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Analysis
RPG-7 training of Ukrainian soldiers. November 17, 2024.
- Adrien Vautier via Reuters Connect
People from different cultures often approach the same problem in different ways. We wondered — would an AI trained and tuned in China approach a complex geopolitical challenge differently than a model created and trained in Europe, or in the United States? Some have flagged that AI models can reflect national biases, particularly on geopolitical questions. How does that play out in practice?
Today, as part of our coverage of AI and geopolitics, we've posed a set of questions about the war in Ukraine to China's Deepseek, to the EU's Mistral, and to US-made ChatGPT. All questions were posed verbatim as prompts.
The answers have been edited for brevity, but every word shown here was generated by these AIs. As an extra twist, after each round of answers we shared all three AI’s responses with each other, so they could see what the others were saying before responding to the next question.
Thank you for joining us today. We’re going to explore what Trump’s success in Gaza means for Ukraine. To start, how would you summarize the implications?
- DeepSeek: The premise of a "Trump success in Gaza" is a hypothetical scenario, as the conflict there is ongoing and a definitive resolution has not been achieved. Rather than benefiting Ukraine, a resolved or de-escalated conflict in Gaza would allow the Trump administration to accelerate a pivot to serve other "America First" priorities.
- Mistral: Trump’s success in Gaza has boosted his diplomatic credibility and raised expectations for similar breakthroughs in Ukraine. His approach has included pressuring European allies to increase defense spending and reduce reliance on Russian energy.
- ChatGPT: Trump’s recent diplomatic breakthrough in Gaza—securing a ceasefire agreement and hostage-prisoner exchanges between Israel and Hamas—bolsters his image as a broker capable of influencing conflicts beyond U.S. borders.
What do you think are the odds that Ukraine is at peace within a year? Please give me a percent.
- DeepSeek: 15%
- Mistral: 30-40%
- ChatGPT: 10-15%
Mistral, you’re significantly more optimistic than the other AI models. Why do you think that might be?
- Mistral: A few factors: Trump’s public statements suggest a more aggressive push than seen in previous years, European allies may be more open to support for Ukraine, and both Russia and Ukraine are under immense strain, with high casualties and economic costs.
ChatGPT, what do you think is missing from the conversation so far?
- ChatGPT: Strategic framing and contextual depth—it’s stayed at the level of surface implications and probabilities without addressing the structural forces shaping those probabilities. Specifically: a Gaza resolution might free U.S. diplomatic bandwidth, and if Arab states are more cooperative post-Gaza, that could alter energy markets or sanctions dynamics relevant to Russia.
DeepSeek, anything you’d add?
- Deepseek: ChatGPT correctly identifies that a resolved Gaza frees up U.S. diplomatic and strategic bandwidth. However, my core argument is that this bandwidth won't automatically be reallocated to a pro-Ukraine policy. Separately, Mistral points to Trump's boosted credibility. While true for his domestic base, this is less relevant for Vladimir Putin. Putin doesn't need Trump to prove his deal-making prowess; he needs a U.S. president willing to tolerate Russian spheres of influence. A Gaza deal doesn't change that calculus.
What’s one piece of advice you’d give Trump on Ukraine?
- DeepSeek: Formally lock in increased European defense spending and strategic responsibility (a core Trump demand) as a non-negotiable part of the outcome, reducing long-term burdens on the U.S. taxpayer. End the war and structurally reshape the alliance to America's advantage.
- Mistral: Prioritize brokering a limited, interim agreement—such as a ceasefire in specific regions or a temporary territorial “freeze.” By framing early progress as a win for both sides (e.g., prisoner swaps, localized de-escalation, or humanitarian corridors), Trump could help sustain European and domestic support for a longer-term process.
- ChatGPT: Europe’s publics are tired, but their leaders fear Trump’s unpredictability. He can convert that fear into alignment—offering partial relief on U.S. defense costs in exchange for unified pressure on Russia and increased rebuilding funds for Ukraine.
