules (aka “debt brake”), which require a two-thirds majority in both houses of parliament.
Created in 2009 to restrict deficits, the constitutionally enshrined debt brake has since limited Berlin’s ability to borrow money to finance public spending. But 2025 is not 2009. Europe’s largest economy is in the midst of a profound economic crisis at a time of unprecedented geopolitical upheaval. Berlin needs to unlock hundreds of billions of dollars to modernize the country’s infrastructure, lower energy costs, invest in innovation, revive its stalled economy, ramp up support for Ukraine, and bolster its defense capabilities. The scale of the challenge has been compounded by President Donald Trump’s recent pivot toward Russia and threat to abandon Europe as the war in Ukraine turns three years old.
Merz struck the right level of urgency when he said that his “absolute priority” as chancellor will be “to strengthen Europe” in order “to achieve independence” from the United States, given that the Trump administration seems to be “largely indifferent” to Europe’s fate. A staunch transatlanticist before Washington started behaving like an adversary, Merz understands that what’s at stake is not just German interests but Europe’s future.
But Germany’s incoming chancellor has his work cut out for him. The AfD will obstruct all attempts to revamp the debt brake and raise borrowing, while the anti-militarist Die Linke supports reforming the borrowing rules but has explicitly vowed to oppose any vote to increase the country’s defense spending on principle. With a blocking minority in the Bundestag, these fringe parties could seriously undermine Merz’s agenda and, by extension, European security.
Merz’s plan to circumvent that challenge is the kind of boldness Germany needs more of. Instead of waiting for the blocking minority to be seated, the soon-to-be chancellor is exploring the possibility of pushing the defense spending hike through the lame-duck parliament, where mainstream parties will technically have a two-thirds supermajority until the newly elected parliament is sworn in on Mar. 25. The fiscally conservative Merz ruled out using this gimmick to reform the debt brake outright yesterday, but he’s reportedly in talks with the Social Democrats and the Greens to set up a special off-budget defense fund worth around 200 billion euros (this would also require a two-thirds majority).
Admittedly, four weeks is very little time to negotiate a workaround while juggling tricky coalition talks in a country that’s notoriously averse to big, fast changes. But extraordinary times call for extraordinary measures. If the German political establishment can’t muster the courage to act decisively now, it may not just be the AfD knocking on their doors in four years – Russian troops could be knocking at Europe’s doorstep, too.
