Podcast: How the US underestimated the Taliban - and who's paying for it one year later

Elliot Ackerman:

We needed to believe that things would hold together in Afghanistan. That was central to our strategy of withdrawal. And I think that in many respects, our need to have them hold together, clouded our judgment as we were looking at the intelligence.

Ian Bremmer:

Hello and welcome to the GZERO World Podcast. This is where you'll find extended versions of my interviews on public television. I'm Ian Bremmer, and today it's been one year since the chaotic US withdrawal from Afghanistan. And while this anniversary marks the end of America's longest war, it also represents what many see as a staggering US defeat and a victory. For a long time, adversary, the Taliban, who remain in control as the country faces a humanitarian crisis and a crippled economy. Their brutal rule has also led to worsening conditions for women and girls across the country.

This week, I speak with former Marine and author Elliot Ackerman about his view of the war and his new book, The Fifth Act. Let's do this.

Announcer:

The GZERO World Podcast is brought to you by our founding sponsor, First Republic. First Republic, a private bank and wealth management company, places clients' needs first by providing responsive, relevant, and customized solutions. Visit firstrepublic.com to learn more. In a world upended by disruptive international events, how can we rebuild? On season two of Global Reboot, a foreign policy podcast in partnership with the Doha Forum, FP editor-in-chief, Ravi Agrawal engages with world leaders and policy experts to look at old problems in new ways and identify solutions to our world's greatest challenges.

Listen to season two of Global Reboot wherever you get your podcasts.

Ian Bremmer:

Elliot Ackerman, thanks so much for joining me.

Elliot Ackerman:

Thanks for having me.

Ian Bremmer:

It's been about a year since the handover in Afghanistan. Talk to me a little bit about what you see happening in the country over that period.

Elliot Ackerman:

I think over the last year probably the headline is the Taliban have discovered it's more difficult to govern Afghanistan than it necessarily is to conquer Afghanistan. But as we're sitting here one year later, I think it's important to also zoom out past Afghanistan and see how the withdrawal has also been in conversation with other global events. And I would say probably most specifically the war in Ukraine. I don't think it's any coincidence that within six months of a really disastrous NATO-led withdrawal from Afghanistan that we see a Russian invasion of Ukraine.

]Those two events are definitely tied. Certainly, Vladimir Putin was watching as we were leaving, the last planes were leaving the airport in Kabul. And I think what's been interesting as much as that was probably one of the darkest chapters in NATO's history, one of the brightest has been its response to the Russian innovation of Ukraine.

Ian Bremmer:

Well, look, I was going to ask you about that later, but since you started with it, I'll jump right in. I mean, in Afghanistan, of course, legion amounts of US intelligence failures, and yet on Russia, Ukraine, I mean the United States seem to have it wired. I mean, literally no one believed that the Americans were saying, look, these guys are going to invade. Here's how they're going to do it. This is the intel we're getting. They're trying to convince Europeans. Is this because of lessons that were learned? What happened that the Americans actually got that so right?

Elliot Ackerman:

I can only sort of presume why we got it right in Ukraine and wrong in Afghanistan, and perhaps I would say is because there was an ability for us in vis-a-vis Ukraine to have a certain type of objectivity that we couldn't have after 20 years of investment in war. I mean, the war in Afghanistan just given its duration in so many ways defined modern US military thinking and our intelligence capabilities. So it's sort of can you see the forest through the trees. In Ukraine, we seemed able to do that. In Afghanistan, we were unable because we were just so deeply involved there for so long.

Ian Bremmer:

So what I hear you saying is that you believe that the Americans actually do/did have the intelligence capabilities in principle to get it right in Afghanistan and just didn't deploy them, didn't filter them, didn't pay attention to them.

Elliot Ackerman:

Well, and I think there's also the mismatch of what you need to believe too. We needed to believe that things would hold together in Afghanistan. That was central to our strategy of withdrawal. I mean, if we look at the strategy of withdrawal in Afghanistan, people have sometimes asked me, well, what do you think we could have done differently? And I would say once we had a strategy where we bet everything on this idea that there would be what Nixon called the decent interval from our withdrawal to the time of an Afghan collapse, the government collapsing.