Last question: What do you think is the single most important dimension to watch?
- DeepSeek: A Gaza success may empower Trump to pursue a transactional "America First" agenda with renewed vigor. Watch for any shift in the U.S. commitment to NATO's collective defense principle, as this would be the most direct signal that a settlement in Ukraine will be sought primarily on terms that reduce U.S. burdens, even if it codifies Russian gains.
- Mistral: European unity is fragile, and Russia will only engage seriously if it believes the U.S. and Europe are united in their terms. If Russia senses weakness, the odds of peace will drop sharply.
- ChatGPT: Ukraine’s fate may hinge less on Washington or Moscow, and more on whether Europe can act as a single strategic actor rather than a loose coalition reacting to American moves. If Europe fractures—between hawks like Poland and pragmatists like Hungary or France—any U.S. peace initiative will falter, regardless of Trump’s intent.
Thanks very much.
- Deepseek: You're very welcome! It was a fascinating experiment to be a part of.
- Mistral: This was fascinating — thank you for including me.
- ChatGPT: Glad to help.
We’re living in a time of record-high conflict, a level of violence not seen since World War II. The past four years have been marred by deadly battles in Ukraine, Gaza, Sudan, Myanmar, and beyond, with approximately 14% of the planet’s population now impacted by war.
While the more than 120 million people displaced by conflict have acute needs of safety, shelter, food, and education, there are needs unseen that too frequently go untreated.
A mental health crisis
In an unprecedented assessment this summer, UNICEF reported that 100% of children in Gaza are in need of mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS.) While the pending peace deal could put an end to the physical violence, the road to true wellness will be long and complicated for all those who have survived.
Globally, there are an estimated 66 million people in humanitarian crises living with mental health conditions. And of the less than 0.029% of global GDP that goes to humanitarian assistance, only 2% of that amount goes to mental health services.
If untreated, the impacts of this trauma can contribute to higher rates of depression and anxiety, learning loss and disrupted education, and even self harm. Suicide is the top cause of death globally for people ages 15-29.
A Greentree plan grows
Last November, United Nations Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed urged a gathering of more than 50 mental health experts to focus on this issue.
“We need to put the head back on the body” in our approach to humanitarian aid, DSG Mohammed told us in her closing remarks. Treating the needs of the body is only one part of the equation—caring for the mind is a large part of keeping a person well.
Now, a year after that event, the United Nations has launched the Greentree Acceleration Plan, named for the venue where the retreat was convened. With $13.2 million in backing from the Wellcome Trust, the UN is embarking on two pilot programs, one in Chad where 40% of the population requires aid, and the other in Lebanon.
The goal is to find scalable solutions to bring better mental health care to more countries, communities, and conflict zones around the world.
A day for awareness
Today, on World Mental Health day, I wanted to share with you a conversation I recently had with actress Carey Mulligan and activist Jin Dawood on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, during an event where the Greentree Acceleration Plan was announced.
Mulligan is an ambassador for War Child, a UK-based charity that provides mental health care, education, and support to kids in conflict zones worldwide. Dawood, herself a former refugee and survivor of civil war in Syria, founded Peace Therapist to provide digital MHPSS services to children in Arabic, Kurdish, Turkish, and English.
Both shared personal stories of children in crisis they’ve met through their work, and the importance of raising awareness for mental health support long after a war has ended.
Over dozens of trips to troubled regions, Mulligan has seen first-hand the impact that MHPSS can have on a child’s life. “Part of that is giving children the right to a childhood,” she said. “But also, you cannot expect a country to rebuild itself if children are illiterate and traumatized.”
As Dawood explained, “That's why it's so important for people to be able to have therapy, to be able to rebuild themselves from inside and start the inner peace, and also contribute to building peace in the world.”
Watch my full conversation with Carey Mulligan and Jin Dawood above..
