We have updated our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for Eurasia Group and its affiliates, including GZERO Media, to clarify the types of data we collect, how we collect it, how we use data and with whom we share data. By using our website you consent to our Terms and Conditions and Privacy Policy, including the transfer of your personal data to the United States from your country of residence, and our use of cookies described in our Cookie Policy.
{{ subpage.title }}
Japan Prime Minister Fumio Kishida poses with U.S President Joe Biden as they are on the way to state dinner in Washington DC, U.S, on April 10, 2024.
Biden and Kishida bromance is meant to make Xi sweat
The White House showered Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida with gifts and honors during his state visit starting Wednesday, but the friendly display is aimed just as much at Beijing as it is Tokyo.
Kishida and Biden announced an upgrade to the longstanding US-Japan defense agreement on Wednesday that will make Japan’s military more agile by appointing a local US command and organizing a joint military-industrial production committee. The two will hold a trilateral meeting with Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. on Thursday to discuss further military cooperation.
“The US-Japan security alliance – even though it’s remarkably strong – is not well integrated and unified in a way where forces can rapidly respond,” says Eurasia Group Japan director David Boling, “The long-term goal is for a combined command, with deep force integration, that can respond lickety-split to emergency contingencies.”
A Paul Simonconcert over ribeye must be a nice change of atmosphere for Kishida, who is unpopular and struggling to put a lid on party scandals at home. One of the few areas where he does relatively well with voters is foreign policy, and Kishida has continued the augmentation of Japan’s armed forces while bolstering relations with South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines — all potential conflict zones with China.
Tokyo’s relationship with Manila has seen the greatest strides forward, including a new agreement that could see Japanese troops deployed to the archipelago.
“On the Philippines, Japan has recognized that any contingency that escalates into a kinetic conflict is going to immediately implicate Japan,” says Eurasia Group senior analyst Jeremy Chan. After all, many of the US troops and ships that would support the Philippines (or Taiwan or South Korea) are stationed in Japan, making US bases there tempting targets for China.
We’re watching for Beijing’s reaction to Thursday’s trilateral.
Thick plates of steel for use in construction and ship building are hot-rolled by machinery at the Nippon Steel Corp. Kimitsu steel mill in Kimitsu, Japan near Tokyo February 6, 2008.
Biden slams Nippon Steel deal — but Tokyo plays it cool
US President Joe Biden on Thursday came out against Japan’s largest steel producer acquiring Pittsburgh-based US Steel, saying America must “maintain strong American steel companies powered by American steelworkers.”
Nippon Steel made an offer worth over $14 billion in December, and shortly afterward the White House indicated it would be scrutinized by the Committee on Foreign Investments in the United States. For now, the deal is still on, but CFIUS review is usually reserved for deals involving companies from potential adversaries – not from trusted allies like Japan — and presidents rarely comment before the committee finishes.
But this is 2024. Biden and presumptive GOP nominee Donald Trump are battling over blue-collar workers in key swing states like Michigan and Pennsylvania in November. Trump promised to block the deal “instantaneously” during a meeting with Teamsters earlier this year, and Biden has never been shy to flex his union bona fides.
How does Tokyo feel? Discretion seems to be the better part of valor for Prime Minister Fumio Kishida.
“Tokyo understands that in love and politics, timing is everything and that the political timing of this deal is awful for Biden,” says Eurasia Group’s Japan analyst David Boling. “That doesn’t mean that Tokyo is happy that Washington is treating an ally this way. But it’s not putting up a big fuss.”
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un attends the groundbreaking ceremony for the construction of a factory in Songchon County, North Korea, February 28, 2024.
IAEA chief backs Japan-North Korea talks
International Atomic Energy Agency head Rafael Grossi said Tuesday that the UN body supports Japan’s efforts to hold a summit with North Korea to boost engagement, even if nuclear weapons aren’t on the agenda.
Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has said he is prepared to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un as he tries to bring back Japanese nationals abducted to North Korea between 1977 and 1983. Kim’s sister Kim Yo Jong, who holds considerable sway, indicated that Pyongyang would be open to talks with Japan last month.
Japan secured the release of five abductees in 2002, and of their children in 2004, but Pyongyang has since stonewalled. Of the 12 people Japan believes remain imprisoned, North Korea claims eight are dead and that four were never abducted.
