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U.S. President Donald Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi shake hands as they attend a joint press conference at the White House in Washington, D.C., U.S., February 13, 2025.
Modi has been around long enough to have navigated trade frictions during Trump’s first term, and he was one of the first world leaders to approach Trump earlier this year with a conciliatory approach to growing trade tensions. Now, according to US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, the first phase of a new US-India trade deal might be “one of the first trade deals we would sign." Following a visit to Washington last week, Rajesh Agrawal, India’s lead trade negotiator, highlighted hopes for a “mutually beneficial, multi-sector bilateral trade agreement by fall of 2025, including through opportunities for early mutual wins.” Creating more market openings for US exports will come at a cost in a country long known for trade protectionism, but Modi has also made moves in recent years to open trade talks with the EU, the UK, and others.
This also follows news that, to avoid the Trump administration’s surging tariff rates on China, Apple has unveiled plans to move production of most of the 60 million iPhones it sells in the US each year from China to India by the end of 2026 – though the transition may take longer.April 29, 1975: Vietnamese refugees line up on the deck of USS Hancock for processing following evacuation from Saigon.
April 30 marks 50 years since North Vietnamese troops overran the capital of US-aligned South Vietnam, ending what is known locally as the Resistance War against America. Despite strong US-Vietnam reconciliation in recent decades, US President Donald Trump has forbidden American diplomats to observe the anniversary of this transformative moment — but those who survived the chaos that followed will never forget the trauma echoing down through the generations.
Saigon, April 29, 1975. For six weeks, South Vietnamese forces have been falling back in the face of a determined communist offensive. American troops have been gone for two years. The feeble government is in disarray. The people are traumatized by three decades of war and three million deaths.
Bing Crosby’s “White Christmas” begins playing on radios across the capital.
Some Saigonese know it’s a sign: It is time to run.
Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, now a Columbia University history professor, was just five months old, the youngest of nine children. After a failed first escape attempt by helicopter, her family heard about an uncle with access to an oil transport boat. More than 100 refugees crammed aboard the small vessel, where they waited for hours to set sail. Nguyen’s father nearly became separated when he dashed back into the city in a futile attempt to find more relatives.
At nightfall, they finally departed, crossing enemy-controlled territory under cover of darkness before being ordered onto an ammunition barge floating off the coast, bursting with over 1,000 refugees.
“When the sun rose the next day, April 30, we realized Saigon had fallen,” says Nguyen.
They were far from safety. The cable anchoring the barge in place severed, and they came under mortar fire as it drifted helplessly. Somehow, no one was killed in the shelling, but the refugees had no water and scant food, and they were baking under the unrelenting sun of the Mekong Delta.
Later that day, after dark, a US ship arrived to take on refugees, but as hundreds of bodies crowded toward their rescuers, they tipped the barge.
“People fell off, and it was in the middle of the night. Many drowned,” says Nguyen. “My brother watched a child fall in the water and then the father dive in after – they were never seen again.”
Baby Lien-Hang and her siblings all made it onto the second ship that arrived and transited through camps in Guam, Wake Island, and Hawaii, then a series of military bases on the US mainland. Months later, the family finally settled permanently in Pennsylvania. But for those who could not find a way out of Saigon that day, the odyssey is just beginning.
The revolution arrives
Americans often think of April 30, 1975, as the end of the Vietnam War. But for the Vietnamese, “the fall of Saigon signals not just the victory of North Vietnam, but the peak of their revolution,” says Tuong Vu, a political science professor at the University of Oregon.
The Communist Party of Vietnam rapidly began purging society of threats to their regime, including former South Vietnamese officials and soldiers, capitalists, religious clergy, intellectuals, and ethnic Chinese and Khmer. The new government also seized property, collectivized agriculture, and removed hundreds of thousands of urban residents to the countryside for farming.
Erin Phuong Steinhauer, now the head of the Vietnam Society, was five years old when she watched North Vietnamese tanks roll down Nguyen Hue Boulevard and crash through the gates of the presidential palace. Her family were wealthy proprietors of camera shops, and her father was a former soldier for South Vietnam.
Shortly after the fall of Saigon, troops arrived at their home to take him away. He would spend the next four years in a re-education camp – a prison meant to indoctrinate and punish perceived enemies of the state – suffering extreme deprivations, forced labor, and brainwashing. The family’s property was confiscated, and Erin and nine of her siblings went to live with their grandparents.
