For over two weeks now, Iranians have been pouring into the streets in the largest demonstrations the country has seen since the 2022 “Women, Life, Freedom” uprising, and possibly since the 2009 Green Movement. It started with economics: merchants in Tehran shuttering their shops on Dec. 29 to protest a currency in free fall and skyrocketing inflation that pushed food prices up more than 70% last year. Within days, the protests spread to all 31 provinces and snowballed into a larger movement, drawing not just the young and jobless but the middle class and middle-aged – groups that had mostly stayed home during previous waves of unrest. Crowds chanting “death to the dictator” grew so large that President Donald Trump rushed to declare the people had “taken control” (fact-check: not so fast).
The regime’s response has been ferocious. Although reliable on-the-ground reporting has been thwarted by the regime’s full internet and communication blackout, Iranian officials have acknowledged that around 3,000 people have been killed so far. The real death toll is likely much higher. That would make this the bloodiest crackdown in the Islamic Republic’s 47-year history.
With protests this large and a body count this high, many are asking whether the regime is finally on the brink of collapse. My friend Karim Sadjadpour, one of the sharpest Iran analysts around, argues in a compelling piece in The Atlantic that Iran now meets nearly all the conditions for revolutionary collapse: fiscal crisis, alienated elites, a broad opposition coalition, a shared narrative of resistance, and a hostile international environment. He calls the Islamic Republic a “zombie regime” – its legitimacy gone, founding ideology hollow to most Iranians, and economy structurally broken.
He’s not wrong – there’s a real case that this time is different. The economy has hit a wall with no plausible fix. The regime’s regional deterrent has been gutted – Hezbollah battered, Bashar al-Assad deposed in Syria, the 12-day war with Israel and the United States exposing Tehran’s military vulnerabilities for all to see. And for the first time, the US president has openly and credibly threatened military action in support of domestic protesters.
But as Karim acknowledges, one condition remains unmet, and it’s the one that matters most: what still keeps this zombie shambling forward is lethal force – specifically, the internal security forces’ continued willingness to use it against their fellow citizens. As long as the men with guns stay loyal, the regime can grind through. It has before, in 2009, 2017, 2019, and 2022. Each time protests flared, the security forces hit back and the regime survived. That’s likely to be the case this time, too. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has handpicked the country’s top military and security commanders. So far, there are no signs of defections, no fractures among the elites, no indication that the Basij paramilitary forces or the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps are wavering.
Demonstrations have already begun to wind down since the crackdown started. Karim argues that while brutality can delay the regime’s funeral, it’s unlikely to restore its pulse. Fair enough – I agree the regime is running out of road. But delaying the funeral is exactly what Khamenei, 86 and reportedly ailing, is playing for.
What about Trump? If the regime can’t be toppled from within – at least not yet – can American power tip the balance?
The president has promised to “rescue” Iranian protesters. On Sunday, he claimed to have spoken with “leaders of Iran” about potential talks; by Tuesday, he had canceled all meetings with Tehran “until the senseless killing of protesters STOPS” and threatened 25% secondary tariffs on any country doing business with Iran. “HELP IS ON ITS WAY,” he posted after warning the regime that America is “locked and loaded” and there will be “hell to pay” if the killing continues.
That’s a bolder commitment than any American president has made on Iran – and a far harder one to deliver. The administration is working non-kinetic angles that go short of bombings, from cyber operations to punch holes in the regime’s internet blackout to funding for opposition groups to tighter sanctions enforcement. But Trump wants to be seen as doing something decisive. The Pentagon has been preparing military options, and airstrikes are likely sooner rather than later. These will probably be limited and symbolic in scope, targeting paramilitary groups such as the Basij militias, the internal security forces in charge of the repression, potentially expanding to missile sites and other IRGC-linked facilities.
Trump sees little downside risk here, and he’s probably right. He ordered the killing of Qasem Soleimani at the end of his first term and Iran’s response was virtually nil. Last year, the US and Israel carried out the 12-day war, degrading Iran’s nuclear and missile programs significantly. Iran retaliated against Israel – some civilians were killed – but did nothing meaningful against the United States. From Trump’s perspective, Iranian threats of retaliation are not credible. That’s not to say Iran won’t respond at all; it could easily target US bases or ships in the region – the Pentagon has evacuated some personnel from military bases already – but it will carefully calibrate and telegraph its attacks to signal resolve without inviting further escalation. Unless the regime is truly on its last legs and has nothing left to lose, they're not going to pick a real fight with America.
Meanwhile, Tehran is betting that Trump won't go much further than symbolic strikes. For all his rhetoric, Trump is less interested in regime change than his predecessors – not in Caracas, not in Tehran. What he wants is a pliant regime, one that gives up its nuclear program, limits its ballistic missile program, ends support for regional proxies, and otherwise does whatever he wants. He got that in Venezuela and he’d take the same deal from the Islamic Republic. But the supreme leader is never going to give him that. In 1988, Khamenei’s predecessor Ayatollah Khomeini accepted a ceasefire with Iraq that he likened to drinking from a “poison chalice.” Khamenei has spent decades making clear he won't follow that example – he’d rather rule over ashes or die than accept terms he sees as surrender.
Trump isn't going to spend the blood and treasure to force the issue. Achieving that would require the internal coercive apparatus to crack from within: IRGC commanders refusing orders, Basij units standing down, men with guns deciding they’re no longer willing to kill their compatriots for a system that no longer benefits them. Only a prolonged military campaign might weaken Iran’s security forces enough to change their calculus, but Trump and his voters have little appetite for that kind of commitment. Short of that, the United States doesn’t have great options to bring about meaningful change within the regime. Airstrikes can punish. They can degrade military capabilities and even decapitate leadership. But airstrikes can’t stop security forces from shooting Iranians in the streets or topple the Islamic Republic on their own.
Limited US strikes might actually make things worse for the protesters Trump says he wants to help. American bombs could hand the regime the narrative it wants – that the protesters are foreign-backed terrorists, not Iranians fed up with their own government. Strikes could cause some Iranians to rally around the flag, as many did during the 12-day war, while giving the regime justification to crack down even harder. Iran isn’t Venezuela, where a surgical raid removed Nicolas Maduro and the aftermath stayed contained. This will be messier (and that’s presuming the American strikes don’t themselves kill Iranian civilians). Any military action that fails to dislodge the regime could embolden Tehran and demoralize protesters who expected more.
So where does this leave us? Probably headed toward a stalemate. Trump launches symbolic strikes. Iran absorbs the blow. The grievances that drove protestors to the streets remain unaddressed, and the bloodshed deepens the chasm between an illegitimate state and a people yearning to be free.
Does Khamenei survive this round? Maybe. The elite remains loyal, and no one is moving to push him out. But he’s no spring chicken, and he’s facing more pressure than at any point in his 36-year reign. Even within his inner circle, there’s a growing recognition that regime survival requires a course correction. Whether that happens under Khamenei or after him, change is coming.
The Islamic Republic as we know it is on borrowed time. I called it “Iran's 1989 moment” (but not 1991) in our Top Risks report a full year ago. The world would be a better place if this regime fell tomorrow. It won’t. But its days are numbered.