Why the change of heart? Kim may be hoping to use the talks to muck up the growing closeness between Tokyo, Seoul, and Washington. The Supreme Leader has made significant rhetorical changes toward the South, renouncing the goal of reunification and referring to Seoul as “the main enemy.” Hawkish South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol wasn’t eager for rapprochement anyway, while the Biden administration has mostly ignored Pyongyang.
Only Kishida, facing an election expected this year amid sagging approval and scandals, has any reason to talk with Kim. A breakthrough on the emotional issue of abductees — even simply obtaining proof of life or death — could goose his numbers.Japan's Prime Minister Fumio Kishida speaks to media at the Prime Minister's office in Tokyo on Dec. 11, 2023
Kishida’s rough road
Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida faces several serious challenges. He must boost his country’s economy by protecting relations with both the United States and China. That means preparing his government for the risk that Donald Trump, the most confrontational of post-war presidents, will be elected president again next November. It also means resolving political and economic differences with Beijing outside the public eye.
But Kishida also faces a rough road at home. In particular, he must manage the fallout from a campaign finance scandal that has tarnished several senior members of his Liberal Democratic Party, aka LDP. We’re watching to see if Kishida fires some or all of those people from his government this week. We’re also tracking the impact of this scandal on his plummeting approval rating, which stands at 23%, according to Japan’s NHK. That’s the lowest score of his nearly 26 months on the job.
Continuing divisions within the opposition will likely keep the LDP in power for the foreseeable future. But Kishida’s future is far less clear. Failure to take forceful action could open up a power struggle within the party that could cost him a party leadership vote scheduled for September.
The Camp David summit
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi everybody. Ian Bremmer here and a Quick Take on the Camp David Principles, the historic meeting taking place in Camp David today between President Biden, the Japanese Prime Minister Kishida, and South Korean President Yoon. It's historic. It's a big deal. It's worth talking about. And frankly, I consider this to be the most significant successful piece of diplomacy of the Biden administration to date. It is roughly equivalent in my mind to the Abraham Accords of the Trump administration. In that case, this was leading to direct diplomatic engagement, opening relations between Israel, America's top ally in the region and the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco, other American allies in the region. With the Saudis, not signing, but certainly getting closer. It's important in part because it stabilized a region that matters to the United States. It also allows for better strategic coordination long-term, and it is broadly speaking, supported by both sides.
Biden had only positive things to say about the Abraham Accords, and in indeed, if we see a Saudi breakthrough that would happen in the context of those accords. Democrats, Republicans can all agree that this was a positive move for the United States in the region. So too, that is true of this breakthrough, the Camp David principles with the most important US ally in Asia, Japan, and South Korea. Another very important ally of the United States, probably the second most important, certainly when you look at the troops that the Americans have positioned there. The level of regular engagement of certainly of the exercises that occur, the level of economic, of military aid and technology transfer that occurs, all of that is pretty significant. Here you have a relationship that really should have been much better between Japan and South Korea, and hasn't been for a long time, improved in part because the South Korea-China relationship got so much worse when the South Koreans decided they needed their THAAD missile defense system from the United States to defend them against North Korea.
The Chinese took vigorous exception and put sanctions against the South Koreans and there was economic damage. The Communist Party supported major demonstrations against South Korea and that really changed the view on the ground. And since then, we now have an election with a South Korean president that is much more oriented towards the west, much more hawkish towards North Korea and China. And a Japanese prime minister that is much more willing to take risks internationally that may not play as well at home. A much softer and willingness to engage with the South Koreans than, for example, Prime Minister Abe had been. Put all of that together and Biden takes advantage of an opportunity in front of him. And what we now see will be annual summits going forward, a commitment to consult on any security threat, which is not the same as a commitment to defend, but a recognition that there will be coordination stepping up regular military exercises as well as the first ever trilateral security hotline being created.
Clearly this is all of a piece with growing US-led security architecture in Asia. We see it with AUKUS and the submarine deal with the Australians. We see it with the Quad and India becoming much closer with the United States and its allies, especially on national security related issues. We also see it with the routine and regular participation of Japan and South Korea in NATO summits. And indeed, going forward, I expect that there will be more willingness on the basis of Japan's working with South Korea now through these Camp David principles to open the Quad to South Korea participation. Canada may well be very interested in that too. All of which bodes well for America's reach and alignment of its standards and values with other countries. And something that I believe would also last beyond the Biden administration. I don't expect that Trump is going to have anything nice to say about Biden here.
