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A man looks at belongings inside a damaged house during clashes between the RSF and the army in Khartoum.
Why Sudan’s crisis is a regional affair
Fighting rages on in Sudan, with the two dueling armies having already broken the 24-hour ceasefire that was declared on Tuesday. Few have high hopes of a cessation of hostilities in the North African country anytime soon.
But this conflict isn’t just about Sudan. Indeed, a host of regional heavyweights with their own strategic interests in Sudan – and the Horn of Africa more broadly – have helped fuel the current political crisis and are closely watching events unfold.
Recap: Who is fighting whom? On one side is Gen. Abdel Fattah Burhan, the country's army chief and de facto leader since 2021. That was when the military took over in a violent coup, overthrowing a joint civilian-military government. On the other side is Burhan’s former ally and junta deputy Gen. Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, who is head of the Rapid Support Forces, a militia that grew out of the Janjaweed death squads that committed genocide in Darfur.
Both men once had close ties to former despot Omar al-Bashir – who ruled the country with an iron fist until 2019 – and helped oust him in a military coup amid a popular uprising.
The two generals have since fallen out and most recently clashed over the planned integration of the RSF into Sudan’s military. This triggered the current violence, but at the heart of the crisis is their personal rivalry over who will ultimately control the armed forces – and the country.
But many other states also have a stake in what goes down in Sudan.
Diplomatic tug-of-war. For decades, al-Bashir enjoyed a close relationship with Iran, but that started to change in 2011, when the energy-rich south – accounting for 80% of Sudan’s oil – gained independence from Khartoum.
Seeking new economic opportunities, al-Bashir began mending ties with rich Gulf states, particularly the UAE but also Saudi Arabia.
Consider that by 2015, Sudan had sent thousands of troops to support the Saudi-UAE coalition in Yemen in exchange for wads of cash and subsidies on imports. Locked in a bitter rivalry with Iran, the Gulf states tried – and succeeded – in bringing Sudan into their sphere of influence, resulting in al-Bashir severing ties with Tehran completely.
Meanwhile, under President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Egypt was keen to drive a wedge between the al-Bashir regime and the Muslim Brotherhood, el-Sisi’s main ideological rival. After the Sudanese autocrat was ousted, Cairo took advantage of Ankara's limited sway with the Sudanese military to try and limit Turkey’s influence in the country, with some success.
Cairo has not officially taken sides but has joined forces with Burhan to push back against Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam project, which they say will cut into their share of water in the Nile.
Sudan’s economic value. The gold trade has long been crucial to Sudan’s economy. Prior to al-Bashir’s ouster, gold accounted for 40% of the country’s exports. In recent years, Hemedti, a former camel herder, has used his growing influence to build a family mining and trading company, exporting illicit gold to Dubai in exchange for hard currency. A report from the Central Bank of Sudan showed that the UAE purchased all of Sudan’s gold exports in the first half of 2022, worth a total $1.3 billion.
Competition for influence in the Red Sea. Enter Russia, which has long been vying for access to Sudan’s strategic Red Sea port. Moscow is reportedly in talks to build a naval base – creating a passageway to the Indian Ocean – in exchange for sending Khartoum more weapons and military equipment. Indeed, this ties into Moscow’s broader strategy of trying to increase its foothold across the resource-rich Sahel region.
The US’ limited leverage. While the US gives Sudan a hefty sum of direct government assistance, Washington’s sway is undercut by the fact that the RSF has an independent revenue stream from its illicit trade scheme, effectively functioning as a state within a state.
And while US sanctions on the Sudanese military since the coup might hurt ordinary civilians (in 2021, Washington withheld $700 million in aid), the military maintains a tight grip over the entire economic system and business community. It has plundered state resources, dubbed by some analysts as an entrenched “deep state,” for decades.
Looking ahead. The Horn of Africa is already one of the world’s most volatile regions. Now, there’s growing concern that the turmoil in Sudan could spill over into neighboring countries, like Chad and Eritrea, creating a full-blown regional crisis.Salem Al-Dawsari celebrates scoring Saudi Arabia's second goal against Argentina.
Saudi shocker is a victory for all Arabs — and a PR coup for MBS
Saudi Arabia's stunning victory over Argentina on Tuesday was one of the greatest upsets in World Cup history. The lowly Saudis defeated the mighty Argentines, overcoming odds so great that if you'd bet $100 on the Saudis, you'd have walked out with more than $2,200 in beer money. (Oops, you can't actually buy any beer at Qatar 2022.)
More importantly, it made the kingdom proud — and sent long-awaited ripples of soccer joy throughout the Arab world. Why?