If that did happen that it would be two years, a year, six months, something, some type of decent interval. Once we didn't have that decent interval, it was a fait accompli that it would be a debacle. So we needed that decent interval. In order to have that decent interval, we needed the Afghan military to hold together. And I think that in many respects, our need to have them hold together, clouded our judgment as we were looking at the intelligence.

Ian Bremmer:

And did that start that reality and that understanding because of as a result of the Trump agreement with the Taliban or because as a result of the Biden withdrawal?

Elliot Ackerman:

I think both. I think it's this continual sort of erosion of credibility with the Afghan government. So the Trump agreement with the Taliban certainly undercuts the Afghan government and their legitimacy. I mean, it's not the only thing, but it's a significant variable. They were not a party to those negotiations. And then we get to the Biden withdrawal and we have a date certain that sets, so we're telegraphing our withdrawal. We are unlike the Soviets before us, we're engaging in what's called a fighting withdrawal.

And so much as you know, we are still in contact and we're trying to get all of our troops out and we're getting them out of a landlocked country. So unlike for instance, in the Iraq War, or unlike when the Soviets left Afghanistan and they back then shared a border with the Afghans, we have to get everybody out via air, and that's incredibly difficult to do. And we saw the results last summer.

Ian Bremmer:

I mean, this clearly has been the biggest debacle of the Biden Administration. And when it was happening, I mean, so many people had so much second guessing that they were doing. But once the decision was made to get out, out, what could have been done differently that would've made a real difference?

Elliot Ackerman:

Once the decision was made to get out, there were a number of lawmakers who were sending letters to the White House basically saying, we need an evacuation plan similar to what occurred in Vietnam with Guam or even in Kurdistan with Guam where we would evacuate people, house them in Guam, and then handled their forward processing from there. And those requests were basically fell on deaf ears. Now, I don't want to be unfair. I can understand why they fell on deaf ears in some respects because the Biden Administration is making this calculation that if we start in April of 2021 evacuating key people out of Afghanistan-

Ian Bremmer:

You're sending a message

Elliot Ackerman:

That's a very strong message. It's a vote of no confidence in the Afghan government. But because you don't make that decision, you are betting the farm again on this idea that there's going to be some type of an interval before the collapse. And they bet wrong. And they bet wrong in a big way. And the thing that probably could have been done better would've been a realization within the administration of, okay, if we do bet wrong, if we don't get our decent interval, what's our contingency plan?

Ian Bremmer:

And it doesn't seem like they had one.

Elliot Ackerman:

There was no contingency plan. And there was no contingency plan by how we would process Afghans who needed to go out. Those would work with us. There was no acceleration of the SIV program. In June of 2021, the SIV program basically ground to a halt because of a high number of COVID cases at the embassy. So when there was no decent interval, when we were evacuating everybody out, there was basically no process. And what you started to see happen was, because we live in the world we live in today, many veterans, journalists, all of the Americans who have 20 years worth of connections in Afghanistan are now being reached out to by their Afghan friends saying, please, you have to help us.

And you kind of wound up with this massive, what's been called the digital Dunkirk happening over the final weeks of August.

Ian Bremmer:

Now, the president flees, the government collapses, the Taliban takeover. At that point, what should the Americans have been doing, should we be doing now that we're not given that there are still a lot of people in Afghanistan that are desperate, desperate, desperate to get out? Many of whom helped the United States, worked with the United States, some of whom even fought with the United States.

Elliot Ackerman:

Well, I think the reality is our ability now because we have no networks, no presence in Afghanistan is it's somewhat limited what we can do to get Afghans out of Afghanistan. But we aren't doing enough for the Afghans who we got out of Afghanistan. Many of the Afghans who've come to the United States for this special immigrant visa program are still sitting in limbo with regards to their immigration status. They're not able to work. Congress is trying to put forward legislation that will more quickly assimilate them into the workforce in the United States.

And oh, by the way, at a time when we have very low unemployment. Actually, we need these people to come here and work. So that is an area where we can actually make real progress. Yes, there should still be efforts to get people out of Afghanistan, but again, it becomes very problematic. Because when we left, I mean, we didn't leave any residual anything behind in Afghanistan, and so that becomes challenging. But we should continue-

Ian Bremmer:

No, we left a lot of Jeeps.