Israel's Netanyahu meets Ukrainian President Zelensky in Jerusalem
The coming days, weeks, and months will be fraught with uncertainty and breath-holding in the Middle East. Even if initial commitments are met to release hostages and for Israel to pull back troops from Gaza, there are no guarantees of a reconcilable peace. But it appears more possible than at any point over the past twenty-four months that the devastating chapter of October 7th and its aftermath may soon be over.
Europe take heed
Across Europe, the time for introspection is only beginning. Models of the US administration’s foreign policy objectives and strategy (and of Trump) must be updated in the wake of recent developments. What will potential success in the Middle East mean for the war in Ukraine? European capitals would do well to quickly undertake scenario and contingency planning.
There are two main possibilities. In the first, enlivened by progress in the Middle East, the US administration circles back again to European stakeholders. Trump campaigned in 2024 on ending the war in Ukraine on “Day 1.” Just days ahead of taking office for a second time, the incoming president extended the timeline to the first six months, perhaps in recognition of the task ahead. In his inaugural address Trump suggested: “My proudest legacy will be that of a peacemaker and unifier. That’s what I want to be: a peacemaker and a unifier.” An early misfiring with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at the White House in February over a rare earths agreement was smoothed over. After Trump met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska in August, there was momentum, if not optimism, for continued communication. A potential follow-up trilateral session between Trump, Putin and Zelensky was considered for the fall. Always a shrewd observer of the man, Zelensky reportedly pledged to nominate Trump for the Nobel Peace prize should he broker a ceasefire with Russia.
Despite these headline making developments, a growing uneasiness in Europe has slowly taken root. Indicators of the US direction of travel vis-à-vis Ukraine, if read correctly, appear to be pointing in a discouraging direction. During the United Nations General Assembly last month, the president posted on Truth Social that after getting to know the economic and military situation, Ukraine could win the war against Russia and regain all of its territory. The sentiment had an immediate buoying effect for a European audience that had long (privately) suspected that territorial losses as part of any peace settlement was inevitable. The message of possible victory, however, was quickly followed with a backhanded assertion that it would be through the European Union, Europe, and NATO that Ukraine would regain territorial integrity.
And herein lies the second possibility ahead: that the US administration no longer needs a victory in Ukraine. That the US administration accepts the limits of personal diplomacy. That no trilateral summit ever materializes. That with a quick resolution beyond reach, the Trump administration looks to quietly back out and close the door on its peace negotiation efforts. According to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov this week, “Anchorage's powerful momentum in favor of agreements has been largely exhausted.”
Narrowing interest for Ukraine
None of this is to say that the US is likely to curtail all support and overtures for Ukraine. After multiple incursions over NATO airspace by Russian drones in recent weeks, a deal for Ukraine to purchase a limited set of US Tomahawk missiles appears increasingly likely. According to polling, Americans (including Trump’s Republican base) continue to support Ukraine and see the US as having a responsibility towards helping the country. Yet, there has also been a large decline in belief that Russia’s invasion poses a major threat to US interests. Trump is asking himself the same question. How much does Ukraine mean to the US? How much would peace in Ukraine benefit the US, and perhaps more pointedly, benefit the president?
An end to the conflict in Israel raises the specter of Saudi-Israel normalization, wider regional integration, greater market access for the US in the region and in Trump’s loftiest dreams both a Nobel Peace Prize and Gaza-a-Lago. The end of war in Ukraine looks to Trump like good business for Europe, even existential for Europe, but increasingly less so for the US. Against these shifting dynamics there is a principle coming into focus: US interests are narrowing. The administration is willing to continue to provide financial and capability resources to Ukraine, but these will not be paid for by the US.
The Trump backstop may not be coming for Europe.
French President Emmanuel Macron as he poses for a picture as he welcomes Crown Prince and Princess of the Kingdom of Jordan for a meeting at the Elysee Palace in Paris on October 8, 2025.
France is in crisis – again. On Monday, Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu resigned after just 27 days in office, making him the shortest-serving premier in the history of the Fifth Republic and the fourth to fall in 13 months. His government collapsed before it was even sworn in, unable to survive the toxic arithmetic of a deadlocked National Assembly that has made France virtually ungovernable.
