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Russia inches closer to taking the Donbas
Russia got one step closer to capturing the Donbas region of Ukraine last Sunday when its forces seized the eastern city of Lysychansk after weeks of heavy fighting. Ukraine’s military announced it had been “forced to withdraw” by Russia’s overwhelming firepower and personnel superiority there in order to avoid “fatal consequences.”
"We continue the fight. Unfortunately, steel will and patriotism are not enough for success—material and technical resources are needed," the Ukrainian military said in a Facebook post.
Following Russia’s takeover of the neighboring city of Severodonetsk just a week prior, Lysychansk had become the last remaining Ukrainian holdout in the Luhansk region. Now, Russia has control of Luhansk, which together with the neighboring Donetsk region makes up the Donbas—the industrialized eastern part of Ukraine that has long been the epicenter of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia.
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Kremlin-backed separatist forces have been fighting an insurgency there since 2014. Before he invaded Ukraine on February 24, Russian President Vladimir Putin recognized Luhansk and Donetsk as independent republics. After his troops failed to take over Kyiv and overthrow the Ukrainian government, Putin declared the top aim of the “second phase” of the war to be the capture and annexation or independence of the Donbas.
Slowly but surely, and despite Ukraine’s fierce resistance, he is succeeding.
For the last month and a half, Russian forces have been making small but steady advances in Ukraine’s east and south. After overrunning Luhansk, the Russian offensive is now turning its focus further west toward the Donetsk, with Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, and Bakhmut, the region’s three largest cities still in Ukrainian hands, coming under heavy shelling in recent days. Local authorities have called for the 350,000 remaining civilians in the area to evacuate immediately.
The capture of Luhansk hands Putin a significant, if mostly symbolic, win, both on the ground and in the propaganda war. But by no means does it spell an end to the fighting or a decisive Russian victory.
Ukraine still controls nearly half of the Donetsk region, and Russian forces are unlikely to gain a hold of the entire region soon. Ukrainian forces are also advancing in multiple directions, including Kherson and Zaporizhzhya regions. The fighting will likely continue through the fall and possibly the winter, dealing heavy casualties to both sides. As long as Western weapons and aid continue to flow, Ukrainians can prevent Moscow from achieving a definitive victory.
The big question is whether Ukraine can get enough advanced weapons from the West at the pace needed to halt the Russian advance, before domestic political pressures erode the level of international support. The Ukrainian government increasingly worries the answer is 'no.'
Kyiv has been desperately asking for more and faster equipment shipments, particularly of heavy artillery and ammunition. While the United States—Ukraine’s top donor in absolute terms—recently provided advanced missile systems and its defense industry is ramping up production to meet demand, stockpiles are getting depleted fast, meaning there isn’t a whole lot more high-capacity artillery readily available for delivery.
Actually getting the materiel to the front lines has been complicated by Russian attacks on rail lines and bridges. And even if getting hardware into place wasn’t a problem, it can take weeks and even months to train Ukrainian soldiers on how to operate certain weapons systems.
Meanwhile, Moscow is stepping up efforts to establish Russia-controlled administrations in the occupied territories and increasing attacks in other parts of the country, including in Kharkiv.
The Ukrainian government is concerned that the level of Western support will only diminish as the conflict drags on, winter makes the energy crunch more acute, and the U.S. midterm elections approach. And rightly so: if they don’t get as much military and financial aid as they possibly can as soon as possible, their ability to fight will suffer, and their odds of success will diminish.
None of this means that Russia can win the war.
As I’vewritten before, no matter what happens on the battlefield, Putin’s decision to invade will turn out to be a catastrophic strategic mistake. Zelensky is an international hero, and Ukraine is now decidedly and permanently anti-Russian. The transatlantic alliance has a newfound sense of purpose. Europe is increasing its military spending. NATO is expanding both its membership and its activities along Russia’s borders. American and European sanctions are effectively permanent, and they will cause significant long-term damage to the Russian economy. There’s no conceivable scenario in which Russia comes out of this war economically and geopolitically stronger than before February 24.
But when it comes to the narrow fight for the Donbas, Putin increasingly finds himself in an ever more comfortable position.
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Fault lines are emerging in the Western front against Russia
French President Emmanuel Macron made headlines over the weekend when he called for the West not to "humiliate" Russia in its war against Ukraine "so that the day when the fighting stops we can build an exit ramp through diplomatic means."
The statement drew ire from the Ukrainian government. Ukraine’s foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba bristled at the suggestion, saying such calls “only humiliate France” because Russia “humiliates itself”
President Volodymyr Zelensky, for his part, seemed perplexed by the thought that he should be wary not to humiliate Russia when "for eight years they have been killing us."