“Then they arrested my mother, and interrogated her,” says Steinhauer. For a week, she slept in a corrugated panel box. “They kept her there and asked her over and over: ‘Where is your money? Where did you hide everything? What are your plans?’”
She returned deeply traumatized – but the family had a lifeline. Erin’s mother had hidden gold with relatives in the countryside, and over the next four years, the family used it to make risky escapes in small groups to Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore, where Erin arrived with her mother and sisters in 1979.
“It was a strange feeling when we escaped Vietnam. I remember my dreams before 1975 were in bright color,” says Steinhauer. “Afterward, they were in dull grey overtones.”
Overextension and reform
The Communist Party’s policies strangled economic growth, and Vietnam’s situation was further complicated by China’s split with the USSR. Hanoi sided with Moscow, which had provided advanced weapons and advisors during the war with the US.
Meanwhile, the Khmer Rouge regime in neighboring Cambodia leaned on Beijing for support. Vietnam invaded its neighbor in 1978 to remove Pol Pot’s regime after over a year of border conflicts and failed peace talks, leading to an 11-year-long occupation and a brief punitive war with China in 1979.
“The Soviet Union, with its weak economy, became totally exhausted because of overreach,” says Vu. Straining under the weight of the war in Afghanistan and the arms race with the US, Moscow “was forced to consider economic reform, and in turn, encouraged the Vietnamese to reform as well.”
In 1986, the death of Party Secretary Le Duan allowed new leadership to initiate the Doi Moi reforms, gradually opening Vietnam’s market and sending out political feelers to former enemies.
“After 1986, Vietnam engaged with the global community again, moving away from the Soviet orbit,” says Nguyen. “It is the end of the international marginalization that came about with its war against Cambodia and China.”
Reconciliation with Washington
Repairing relations with the United States remained a slow process, in large part due to an American embargo, and formal diplomatic ties were not fully reestablished until 1995. The relationship strengthened rapidly in the following years, including defense and diplomatic cooperation, but most crucially through trade. Access to US markets helped the Vietnamese economy grow at an astounding pace, with per-capita GDP in 2023 more than 14 times higher than it was in 1995, and total US trade volume over 248 times larger.
That close relationship is part of why many Vietnam observers were shocked when the Trump administration ordered its diplomats in Hanoi to avoid any ceremonies recognizing the 50th anniversary of the fall of Saigon.
“It’s a smack in the face,” says Steinhauer. Though a symbolic gesture, “It invalidates everything we have gone through – not just Vietnamese-Americans, but US veterans, and the people of Vietnam, and the hundreds of diplomats who worked to broker reconciliation over the past 30 years. All of that seems like it is meaningless to this administration.”
Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney speaks in the small hours of April 29, 2025, in Ottawa after his Liberal Party won the general election the previous day.
The Liberals have won the battle to lead Canada. On Monday, Prime Minister Mark Carney’s party completed a stunning turnaround, with projections showing it secured 168 of 343 parliamentary seats.
Just months ago, with Justin Trudeau at the helm, the Liberals — who have been in power for a decade — were underwater in the polls, down as far as 25 points compared to the Conservatives. But Carney, Conservative Pierre Poilievre, and New Democrat Jagmeet Singh all had a mutual opponent in Donald Trump, and a surge in Canadian nationalism helped flip the momentum for the Liberals. The US president’s trade war and threats of using “economic force” to push Canada into becoming the “51st state” fueled much of the “Canada Strong” and “Restore the Promise of Canada” campaign promises of the Liberals and Conservatives, respectively.
A closer race than expected. The Liberals and Conservatives both gained seats compared to the last race in 2021. Led by Poilievre – who notably lost his seat in Ottawa – the Conservatives did better than many predicted, winning roughly 42% of the vote share and at least 144 seats. But the New Democratic Party and Bloc Québécois (which only runs candidates in Quebec) saw their parties lose seats. The NDP secured only seven ridings, down from 25, while the BQ won 23 ridings compared to 32 the last time. Despite losing in his riding, Poilievre has said he will stay on as opposition leader, while Singh has resigned as party leader in the wake of Monday’s crushing results for the NDP.