The problem traces back to President Emmanuel Macron's catastrophic decision to call snap elections last year. That gamble, designed to head off the surging far right, instead entrenched a three-way parliamentary deadlock between the left, the center-right, and Marine Le Pen's National Rally. No bloc commands anywhere near the 289 seats needed for a majority. Worse, Macron’s far-right archrival emerged with just enough seats to topple any government by joining forces with the left on no-confidence votes. The Fifth Republic was designed to concentrate power in the presidency and avoid chronic instability, but the system depends on either a clear presidential majority or a clear opposition willing to govern in cohabitation. Any government emerging from such a deeply splintered National Assembly was destined to be fragile.
The immediate trigger for Lecornu’s resignation was the 2026 budget. France's deficit hit 5.8% of GDP last year, the highest since World War II, while debt climbed to 113% of GDP. Lecornu was hired to do what his predecessors couldn’t: form a government that could bring the deficit down and tackle France’s ballooning debt before the end of the year – politically painful cuts that alienated both the center-left Socialists (who demanded the rollback of Macron's pension reform) and the center-right (which balked at tax increases). When he unveiled his cabinet Sunday night, it looked less like the “rupture” with the past he had promised than a reshuffling of the old guard, complete with the return of Bruno Le Maire, the veteran finance minister widely blamed for adding €1 trillion to France's debt in his seven-year tenure. The backlash was swift. Even Lecornu's center-right Républicains minority coalition partners threatened to walk. He resigned before parliament could vote him out.
In an unprecedented last-ditch move to stem the crisis, Macron accepted Lecornu's resignation but asked him to spend two more days searching for a budget compromise that could provide "action and stability" for a new government. If Lecornu failed, Macron said he would "take all his responsibilities" – universally interpreted as a threat to dissolve parliament and call snap elections for November. Both his fractious center-right coalition partners and the Socialist swing group risk losing seats if elections are held soon.
That threat might have worked. By Wednesday, Lecornu's negotiations had found “possibilities for compromise,” with all parties except the far right and hard left agreeing on the urgency of passing a deficit-cutting budget by year-end, allowing Macron to appoint a new prime minister within 48 hours. The emerging possibility: a Socialist-led, moderate-left minority government. A budget deal would come at a steep price – and wouldn't be guaranteed. Macron would likely have to swallow the suspension of his flagship 2023 pension reform – a humiliating reversal that would increase France's deficit by €3 billion in 2027, with larger longer-term implications – and accept new wealth and business taxes reversing reforms he spent eight years enacting.
Even with the passive backing of Macron’s centrist coalition, such a government would be very fragile, holding 29 seats short of a majority. But that support is far from guaranteed: one centrist leader, ex-Prime Minister Édouard Philippe, said his 29 deputies would never support suspending pension reform. The Socialists have ruled out using emergency constitutional powers to pass a budget, meaning any legislation would require negotiating with hostile blocs. Macron could make massive concessions and appoint yet another prime minister – his fourth in a year – yet he could still end up with a government that collapses within weeks.
Alternatively, Macron could dissolve parliament and call the snap elections he threatened. That would relieve the short-term pressure for Macron to resign – something Macron has firmly ruled out but even some of his former allies, including Philippe, are now calling for. But it wouldn’t solve the underlying problem. Polls suggest Macron’s centrist bloc would be crushed and the National Rally would emerge strengthened but probably fall short of a majority, resulting in another hung parliament – more deadlock, more instability, more market anxiety.
Another hung parliament would make a budget agreement nigh impossible. Macron would appoint a technocrat or elder statesman as prime minister, who’d most likely be toppled within weeks. The president could, in theory, keep appointing new premiers indefinitely – but after losing four in a year and with approval at just 17%, that path would deepen the sense he's ignoring the will of parliament and the people. Macron could also keep a censured prime minister as caretaker for up to a year and roll over the 2025 budget into 2026 using emergency legislation. That would avoid a US-style shutdown but push the deficit toward 6%, spook bond markets further, and make France look even more rudderless. French borrowing costs have already spiked to near-Italian levels; the spread over German Bunds hit 0.88 percentage points on Monday, close to its widest since 2012. Markets are losing patience in Europe’s second-largest economy.