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I share his sentiment. It is immoral to ask Ukrainians to show restraint or moderate their war aims in order to help Russian President Vladimir Putin "save face." He started this war unprovoked. The only alternative to humiliating Russia is to let it win—no doubt an unacceptable outcome for Ukraine, and one only Ukrainians have the right to accept, anyway.
Statements like Macron’s undermine Ukrainian sovereignty and weaken the Western front against Russia. They signal to Putin that time is on his side: that if only he can take and hold all the Donbas and keep the land bridge to Crimea, he can outlast the West. Pressuring Kyiv to accept a ceasefire before it has retaken all of its lost territory would de facto codify Russia’s gains—precisely what Putin wants. As such, these calls make it more, not less, likely that Putin stays the course in his war of conquest against Ukraine.
That doesn’t mean Russia has a path to victory. As I’ve written before, no matter what happens on the battlefield, Putin’s invasion of Ukraine will turn out to be a catastrophic strategic mistake. Zelensky is an international hero, and Ukraine is now decidedly anti-Russian. The transatlantic alliance has a newfound sense of purpose. Europe is increasing its military spend. NATO is expanding both its membership and its activities along Russia’s borders. American and European sanctions are effectively permanent, and they will cause significant long-term damage to the Russian economy. There’s no conceivable scenario in which Russia comes out of this war economically and geopolitically stronger than before February 24.
But when it comes to the narrow fight for the Donbas—Putin’s stated goal for the "second phase" of the "special military operation"—calls to negotiate with Russia even as it continues to mercilessly shell Ukrainian cities make it easier for Putin to claim a win there.
As poorly conceived as it was, though, Macron’s statement was no slip of the tongue. The French president has repeatedly insisted that Russian President Vladimir Putin should be incentivized to end the war as soon as possible, even if it means pressuring the Ukrainians to voluntarily cede part of their territory to Russia.
And he’s not alone in calling for Putin to be appeased. Whether in private or in public, the leaders of Germany and Italy have also urged Ukraine to make some sort of compromise with Russia in recent weeks, as have former U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger and the New York Times editorial board.
What’s happening is that as the conflict settles into aprotracted yet unstable stalemate, the triumphalist mood that permeated European capitals until recently has turned gloomy. Russia is making slow but steady territorial gains in the Donbas, and despite their valiant efforts, Ukrainian forces are displaying wear and tear. It’s becoming clear that neither side will be able to achieve a decisive victory anytime soon.
In the meantime, however, global growth, inflation, energy prices, and food shortages are getting worse. The prospect of an unending “war of attrition,” as NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg called it, has some leaders starting to wonder aloud about the impact of a long slog on their own economies and politics.
In their eyes, those like Macron who believe that Ukrainians can’t win, that Russians will eventually be able to capture and hold most of the Donbas, that sanctions will hurt the West more than they hurt Russia—they are trying to get ahead of the inevitable outcome. Whether the Ukrainians agree or not, they think it’s better for everyone to freeze the conflict sooner rather than later, preventing unnecessary Ukrainian bloodshed, global economic pain, and political upheaval.
There are, of course, exceptions to this position: the Americans, the British, the Finns, the Swedes, the Poles, and the Baltics are still committed to helping Ukraine recapture their territory, believing only Ukrainians can determine when enough is enough. Kyiv’s official position is that Ukraine will keep fighting until the country’s full territorial integrity has been restored—or at the very least, until Russian forces are pushed out of the territory they have occupied since February 24.
So far the Biden administration has managed to keep the coalition together in support of Ukraine’s war aims, but its ability to continue to do so over the coming three to six months will be increasingly tested.
After more than 100 days of near-absolute unity, cracks in the Western front are starting to show.
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Russia-Ukraine: What’s a “no-fly zone” and why is it a terrible idea?
During a call with a bipartisan group of more than 300 U.S. members of Congress on Saturday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky urged the U.S. and its allies to establish a “no-fly zone” over Ukraine to help the country defend against Russian airstrikes.
“Close the sky over Ukraine! Close it for all Russian missiles, Russian combat aircraft, for all these terrorists, make a humanitarian air zone, without rockets, with air bombs,” Zelensky pleaded again on Sunday following Russian missile strikes on the city of Vinnytsia.A recent Reuters/Ipsos poll found that 74 percent of Americans (including majorities of Democrats and Republicans) support imposing a no-fly zone in Ukraine.
But while a small number of U.S. lawmakers, including Sens. Roger Wicker (R-MI) and Joe Manchin (D-WV) and Rep. Adam Kinzinger (R-IL), have called for the measure to be considered, the vast majority of American and European policymakers have rebuffed the idea as dangerous.
