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The Camp David summit
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi everybody. Ian Bremmer here and a Quick Take on the Camp David Principles, the historic meeting taking place in Camp David today between President Biden, the Japanese Prime Minister Kishida, and South Korean President Yoon. It's historic. It's a big deal. It's worth talking about. And frankly, I consider this to be the most significant successful piece of diplomacy of the Biden administration to date. It is roughly equivalent in my mind to the Abraham Accords of the Trump administration. In that case, this was leading to direct diplomatic engagement, opening relations between Israel, America's top ally in the region and the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco, other American allies in the region. With the Saudis, not signing, but certainly getting closer. It's important in part because it stabilized a region that matters to the United States. It also allows for better strategic coordination long-term, and it is broadly speaking, supported by both sides.
Biden had only positive things to say about the Abraham Accords, and in indeed, if we see a Saudi breakthrough that would happen in the context of those accords. Democrats, Republicans can all agree that this was a positive move for the United States in the region. So too, that is true of this breakthrough, the Camp David principles with the most important US ally in Asia, Japan, and South Korea. Another very important ally of the United States, probably the second most important, certainly when you look at the troops that the Americans have positioned there. The level of regular engagement of certainly of the exercises that occur, the level of economic, of military aid and technology transfer that occurs, all of that is pretty significant. Here you have a relationship that really should have been much better between Japan and South Korea, and hasn't been for a long time, improved in part because the South Korea-China relationship got so much worse when the South Koreans decided they needed their THAAD missile defense system from the United States to defend them against North Korea.
The Chinese took vigorous exception and put sanctions against the South Koreans and there was economic damage. The Communist Party supported major demonstrations against South Korea and that really changed the view on the ground. And since then, we now have an election with a South Korean president that is much more oriented towards the west, much more hawkish towards North Korea and China. And a Japanese prime minister that is much more willing to take risks internationally that may not play as well at home. A much softer and willingness to engage with the South Koreans than, for example, Prime Minister Abe had been. Put all of that together and Biden takes advantage of an opportunity in front of him. And what we now see will be annual summits going forward, a commitment to consult on any security threat, which is not the same as a commitment to defend, but a recognition that there will be coordination stepping up regular military exercises as well as the first ever trilateral security hotline being created.
Clearly this is all of a piece with growing US-led security architecture in Asia. We see it with AUKUS and the submarine deal with the Australians. We see it with the Quad and India becoming much closer with the United States and its allies, especially on national security related issues. We also see it with the routine and regular participation of Japan and South Korea in NATO summits. And indeed, going forward, I expect that there will be more willingness on the basis of Japan's working with South Korea now through these Camp David principles to open the Quad to South Korea participation. Canada may well be very interested in that too. All of which bodes well for America's reach and alignment of its standards and values with other countries. And something that I believe would also last beyond the Biden administration. I don't expect that Trump is going to have anything nice to say about Biden here.
It's not his style, but I do think that he would uphold if he were to become president these regular trilateral meetings. In other words, something as opposed to the Iranian nuclear deal as opposed to the failed effort to get the transpacific partnership, the Paris Climate Accord that is bounced around from one administration to the next. This is a piece of foundational architecture that can be built upon over time, in large part because the Japanese and South Koreans are themselves so deeply committed to it. The problem of course, is China. So much of the reason why you have the willingness to form this architecture around Asia is because of greater concerns that China is a national security threat. Some of that is driven by greater decoupling of national security related elements of the global economy away from China. When you're talking about the US and its allies, some of that is greater military confrontation over Taiwan in the South China Sea, in the East China Sea.
And that's happening at a time when the Chinese economy is performing very badly. Now, there's a big question in how Xi Jinping is going to react to all of this. It's a bad time economically for him to be getting into a bigger fight with the Americans and others. He needs as much economic stability and growth as he can get, but that doesn't mean that he's going to sit and take it. There are political stability issues. He doesn't want to be seen as weak. He and his advisors all believe that the Americans are trying to contain Chinese growth and they see all sorts of policies that are being put in place, particularly by the Americans that lend support to that belief. And as a consequence of that, I think we are likely to see at least some level of Chinese response and reaction. We'll see how much of that plays out at the BRICS summit up coming in South Africa.