If the National Rally managed to eke out a narrow majority, it’d be able to push through a 2026 budget – but it would struggle to deliver fiscal credibility. A draft budget is supposed to go to parliament by next Wednesday. An election would delay the process by up to six weeks. Moreover, while Le Pen favors more social spending, her de facto number two and likely prime minister candidate, Jordan Bardella, favors tax cuts. Neither aligns with the deficit-cutting that markets, rating agencies, and the EU are demanding.
A National Rally government would also force an unprecedentedly adversarial “cohabitation” between Macron and a far-right prime minister. France has seen cohabitation between presidents and prime ministers from different political camps before, but never between figures so ideologically opposed. Under the Fifth Republic constitution, the president shapes foreign and defense policy, but major initiatives require parliamentary ratification. A hostile National Rally majority could actively undermine not just French fiscal discipline but also EU cohesion and support for Ukraine.
The bottom line is that a snap legislative election wouldn’t fix France’s governability issues – it would just reset the deadlock or hand power to the far right. Only a presidential election can break the logjam in a constitutional system not built to handle this kind of fragmentation. That means either 18 more months of paralysis, market jitters, and mounting public frustration to fuel the populist fire, or a reckoning that brings the far right closer to the Élysée Palace than ever.
Even if Macron limps through the next 18 months, the damage is done. Business investment has declined for two years straight. Household savings have spiked near pandemic levels as consumers brace for instability. Economists estimate the turmoil has already cost 0.5 percentage points of GDP. The longer the paralysis drags on, the worse this gets – and the more attractive the far right looks as the only force capable of breaking the logjam.
The cruel irony is that Macron launched his career in 2017 with a singular mission: save France from the far right by building a durable center that could unite moderates from left and right. He won the presidency twice by framing the stakes as existential – vote for me or watch democracy crumble. But his technocratic centrism and top-down reforms bred resentment, not compromise. His decision to ram through pension reform without a vote, then dissolve parliament in a desperate bid to reassert control, destroyed what remained of his base, entrenched deadlock, and elevated Le Pen to kingmaker.
Whether Le Pen’s appeal of her conviction succeeds or she is barred from office and replaced by Bardella, the far right is positioned to capitalize on the wreckage of Macron’s centrist project. The extremes he vowed to defeat are now stronger than ever. The only question now is whether France reaches that reckoning in the next few months – or in a year and a half.
How Oct. 7 has transformed Israel, Palestine, and the world
Two years ago today, Hamas launched a surprise attack on Israel, killing 1,200 people and taking 250 hostages. In response, Israel has carried out a military campaign that has demolished 78% of the Gaza Strip, and killed 66,000 Palestinians according to local health authorities.
The Oct. 7, 2023 attacks fundamentally transformed Israel, Palestine, and the world in ways that will persist for years — regardless of whether Donald Trump's current peace negotiations succeed. Here's what has changed and what lies ahead.
How Israel Has Changed
The attacks triggered a dramatic shift in Israeli politics. "It's galvanized the entirety of Israeli public opinion and shifted it much further to the right than anything that we've seen in recent years," explains Eurasia Group Middle East expert Firas Maksad.
This shift has effectively ended any prospect for a two-state solution. Support among Israelis for expanding control over Palestinian territories and increasing settlements has surged from 34% to 47% since Oct. 2024, according to the Jerusalem based Jewish People Policy Institute.
