Yemen’s civil war had been at a stalemate for years.
That changed in early December, when the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC), a separatist group seeking to re-establish the southern Yemeni state that existed until 1990, stormed through the oil-rich region of Hadramout, ousting the Saudi-backed forces and extending its area of control to the Saudi border.
Riyadh was furious. It punched back with airstrikes and demanded that the Emirates cease their support for the STC and retreat from the country. The UAE denied that it pushed for the separatists’ advance, but – in a surprise move – it agreed to withdraw its own troops from the country. On Sunday, Yemen’s Saudi-backed government forces retook Hadramout.
The clash underscores a new reality: once close allies, the UAE and Saudi Arabia are now competing on multiple fronts. The two oil-rich Gulf states are also battling over artificial intelligence, vying to host data centers from major US firms as each tries to diversify their economies. They are also on opposite sides of Sudan’s civil war: Riyadh backs Sudan’s government forces, while the UAE has been smuggling weapons to the rebels, the Rapid Support Forces, according to US intelligence.
“What happened [in Yemen] is just only a demonstration of the rising tension between the Saudis and the Emiratis,” Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue’s political adviser Mohammed Al-Qadhi, who is from Yemen, told GZERO. “It’s the competition over who is going to be the main game-changer in the region.”
What happened in Yemen? When the Houthi rebels seized Yemen’s capital city in 2014, sparking civil war, the UAE and Saudi Arabia were united in helping the government defeat the Iran-backed group – a shared response to their chief Middle East rival. However, the two Gulf monarchies diverged over how exactly to help the Yemeni government.
“They haven’t always been 100% aligned throughout the history of the conflict, in terms of their support for specific actors,” Alia Awadallah, a Pentagon official during the Biden administration, told GZERO. “Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE have generally supported the internationally-recognized government framework, but they’ve backed different factions within that umbrella and have diverged on important issues like southern Yemen secession.”
Those differences were exposed in 2019, when the STC toppled the Yemeni government and seized control of Aden, the war-time capital. The Riyadh Agreement, signed months later, attempted to reunify the anti-Houthi forces, but it didn’t hold, as the STC and the Yemeni government forces refused to implement its conditions and make long-term peace.
Then, last year, a diplomatic misunderstanding poured coals onto the fire. When Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman visited the White House in November, the Emiratis came to believe – despite Riyadh’s denials – that he asked US President Donald Trump to impose sanctions on the Sudanese rebel group Rapid Support Forces and their alleged backers in the UAE.
“That ended up being the trigger for the latest round of reprisals, including this offensive by UAE allies, the STC, in Yemen against Saudi-backed forces, taking over territory all the way reaching all the way to the Saudi border,” said Eurasia Group’s Middle East Director Firas Maksad. With the STC at its border, Riyadh began its fight back late last month.
What is Saudi Arabia’s goal here? Saudi Arabia has both regional and global aspirations. As part of its Vision 2030, its national development plan, the kingdom wants to cement its position as the Gulf’s leading power, diversify its economy, and integrate further with the global order – with ambitions to join organizations like the G7.
“Instability in the kingdom’s backyard undermines that objective, the ability to achieve those goals,” said Maksad. “The UAE has backed and supported various elements in those various countries surrounding Saudi Arabia in ways that the Saudis view as destabilizing and potentially encircling their sphere of influence.”
What about the UAE? Abu Dhabi also wants to expand the breadth of its economy and boost its regional influence – goals that have often put it on a collision course with Riyadh. In Yemen, geography matters: the country sits along the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, through which nearly a third of global shipping passes.
“Having their allies control these strategic coastal areas is very significant for their objectives,” said Al-Qadhi, which may explain why the UAE supported a separatist group that primarily operates on the water.
Where do we go from here? With regards to Yemen, the back-and-forth in Hadromout has further damaged the anti-Houthi coalition. On Wednesday, STC leader Aidarous al-Zubaidi chose not to board a flight to Riyadh for crisis talks with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, after the Saudi-backed presidential council stripped him of his membership and referred him to the public prosecutor for high treason charges.
Meanwhile, relations between the UAE and Saudi Arabia have deteriorated to the point where MBS and Emirati President Mohammed bin Zayed, once close friends, are no longer on speaking terms. Speculation has mounted over how far the rift could go.
“I’ve heard things including potential border closure, flight restrictions, withdrawal from OPEC by the UAE, all being floated around in that toxic mix of threats and counter threats,” said Maksad.
However, Maksad believes those outcomes are unlikely.
“I don’t think that we’re going to get there despite all these being in the mix,” he said. “I think we’ve seen the worst of it, and for now it will ebb. The UAE withdrawal announcement is a step in the right direction.”