We'll watch the Chinese statements very carefully there. But certainly all of this puts a very big focus on what is expected to be a Biden-Xi Jinping summit at APEC in San Francisco in November. I'm certainly planning on spending the week out there, assuming it happens. And at this point I do believe it's very likely. It is the one chance to see if you can try to stabilize a relationship that continues to deteriorate, despite all stated efforts by Biden and Xi Jinping otherwise. And the fact is that Xi Jinping has different expectations of that meeting than Biden does. I think the Chinese expect this is all but a state visit. Biden expects a very important working level meeting with none of the pomp and circumstance. Can that circle be squared? And if it can't, does that mean that the meeting is off? We'll see. We'll see. I'm still optimistic, but all of the news that we're seeing is only making it both more important and more challenging to pull that summit meeting off.
Anyway, that's it for me and I'll talk to you all real soon.
Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida.
Viewpoint: How Abe still casts a shadow over Kishida in Japan
Former Japanese PM Shinzo Abe was tragically gunned down one year ago. Yet he still casts a long shadow on Japanese politics and the agenda of current PM Fumio Kishida.
Last year, Kishida’s public approval ratings nosedived mainly because of controversies related to Abe, like the ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s ties to the Unification Church (or “Moonies”). Those ties go back decades to former PM Nobusuke Kishi, Abe’s grandfather. Since then, Kishida has regained his political footing. But when it comes to Japan’s national security, foreign affairs, and economic policies, Kishida still walks in Abe’s shadow. Or does he?
To get an idea of how this is all playing out, especially as Kishida mulls calling snap elections later this year, we sat down for a chat with David Boling, Eurasia Group’s lead Japan analyst.
What is Abe's main legacy on Japanese politics a year after his death?
He continues to exert outsized influence over day-to-day politics and policymaking.
At the time of his death, Abe was head of the largest faction, which now has 100 members, within the conservative LDP. That’s nearly double the size of the next largest faction. The caucus still bears his name, the “Abe faction,” and he remains the glue that holds them together. Even though a year has passed, they still can’t agree on a new standard bearer.
On policy, his vision outlives him too. Abe was a very controversial and provocative politician. He was edgy and relished a good fight. This made him unpopular and is the reason why most Japanese people opposed a state funeral for him — to the dismay of many foreign observers. But his policy vision transcends all that rancor. It might even be called mainstream now.
So as William Faulkner said, “The past is never dead. It’s not even past.”
What would Abe think of Kishida’s performance so far?
Abe would be happy to see that Kishida has supported increased defense spending, which is set to reach 2% of GDP by 2027. But he would question Kishida’s leadership abilities and not consider him conservative enough.
It’s worth remembering that before Abe was gunned down, he was positioning himself to make yet another run for prime minister. So Kishida certainly saw Abe as a political rival – you might even say they were “frenemies.” They were both LDP members and somewhat dependent on each other – Kishida had served nearly five years as Abe’s foreign minister. But they were suspicious of one another.
How has Kishida shaken off the controversy over the Moonies in the wake of Abe’s shooting?
Kishida took a huge beating in the polls last fall over the Unification Church scandal, even though Kishida himself had no personal connection to the church. It was Abe, members of his faction, and other LDP members who were chummy with the Moonies.
The controversy over LDP ties with the Moonies burned very hot but then fizzled out. In December, Kishida helped push through legislation to crack down on fundraising abuses by religious organizations. Since then, though, the issue has completely dropped out of opinion polling.
How has Kishida followed Abe’s playbook, and where has he distanced himself from his old boss?
Although he has sought to distance himself from “Abenomics” with his “new form of capitalism,” Kishida has stuck to Abe’s economic blueprint of big fiscal spending and ultra-loose monetary policy. That’s been a surprise.
On defense, Abe was a hawk. Kishida is a dove who has been mugged by the reality of China, North Korea, and Russia. So Kishida has become a supporter of spending more money on defense. He wants to raise taxes to pay for some of that increase, whereas Abe was fine just to pay for it with new debt.
Finally, the Japanese public sees amending the constitution to clarify the status of the self-defense forces as a low priority – as does Kishida – while it was a top priority for Abe.
How popular is Kishida today, and how much of a change/mandate is that for him moving forward?
Kishida’s popularity has been like a roller coaster. It was up at the beginning of his tenure. But it went down in the second half of last year to its lowest point. Then up from the beginning of this year through the G7 summit in Hiroshima. Now it’s heading down again.