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The Biden administration has repeatedly ruled out imposing a no-fly zone, citing the risk of triggering a “potential direct war with Russia,” while British Prime Minister Boris Johnson said enforcing a no-fly zone is "not on the agenda of any NATO country.” On March 4, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg conclusively rejected Zelensky’s pleas for a no-fly zone, saying doing so “could end in a full-fledged war in Europe.”
What is it? A no-fly zone is an area over which aircraft are banned from flying. The point of imposing a no-fly zone over Ukraine would be to prevent Russian airstrikes and airdrops and to enable Ukrainians and their allies to safely move supplies and people across the country.
Here’s the catch: a no-fly zone isn’t just declared. It has to be enforced. In practice, this would require deploying NATO fighter jets to patrol Ukrainian airspace and shoot down any trespassing Russian planes. That’s right, shoot down Russian planes.
If that sounds...serious, it’s because it is: a no-fly zone over Ukraine would put American and European troops in direct military confrontation with Russia.
A no-fly zone is “not some rule you pass that everybody has to oblige by. It’s the willingness to shoot down the aircraft of the Russian Federation,” Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL) explained. “It means starting World War III.”
Why is it a bad idea? Although Russian President Vladimir Putin views other Western measures like military aid and economic sanctions as “akin to a declaration of war,” he believes that a no-fly zone would be a declaration of war. Imposing a no-fly zone would therefore make NATO a combatant in a war against Russia. This isn’t speculation: Putin explicitly laid out the red line on March 5, saying that a no-fly zone would “be viewed” by the Kremlin as “participation in the armed conflict.”
While the U.S. has enacted no-fly zones in the past—notably in Iraq between 1991 and 2003, in Bosnia between 1993 and 1995, in Kosovo in 1999, and in Libya in 2011—it has never done so against a nuclear-armed adversary or an air force of Russia’s caliber. The stakes are much higher, and the risks greater, in Ukraine.
“For everything we’re doing for Ukraine, the President also has a responsibility to not get us into a direct conflict, a direct war with Russia, a nuclear power, and risk a war that expands even beyond Ukraine to Europe,” U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken told NBC’s “Meet The Press” on Sunday.“What we’re trying to do is end this war in Ukraine, not start a larger one,” Blinken said.
You might wonder, ‘What’s the difference between NATO shooting down Russian planes and providing planes and surface-to-air missiles to Ukraine so that Ukrainians do it themselves?’
Sure enough, in the eyes of the Russians both measures are acts of war. But the latter—like sanctions and real-time intelligence-sharing—is qualitatively different, with a built-in ceiling on escalation. Russia will retaliate, but the retaliation will be somewhat proportional to the intervention: cyberattacks, economic countermeasures, energy shutoffs, proxy terrorism, and so on. The risk of the conflict spiraling out of control will be capped. With direct confrontation? It’s a much greater risk.
None of this means that the West should or will idly sit by as Ukraine gets invaded. NATO has already provided a tremendous amount of humanitarian aid, essential supplies, and military support, with much more to come. Congress is reportedly close to approving a $14 billion aid package to Ukraine, and the U.S. and U.K. are set to ban Russian oil imports. These are significant steps.
But even (and, indeed, especially) in war, there have to be guardrails. Implementing a no-fly zone would bring the U.S. and Russia much closer to nuclear confrontation. Let’s say no to that.
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Russia attacks Ukraine: Why it matters
Early on February 24, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin announced he had ordered a “special military operation” aimed at the “demilitarization and denazification” of Ukraine. Russian troops promptly launched a large-scale military assault from Ukraine’s northern, eastern, and southern borders, striking military targets across the country and bringing explosions to Kyiv and other large Ukrainian cities.
Only hours before Putin’s declaration of war—an unprovoked war—against the innocent people of Ukraine, President Zelensky had given an extraordinary speech appealing to the Russian people, revealing that Putin refused his entreaties for a phone call, and warning that an invasion was likely to start within hours. He was, of course, correct, as he was when he said that the Ukrainians were after nothing other than their own defense.
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There's been a massive disinformation campaign against the Ukrainians by the Russian government, including false claims of border attacks and baseless genocide charges supposedly committed by Ukrainians against Russians in the occupied territories. This narrative was not meant to be credible or believable. It was meant to show the rest of the world that Putin demands a sphere of influence and will take any actions he feels necessary to acquire it.
I want to be very clear: over the course of the past several weeks, the only de-escalatory measures that we have seen were the fake news, the disinformation, and the lies coming from the Kremlin, and particularly from Russian President Vladimir Putin. When he spoke to US President Biden and Germany Chancellor Olaf Scholz and France President Emmanuel Macron, he said that troops were pulling back from the Ukrainian border. He lied. When he said the Russian troops conducting military exercises in Belarus would leave on February 20 when they were done, he lied. When he said that he not planning an invasion, he lied. When he said that all of the diplomatic efforts would lead to de-escalation unless the Russians were provoked by the Ukrainian government, he lied.
