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Russian President Vladimir Putin attends a meeting with Head of the Federal Service for Financial Monitoring Yury Chikhanchin at the Kremlin in Moscow, Russia, on July 8, 2025.
At first glance, Russia has coped well under the weight of Ukraine-related Western sanctions. In 2024, its economy grew at a faster rate than every G7 country. Though Europe has gone almost entirely cold turkey on Russian oil and gas supplies, thirst for these resources in China and India, quenched by a shadow tanker fleet that helps evade those sanctions, has kept Russia’s energy trade stable.
Longer term, climate change can help. Warming temperatures will open new Russian lands to farming and boost its agricultural output. They will open new sea routes that lower Russia’s cost of commerce and bring revenue from transit fees imposed on others. Perhaps most importantly, the Kremlin has long claimed it can transition from its currently heavy reliance on oil and gas exports to deeper investment in wind, hydro, geothermal, biomass, hydrogen, and solar energy.
But the realities of Russia’s future are darkening.
Its economy has become addicted to war in Ukraine. Its growth over the past two years was fueled mainly by the tidal wave of military spending needed to eke out modest gains in what’s become a war of attrition. Military and security spending now make up about 40% of Russia’s total government expenditure. This spending surge is sending inflation into overdrive, forcing Russia’s central bank to raise interest rates to a record 21%, raising borrowing costs for businesses and slowing future investment. Manufacturing has slowed and ordinary Russians aren’t spending.
None of this will persuade President Vladimir Putin to cut a deal with Ukraine – and that’s Russia’s bigger problem. Current evidence suggests Putin intends to keep doubling down on a war that leaves a supposed great military power to take 1,000 casualties per day to make tentative gains of a few kilometers, to kill Ukrainian civilians, and to laud slow advances on individual towns and villages in a war that’s already dragged on for three years and four months.
In addition, while China and India remain eager to buy the energy Russia pumps out of the ground, they know the loss of Moscow’s best customers in Europe allows them to buy the product at a below-market price. China, with an economy nearly nine times larger than Russia’s, has done remarkably little to help Putin win his war. India has shifted large volumes of arms purchases from Russia to the United States. The Kremlin’s trade problem is compounded by the reality that even ending the war with Ukraine won’t bring mistrustful Europeans to return to their former volumes of trade with Russia.
But Russia’s biggest problems are found inside its borders. Longtime reliance on the revenue from exports of oil, gas, metals, and minerals has allowed Russia to avoid large-scale investment in the digital-age industries needed for an innovative 21st-century economy. The most recent credible measure of this comes from the Global Innovation Index 2024, produced by the World Intellectual Property Organization, a UN agency. According to the report, which measures entrepreneurship and innovation-driven growth and development across 133 countries, Russia ranks 59th in the world, behind Mauritius, Georgia, and North Macedonia.
This problem probably has many sources – an economy dominated by well-connected elites who don’t need innovation to remain wealthy, a lack of entrepreneurial tradition, and increased investment focus on a war Russia isn’t winning. But the larger challenge facing Russia is the depletion of the generation of young people that might help solve these problems. A report last month from the Center for Strategic and International Studies found “250,000 Russian soldiers have died in Ukraine, with over 950,000 total Russian casualties.” That’s a tremendous blow for Russia’s potentially most productive generation, with no end of the sacrifice in sight. Here’s another: aware of both Russia’s long-term economic problems and the much more urgent problem of avoiding war, nearly one million Russians have fled the country in search of better opportunities since the earliest days of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine.
Russia, a resource-rich country with 11 time zones and an economy about half the size of California’s, still depends almost entirely for its great-power claims on its stockpile of nuclear weapons, the world’s largest. But these are weapons that can only be used at high risk of self-annihilation, and Russia’s sophisticated arsenal of cyber-weapons is useful only for undermining other countries.
Worst of all, it’s hard to imagine any Kremlin change of direction toward creating a more dynamic and innovative Russia anytime soon. The war in Ukraine grinds on. For now, Putin and his enablers seem content to define Russia’s “greatness” solely by its ability to disrupt and punish others.
Hezbollah beat on their chests as a sign of mourning during a mass rally to mark Ashoura, commemorating the martyrdom of the Prophet Muhammad's grandson Hussein.
On Wednesday, the Trump administration’s envoy to Lebanon, Tom Barrack, received a stunning proposal from the Lebanese government– a plan to disarm Hezbollah, the powerful Iran-backed Shia militia group that has dominated Lebanon’s politics and fought two major wars with Israel over the past 20 years. The process would occur over the next four months, in exchange for Israel halting strikes on Lebanon and withdrawing from the country’s South.
If Hezbollah were to drop its weapons it would redefine the Middle East virtually overnight. But can the Lebanese government really turn this proposal into reality?
On the one hand, Hezbollah has never been weaker. Over the past year and a half, Israel has decimated the group’s leadership and destroyed a great deal of its weapons. The collapse of the Assad regime, a key ally, upended a major smuggling route for weapons from Iran. And the regime in Tehran itself has been hobbled by the recent Israeli and American airstrikes.
