The United States and Iran seem to be moving closer to a deal to end the war, recent skirmishing and mixed signals notwithstanding.
If concluded – still a big if – this agreement would reopen the Strait of Hormuz, lift the US blockade, unfreeze Iran’s frozen assets (via Qatar), and extend the ceasefire – while kicking nuclear negotiations down the road. There’d be no dismantling of Tehran’s proxies, no restrictions on its ballistic missiles program, no permanent ban on nuclear enrichment, no takeover of its highly-enriched uranium stockpile, no captured oil, no handpicked successor to Ali Khamenei (sorry, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad), no regime change. Iran’s navy and much of its old leadership are gone, but the regime is more entrenched and emboldened – now armed with a proven ability to close the world’s most important oil chokepoint at will, a more effective deterrent than being a threshold nuclear state ever was. Throw in the cost in US lives and treasure, the global economic disruption, and the damage to American credibility, and this is President Donald Trump’s worst foreign policy failure by a long margin.
And yet, despite falling short of his every war aim and leaving the US worse off, this is also the least-worst outcome presently available to Trump (after refusing those terms sooner, starting the war in the first place, and withdrawing from the 2015 nuclear deal that constrained Iran’s nuclear program to begin with).
The same cannot be said of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. For him, this is the worst conceivable outcome.
Israel’s longest-serving leader faces elections no later than Oct. 27. His popularity has rebounded from the sharp decline that followed the Oct. 7, 2023, attacks and his early handling of the Gaza war and hostage negotiations, owing in no small measure to Israel’s military campaigns against Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran. At the same time, his ruling coalition of hard-right and ultra-religious parties has consistently polled well short of the 61 Knesset seats needed to retain its parliamentary majority. Bibi set out to topple the Iranian regime; instead, it’s his own that’s on the brink.
While domestic support for the multi-front war remains strong, with Israelis across the political spectrum seeing Tehran and its proxies as existential threats to the Jewish state, most have tired of Netanyahu’s corruption scandals, his attacks on Israel’s democratic institutions, and his subservience to ultra-Orthodox and settler interests. A decisive victory against Iran might have overridden all that and kept “Mr. Security” in power. But as Yair Lapid, one of Netanyahu’s chief rivals, put it: “Three years after Oct. 7, Hamas rules Gaza, Hezbollah rules Lebanon, and instead of an 86-year-old Khamenei ruling Iran, a 56-year-old Khamenei rules Iran.”
A Trump-Tehran deal that leaves the regime not just intact but geopolitically stronger than before would undercut Netanyahu’s pitch to voters that he, and only he, could defeat the Iranian threat, manage Trump, and keep Israel safe. Strip away that shield, and all that's left are the liabilities. Not least among them: his multiple criminal probes. And with Israeli President Isaac Herzog so far declining to pardon him despite pressure from President Trump, the corruption trials will stay a live campaign issue and raise the stakes of defeat beyond the merely political.
Historically, Bibi’s saving grace has been the fragmentation of the anti-Netanyahu opposition – comprising right-wing, centrist, left-wing, and Arab parties – while his own narrow bloc has remained relatively united, with hard-right and ultra-religious partners able to extract policy concessions from Netanyahu that no other government would give them (including Netanyahu’s own previous coalitions). That unity started to crack when ultra-Orthodox parties Shas and UTJ temporarily pulled their support from the coalition last year over Netanyahu’s failure to pass legislation exempting their constituents from military service – a demand he can’t satisfy without losing nationalists, reservists, and the broader public. Meanwhile, two former prime ministers – the centrist Lapid and the right-wing Naftali Bennett – agreed to merge parties and run together on a single unified list that pools resources, maximizes the number of Knesset seats the bloc can win, and projects the kind of unity that eluded the partnership that briefly came to power in 2021 before collapsing under the weight of its internal contradictions.
Current polls show the Jewish opposition bloc close but still two seats short of the 61 needed to form a majority government, a gap that is likely to close if a Trump-Iran agreement is reached. If Gadi Eisenkot, a popular former IDF chief of staff with appeal among security-minded voters, joins the Bennett-Lapid list rather than running separately, it would further consolidate opposition strength. Any defections of Knesset members within Bibi’s Likud who see the writing on the wall and hope to distance themselves from Netanyahu to protect their own seats would help the opposition’s margin too.
I’m not foolish enough to count out a politician nicknamed “the Survivor.” He’s been pronounced politically dead many times before, and he’s still in power. A late pardon from Herzog could help him win back voters who have soured on him over the trials. Much of the Jewish opposition bloc, including its presumptive leader Bennett, has already ruled out a coalition with Arab parties – fearing that post-Oct. 7 nationalist sentiment and the need to peel away voters from Netanyahu’s coalition make it toxic. But without Arab parties’ projected 10-12 seats, the path to an anti-Bibi opposition majority is narrow. Netanyahu will rile up public opposition to an inclusive government with Arabs to make it more so, knowing that if no coalition manages to form a government after the election, he stays on as caretaker prime minister pending a new vote.
That said, don’t hold your breath for a pardon. The polling will get worse, not better, for Netanyahu if the US and Iran reach a deal – enough that a deadlock becomes less likely even with the Arabs out. The worse his odds get, the bigger the risks he’ll take. Which helps explain why, despite US pressure to wind down the fighting, the Israeli military stepped up its offensive against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon this week in response to ongoing rocket and drone strikes on northern Israel. “We are not removing our foot from the pedal,” Netanyahu said. “On the contrary, I said to press on the pedal even more.”
Trump retains effective veto power over any return to the Iran war and has shown little appetite for resuming it, making Lebanon the only available lever. Netanyahu faces intense domestic pressure to use it. Even if the US and Iran reach an agreement that nominally includes de-escalation in Lebanon, Bibi could calculate that neither Trump nor Tehran will want to jeopardize hard-earned peace over Iran-backed Hezbollah. If US-Iran talks collapse and hostilities resume, he’d have a free hand to expand the war in Lebanon. And if the talks drag on, he can argue to Washington that harder pressure on Hezbollah will further compel Tehran to come to terms. Every scenario gives Netanyahu an incentive to escalate ahead of the elections.
Whether it pays off for him is a different question. Bibi has promised total victory for nearly three years – against Hamas, against Hezbollah, against the Islamic Republic – and failed to deliver each time. He may finally pay the price.