Instead, he launched a war of choice against Ukraine, featuring cyber and bombing campaigns in addition to a military invasion of the largest Ukrainian cities. Thousands upon thousands of innocent Ukrainian civilians will surely die, and hundreds of thousands (if not millions) will become refugees overnight.
The response will be significant. No, it will not be a direct defense of the Ukrainian government and people. It has been made clear by the United States and the NATO allies that as a non-member of NATO, collective security does not apply to Ukraine, and therefore Western troops will not be deployed on the ground. But we will see major comprehensive sanctions in the next 24 hours on financial transactions, on technology access, on trade, on individual members of Putin's family, and on top members of the Russian government and elites. We will see a stronger and more coordinated NATO. We will see forward troop deployments, including in all likelihood permanent bases in the Baltic states. We will see countries like Sweden and particularly Finland looking to join NATO more intently, which the Russians have stated would be a red line.
This is a turning point in the global order as we know it. The G-Zero has only intensified as a consequence of the lack of global leadership, facilitating impunity of rogue states and rogue actors on the global stage. There is no more powerful rogue actor in the world today than Vladimir Putin and the Russian government, engaging in horrific crimes literally as I write these words.
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THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 24 UPDATE: Russia launched a full-scale military assault and invasion of Ukraine, with troops crossing from multiple directions and explosions and fighting in multiple cities, including Kyiv. Read my latest take and subscribe to GZERO World with Ian Bremmer to get the latest updates on the war.
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 23 UPDATE:
- The heads of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic formally asked Russia for military assistance to "help beat back the aggression of the Ukrainian armed forces."
- The United States warned Ukraine of a full-scale Russian invasion in the next 48 hours. According to the Pentagon, Russian troops around Ukraine are now “at a state of readiness where they could attack at any time,” and additional forces are mobilizing into the occupied Donbas region.
- Australia, Japan, and Canada joined the US, the UK, and the EU in sanctioning Russia. Brussels imposed new sanctions on Putin’s inner circle, while Washington sanctioned the company building Nord Stream 2 and threatened to ban exports of American technology to Russia in the event of further escalation.
- Ukrainian government and bank websites were hit by a new mass cyberattack.
- Ukraine called up reservists to active duty, declared a 30-day nationwide state of emergency, and urged its citizens to leave Russia “immediately.”.
- Russia began evacuating its diplomats from Ukraine.
It’s official: Russia is now invading Ukraine (for the second time), marking the beginning of a new Cold War between the West and Russia.
On Monday, after an hour-long televised address where he accused the United States of threatening Russia’s security, denied Ukraine’s right to exist, and laid out his case for its wholesale annexation, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared the eastern Ukrainian separatist regions of Donetsk and Luhansk independent.
Shortly thereafter, the president ordered Russian troops (which the Kremlin claims are “peacekeepers”) into the two self-declared republics to “defend” Russian nationals from alleged (though unsubstantiated) Ukrainian aggression.
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Then, on Tuesday, the Kremlin raised the stakes further when Putin clarified that the independence recognition includes not just the separatist-held areas of Donetsk and Luhansk but rather the entire Donbas, about two-thirds of which is held by Ukrainian government forces. Kyiv has been clear that it will not yield control of the rest of Donbas without a fight.
While Russian troops are already present in separatist-held Ukrainian territory in direct contravention of international law—and in fact they have been since 2014, despite the Kremlin’s denials—they have yet to move into Ukrainian-held territory. However, Russia has for weeks been laying the groundwork to use any Ukrainian attacks in the Donbas—whether actual retaliation to Russian provocations or made-up “false flag” operations—as a pretext for escalation.
Moscow has already alleged multiple ceasefire violations by Ukrainian forces and warned that Russia would fulfill its “obligations” to defend Luhansk and Donetsk “if necessary.” Kyiv has denied the allegations, with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba assuring the United Nations on Wednesday that his country "has never planned and does not plan any military offensive in the Donbas [region], neither any provocations or acts of sabotage."
Putin’s independence recognition put an end to the Minsk peace process, which sought to re-integrate an autonomous Donetsk and Luhansk back into the Ukrainian state and which until recently was Russia’s and the international community’s preferred path to resolve the conflict.
Because its maximalist scope entails a high likelihood of direct military confrontation with the Ukrainian army, the move was also tantamount to a declaration of war on Ukraine.
A winding road to war
While extraordinary, Moscow’s escalation over the last 72 hours was not unexpected.