With the Liberals coming up just shy of the 172 ridings needed for a majority government, they can forge a coalition with the NDP, Bloc Québécois, or the Green Party, or they can go it alone and simply seek votes from other parties on an as-needed basis, issue by issue. Historically, the NDP has collaborated with the Liberals in confidence-and-supply agreements, while the BQ has focused on one-off support for specific issues.
In his victory speech, Carney focused on unity. “Let’s put an end to the division and anger of the past. We are all Canadian and my government will work for and with everyone,” he said.
He also pointed to the job ahead: tackling US-Canada tensions. “When I sit down with President Trump,” Carney said, “it will be to discuss the future economy and security relationship between two sovereign nations.”
“It will be our full knowledge that we have many, many other options to build prosperity for all Canadians.”
US President Donald Trump returns to the White House from his New Jersey golf club to Washington, DC, on April 27, 2024.
President Donald Trump has claimed a broad mandate to pursue sweeping changes to US institutions and policies since he took office on Jan. 20. He has sought to overhaul the federal government by closing agencies and cutting thousands of jobs, restructure the economy by throwing up a tariff wall to force companies to base more of their operations in the US, reconfigure decades-old foreign alliances, and assert expansive powers in an illegal immigration crackdown.
With a cohesive team in the White House, Republican control of Congress, and a disoriented Democratic opposition, Trump has pushed ahead rapidly on many fronts. But opinion polls in recent weeks have shown a sharp decline in public support for the president, and the courts, financial markets, and other institutions have started curbing his actions. Eurasia Group’s Clayton Allen and Noah Daponte-Smith explain their shared insights on where things are likely to go from here.
What is your assessment of the strength of Trump’s starting position? Was it a “historic mandate,” as he has said? And where does he stand today?
Trump’s popular vote win last November gave him a mandate — not the historic romp that he claimed, but a clear signal from voters that they wanted to buy what he was selling. A hundred days in, a lot of voters are suffering buyer’s remorse. It’s been a rough 100 days, almost all self-imposed: The US economy is headed for much lower growth, if not contraction; negotiations are moving slower than the expectations Trump set for the Ukraine war and Gaza; and national polling shows Trump underwater in overall approval, his handling of the economy, management of foreign policy, inflation, even immigration in some polling.
In the Silver Bulletin polling average, Trump had a 52% approval rating (with +12 net approval) on Jan. 21. His approval has since declined to 44%, with a -9 net approval.
The big question for Trump is if, or when, the negative views on the economy and general exhaustion with volatility begin to weigh on his GOP support. His approval among GOP voters is still robust in the mid-80s, but it is showing signs of weakening on the issues. A Gallup poll over the weekend, for example, found that 36% of Republicans believe that tariffs — one of the administration’s headline policies — will “end up costing the US more money than they bring in.”
What signs of Trump’s support will you be focusing on in the months ahead?
Two things – Trump’s approval ratings on the economy and his approval ratings among Republicans. Economic performance polling is a traditional source of strength for Trump, but the economy is where he has shown his sharpest and most notable decline, largely stemming from the tariff rollout. According to the Economist/YouGov survey, Trump’s net approval on the economy was -5.8% as of last week. That is lower than at any point in his first term when he reached a nadir of a net -2%. If Trump is losing support on one of his traditionally strongest issues, that suggests he will be somewhat politically weakened in the latter half of 2025 and beyond.
Trump’s approval ratings among Republicans will be another key sign to watch. The president’s ability to command an unruly Republican conference in Congress depends in large part on his unquestioned popularity within the party. So far, that has held up: He’s still above in the mid-80s% approval among Republicans. But if that dips below 80%, Trump may no longer appear the invincible figure in the party that he does today.
What do you see as the biggest risks for Trump and his ability to advance his agenda?
Recession, market blowback, and the courts. After a big sell-off in early April, markets have stabilized somewhat following Trump’s decision to pause some of his most expansive tariff measures. But with no imminent trade deals on the horizon to clarify tariff levels, one wonders how long that confidence can hold. Similarly, a recession – beginning in the second half of the year, or potentially backdated to the first – would severely disrupt his tax cuts-and-tariffs agenda.