Hezbollah has not publicly responded to the proposal, but is reportedly at least considering shrinking its arsenal. However, according to Eurasia Group’s Middle East expert Firas Maksad, “Hezbollah could just be buying time” by appearing open to diplomacy, hoping that the winds in the region shift back in its direction.
Why does the Lebanese government want Hezbollah to disarm? Hezbollah, which enjoys support from Lebanon’s sizable Shia population, is a major challenge to the Lebanese government. The group dominates South Lebanon, providing social services to the population, and it makes decisions about war and peace in the conflict against Israel without the national government’s consent.
“With the exception of Hezbollah’s support base, most Lebanese very much would like to see strengthened state authority and control over weapons,” says Maksad.
They aren’t the only ones. Wealthy international donors, including the US and the Gulf Arab monarchies, have made it clear that desperately needed financial and reconstruction aid won’t flow to the Lebanese government while a powerful armed group like Hezbollah operates effectively beyond state control.
What would it take for them to disarm? Hezbollah and its supporters in South Lebanon see its arsenal as a protection of Shia interests in Lebanon’s fragile sectarian balance, as well as a defense against Israel. Among many in the Shia community, Maksad explains, “any attempt to try and take away the weapons [is seen as] meant to undermine the community.”
He added that real disarmament would require, at a minimum, Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon under the terms of ceasefire agreements reached last November.
“There is this sense in Beirut, reflective of Hezbollah’s thinking, that Israel would need to fulfill its side of the obligations before more can be expected,” says Maksad.
But that sets up an impasse: Israel’s position is that it can’t leave Southern Lebanon while an Iran-backed militia is dug in there with weapons pointed at the Jewish state.
So where do things go from here? Maksad says there are two scenarios. One is a slow, drawn-out process where Hezbollah makes limited concessions under the guise of diplomatic dialogue — but without any real, comprehensive disarmament.
The other involves Israel forcing the issue. With its campaign in Gaza winding down, Israel may now look northward again, making a fresh effort to weaken Hezbollah so much that the group has no choice but to surrender.
At the moment, that looks like the way things are headed – Israel on Wednesday night launched a limited attack into South Lebanon, and its attacks on Hezbollah’s territory have ramped up in recent weeks. That almost certainly puts the prospect of a negotiated disarmament further out of reach in the near term.
“I don’t see diplomacy right now providing the required results of fully disarming Hezbollah,” Maksad warns.
In this episode of Ian Bremmer’s Quick Take, Ian breaks down the growing crisis between the US and Brazil, sparked by Donald Trump’s surprise announcement of 50% tariffs on all imports from Brazil.
Ian argues Trump’s tariffs are not driven not by trade but by politics.“This is clearly an abuse of executive authority,” Ian says, adding the tariffs have “nothing to do with a national security emergency.” He notes the move targets Brazil over efforts to prosecute former President Jair Bolsonaro and for legislation moving against social media companies.
Ian warns that Trump’s move could backfire badly. “Lula is going to lean into this fight,” he explains, noting it may hurt Bolsonaro’s political chances. Trump’s goal? “Purely a political vendetta… it doesn’t advance the American national interest,” says Ian. He predicts this unprecedented intervention could ultimately “blow up in Trump’s face.”
In this episode of Ian Bremmer’s World in :60, Ian breaks down the latest on US trade tensions, Iran’s nuclear program, and Trump’s meeting with Netanyahu.
On US tariffs, Ian says Japan and China face “radically different” situations.
As Iran cuts ties with nuclear inspectors, Ian says they’re “taking their program dark.”
On Trump’s recent meeting with Netanyahu, Ian says a Gaza ceasefire remains uncertain. Though Netanyahu nominated Trump for a Nobel Peace Prize, Ian points out, “That’s nice for Trump, but not a Gaza ceasefire.”
Bavaria, Germany - June 6, 2025: PHOTOMONTAGE, Red cap with VOTE FOR ELON MUSK in front of US flag.
It started, as most of Elon Musk’s moves do, with a post on X. On July 5, the Tesla CEO and former adviser to US President Donald Trump announced the formation of the America Party, a new political movement meant to upend what he called “a one-party system, not a democracy.”
Why start a party? The two men have been feuding over the president’s “One Big Beautiful Bill,” which became law July 4. Musk slammed the package – which pairs tax cuts with massive spending hikes for defense and immigration enforcement – for adding trillions to the US debt. He now plans to defeat legislators who supported it, vowing that “They will lose their primary next year if it is the last thing I do on this Earth.”
Will voters bite? Musk posted a poll on X on July 4 – American Independence Day – asking whether voters wanted “independence” from the American two-party system: 65% of 1.2 million respondents answered “Yes.” A subsequent Quantus Insights poll found that 40% of voters are open to supporting his America Party, though just 14% are “very likely” to vote for it, with skepticism highest among Democrats and older voters.