It's not his style, but I do think that he would uphold if he were to become president these regular trilateral meetings. In other words, something as opposed to the Iranian nuclear deal as opposed to the failed effort to get the transpacific partnership, the Paris Climate Accord that is bounced around from one administration to the next. This is a piece of foundational architecture that can be built upon over time, in large part because the Japanese and South Koreans are themselves so deeply committed to it. The problem of course, is China. So much of the reason why you have the willingness to form this architecture around Asia is because of greater concerns that China is a national security threat. Some of that is driven by greater decoupling of national security related elements of the global economy away from China. When you're talking about the US and its allies, some of that is greater military confrontation over Taiwan in the South China Sea, in the East China Sea.
And that's happening at a time when the Chinese economy is performing very badly. Now, there's a big question in how Xi Jinping is going to react to all of this. It's a bad time economically for him to be getting into a bigger fight with the Americans and others. He needs as much economic stability and growth as he can get, but that doesn't mean that he's going to sit and take it. There are political stability issues. He doesn't want to be seen as weak. He and his advisors all believe that the Americans are trying to contain Chinese growth and they see all sorts of policies that are being put in place, particularly by the Americans that lend support to that belief. And as a consequence of that, I think we are likely to see at least some level of Chinese response and reaction. We'll see how much of that plays out at the BRICS summit up coming in South Africa.
We'll watch the Chinese statements very carefully there. But certainly all of this puts a very big focus on what is expected to be a Biden-Xi Jinping summit at APEC in San Francisco in November. I'm certainly planning on spending the week out there, assuming it happens. And at this point I do believe it's very likely. It is the one chance to see if you can try to stabilize a relationship that continues to deteriorate, despite all stated efforts by Biden and Xi Jinping otherwise. And the fact is that Xi Jinping has different expectations of that meeting than Biden does. I think the Chinese expect this is all but a state visit. Biden expects a very important working level meeting with none of the pomp and circumstance. Can that circle be squared? And if it can't, does that mean that the meeting is off? We'll see. We'll see. I'm still optimistic, but all of the news that we're seeing is only making it both more important and more challenging to pull that summit meeting off.
Anyway, that's it for me and I'll talk to you all real soon.
Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida.
Viewpoint: How Abe still casts a shadow over Kishida in Japan
Former Japanese PM Shinzo Abe was tragically gunned down one year ago. Yet he still casts a long shadow on Japanese politics and the agenda of current PM Fumio Kishida.
Last year, Kishida’s public approval ratings nosedived mainly because of controversies related to Abe, like the ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s ties to the Unification Church (or “Moonies”). Those ties go back decades to former PM Nobusuke Kishi, Abe’s grandfather. Since then, Kishida has regained his political footing. But when it comes to Japan’s national security, foreign affairs, and economic policies, Kishida still walks in Abe’s shadow. Or does he?
To get an idea of how this is all playing out, especially as Kishida mulls calling snap elections later this year, we sat down for a chat with David Boling, Eurasia Group’s lead Japan analyst.
What is Abe's main legacy on Japanese politics a year after his death?
He continues to exert outsized influence over day-to-day politics and policymaking.
At the time of his death, Abe was head of the largest faction, which now has 100 members, within the conservative LDP. That’s nearly double the size of the next largest faction. The caucus still bears his name, the “Abe faction,” and he remains the glue that holds them together. Even though a year has passed, they still can’t agree on a new standard bearer.
On policy, his vision outlives him too. Abe was a very controversial and provocative politician. He was edgy and relished a good fight. This made him unpopular and is the reason why most Japanese people opposed a state funeral for him — to the dismay of many foreign observers. But his policy vision transcends all that rancor. It might even be called mainstream now.
So as William Faulkner said, “The past is never dead. It’s not even past.”
What would Abe think of Kishida’s performance so far?
Abe would be happy to see that Kishida has supported increased defense spending, which is set to reach 2% of GDP by 2027. But he would question Kishida’s leadership abilities and not consider him conservative enough.
It’s worth remembering that before Abe was gunned down, he was positioning himself to make yet another run for prime minister. So Kishida certainly saw Abe as a political rival – you might even say they were “frenemies.” They were both LDP members and somewhat dependent on each other – Kishida had served nearly five years as Abe’s foreign minister. But they were suspicious of one another.