The courts are the biggest source of procedural risk for Trump, especially on the deportation of illegal immigrants and the spending cuts made by Elon Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency. We have already seen strong pushback from the courts in both areas. That pushback may extend to tariffs as well, with court cases in the pipeline over the legality of the emergency authorities claimed to enact them. In all these areas, the courts’ skeptical postures toward the Trump administration’s more disruptive actions will be a major source of conflict between the branches of government over the next year.
How do you think Trump will react if some of these risks materialize? Change approach? Lash out against institutional checks on his power?
Lashing out against institutional checks is more likely. A Trump who can no longer marshal the Republican congressional conference at his will probably seek to expand executive power so that he can act without Congress. Key members of the administration have already pointed in that direction. Even with Musk poised to scale back his involvement with DOGE, the administration is claiming broad powers to reshape the federal government under the so-called unitary executive theory. Similarly, pushback from the courts will likely lead Trump to further test the exact bounds of the courts’ power, as in his moves to skirt rulings related to deported immigrant Kilmar Abrego Garcia’s case. And if an economic downturn materializes, Trump will likely blame it on the policies of the Federal Reserve and its Chairman Jerome Powell.
Edited by Jonathan House, senior editor at Eurasia Group.
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: It is a hundred days of President Trump's second administration. How's he doing? And the answer is not so well, certainly not if you look at the polls. Worst numbers for first a hundred days of any president since they've been taking those polls. Markets, of course, down, global economy also down, so much of this self-imposed. And it's not the big-picture policy ideas. The things that Trump says he wants to do are not only popular, but they're also sensible policy: end wars, secure the border, and fair trade. Running on those three planks would work for pretty much anyone in the United States, the things that Trump is committed to, the things that previous administrations, including Biden and the promise of Harris, had not been particularly effective at. But the implementation has been abysmal. The lack of interest in policy specifics, lack of ability to effectively execute, and the dysfunction inside the Trump team/teams, economy, national security has been really challenging.
Tariffs, of course, so far have been the big problem, big internal fight on what it was that Trump should do and for what purpose. In terms of the purpose of these tariffs, you had so many ideas, and a lot of them were mutually contradictory. You're meant to raise revenue and lower taxes and reshore manufacturing and balance deficits and decouple from China and improve national security and on and on and on. These tariffs were going to be a panacea for absolutely everything, and you can't accomplish all of it. And that means that all of the fights that are going on, these countries don't know what the Trump administration actually wants. Bessent, the secretary of treasury, came in with one idea, and Peter Navarro, who initially won, came in with a second, the senior trade advisor in the White House, and Lutnick sort of had a third, and now Bessent is in charge for now, nominative.
Of course, Trump is really in charge, and Trump isn't interested in the specifics. He just wants deals. He wants wins. And he's saying, "Well, you guys, you other countries, you tell us what you're going to do. Well, it's not our job to tell you what we want, even though we're the ones that are expecting these deals to come together." And of course, it's happening with the Americans picking fights with all of these countries, literally everybody in the world simultaneously. And the impact that's going to have on the American economy is going to be dramatic. It's going to be long-lasting. It'll be, in many ways, as big as the pandemic, but completely self-imposed.
And even if deals were put together tomorrow, and they won't be, with the Europeans, with the Mexicans and Canadians, with the Chinese in particular, you'd already have a massive long-term disruption because the supply chains, the tankers, the contracts have already been severed for a period of time. And every day this goes on is a day that it's going to get worse. So that's going to lead to a lot of inflation in the United States, going to lead to a lot of bankruptcies and need for stimulus in other countries around the world, and the average voter's not going to be happy about that at all, which does help to explain why they did Liberation Day the day after elections in the US, special elections in Wisconsin and Florida and elsewhere.
Ending wars, Gaza did have a ceasefire early on, but not now. And now Trump is planning his trip to the Gulf and doesn't have Israel on the schedule, at least not yet, because there's more fighting happening between the Israeli Defense Forces and what's left of Hamas. And that fighting is not something Trump wants to see. Let's see how successful he is at bringing it to a ceasefire.