Elliot Ackerman:

We left plenty of equipment. But absolutely, I mean, we should still stay engaged and do the best we can either helping people get out of Afghanistan who have been approved this special immigrant visa program if they can't, and also facilitating their onward migration into the United States.

Ian Bremmer:

One thing that seems pretty critical to the moral code of the military is leave no man behind. What did it do to the morale of the American men and women that were serving in Afghanistan that we ended the war the way we did?

Elliot Ackerman:

I think this idea of leave no man behind. I mean, this is not an idea that is only unique to the United States military, although it is foundational to the code of honor that exists in the US military. I mean, this is an idea that is as old as warfare, and it's an idea that goes back to the Iliad when Achilles kills Hector or Hector's father shows up in Achilles' camp begging for the body of his son. So when we left Afghanistan, effectively what the US government was doing, because there was no visa system in place, there was no process to get our allies out.

We were basically saying as a country that we're going to leave all these Afghans behind and asking the people who had personal relationships with the Afghans, who we had cultivated over 20 years, in many respect at the behest of our government to just turn our backs on these people who were asking for help. And it shouldn't come to surprise that many people, veterans, journalists, activists who've been involved there 20 years weren't willing to do that.

Ian Bremmer:

You yourself have served on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan. You're highly decorated, Silver Star, Bronze Star for valor, Purple Heart. Not every day we have people like that on the show. Could you just walk me through what happened, the experience you had that led to one of those decorations?

Elliot Ackerman:

Sure. I think something people don't always talk about or realize about those decorations is there's sort of a double-edged sword. I mean, it's obviously a great honor to receive any type of award like that, but you're often being recognized for one of the worst days of your life. Because when everything on the mission goes perfectly according to plan, they usually don't hand out those awards. I received the Silver Star for actions in Fallujah for basically, probably manning a machine gun on our rooftop during a very tough day during that battle. So that's one instance of it.

Ian Bremmer:

And I mean, walk me through what actually happened on the day.

Elliot Ackerman:

On that day, it was the second day of the battle.

Ian Bremmer:

Where are you? You're on a roof of what?

Elliot Ackerman:

I'm on the three-story-tall roof of a building. It was the second day of the battle. Our platoon had started that day with 46 Marines. We had had to fight about 300 yards deeper into the city, which wound up being kind of really the teeth of the Al-Qaeda in Iraq resistance. By the end of that day, we had 21 combat effective Marines left in the platoon. We got to a building, there were insurgents across the street of the building. We had tanks on the ground. One of the ways you could tell the tanks and signal to the tanks, because it's very difficult to see in a tank where the insurgents were shooting at us from, was with the tracer from a machine gun.

A tracer is a kind of an old phosphorus round. And our median machine guns were the only ones that they could see because the bullet was heavy enough. So we were up on a rooftop, we were all fighting on the rooftop, and the insurgents knew where we were and they started shooting rockets at us. And so I realized it didn't make it a lot of sense for all of us to be on this rooftop. Someone was going to get hurt. I told everybody to go downstairs and then myself and one other Marine stayed up there with the machine gun and with the radio, we marked the positions of the insurgents with that tracer and the tanks took out-

Ian Bremmer:

Took them out.

Elliot Ackerman:

... Their positions one at a time.

Ian Bremmer:

And how long before you knew that it was safe for you and your men to get out?

Elliot Ackerman:

Of that house? A few hours.

Ian Bremmer:

Yeah. And that night?

Elliot Ackerman:

It was two days into a month-long battle. So that night we slept for an hour and woke up in the morning and did it all again.

Ian Bremmer:

How long did it take you to process that that was a pretty dramatic, impossible issue, that it was a day that was going to stay with you for a long time? Because you just described that day as if it was yesterday in a way that if I asked a lot of people or myself about the day that happened decades ago, it would be hard.

Elliot Ackerman:

Yeah. I think I knew in the moment that what we were living through, we would be thinking about for a long time. But I knew too for the Marines in the platoon with me, the younger guys, I would actually say to them when they would start talking about what happened yesterday, the day before, I would kind of say them like, guys, let's not talk about it right now. We're going to have the rest of our lives to talk about this. We just kind of need to progress through what we need to do to kind of get day to day in this battle.