Even as Putin repeatedly denied any intention to invade Ukraine and engaged in negotiations with the United States and its European allies, Russia’s military buildup continued throughout, massing an estimated 190,000 troops along Ukraine’s eastern, northern, and southern borders and demanding a number of unlikely concessions from the West in exchange for de-escalation.
Western officials were right to be skeptical of the Kremlin’s conciliatory messages last week, which happened at the same time as Putin reiterated the false claim that a “genocide” was being committed by Ukraine against ethnic Russians, the Russian Duma (i.e., its parliament) asked Putin to recognize the independence of the breakaway regions, Ukraine suffered a series of cyberattacks, and separatists shelled a Ukrainian kindergarten.
Indeed, the White House had been warning about an imminent Russian invasion of Ukraine for weeks, which the Kremlin dismissed as false and “provocative speculation.” The American assessment (rightly) persisted despite the mixed signals coming from Moscow.
The latest escalation came after several days of frantic diplomacy—notably by France President Emmanuel Macron on Sunday and Monday—and Russian theater, starting with an obviously choreographed security council meeting where Putin “asked” his top officials to offer their “honest” recommendations on the Ukraine crisis, and ending with Monday’s “bizarre” (as President Biden called it) address to the nation in which a rambling and combative Putin tried to rewrite history and aired his unhinged grievances with everyone from Bill Clinton to Vladimir Lenin.
Putin’s Monday speech and subsequent actions ended any hopes for a negotiated solution and definitively laid to rest the theory that Moscow’s previous escalations were an attempt at coercive diplomacy whose goal was to extract concessions from Kyiv and the West but not to actually use force.
Russia has long claimed its actions in eastern Ukraine are purely defensive, instead blaming the United States and its NATO allies for threatening Russia’s security and painting Ukrainian sovereignty as an artificial construct and a naked tool of the West.
“Ukraine’s membership in NATO poses a direct threat to Russia’s security,” Putin said on Monday.
The Russian president did allow for the possibility of an off-ramp to the crisis when he urged Kyiv to renounce its aspiration to join NATO, recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea, negotiate with the separatists, and demilitarize Ukraine—moves that Putin knows Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky cannot agree to.
“Otherwise, all responsibility for the possible continuation of the bloodshed will be entirely on the conscience of the regime ruling on the territory of Ukraine,” Putin threatened.
Western unity will be put to the test
After initially hesitating to describe it as such, on Tuesday the White House began calling the Russian troop deployment into the Donbas for what it is: a “renewed” (now overt, unlike in 2014) invasion of Ukraine.
“An invasion is an invasion and that is what is underway,” said Jon Finer, principal deputy national security adviser.
The use of this term matters because the United States and its NATO allies had promised sweeping sanctions in response to a Russian invasion, with severity to be calibrated to the scope of Russian actions. In a speech on Tuesday, President Biden confirmed that his administration sees the latest escalation as the “beginning of a Russian invasion of Ukraine” and warned the US and its partners and allies would respond with sanctions “far beyond” the ones imposed in response to Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea.
As a start, Biden announced that the US would add targeted sanctions on select Russian banks and elites as well as a ban on the secondary trading of Russian sovereign debt to Monday’s executive order prohibiting trade with and investment in the rogue Donetsk and Luhansk republics. And both the European Union and the United Kingdom agreed to slap their own sets of similar sanctions on Russian individuals and entities.
Yet for a number of reasons, Putin is undeterred.
While Washington, Brussels and London all left the door open for more aggressive measures in the future, they have thus far held back from the most painful measures, recognizing that if they drop the whole sanctions arsenal on Moscow at once they’ll be left with no ammunition to dissuade Putin from escalating to a full-scale invasion and possibly even annexation.
Moreover, it remains to be seen how far Europeans will be willing to go given the immediate costs to their economies of decoupling from Russia. An encouraging sign came early on Tuesday when German Chancellor Olaf Scholz kept his promise to Biden and ordered the indefinite suspension of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline.
While NATO is the most unified and purposeful it has been since the end of the Cold War, Putin will do his best to give the West opportunities to trip up and drive a wedge in the alliance. As Biden himself correctly predicted in January, Russian military escalations short of full-blown invasion were always going to make it harder for the West to retaliate in a strong and cohesive manner, instead eliciting a more limited and divided sanctions response. Russia is likely to test NATO’s unity and resolve even further in the coming weeks and months.
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Russia’s moves toward Ukraine
Vladimir Putin has Ukraine in Russia's crosshairs. Will he invade, or is this just a high-stakes game of political chess with the US and NATO?
Russia has long feared that Ukraine would someday join NATO, Ian Bremmer explains on GZERO World. No way, says Putin, who's demanding serious concessions from Joe Biden and his Western allies.
Putin regards the collapse of the Soviet Union as the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century. He believes Russians and Ukrainians are one people.