Kishida is not as threatening as Abe, but his popular support does not run as deep either. The Japanese public has a “meh” attitude towards him. There’s a good chance he’ll dissolve the lower house and hold snap elections later this year, and those results will determine how much Kishida can do in the coming months.
Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida speaks during a news conference at the prime minister's office in Tokyo
Japan snap election speculation grows
Quick recap: Since Kishida took office in October of 2021, he has faced serious questions about his political viability. The period following last year’s assassination of former PM Shinzo Abe, which put a spotlight on the ruling party's ties with the controversial Unification Church, was particularly tough. That combined with high consumer prices had some polls at a sub-30% approval rating, an area known as the “danger zone” for Japanese prime ministers.
But Kishida’s approval ratings have soared in the wake of the G7 summit in Hiroshima in May. Kishida has also improved relations with South Korea and taken a hard line on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. “He has positioned himself as an international statesman,” says Boling, which in today’s world of heightened geopolitical risk has benefitted Kishida politically.
Even though official elections aren’t due for the lower house until late 2025, winning a snap election would solidify Kishida’s power before the end of his term as president of the Liberal Democratic Party in September 2024. So with his popularity on the rise, Boling thinks that Kishida could decide to “strike while the iron is hot” and capitalize on high public support by calling a snap election this summer.
But there is also a case for Kishida waiting to call the snap elections until later in the year, closer to the LDP presidential elections. “Kishida's real political threats are within his own party, not the opposition parties,” says Boling. By delaying, he increases his chances of retaining the party role because internal opponents will be more reluctant to challenge him.
Opposition lawmakers have threatened to submit a no-confidence vote before the parliamentary session ends on June 21, which could also trigger a snap election. While the opposition party, the Japan Innovation Party, is on the rise, Boling warns that “they need to be careful what they wish for” if they think a snap election would end in their favor. In a by-election in April, the LDP won four of the five seats up for grabs.
Kishida stoked the election rumors at a press conference on Tuesday over his government’s plan to reverse Japan's rapidly declining birth rate through childcare spending and tax incentives. When asked about a snap election, he did not deny that it was a possibility, instead noting that he was monitoring the political climate.
A G-7 sign, decorated with flowers, stands at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial in Japan.
G-7 leaders gather to chart next moves on Russia, China, other issues
The leaders of the industrialized nations that make up the G-7 will hold their annual meeting on May 19-21 in Hiroshima, Japan, a location of special significance at a time of intensifying great power competition. In the closing chapter of World War II, the US detonated an atomic bomb over the Japanese city, killing more than 100,000 civilians.
This year’s G-7 summit takes place as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and an increasingly assertive China test the resilience of the postwar order and make it more difficult to address transnational challenges such as climate change. We asked Eurasia Group experts Ali Wyne, Lívia Pereira, and David Boling what to expect.
What are the top items on the agenda for the summit?
Nuclear proliferation, climate change, and food insecurity will be prominent agenda items. Conversations about climate change and the clean energy transition will build on the G-7’s climate meeting last month. Special attention will be placed on the group’s proposed Just Energy Transition Partnership and the possibility of India’s adopting it. The G-7 countries are promoting this new template for financing climate change mitigation actions as a mechanism that will enable large emerging-market economies to diversify away from coal.
Food security talks will also take place, following a previous gathering this year of G-7 agricultural ministers. The focus will be on ensuring long-term food supplies by boosting both sustainable agricultural practices and technologically innovative ones.
What personal dynamics and narratives should we watch out for?
Observers will be looking to see how unified a stance the G-7 countries can present in their competition with an increasingly capable China and their efforts to close loopholes that have allowed Russia to blunt the impact of sanctions and continue its aggression against Ukraine.
Another dynamic to watch will be between G-7 leaders and Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who has recently argued that the US and Ukraine are partly to blame for Russia’s invasion and called for diversifying away from the dollar as the dominant global reserve currency. Still, Brazil is unlikely to make a hard pivot toward China that would fundamentally undercut its relations with the West; in fact, Lula is eager to finalize the EU-Mercosur trade agreement, which would deepen his country’s ties with the EU.
Finally, Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio and South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol will try to continue building trust, especially during a trilateral meeting with US President Joe Biden. Kishida and Yoon met in Seoul on May 7-8.