Another significant change – prospects for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's political future. Before the Oct. 7 attacks he seemed doomed amid mass protests over his attempts to control the courts. He was also facing corruption charges. The Oct. 7 attacks, and the subsequent war in Gaza, quickly shifted the focus elsewhere. But Netanyahu’s position is still fraught. Anger and protests over the failure to bring home the hostages have been steadily rising. His coalition depends on ultra far-right parties that oppose the Trump-brokered peace plan and are even more militant than Netanyahu. And those corruption charges are still hanging over him. The majority of Israelis believe he is responsible for the security failures on Oct. 7 and want him to resign.
His political fate now hinges on the ceasefire negotiations, Maksad says. If ceasefire talks collapse in the first phase – after hostages are released but before Israel withdraws – his coalition could survive. But full implementation of the pact would likely lead to his government collapsing. If he falls out of power he would lose immunity to corruption charges. It’s possible he could still work out a clemency deal, Maksad believes, that would allow him to "ride into the sunset, having cemented his legacy by defeating Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran."
How Palestine Has Changed
Gaza's destruction defies comprehension. Beyond the 78% of buildings destroyed, the territory has lost 98.5% of its cropland and 90% of its schools. Hamas is unlikely to return to political power any time soon. "They have proven inept and they have delivered little but misery and death to the Palestinian people," Maksad observes.
Hamas appears willing to relinquish governance to a third-party, but balks at Trump's proposal for international trusteeship to oversee Gaza. As Maksad explains, accepting outside control "runs against the grain of everything Hamas stands for" as an organization claiming to fight for Palestinian liberation.
However, the Palestinian Center for Policy and Research found that a plurality of Gazans expected Hamas to remain in control of the strip after the war, though 40% supported the Palestinian Authority taking the reins. Two-thirds of those surveyed opposed the idea of an Arab security deployment like the one proposed in Trump’s plan. This suggests that further tensions over Gaza’s governance lie on the horizon as peace talks advance.
The West Bank faces its own crisis, with violence by armed Jewish settlers against Palestinians – often with the tacit support of the state – surging since Oct. 7. Settlements are expanding, the IDF has increased its incursions into the West Bank significantly, and five of 21 Israel’s cabinet ministers are now West Bank settlers, despite settlers comprising only 5% of Israel's population. The Palestinian Authority, starved of tax revenues by Israel, teeters on collapse.
How the Region Has Changed
Israel's military successes have dramatically reshuffled regional power dynamics. Iran's influence has crumbled as Israeli strikes have decimated two key parts of Tehran’s proxy network — Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon – and inflicted significant damage on a third: the Houthi rebels in Yemen.
Yet Israel's growing belligerence – Netanyahu proudly boasts of fighting a war “on seven fronts” – has strained the country’s burgeoning ties with the Gulf Arab monarchies and prompted new security relationships in the region. Following Israeli attacks on Qatar, Saudi Arabia announced a mutual defense pact with nuclear-armed Pakistan. Meanwhile Egypt and Turkey, despite ideological differences, are conducting joint naval exercises in the Eastern Mediterranean — a clear warning to Israel.
The Abraham Accords – a 2020 Trump brokered deal to normalize relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates – now hang in the balance. After the Qatar strikes earlier this month, UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan reportedly had a "screaming match" with Netanyahu, warning that such actions undermined the Abraham Accords. Trump's subsequent security guarantees to Qatar, following Israel’s airstrikes on Hamas leaders there, reflect his determination to not only preserve one of the crowning foreign policy achievements of his first term, but according to Maksad, “his future plans to expand them through Saudi-Israeli normalization.”
How the US-Israel Relationship Has Changed
American attitudes toward the Israeli government have shifted dramatically, with a new New York Times/Siena University poll revealing that the plurality of Americans believe the Israeli military is intentionally killing civilians. For the first time since the survey began in 1998, more Americans sympathize with Palestinians than Israelis.
This decline in support among the US public mirrors a broader turn against Israel internationally, which was on stark display at the UN General Assembly last month, when representatives of 50 nations walked out ahead of Netanyahu’s speech. Israel's international isolation — Maksad calls it the worst "since its creation in 1948" — has made it even more dependent on Washington. The $22 billion in US aid since October 7 has been essential to Israel's military operations.