For one thing, soccer is immensely popular across the Middle East and North Africa. Cafés everywhere from Cairo to Damascus celebrated the Saudi win as one of their own in a part of the world that often gets more attention from conflict and political turmoil than from its achievements on the world stage. What's more, for the first time the tournament is being hosted by Qatar, which has made a big deal out of this being the World Cup for the Arab world.
For another, MENA countries have traditionally underperformed at the World Cup. Only three countries — Morocco in 1986, Saudi Arabia in 1994, and Algeria in 2014 — have ever made it to the knockout stage, despite having a rich soccer tradition and many players in top European leagues. For connoisseurs, MENA teams play a beautiful attacking game but get bested by the superior physical and tactical skills of the squads from Europe or South America that have long dominated the sport.
What’s more, 40 years ago Arabs around the world felt cheated when squeaky-clean Austria and Germany agreed to draw 0-0 to kick out Algeria from the last 16 in Spain 1982. One of the biggest scandals in World Cup history left a bitter taste in the mouths of those who dreamed Algeria would go far.
And then there's the politics of it all. Watching in the presidential box in Doha was none other than Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who less than two years ago was still leading a blockade of Qatar. MBS must have been on cloud nine as his men beat Argentina, a two-time World Cup winner led by Leo Messi — (arguably, for some) the sport's GOAT.
It turns out Messi is also (!) tourism ambassador for Saudi Arabia, whose human rights record makes Qatar's look like child's play. Hardly a surprise that the Paris Saint-Germain star got a lot of flak over it.
MBS is basking in the glory. Four years ago, the world turned its back on the Saudi de-facto ruler after US intelligence suggested he ordered the killing and dismemberment of Jamal Khashoggi, a dissident journalist and Saudi critic. Now, he's welcomed everywhere and will likely escape US prosecution after being named PM.
When Saudi Arabia reached the knockout stage in USA '94, then-King Fahd gifted the team's best player with a luxury car. This time, perhaps the sky's the limit for MBS if the Saudis advance in Qatar.This article comes to you from the Signal newsletter team of GZERO Media. Sign up today.
The EU’s natural gas troubles won’t end after ditching Russia
When Russian energy giant Gazprom shut off the Nord Stream 1 natural gas pipeline for routine summer maintenance last week, Germany and the rest of the EU feared that Russian President Vladimir Putin would refuse to turn the tap back on as a way of punishing the West for sanctions against Russia.
The jitters dissipated somewhat when Nordstream went back online Thursday, albeit at 40% capacity. But Berlin and other European capitals still worry that if things go south, they’ll need to ration gas at the worst possible time: when they need it to keep homes warm during the winter. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen is urging EU members to ration natural gas by 15% through next March to prepare for a likely future cut in supply.
The Europeans have long realized that over-depending on (and over-investing in) a single energy source makes them geopolitically vulnerable. But cutting off Russia and turning to the Middle East and North Africa will be anything but smooth sailing.
Lands (and waters) of opportunity. Recent data show that in 2021 North Africa sat on 620 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, with Algeria already one of Europe’s top five suppliers.
Recently discovered offshore gas fields in the eastern Mediterranean hold an estimated two trillion cubic meters in Israeli waters. Not to mention Qatar, the world’s no. 1 liquified natural gas producer (LNG is easier to transport by sea) that’s eager to do more business with Europe.
That’s good news for the EU, which last year imported a whopping 40% of its gas from Russia.
European leaders are wasting no time. Outgoing Italian PM Mario Draghi signed a deal on Monday with Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune for the Maghreb country to become Italy’s top gas supplier.
And in the last few weeks, Qatar agreed to increase LNG exports to Germany, while the EU inked a trilateral agreement with Egypt and Israel to deliver LNG from Israel’s offshore fields (via Egyptian facilities).
Europe seems to think: “Get this, Vladimir — we're gonna cut you off, turn south and import more gas than ever before.” Easy, right? Not really.
Diversification tradeoffs. Europe buying more gas from North Africa and the Middle East commits dozens of countries to extraction, processing, storing, and delivery.
One might say that multiple suppliers carry more risks. But it’s also true that by diversifying its gas sources, Europe exposes itself to “less single points of failure,” says Raad Alkadiri, Eurasia Group’s top energy expert. “That gives those sources of gas less leverage, and it also means that disruption in one area doesn't get magnified.”
However, there’s no such thing as a risk-free energy supply.
What’s more, “all energy is political,” Alkadiri notes. So, when Europe plans to decouple from Russian gas, in a sense it’s “jumping out of the frying pan and into the fire.”
This time, the Europeans claim, it’ll be different. Europe’s new gas policy will be susceptible to different — and less purely political — risks than those stemming from an aggressive Russia. Those are mainly infrastructure investment and contractual security.
“The biggest immediate challenge is creating the right infrastructure to allow that movement to take place,” Alkadiri says. That means not only investing big in places like North and Western Africa as well in the eastern Mediterranean but also building expensive facilities in Europe to manage gas, particularly if it’s LNG.