How has Kishida shaken off the controversy over the Moonies in the wake of Abe’s shooting?
Kishida took a huge beating in the polls last fall over the Unification Church scandal, even though Kishida himself had no personal connection to the church. It was Abe, members of his faction, and other LDP members who were chummy with the Moonies.
The controversy over LDP ties with the Moonies burned very hot but then fizzled out. In December, Kishida helped push through legislation to crack down on fundraising abuses by religious organizations. Since then, though, the issue has completely dropped out of opinion polling.
How has Kishida followed Abe’s playbook, and where has he distanced himself from his old boss?
Although he has sought to distance himself from “Abenomics” with his “new form of capitalism,” Kishida has stuck to Abe’s economic blueprint of big fiscal spending and ultra-loose monetary policy. That’s been a surprise.
On defense, Abe was a hawk. Kishida is a dove who has been mugged by the reality of China, North Korea, and Russia. So Kishida has become a supporter of spending more money on defense. He wants to raise taxes to pay for some of that increase, whereas Abe was fine just to pay for it with new debt.
Finally, the Japanese public sees amending the constitution to clarify the status of the self-defense forces as a low priority – as does Kishida – while it was a top priority for Abe.
How popular is Kishida today, and how much of a change/mandate is that for him moving forward?
Kishida’s popularity has been like a roller coaster. It was up at the beginning of his tenure. But it went down in the second half of last year to its lowest point. Then up from the beginning of this year through the G7 summit in Hiroshima. Now it’s heading down again.
Kishida is not as threatening as Abe, but his popular support does not run as deep either. The Japanese public has a “meh” attitude towards him. There’s a good chance he’ll dissolve the lower house and hold snap elections later this year, and those results will determine how much Kishida can do in the coming months.
Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida speaks during a news conference at the prime minister's office in Tokyo
Japan snap election speculation grows
Quick recap: Since Kishida took office in October of 2021, he has faced serious questions about his political viability. The period following last year’s assassination of former PM Shinzo Abe, which put a spotlight on the ruling party's ties with the controversial Unification Church, was particularly tough. That combined with high consumer prices had some polls at a sub-30% approval rating, an area known as the “danger zone” for Japanese prime ministers.
But Kishida’s approval ratings have soared in the wake of the G7 summit in Hiroshima in May. Kishida has also improved relations with South Korea and taken a hard line on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. “He has positioned himself as an international statesman,” says Boling, which in today’s world of heightened geopolitical risk has benefitted Kishida politically.
Even though official elections aren’t due for the lower house until late 2025, winning a snap election would solidify Kishida’s power before the end of his term as president of the Liberal Democratic Party in September 2024. So with his popularity on the rise, Boling thinks that Kishida could decide to “strike while the iron is hot” and capitalize on high public support by calling a snap election this summer.
But there is also a case for Kishida waiting to call the snap elections until later in the year, closer to the LDP presidential elections. “Kishida's real political threats are within his own party, not the opposition parties,” says Boling. By delaying, he increases his chances of retaining the party role because internal opponents will be more reluctant to challenge him.
Opposition lawmakers have threatened to submit a no-confidence vote before the parliamentary session ends on June 21, which could also trigger a snap election. While the opposition party, the Japan Innovation Party, is on the rise, Boling warns that “they need to be careful what they wish for” if they think a snap election would end in their favor. In a by-election in April, the LDP won four of the five seats up for grabs.
Kishida stoked the election rumors at a press conference on Tuesday over his government’s plan to reverse Japan's rapidly declining birth rate through childcare spending and tax incentives. When asked about a snap election, he did not deny that it was a possibility, instead noting that he was monitoring the political climate.
A G-7 sign, decorated with flowers, stands at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial in Japan.
G-7 leaders gather to chart next moves on Russia, China, other issues
The leaders of the industrialized nations that make up the G-7 will hold their annual meeting on May 19-21 in Hiroshima, Japan, a location of special significance at a time of intensifying great power competition. In the closing chapter of World War II, the US detonated an atomic bomb over the Japanese city, killing more than 100,000 civilians.
This year’s G-7 summit takes place as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and an increasingly assertive China test the resilience of the postwar order and make it more difficult to address transnational challenges such as climate change. We asked Eurasia Group experts Ali Wyne, Lívia Pereira, and David Boling what to expect.