But most Ukrainians disagree, especially after Russia seized Crimea and began supporting Russian separatists in the Donbas in 2014.
Watch this episode of GZERO World with Ian Bremmer: Will Putin invade Ukraine?
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- Europeans suggest reviving Minsk Agreement to resolve Ukraine Crisis - GZERO Media ›
- Russia-Ukraine: Diplomacy is still on the table - GZERO Media ›
- Russia-Ukraine crisis: Major escalation this week - GZERO Media ›
- Minsk agreement a path to resolving Ukraine crisis - GZERO Media ›
Russia cares more about Ukraine than the US does
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi, everybody. Ian Bremmer here, and kicking off the week with more concerns about rising tensions between the United States, NATO, and Russia over Ukraine.
We saw from the Biden press conference last week, which feels already like a month ago, that he believes the Russians are "going in." That doesn't mean full invasion and overthrow of the Ukrainian government, which would impose massive costs on the Russians. But some form of direct Russian escalation that the United States would respond sharply to and wants to convince its NATO allies that they need to as well.
The Americans are doing what they can to show the Russians they are taking this seriously. And that means, of course, coordination with NATO. And we've seen already some announcements of advanced deployments in the region, F-16s to Lithuania, F-35s to Bulgaria, troops to Romania, a frigate to the Black Sea, all announced earlier today by NATO and supported by all NATO members. But the countries involved include France in directly providing those deployments, which is important given that the French president was talking about strategic autonomy and basically going it the European way, which ain't going to work, but makes NATO and makes the United States look weaker in their ability to respond to Russia right now.
The Americans are also talking potentially about some level of preemptive sanction, again, to get the Russians to back down. Because, so far, the messages from Russia have been escalation. They're the ones taking first their personnel out of their embassy in Kyiv. They continue to expand dramatically Russian troops across all of the borders on Ukraine, including, in short order, into Belarus with massive military exercises starting in short order. And those were announced only very recently, and with the cyberattacks against Ukraine just over a week ago.
So, the new news leaked from the UK, or not leaked actually, announced from the UK and supported by the United States that the Russians have this intelligence plan to put a new government into Kyiv, doesn't really change my view in the sense that it's very clear that President Putin has ordered that there be a plan in place if he were to decide to full-on invade and overthrow the Ukrainian government. He wants a plan and they've put together a plan for him. Doesn't mean he's going to do it. It means that the plan is there. And that's consistent with the course of diplomacy and it's consistent with Putin keeping options open. Doesn't tell you very much about what he's going to do.
But I do think that all of the Russian activities are consistent with, if we don't have a diplomatic breakthrough, and diplomacy is still ongoing but there's no reason to believe there's a breakthrough, then we will see a level of further escalation from Russia, and America and NATO has to respond.
One of the heartening things is that, in reality, the US policy towards Ukraine is broadly consensus on almost every issue. Democrats and Republicans across the political spectrum agree that the US should be making strong efforts to engage in diplomacy with the Russians right now to bring tensions down. Everyone agrees on that. Everyone agrees pretty much that the Americans should provide further military support for the Ukrainian government. The US is doing that. Furthermore, that there needs to be heavy deterrence against any Russian intervention into Ukraine. Any Russian intervention into Ukraine, the Americans have to be very clear that are going to pay a very significant cost. Furthermore, the US needs to get the Europeans on the same page with all of that. That's a hard thing to do, but that still is supported across the board in the US. And finally, across the board in the US, is that Ukraine should not be offered a NATO invitation, but the NATO invitation cannot be taken off the board unilaterally by Russia.
I can't remember the last time I've seen a serious foreign policy crisis that the US was in. We could talk about Iran. We could talk about Afghanistan. We could talk about the war in Iraq. Almost anything you think about, that there was this level of actual agreement across the political spectrum on what the Americans should do. That you put a Republican leader in place, the views would be the same. But the country is so incredibly divided that everyone is trying to find just things to pick on. In part, because there's no utility in saying the other side is right. And furthermore, assuming that the policy doesn't work to some degree, and there's a high likelihood that the policy won't work to some degree, because America's in a challenging position. The Russians care a lot more about Ukraine than the US does. The Russians have a lot more economic influence over Europe than they do over the United States. So the US has more freedom of action if you were.
And it is really challenging to get a strong coalition to agree on all levels of action, given all of the weakness and unwillingness that the United States has displayed to be the global sheriff and to lead the world and make it safe for democracy. Some of which is self-owned and some of which has to do with the nature of the global order. So you put all those things together, and it is quite likely that even the best US foreign policy on Ukraine is going to fall somewhat short. And also that as a consequence of that, the fingers that are going to be pointed are going to be extravagant.