More important for everyone right now in the United States is the Russia-Ukraine War. The Americans are pushing to end that war, and Trump has had some success in getting the Ukrainians to the table because they understand that the or else is their intelligence and defense support from the US will be shut down, as it was suspended, so they're taking it very seriously. But the Russians are not because Trump has not displayed much of an or else for the Russians, hasn't said directly that if Russia refuses to do a ceasefire, that the US will provide more support for Ukraine, even though Trump advisors were saying that before he became president, has said, "Well, maybe there'll be secondary sanctions." But Trump is not making this very serious for Putin, and so Putin isn't taking it very seriously. Nobody thought he was really going to end the war in a day, but it's been a couple of months of effort, and clearly now Trump and team are losing patience and it's looking increasingly that they might walk away, which is why they're engaging with the Iranians and why, heck, Kim Jong Un probably is going to get a call at some point, right? Because Russia-Ukraine not working so well. So much for ending those wars.
And then on the border front, where Trump is having much more success in terms of policy, you don't see illegal immigrants coming into the US at anywhere close to the numbers they were under Biden or during Trump first term, and that has been a response to effective US policy. But there's also been overreach in terms of refusal to carry out the rulings of federal justices and even the Supreme Court, and that overreach is something that most Americans oppose. So even in the area where Trump is doing the best, his numbers are actually not as favorable as you might otherwise expect because of the dysfunction and because of the overreach of a more revolutionary Trump orientation.
Look, even DOGE, where I was kind of hoping in the early days that DOGE was certainly going to be effective at taking a lot of the corruption and the overspending out of the US government, but much less has been done on that front. There's been lots of claims of fraud, but very little evidence of actual fraud. There's been lots of claims that they were going to take two trillion, then one trillion, then maybe 150 billion, and now looks like less of that with Elon in charge of DOGE. And the focus that they have had has been much more politicized, much more ideological. Anything that looks like DEI or woke, let's just remove all of it and not necessarily do it with a scalpel, but more with a sledgehammer or a chainsaw, which means a lot of important programs get caught up, along with programs that no Americans should be funding.
And so overall, it's been a very challenging first hundred days. This is very much a move fast and break things approach. They are moving very fast. They are breaking a lot of things. There's not a lot of building, at least not yet. And a lot of Americans, while they feel that their government is inefficient and bloated, very few Americans want to see the government be broken further than it already is and less effective than it is, and that is so far what people are seeing. They're seeing it at home and they're seeing it internationally.
And they're not seeing a lot of restraint, even as mistakes are made, not only because Trump is never going to admit to have made any mistakes, of course that is something that you see from pretty much every president, but also, unlike most presidents, he's surrounded by people that don't tell him when he gets things wrong. And that is very different from Trump's first term, and that's a problem because you want to have people, irrespective of how loyal they are to you, you want them to be loyal first and foremost to the country. But Trump doesn't want that. He wants them loyal to him before they're loyal to the country, and that means not giving him information when he screws up because he will retaliate against them. And that's going to get you negative outcomes, I think, not just for the first a hundred days, but also for a much longer period of time in the United States and internationally. I hope I'm wrong. I certainly want to see him succeed, I want to see the country succeed, but that is not the trajectory that we are now on.
That's it for me, and I'll talk to y'all real soon.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US President Donald Trump meet while they attend the funeral of Pope Francis at the Vatican on April 26, 2025.
Has the pope’s funeral set the stage for peace in Ukraine? At the Vatican on Saturday, US President Donald Trump sat down with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky for a meeting the White House described as “very productive,” and which Zelensky said had the “potential to become historic, if we achieve joint results.” Zelensky also met separately with Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, and French President Emmanuel Macron, who later claimed that Ukraine was ready for an “unconditional ceasefire”and that it’s “now up to Russia to prove that it truly wants to end this war.”
Trump also threw the ball into Russia’s court – but it landed more like a grenade. After meeting Zelensky, the US President posted to Truth Social that he feared Russian President Vladimir Putin might have been “tapping” – aka, deceiving – him about his willingness to end the war. The evidence? Russia’s continued bombardment of Ukraine, including an attack Thursday that killed 12 people and injured 90. Trump suggested that now Putin must be “dealt with differently,” possibly through banking or secondary sanctions. At the same time, the US president claimed late Sunday that Ukraine was ready to yield Crimea – Zelensky said last week this was a nonstarter.
The response? Hours later, Russia launched a large-scale drone and airstrike assault across Ukraine, killing at least four people and injuring several others. Each country also targeted the other overnight with long-range attacks, though there were no immediate reports of casualties. Mediators are now urging the two sides to the table in what US Secretary of State Marco Rubio described as a “critical week” for resolving the conflict.