What are the top items on the agenda for the summit?
Nuclear proliferation, climate change, and food insecurity will be prominent agenda items. Conversations about climate change and the clean energy transition will build on the G-7’s climate meeting last month. Special attention will be placed on the group’s proposed Just Energy Transition Partnership and the possibility of India’s adopting it. The G-7 countries are promoting this new template for financing climate change mitigation actions as a mechanism that will enable large emerging-market economies to diversify away from coal.
Food security talks will also take place, following a previous gathering this year of G-7 agricultural ministers. The focus will be on ensuring long-term food supplies by boosting both sustainable agricultural practices and technologically innovative ones.
What personal dynamics and narratives should we watch out for?
Observers will be looking to see how unified a stance the G-7 countries can present in their competition with an increasingly capable China and their efforts to close loopholes that have allowed Russia to blunt the impact of sanctions and continue its aggression against Ukraine.
Another dynamic to watch will be between G-7 leaders and Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who has recently argued that the US and Ukraine are partly to blame for Russia’s invasion and called for diversifying away from the dollar as the dominant global reserve currency. Still, Brazil is unlikely to make a hard pivot toward China that would fundamentally undercut its relations with the West; in fact, Lula is eager to finalize the EU-Mercosur trade agreement, which would deepen his country’s ties with the EU.
Finally, Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio and South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol will try to continue building trust, especially during a trilateral meeting with US President Joe Biden. Kishida and Yoon met in Seoul on May 7-8.
Japan dropped out of the cap on Russian oil because it’s more dependent on Russian energy than any other G-7 member. Is that a sign of disunity?
Japan has been very tough on enforcing sanctions against Russia, especially considering its long history of aversion to such measures. But its Sakhalin projects in Russia are critical to ensuring its energy supplies. Other G-7 countries understand that Japan — a country completely dependent on imported energy — needed some leeway, so its decision to drop out of the bloc’s cap has not caused disunity.
Nonetheless, there are tensions within the G-7 over policies toward China and Russia. France and Germany are more reluctant to weaken economic ties with China than the US. Following a recent visit to China, French President Emmanuel Macron said that Paris should not be a “vassal” of Washington, suggesting that he seeks to create some distance from the US. Moreover, the US has not gained traction for its proposal that G-7 countries ban all exports to Russia.
Japan has invited a number of countries from outside the G-7 to attend — which ones and why?
Eight other countries received an invitation. These include Australia, India, Indonesia, South Korea, and Vietnam, all linchpins of Japan’s efforts to promote “a free and open Indo-Pacific” that challenges China’s growing regional assertiveness. Brazil also received an invitation, in response to growing concerns in the West — especially the US — about its closer alignment with China. Finally, the G-7 countries recognize that it will be difficult to push back against China and Russia without greater support from developing countries — hence Japan’s invitations to the Cook Islands, which chairs the Pacific Islands Forum, and Comoros, which chairs the African Union.
Japan did not invite South Africa, a country that usually attends high-level multilateral summits, prompting speculation that the Comoros invitation was meant to signal disapproval of South Africa’s stance toward Russia. The two nations recently hosted joint military exercises, and South Africa has suggested that it is open to hosting Russian President Vladmir Putin in person at the upcoming BRICS summit in Durban, despite the International Criminal Court’s arrest warrant against him.
Most of these countries have so far refused to join G-7 sanctions on Russia. Why? Can the group do anything to change their mind?
Few non-G-7 countries share the view that the war between Russia and Ukraine is a struggle between autocracy and democracy with profound implications for the international system. Instead, seeing it as an enduring source of disruptions to food and energy markets, they question why they should deprive their populations of discounted grain and oil supplies from Moscow to uphold a “rules-based international order” that they feel has done little to address their development needs.
The summit has a special significance for Kishida, doesn’t it?
Kishida’s political base is Hiroshima, so hosting the summit there is a big domestic political win for him. He will enjoy around-the-clock Japanese press coverage during the event, which will likely boost his public approval rating. That rating hit a low point late last year but has been steadily improving this year. Given that expected boost, many observers predict that Kishida may capitalize on the G-7 momentum by dissolving the lower house and calling snap elections after the summit concludes.
Edited by Jonathan House, Senior Editor, Eurasia Group.