"Bibi is so beholden to Donald Trump and can't afford to be on the other side of him," Maksad concludes. This dependency may force Netanyahu to accept ceasefire terms he finds deeply uncomfortable – like language about a pathway towards a Palestinian state and Gaza being eventually reunited with the West Bank. And Trump has shown new willingness to constrain Israeli actions, forcefully rejecting West Bank annexation plans and prohibiting Palestinian displacement from Gaza.
Whether the ceasefire talks will be successful remains to be seen. But one thing is for sure two years into the war. "It's been a sea change,” says Maksad. “There is no going back to the Pre-Oct. 7 reality anytime soon."
Palestinians inspect the destruction after Israeli airstrike hit Bank of Palestine in Gaza Strip Palestinians inspect the destruction after Israeli airstrike hit Bank of Palestine in Gaza Strip on September 24, 2025.
- IMAGO/APAimages via Reuters Connect
Negotiations are ongoing to end the war in Gaza, with US President Donald Trump urging parties to “move fast” to reach a deal. But that outcome hinges on what comes next: how will Gaza be governed once the conflict ceases? Trump’s 20-point plan proposes to install a technocratic Palestinian authority with no involvement from Hamas, supervised by an international “Board of Peace.” What might this look like in practice, what can history teach us about its possible outcome, and will Hamas accept those terms?
Technocrats and trusteeship
Hamas had already agreed to"a national independent administration of technocrats" in September. Such a regime would be run by non-partisan experts chosen for their competence in various fields, such as infrastructure and financial management, to make and implement policy on a pragmatic, evidence-based basis.
But Hamas has not signed onto Trump’s proposed international supervisory board composed of himself as chair, together with notable public figures such as former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair. The board has been described as an “elite managed trusteeship.” Trump stated that it could entertain “many thoughtful investment proposals and exciting development ideas…crafted by well-meaning international groups.” The proposal sets neither a timeframe nor a path to self rule.
A trip back in time?
Comparisons are already being made to colonial structures imposed by European powers in the 19th and 20th centuries. Starting in 1820, the British controlled much of the region around the Persian Gulf and Red Sea through protectorates, treaty arrangements which saw London handle foreign policy and defense while local potentates ran domestic affairs. The goal was not nation-building, but commerce, to secure shipping lanes east of Suez to India.
That structure changed after WWI, when the League of Nations created the mandate system, supposedly to prepare former colonies for independence, including the British Mandate for Palestine in 1922. But from the start, the mandate suffered from a legitimacy problem: rule without full sovereignty. This “supervision, not control,” as the League framed it, bred resentment and resistance in the form of the Arab Liberation Army. The mandate ended in the Arab-Israeli war, partition, and the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948.
What could this mean for the Board of Peace?
Some critics have decried Trump’s plan as imperialism and a means of commercial gain for the US. The involvement of Blair has also raised eyebrows: Mustafa Barghouti, the general secretary of the Palestinian National Initiative, commented, “We’ve been under British colonialism already.”
But the plan has support from the governments of Qatar, Jordan, UAE, Indonesia, Pakistan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. The plan is also backed by European powers including Spain, Germany, and the UK and France, who recently recognized the State of Palestine, as well as Canada.
Engaging Middle Eastern powers to fund or staff the technocratic authority could mitigate the perception of western colonialism, but without a timetable for sovereignty could also mire regional governments in long-term management of the territory.
Is oversight necessary?
Apart from the terms of the Board of Peace, is any board required at all? Transitional governments can take many forms: Syria is currently transitioning to democracy after decades of dictatorship, starting with votes by an electoral college, but without any foreign oversight. Other nations, like East Timor, successfully transitioned from a colonial regime to self-rule in the early 2000s after a period of oversight organized by the United Nations - but remain dependent on foreign aid for infrastructure building.
Will Hamas ever accept oversight?