Have third parties ever made a difference? Alternatives to the Republican-Democrat duopoly have periodically emerged. And while a third-party candidate has never won the White House, they’ve helped other candidates to do so. In 1912, Theodore Roosevelt’s breakaway Progressive Party won 27% of the popular vote, dividing the Republican base and handing the presidency to Democrat Woodrow Wilson. In 1992, billionaire Ross Perot’s independent candidacy captured nearly 19% of the vote and helped Democrat Bill Clinton defeat incumbent Republican President George H. W. Bush. In 2000, Ralph Nader’s campaign under the Green Party banner swung the election to George W. Bush by drawing Florida votes away from Democrat Al Gore. Most recently, Robert F. Kennedy Jr. ran as an independent in 2024 but dropped out to endorse Trump, later becoming his secretary of Health and Human Services. On Capitol Hill, meanwhile, no significant third party has ever emerged.
President or power broker? Musk isn’t aiming for the presidency himself (as a foreign-born American he isn’t eligible anyway). Rather, he says he wants to target two or three Senate seats and eight to ten House races to act as a swing bloc in a polarized Congress. He promises to champion fiscal discipline, deregulation, and centrism, positioning him as a potential spoiler for Trump in the 2026 midterms. But Musk’s personal brand is polarizing: a Morning Consult poll from late June showed his overall net favorability at -14, and an Economist-YouGov poll found that Musk’s net favorability dropped from -9 to -23 after his feud with Trump.
Can Musk really pull this off? Despite Musk’s deep pockets, money might not be enough: in April, his $20-million political push in Wisconsin failed to sway a key judicial race. Logistical barriers might prove even tougher. Starting a nationally-competitive third party requires navigating a maze of state-level signature thresholds and party-registration deadlines, as well as building campaign infrastructure and volunteer networks – his disruptive intentions aside, does Musk really have that level of patience for politics?
And what if Trump acts against him? Last week he threatened to strip him of citizenship, and Sunday night called his third-party effort “off the rails.” With stakes this high, this next chapter in the clash between the world’s richest man and the president could have huge implications.
Demonstrators with US and Ukrainian flags rally near the U.S. Capitol ahead of President Donald Trump’s address to a joint session of Congress in Washington, D.C., USA, on March 4, 2025.
Earlier this week, the US cut shipments of a number of weapons to Ukraine, including Patriot interceptor missiles, a critical part of Kyiv’s air defenses. Here’s a short guide to making sense of why that happened, and how it could affect the course of the Russia-Ukraine war.
What is a Patriot interceptor? It’s one of the world’s most advanced air defenses, able to shoot ballistic missiles out of the sky. The US-made system is sold to nearly 20 countries, and was first given to Ukraine in early 2023. The Patriot’s main theaters of action are Ukraine as well as in the Middle East, where it has protected US forces and Israel from ballistic missiles launched by Iran or Iran-aligned groups.
Why did the US stop sending them to Ukraine? Low stockpiles, evidently. Nearly two years of intense use in both Ukraine and the Middle East have crushed supplies of Patriot missiles, of which only about 500 are made annually, and drawn resources away from other critical weapons systems as well.
After the Trump administration bombed Iran’s nuclear facilities ten days ago, for example, American forces fired the largest salvo of Patriots “in history” to repel Tehran’s (well-telegraphed) retaliatory airstrikes on the US base in Qatar. That may have pushed supplies below critical levels, raising concerns about broader US weapons production capacity.
Still, this is a message to Ukraine, right? Even if concern about scarcity was the primary motivation, US President Donald Trump – who won the election in part on promises to cut aid for Ukraine and force both sides into a “deal” – has clearly hit Kyiv with the short end of the stick here.
It’s worth noting that the decision to cut the shipments to Ukraine reportedly came from Pentagon policy chief Elbridge Colby, a prominent China hawk who sees support for Ukraine as a distraction from challenging Beijing.
And that’s not the only China connection in this story. Amid a growing trade and technology war with Washington, Beijing recently banned the US-bound export of certain minerals that are essential in weapons manufacturing. Among them were gallium, antimony, and germanium, critical components of various weapons and ammunition systems, including the Patriot.
“To me, this is the most interesting untold story,” says Eurasia Group research director Marc Gustafson, a former national security intelligence chief, “mostly because the Pentagon cannot talk about it. China’s bans have been crushing for the US defense industry, particularly regarding the weapons the US has been providing to Ukraine and Israel.”
How badly will this decision hurt Ukraine? Kyiv called the announcement a “total shock.” At a moment when Russia has been launching its most ferocious – and increasingly indiscriminate – aerial assaults of the entire war, losing the Patriots will leave Ukraine’s cities and civilians vastly more exposed to the Kremlin’s missiles and drones.
But the move will have less effect on Kyiv’s primary goal of simply holding off Russia at the front lines, says Alex Brideau, Eurasia Group’s top Ukraine and Russia expert. “It’s not a back breaker,” he says. Still, if the Trump administration cuts to conventional ammunition last for any length of time, Ukraine could be in more serious trouble fast.