And although Europe will drag its feet into those projects, Alkadiri maintains that “it has a political incentive, an energy security incentive, to make them in the short term.”
The climate conundrum. Another big headache will be that Europe’s future climate plans — achieving net zero emissions by 2050 — collide with those of its new gas partners. Europeans understandably are reluctant to sign contracts that require them to continue importing fossil fuels in the distant future.
“Europe isn't looking to replace all Russian gas for the next 20 years,” Alkadiri notes. “What it's looking to do is to replace enough Russian gas for the next 10 years so that its very ambitious decarbonization agenda can be achieved.”
The gas-exporting nations Europe is turning to now to replace Russian supplies know that time is not on their side.
“There’s a tension between the short-term need for gas prices and Europe's longer-term energy transition,” says Ben Cahill, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Yet “it's very difficult to compete for energy supplies on the market unless you sign a long-term contract because we have got a very tight energy market, elevated prices, and buyers who are scrambling for gas,” he adds.
Concessions across the board. Europe won’t approach all exporting countries in the same way and vice versa.
For example, Qatar has much more leverage on the negotiating table due to its unique ability to deliver high volumes of LNG fast. Doha will thus squeeze profits while it can and request that Europe sign longer-than-wanted deals. After all, Asian buyers are just around the corner.
But with non-established players in gas markets, including many African nations, shorter contracts are more likely. Unfortunately, that also means that those countries have less incentive to invest in facilities and supply chain security — which, in turn, opens the door to future supply disruptions.
It’s a risk that Europe is unable to calibrate but feels forced to take.
Unrealistic outlook. “The idea that Europe can secure gas supplies just up until the year 2030, and then diversify away quickly, is not a very realistic way of procuring gas supplies,” Cahill says.
Indeed, Europe’s energy plans are “predicated on absolutely everything falling into place at the right time, and that rarely happens in the market,” Alkadiri concludes.
It’s a less enjoyable position than expected for the Europeans, who are noticing that decoupling from Russian gas might open a Pandora’s box of many more problems down the line than heating houses for the next few winters.
- Russia cutting Nord Stream 1 gas to undermine European leaders - GZERO Media ›
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- Europe's 2023 energy scarcity will drive green transition, says IMF chief - GZERO Media ›
- European unity vs Putin, energy shortages, & economic pain - GZERO Media ›
What We’re Watching: Protests in Chile, US vs Google, Middle East economic peril
Protests ahead of Chile's referendum: It's been one year since massive protests over inequality rocked the normally staid and ostensibly affluent country of Chile. To mark that anniversary this week, tens of thousands of protesters hit the streets again, in part to call for a "YES" vote in Sunday's upcoming referendum on whether to rewrite the country's constitution. But some of the demonstrators turned to violence and looting, setting the country on edge as the crucial vote looms. Replacing the country's current constitution — which dates from the days of Pinochet's dictatorship — was a key demand of last year's protesters, who say that it entrenches the country's dizzyingly high inequality by limiting the role of the state and constraining political choices. If the current protests continue through the weekend, authorities and street activists alike are concerned violence may deter some people from voting.
Google hit with US antitrust case. The US Department of Justice has filed a lawsuit against the tech giant for maintaining an illegal monopoly over the search engine market. The ruling sets up an epic battle between government regulators and one of America's most powerful companies. Google, which says it faces more search engine competition than you'd think and that its services have actually boosted small businesses, will of course fight this with the lobbying and legal power you'd expect from a trillion-dollar enterprise. But the DOJ filing comes just weeks after a Democrat-led House Committee released a 450-page report alleging various ways in which Google, Apple, Amazon, and Facebook undermine commercial and political freedom. As a bipartisan consensus emerges on the need to rein in these companies, the DOJ's Google case is sure to be a watershed event in US regulation of Big Tech.
(Economic) trouble in MENA: A report this week from the International Monetary Fund warns that COVID-19 has inflicted a "deeper and more persistent economic impact" on potentially fragile states in the Middle East and North Africa, adding to the risk of major social unrest. The IMF blames a witch's brew of the global impact of coronavirus, low oil prices, coronavirus containment measures, the impact of "limited digitalization" and "limited remote working," weak social safety nets, cash-strapped governments, and the region's disproportionate share of the world's refugees and displaced people. The list includes war zones like Syria, Libya, Somalia, and Yemen. But Lebanon, Iraq, and the West Bank and Gaza qualify too. Even in Saudi Arabia and other wealthy Gulf states, where sizable protests are far less likely, governments will probably have much less money to spend for years to come.
Hard Numbers: The Young & Restless
GZERO World looks at the Hard Numbers facing the youth and women in the Middle East and North Africa.