Japan dropped out of the cap on Russian oil because it’s more dependent on Russian energy than any other G-7 member. Is that a sign of disunity?
Japan has been very tough on enforcing sanctions against Russia, especially considering its long history of aversion to such measures. But its Sakhalin projects in Russia are critical to ensuring its energy supplies. Other G-7 countries understand that Japan — a country completely dependent on imported energy — needed some leeway, so its decision to drop out of the bloc’s cap has not caused disunity.
Nonetheless, there are tensions within the G-7 over policies toward China and Russia. France and Germany are more reluctant to weaken economic ties with China than the US. Following a recent visit to China, French President Emmanuel Macron said that Paris should not be a “vassal” of Washington, suggesting that he seeks to create some distance from the US. Moreover, the US has not gained traction for its proposal that G-7 countries ban all exports to Russia.
Japan has invited a number of countries from outside the G-7 to attend — which ones and why?
Eight other countries received an invitation. These include Australia, India, Indonesia, South Korea, and Vietnam, all linchpins of Japan’s efforts to promote “a free and open Indo-Pacific” that challenges China’s growing regional assertiveness. Brazil also received an invitation, in response to growing concerns in the West — especially the US — about its closer alignment with China. Finally, the G-7 countries recognize that it will be difficult to push back against China and Russia without greater support from developing countries — hence Japan’s invitations to the Cook Islands, which chairs the Pacific Islands Forum, and Comoros, which chairs the African Union.
Japan did not invite South Africa, a country that usually attends high-level multilateral summits, prompting speculation that the Comoros invitation was meant to signal disapproval of South Africa’s stance toward Russia. The two nations recently hosted joint military exercises, and South Africa has suggested that it is open to hosting Russian President Vladmir Putin in person at the upcoming BRICS summit in Durban, despite the International Criminal Court’s arrest warrant against him.
Most of these countries have so far refused to join G-7 sanctions on Russia. Why? Can the group do anything to change their mind?
Few non-G-7 countries share the view that the war between Russia and Ukraine is a struggle between autocracy and democracy with profound implications for the international system. Instead, seeing it as an enduring source of disruptions to food and energy markets, they question why they should deprive their populations of discounted grain and oil supplies from Moscow to uphold a “rules-based international order” that they feel has done little to address their development needs.
The summit has a special significance for Kishida, doesn’t it?
Kishida’s political base is Hiroshima, so hosting the summit there is a big domestic political win for him. He will enjoy around-the-clock Japanese press coverage during the event, which will likely boost his public approval rating. That rating hit a low point late last year but has been steadily improving this year. Given that expected boost, many observers predict that Kishida may capitalize on the G-7 momentum by dissolving the lower house and calling snap elections after the summit concludes.
Edited by Jonathan House, Senior Editor, Eurasia Group.
South Korea's President and Japan's Prime Minister on Stage in Tokyo
Japan-South Korean diplomatic ice melting fast
On Sunday, Fumio Kishida will become the first Japanese PM to visit South Korea in five years. Kishida’s trip comes less than two months after South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol went to Tokyo. The two neighbors are trying to end decades of tensions over Japan’s occupation of the Korean Peninsula (1910-1945) … with weeks of shuttle diplomacy.
Why now? Both US allies have a mutual interest in countering the threat of an increasingly aggressive North Korea, investing jointly in strategic sectors like semiconductors, and making their supply chains less dependent on China. In a nutshell: This is good for Joe Biden, bad for Xi Jinping.
But to really patch things up, Yoon needs a favor. He knows that most South Koreans believe that his recent deal with Kishida to compensate victims of Japan’s forced labor camps didn't go far enough in holding Tokyo accountable for its colonial-era abuses because it whitewashed the role of Japanese companies that benefited from the free labor.
Kishida has long wanted to win South Korean hearts and minds but is uneasy about making his zaibatsus (financial and industrial conglomerates) pick up part of the reparations tab. Still, now that Japan’s PM is starting to get his mojo back after months of polling in the red, perhaps Kishida can afford to spend some political capital on doing Yoon a solid by “encouraging” Japanese big biz to donate to the fund.
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Handout photo dated January 14, 2020 shows an MQ-9 Reaper flies over the Nevada Test and Training Range.