Now, I will say, the one thing that I've been annoyed by that's come from the US and some allies, I'm looking at you, Canada, has been the virtue signaling, the hashtag #StandWithUkraine, which the Obama administration started. I remember when Jen Psaki was putting up that placard, I was really annoyed with her at the time when she did it. And I'm annoyed now, too. It looks weak. The Russians think it's a joke and it's unnecessary. I mean, it's the sort of thing that you do when you don't actually have a policy. But the reality is that the Americans and Europeans, as I’ve just laid out, have a policy. It's not about policy. And it reflects both multilateralism and strength, and also reflects the limits of what the Americans aren't going to do. I mean, you can stand with Ukraine, but we're not bringing them into NATO and we are not defending the Ukrainians directly if they're attacked.
This is not like Taiwan where there's ambiguity on that point. There is no ambiguity that the Americans and American allies, if the Russians roll tanks in, maybe sending weapons to Ukraine, but they are not coming to Ukraine's direct aid. There is not a chance that this is going to be World War III with the Americans and the Russians fighting over Ukraine. That's not going to happen. So precisely for all those reasons, we should stop with the hashtags and we should focus on real diplomacy and real consequences, which I think most of us are doing, but some of us aren't. It's, again, one of these silly things that allows people to have their hair on fire in the media and on social media. And right now this is a time where the US should be coming together because frankly, in reality, we are together, which is interesting and useful for us to remember.
So that's it for me. I'll talk to you all real soon.
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Russia-Ukraine: Don’t expect full-on invasion, but Putin isn’t bluffing
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi everybody. Happy Tuesday after the long weekend for those of us that had a long weekend. I thought I would kick us off with the first major foreign policy crisis of the Biden administration. And that is of course, Russia-Ukraine. Afghanistan, of course, was a debacle, but not exactly a global crisis. This of course has the potential to really change the way we think about European security and about US relations with the other major nuclear power in the world. So, I would say that the level of concern is even higher and there are a lot of things we can say.
First, the last few days have mostly been escalatory. The last week of meetings between the United States and Russia, as well as NATO and Russia, it's good that the sides are talking, but there was not significant progress. The Russians made very clear that if you want to have more talks, we need a very quick written response to the demands they made publicly. So, you wouldn't say that there has been anything that looks like a diplomatic breakthrough.
And on the other hand, the messages that have come from the Russians in the last few days have mostly been escalatory. There's been cyberattacks against a number of websites in Ukraine belonging to government organizations, direct malware attacks against the number of government agencies, almost certainly from Russia. You see the Russians sending a bunch of troops to Belarus for sudden and non previously announced military exercises right on Ukraine's border and also now moving personnel from Russia's embassy in Kyiv. These are all signs that the Russians want the rest of the world to see that they are planning significant military activities in Ukraine.
On the other hand, it's really a bad idea for the Russians to go in and the costs that they would incur, both because the Ukrainian population on the ground is hostile to Russia, and there was consideration when they occupied Donbas, about taking further territory in Ukraine and one of the reasons they didn't do it is because they understood that that was going to lead to significant ongoing fighting. It would be unpopular in Russia and there'd be body bags and nobody wants to see that.
Now Putin's in a stronger economic position today. He might think that Biden's a little weaker, might think he's a little bit less likely to respond strongly. There's a new German chancellor in place who wants to engage directly with the Russians. Merkel's not there anymore. So, I understand why there might be more willingness to escalate. But still, a decision to do a full-on invasion of Ukraine is the one thing that is certain to bring the Americans and the Europeans together.
The one thing that is certain to revitalize NATO, which is an organization that's been floundering around for a lack of a mission over the past years. They would have a mission. That mission would be very much to defend against Russia and both the economic sanctions as well as the NATO military response, terms of more exercises, troops in the Baltics, positioning of forces closer to Russia's borders. All of that, I think, is something that Putin really wouldn't want to see. Would be very reluctant.
So, I personally think that there is a lower likelihood of overall full-scale invasion, takeout Zelensky, the tanks roll into Ukrainian territory. But I also recognize that every sign the Russians are sending points to very significant escalation.
So, there are two really big questions that we need to ask. The first is, is there a deal to be cut? Is it possible that diplomacy could actually bear some fruit and we can deescalate this? And secondly, if not, how big does Putin go? So, on the first question, I think it's worth remembering that when Biden met face to face with Putin in Geneva, the one big meeting back in June, they spent about two hours together, that was mostly Biden's agenda and there was one thing that Biden really put as a top priority to the Russian president. He said, "I've got a red line. You guys are allowing these criminal syndicates inside Russia to engage in cyberattacks against American critical infrastructure. And that's not acceptable. And I'm going to give you a few months to address it. But if you don't address it, there's going to be hell to pay. There will be direct retaliation from the United States. This is a really big issue for me."