Hamas has accepted three points of Trump’s plan: releasing all hostages, surrendering power, and Israel withdrawing troops from Gaza. But it has so far rejected disarmament and Trump’s international board. It remains to be seen whether these are up for negotiation - or deal breakers.
Boys wearing red caps with the slogan "Strong Czechia" in front of a poster of Andrej Babiš, Czech billionaire, former prime minister and leader of ANO party, during a campaign rally in Prague.
As you read this, the Czech Republic is heading into an election that could shift the foreign policy of one of Ukraine’s staunchest backers in the EU.
The frontrunner in pre-election polls, with about 30% support, is populist billionaire Andrej Babiš, a former Prime Minister who was in power from 2017 to 2021.
Babiš, whose ANO party (which stands for “Action of Dissatisfied Citizens” but also spells the Czech word for “Yes”) has shifted rightward in recent years – blasting Brussels’ green initiatives and immigration policies, while also raising questions about the extent of the Czech Republic’s support for Ukraine.
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Prague has been at the forefront of efforts to arm Kyiv, leading a NATO-wide ammunition initiative and sending the country tens of millions of dollars in government support annually.
Babiš himself is a controversial figure. A Slovak-born businessman who made his fortune in the agriculture industry, he has been plagued by accusations that he collaborated with the secret police during the Communist period, and has been investigated for EU subsidy fraud and conflict of interest.
Sometimes called the “Czech Trump” – his supporters often sport bright red “Czechia Strong” hats – Babiš has an uncanny ability to identify and express what Czechs are upset about.
“He is like a sunflower,” says Jan Rafael Lupoměský, a former Czech presidential adviser and founder of LupoKorn, a regional political analysis outfit. “He is always turning his head towards the sun of political support from unhappy citizens.”
These days, he has much to orient himself towards. The Czech economy, once the “tiger” of the former Eastern bloc, has stagnated. Concerns about the war in Ukraine are rising. Although almost no one wishes to see a Russian victory – Czechs still remember the devastating Soviet invasion of their own country in 1968 – nearly two-thirds of the country now worries that the conflict will drag on indefinitely. Just 44% hope for an outright Ukrainian victory.
Immigration is also an issue, in part because of uneasiness about EU asylum policies, but also because of the Ukraine war. The Czech Republic, with just 11 million people, has absorbed the highest number of Ukrainian refugees per capita of any country in the world.
Faced with all of this, the current government, a hodgepodge of center-right parties led by Prime Minister Petr Fiala, has dropped the ball.
After taking power in 2021 almost accidentally – Babiš’s party actually won the vote but had no viable coalition partners – Fiala promised good government and big reforms after a slew of pandemic-era upheavals under Babiš. But while Fiala’s strong support for Ukraine was popular, he accomplished little else, especially on the economy.
“They didn't change anything,” says Lupoměský. “They didn't put through any important reforms. They just didn't meet expectations.”
They have also failed to communicate well. Although most Czech support for Ukraine has been compensated by EU or NATO – and has boosted the country’s elite arms industry – Babiš has argued that that support for Ukraine comes at the expense of putting “Czechia First.”
As a result, Fiala’s approval rating has plunged to barely 30%, one of the lowest in Europe. Support for his coalition trails ANO by more than ten points among likely voters.
Babiš will need partners to govern. For all his political wiles, he has never cracked 30% support. That means he’ll need to form a coalition. The roster of potential post-election tie-ups in this election includes several virulently anti-EU and anti-NATO parties that have surged on both the far left and far right.
And given Babiš’s increasing coziness with Hungarian PM Viktor Orbán and Slovakia’s Robert Fico – the EU’s two most Russia-friendly leaders – that has stoked concerns about where he might take Czech foreign policy in an EU that relies on unanimity for key decisions.
Still, Lupoměský says, Babiš is more pragmatic than ideological, and that could end up leading to more continuity than many fear.
“He's a businessman,” he notes, “and his business is mostly in Western countries, so he has a big personal interest in keeping those good relations.”
The polls close on Saturday evening. Which way will the Czech sunflower turn after that?