What We’re Watching: Drone drama, DeSantis vs. Ukraine, Japan hearts South Korea, Pakistan-Khan standoff
Drone drama over the Black Sea
In what is so far the closest thing to a direct clash between the US and Russia over Ukraine, a Russian jet on Tuesday crashed into an American drone over the Black Sea, sending the unmanned craft hurtling into the water.
Moscow disputes the claim, saying its jets didn't hit the drone. The US accused the pilots of two Russian Su-27s of being “unprofessional” and “environmentally unsafe” for harassing and “dumping fuel” on the $32 million MQ-9 Reaper drone.
But scholars point out that the US didn’t call the act “unlawful.” Russia was evidently within its rights to disrupt a drone in international territory that was almost certainly gathering intel for Moscow’s adversaries in Kyiv. Still, the incident shows the dangers of US and Russian military hardware operating in such close proximity, even if they aren’t in direct conflict.
Ron goes Don on Ukraine
Speaking of those dangers, Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis has waded into some foreign policy waters of his own, telling FOX News host Tucker Carlson he thinks that the Russia-Ukraine “territorial dispute” is not a vital US national interest and that Biden’s “blank check” for Kyiv is a distraction from more pressing issues like China.
This puts Desantis at odds with much of the GOP but firmly in line with … former President Donald Trump, whom he is all but sure to challenge for the Republican nomination in 2024.
Political wrangling aside, Desantis may be trying to catch a broader trend: In February, polls showed that only 48% of Americans favored providing weapons to Ukraine, down 12 points from May of last year. Is Ron on to something?
Japan and South Korea’s efforts to strengthen ties
South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese PM Fumio Kishida are meeting in Tokyo this week in a bid to forge stronger economic and security ties. Diplomatic engagement between the countries has stalled in recent years owing to territorial disputes and Japan’s rearmament amid what Koreans see as Japan’s efforts to whitewash World War II-era atrocities.
This follows a recent landmark agreement between Tokyo and Seoul for a South Korean fund to compensate victims of Japan’s forced labor camps during its 20th-century colonization of the Korean peninsula – a deal that has proven unpopular with South Koreans for not holding Japan directly and financially accountable.
Improved cooperation would help both countries meet the increasing security challenges posed by China and North Korea in the region. Restoring trade links between South Korea and Japan, meanwhile, will help alleviate high-tech global supply chains. But for this to work, Kishida’s government must first win over South Korean hearts and minds.
Imran Khan 1 - Pakistan’s government 0
Pakistani security forces on Wednesday withdrew from near Imran Khan’s home in Lahore after failing to detain the former PM, despite having an arrest warrant. The reason: to allow a big cricket match to take place in the city.
As the standoff unfolded, Khan — who used to captain the national team in cricket-crazy Pakistan — took to Twitter, urging his supporters not to give up. He was ousted in a no-confidence vote last April over allegations of corruption and “terrorism”, which he and his supporters dismiss as politically motivated. But since then, Khan has fervently sought to win back the top job, leading a populist movement against Pakistan’s political elite and all-powerful army, whom he accused of being behind an assassination attempt against him in Nov. 2022.
So far, the government was too scared of igniting his base to arrest the former PM, even after he was a no-show in court. Yet, in a country where the army calls many political shots, perhaps he’s made too many enemies. And if he’s behind bars when Pakistanis vote in provincial elections this fall, will his fans remain silent?
A mock 10 baht banknote bearing an illustration of a yellow duck instead of the Thai king or his predecessor is pictured in Bangkok on Nov. 25, 2020.
Hard Numbers: Thai royal canard, Biden’s deficit plan, Japan’s gender pay gap, golden Odin, Greek walkout
2: Prepare to read the next sentence twice. A man in Thailand is facing two years in jail for selling calendars of … rubber ducks. The squeaky fowl has long been a symbol of the country’s pro-democracy movement, and since these birds were dressed in royal regalia, authorities say they insulted the monarchy. The country’s defamation laws have been used to convict 200 people since 2020.
2 trillion: With a partisan battle over the debt ceiling looming, President Joe Biden on Thursday is set to unveil a plan to reduce the federal budget deficit by $2 trillion over the next 10 years. Don’t expect Republicans to jump for joy though – the plan is expected to call for tax increases for the wealthy and corporations but won’t satisfy the GOP’s demands for spending cuts.