Oh and by the way. Though it had been known for some time,North Korea formally acknowledged on Sunday that it has been lending troops to the Russian cause. Separately, the Trump administration is reportedly looking to reopen talks with the North Korean regime, after Trump held a pair of talks with Kim Jong Un during his first term in office.President Donald Trump raises a fist during a ceremony where he signs two executive orders that will lead to reciprocal tariffs against other countries that charge tariffs on US goods.
What’s the old line about there being decades where nothing happens and weeks where decades happen?
Quoting Vladimir Lenin may not be the wisest move in today’s America, but it’s an apt description of the (second) first 100 days of Donald Trump’s foreign policy.
In barely three months, he’s bashed America’s closest European allies, spooked NATO into worrying about its survival, taken a chainsaw to US foreign aid programs, pulled the rug out from under Ukraine, threatened to expand US territory for the first time since the 19th century, and started a global trade war that’s pushed protectionism to its highest levels since the Great Depression.
Not bad for 100 days! But is there a method to what seems – to horrified defenders of the “US-led world order” – like so much madness? “Method” is a risky word to use with a figure as famously capricious as Trump, but there are a few basic aspects of his worldview and commitment to “America First” that are consistent and worth understanding.
No new friends (also no old friends)
First, Trump believes that the world is a place where all countries are just trying to “screw” each other. This is true not only of adversaries but, especially, of allies. (Tell me you’re a New York real estate developer without telling me you’re a New York real estate developer.)
The mutual screwing occurs in an endless chain of zero-sum transactions between countries in which hard power and cold cash are all that matters. Deficits or defense umbrellas are ripoffs. Alliances based on “values” are silly. Soft power is a useless conceit, a virtue signal, a kind of “Geopolitical wokism.”
It’s a (multipolar) jungle out there
Second, there are various great powers in this world, and each has its own sphere of influence. The largest of these are the US and its chief rival China, but Russia is up there as well. You do not, in Trump’s view, mess with another power’s sphere of influence, and you do not waste time trying to win over countries of marginal economic or strategic value beyond your neighborhood. You put your country, to borrow a phrase Trump uses a lot, “first.”
Once you grasp that, for Trump, the world is a transactional and increasingly multipolar jungle, it actually explains a lot about his foreign policy.
It tells you why he doesn’t seem to care that much about Ukraine (he sees it as Russia’s sphere) or Taiwan (ditto for China) or why he’s OK slashing foreign aid (soft power is silly). It explains why he wants a piece of Greenland, Canada, and the Panama Canal (all have immense strategic and economic value within Washington’s own sphere of influence, especially if conflict is coming with other powers.) And of course, it tells you why he loves to love tariffs – a crude but effective tool for unleashing America’s immense economic power
Hard power dreams, soft power missteps
All of this is a big rupture with the longstanding idea that the US, as a hegemon, gets more than it gives by providing security, market access, or development assistance to vast parts of the world.
But taken on its own terms, is Trump’s foreign policy ... working? The evidence is mixed. Many of his objectives – restore America’s lost manufacturing capacity, confront China, and force Europe to carry its share of the defense burden – can make sense on their own. But, taken together, the overall policy is still a mess of conflicting impulses.
Trump wants to isolate and pressure China, but he’s simultaneously wrecking relations with Europe, Washington’s most natural ally against Beijing. He wants to maintain technological supremacy over China, but his immigration and education policies are scaring the world’s best minds away from America.
He wants to use tariffs to restore manufacturing – which, by definition, almost requires leaving them in place for a long time. But he also wants to use them to extract tactical concessions on trade and defense – which means not leaving them in place for a long time. Which is it?
And while he is right to force the West to confront the problems of Biden’s well-intentioned but poorly defined Ukraine policy, his pledge to end the war “within 24 hours” is already 2,376 hours overdue. Browbeating Ukraine while pleading with Vladimir Putin on social media is not exactly a foreign policy to be reckoned with.
It’s still early days to be sure. But whether the decades that have happened in these 100 days are a real revolution against the long-established order of US foreign policy, or a a tangle of disruptive but ultimately confused impulses remains to be seen.