Now, Putin heard that and over the course of the last few months, the Russians have addressed it. There's been markedly fewer Russian attacks, cyberattacks. And I'm not talking state-sanctioned, I'm talking criminal organizations against US critical infrastructure. It's very clear that the Kremlin actually did send that message. And indeed, last Friday on the same day that the Russians decided to engage in cyberattacks against Ukraine, they also announced that they had arrested some 14 people that were involved with the organization called REvil, R-E-V-I-L, which is the organization that was behind the Colonial Pipeline attacks. And the Russians said that that organization had been disbanded. So at the very least, this is a direct message to the Americans that when you said you had a big problem with us, we responded. That's obviously some kind of an opening of, "We say we have a big problem on Ukraine. Are you going to respond?"
Now, that doesn't mean that there is an adequate response to be had. That doesn't mean that there is an easy negotiation to be had, that doesn't imply that we're suddenly going to have a breakthrough, but it certainly implies that the Russian president, who is the single decision maker in determining whether or not this becomes war, is interested in a potential climbdown.
And my argument would be yes. And now we see if the two so are going to move in that direction. So, that's the first point. I'm more optimistic than anyone out there, I think, I'm seeing in the media that there is a desire on the part of the Kremlin to actually fix this if it's fixable and it's about Ukraine.
With the Ukrainian president, that let's face, is not the favorite of the West. This is a guy that's been arguing strongly for NATO membership and a membership action plan that he would never get support from the United States and Europe. He's also someone that's planning trumped-up house arrest, it looks like, of the former president, a domestic opposition to Zelensky, the Ukrainian president. This is closer to the Russian rule book in terms of the way they dealt with Navalny and not what he should be doing or supporting at a time that his country risks being invaded. Neither here nor there. But all of that makes me a little more optimistic.
But what if it doesn't work? Then are the Russians going to do something? And I think the answer is yes and the question is how big they go. In other words, I don't think Putin's bluffing. I think if he's not given something significant by the West. If there isn't a deal to be had over Ukraine, then there will be escalation. I don't think they're just going to back down like Iran where, when we killed Soleimani and suddenly they said, "Okay, we're not doing anything. Sorry, that was a bluff."
I don't think Putin's bluffing. But I'm not sure that what he's planning on doing is this all-out invasion for reasons I've discussed. It's very expensive. It will be unpopular in Russia. It will bring together NATO. And long term, I think it's going to be a real challenge for Putin to actually be seen as having a success in Ukraine. But I think that there are lots of things that they can do that would be successful for Russia that are smaller, that would be problematic for the United States and its allies. They've talked consistently about military and technical responses if their concerns aren't addressed. Technical's fairly obvious, we're talking about much bigger cyberattacks against Ukraine, which could be economically devastating to the country, remember the NotPetya attacks years ago, which probably took 1% of GDP off of Ukraine and people died in hospitals when the hospital suddenly had lost their ability to have data and connectivity. Those cyberattacks were big problem.
And I think they would easily do that again. If they want to defend Russian citizens in the occupied Donbas, they could roll tanks in. They could formally take that territory. They could maybe even annex it. It's interesting to me, that Belarus, in addition to these new exercises, the Belarus president has organized a referendum to change their constitution for February. How do you like that? And the February constitution, that's obviously going to pass because Belarus isn't a democracy, two of the changes are that they are no longer formally neutral and they're no longer a non-nuclear state.
In other words, quite a coincidence. Huh? In other words, the Belarusians could easily invite the Russians to put troops on their territory, which is an advance location for Russia, vis a vis Ukraine and also Europe, Eastern Europe, and also could station nuclear weapons on their territory.
And then finally, we've seen the Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine talking about, "Well, how would you like it if there were troops in Cuba or Russian presence in Venezuela?" And I think the Americans wouldn't like it at all. And I think it's quite feasible that the Russians would engage in some form of military activity there and you'd see more Russian activity on America's borders.
So, I think there's a lot they can do and part of the problem there is that the Americans can respond unilaterally, but it's not at all clear to me the Europeans would be responding with the US in terms of tough sanctions, in terms of Nord Stream 2, and in terms of NATO prepositioning of forces in return. I think there's an open question as to how far the alliance would go and how much there'd be a divide, with the Europeans much more reliant and their economy is much more reliant, especially in the winter on Russia if the Russians escalate, but that escalation is not a full-on invasion of sovereign Ukraine.
So anyway, a lot to watch. A very significant set of activities, mostly being driven by the Russians at this point, and very dangerous indeed. And so quite a lot to start off our week. I hope everyone's well, and we'll talk real soon. Be good.
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