75: PM Fumio Kishida vowed yesterday to “work even harder” to tackle the massive gender pay gap in Japan, where women earn 75% of what men do for full-time work. The Land of the Rising Sun has ranked abysmally on the World Economic Forum’s gender parity report despite efforts by successive governments to tackle the issue.
1,500: Historians shouldn’t be too Thor about this. Scientists have uncovered the oldest-known reference to the Norse god Odin on a gold disc dating back 1,500 years. The ornamental pendant is part of a trove of gold found in Denmark in 2020, and its inscription, “He’s Odin’s man,” likely refers to an unknown lord or king.
60,000: At least 60,000 Greeks joined anti-government protests Wednesday, a week after a deadly train crash — blamed on years of underinvestment in infrastructure — killed 57 people. Most protesters were in Athens, where they marched to parliament chanting "murderers” in the biggest challenge to date to PM Kyriakos Mitsotakis.Will Japan grow its population before it's too late?
What if a hypothetical government, overtaxed by an aging, shrinking population, decided to ask its seniors to make the ultimate national sacrifice to voluntarily die?
That’s the premise of "Plan 75," a 2022 indie film that predicts a grim dystopian and not-too-distant future for a fictional Japan, where the elderly are offered compensation to submit to euthanasia and avoid being a burden to society when they turn 75.
Sure, it’s just a movie, but nowhere is more at risk of a demographic implosion than Japan. With a median age of 49, it’s the world's oldest country, and 28% of people are 65+. The nation of 125 million — whose annual births dropped below 800,000 for the first time in 2022, eight years earlier than forecasted — is expected to lose almost one-third of its population by 2060.
As its population shrinks, Japan’s government is running out of time. “It is now or never when it comes to policies regarding births and child-rearing,” PM Fumio Kishida said on Monday during a speech in parliament.
For the first time, he’s made reversing Japan’s declining fertility rate (1.38 births per woman) an urgent priority — as time-sensitive as doubling defense spending to counter military threats from China and North Korea.
Indeed, Kishida warned, “our nation is on the cusp of whether it can maintain its societal functions.” Within decades, the GDP of Japan, now the world’s third-largest economy, might contract to the point where it struggles to keep the lights on because it won’t have enough productive workers.
The declining births are a "huge pothole on Japan’s road to economic growth," says David Boling, Eurasia Group’s lead Japan analyst.
"It means Japan has to squeeze more and more productivity out of fewer and fewer people. Technology, artificial intelligence, and robotics can help gain back some of that lost productivity," he explains. "But it can only go so far.”
There are two ways to boost Japan's dismal birth rate from the domestic supply side. First, encourage couples to have more kids by paying them money. Second, support families with further economic benefits like paid parental leave or subsidized childcare. Kishida says he plans to double the national budget for families and create a new government agency to get Japanese to make more babies.
But "it’s not that simple," says Boling. "The government has provided financial incentives in the past and created a cabinet minister for dealing with the low birthrates. But the [births] continue to drop."
Meanwhile, Japanese women are giving birth less because fewer are getting married. Although that’s mostly due to more economic opportunities for them, many are also reluctant to tie the knot due to traditional domestic gender roles that put almost all the burden on women to take care of the house and kids.
There is something else Kishida could do that would actually fix the problem: welcome immigrants with families.
Unfortunately, for decades immigration has been a political taboo in Japan due to centuries of self-imposed isolation and a long-held defense of ethnic homogeneity among the right. Even an acute labor shortage in recent years has only resulted in slight relaxation of one of the world's strictest immigration policies.
"Rapidly increasing immigration would probably be the fastest way to reverse the population decline. But Japan resists that option," says Boling. For Japan to reverse course, he adds, "there must be a sea change in attitude about the benefits of immigrants."
Finally, Japan’s demographic erosion will be closely watched by its two East Asian neighbors, who view it as a cautionary tale they must avoid at all costs. China recently admitted its first population drop since 1961, while South Korea has reported the world’s lowest fertility rate for three years in a row.
If things really go south, would Japan implement Plan 75? Certainly not, but the director wouldn’t be too surprised if it did.
"After the film's release, I encountered the voice of people who strongly desire to have this option because they are afraid of their future living as the elderly," says Chie Hayakawa. "I feel that we Japanese are covered with [such a] sense of resignation and hopelessness [that we] cannot believe or expect our government to bring any solution to it."