So I think I had a realization at the time that we were living through something that was extraordinary. And truth be told, I wanted say much time goes by at all when I don't think about that day and other days that are like it. And I'm still talk to the guys I was there with all the times. They're my best friends.

Ian Bremmer:

Do you feel that the military is adequately understood/appreciated for everything that you have done, do in the United States?

Elliot Ackerman:

Well, I think a concerning trend that we've seen in American life, if you look back at the history of our country almost since its inception, we've had a very long tradition of a military that was comprised of citizen soldiers. And in recent years, we've seen the all volunteer military really become the norm. I served in the all volunteer military. There are certain benefits of having an all-volunteer military, namely the professionalism. You don't have anyone there who doesn't want to be there, but it does come with a cost.

And one of those causes is an ever widening civil military divide where fewer and few people know anyone who has served in the military and the military really becomes a cast of its own in the United States, sort of this hived off 1% of America. And that is particularly dangerous in a society that has very dysfunctional domestic politics. If you look back in history from Caesar's Rome to Napoleon's France, when you couple a large standing military with dysfunctional domestic politics, democracy doesn't last long. And that's something I think about and that certainly concerns me.

That's not the American people not paying enough deference to the military. In many respects, my concern is that there's too much difference that is paid and that deference is paid in lieu of understanding, in lieu of experience with the military. And that's something I think about and concerns me.

Ian Bremmer:

Intelligence collection is becoming very different, used to focus a lot on humans. Human intelligence now increasingly is intermediated by technology. How do you see the Americans doing, faring in the future of intelligence gathering, collection and processing?

Elliot Ackerman:

I think it's sort of interesting because it goes into we are in a transition stage in so much as the last 20 years in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were wars of counter-terrorism so that they're much more tactile in terms of the human networks you're dealing with. Now we're sort of in a back to the future moment. We were reentering this era of great state competition. And so suddenly the intelligence failures are, for instance, yes, the failure to see the collapse in Afghanistan, but the success in seeing the intention of Russia to invade Ukraine and places that we're obviously watching very, very closely.

For instance, what is China's intention in Taiwan? And so those are the types of intelligence questions that once upon a time featured very prominently in American life and it's sort of in the last 20 years, there have been this aberration where the intelligence community hasn't been as focused on the intentions of states, but more sort of the intentions of terrorist networks or even individuals. And now we're kind of getting back to that great power competition.

Ian Bremmer:

So before we close, your book, The Fifth Act kind of follows this classic arc of a Greek tragedy. I'm wondering if you had a sixth act, especially because you've spent a lot of time recently thinking about the future of military warfare and you had to look a couple decades ahead at Afghanistan. What do you think that chapter would look like in your book?

Elliot Ackerman:

Well, I think the sixth act is really the rise of authoritarian alliances in the world and how we, the West or the free nations of the world are going to once again rally ourselves to stand up against this type of authoritarianism. I think in Afghanistan, we saw what seemed like a very dark and dysfunctional chapter with regards to the resolve of international alliances like NATO. I think in Ukraine we've seen that there still exists an ability to muster that resolve and to stand against an authoritarian.

But the question in the sixth act, as you put it, is who is going to wind up on top in that contest between the old nations of the free world and these newer authoritarian states?

Ian Bremmer:

Elliot Ackerman, thank you for your service.

Elliot Ackerman:

Thanks for having me.

Ian Bremmer:

That's it for today's edition of the GZERO World Podcast. Like what you've heard? Come check us out at gzeromedia.com and sign up for our newsletter Signal.

Announcer:

The GZERO World Podcast is brought to you by our founding sponsor, First Republic. First Republic, a private bank and wealth management company, places clients needs first by providing responsive, relevant, and customized solutions. Visit firstrepublic.com to learn more. In a world upended by disruptive international events, how can we rebuild? On season two of Global Reboot, a foreign policy podcast in partnership with the Doha Forum, FP editor-in-chief, Ravi Agrawal engages with world leaders and policy experts to look at old problems in new ways and identify solutions to our world's greatest challenges.

Listen to season two of Global Reboot wherever you get your podcasts.

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