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Russia’s last independent pollster tells me how Putin does it
How does Vladimir Putin manage to keep this up? For all the destruction he’s visited on Ukraine, his invasion has also inflicted so much damage on Russia.
There are the financial and economic costs. There’s the diplomatic isolation. There’s the exodus of hundreds of thousands of Russians who’d rather bet on a future abroad than support Putin’s war for the past at home.
But above all, there are the dead. The Kremlin doesn’t announce casualty figures, but a running tally by the BBC and the independent Russian outlet Mediazona estimates that at least 45,000 Russian soldiers have been killed in Ukraine.
To put that in perspective, it’s triple the number of Soviets killed in the USSR’s decade-long invasion of Afghanistan, often described as the “Kremlin’s Vietnam.”
In fact, it surpasses the number of Soviet and Russian troops killed in the entire period between 1945 and 2022, a period that also includes the Kremlin’s hamfisted and initially disastrous bid to suppress Chechen separatists and jihadists in the 1990s. To put it in American terms, those 45,000 dead would amount to 100,000 flag-draped caskets in the United States.
And yet, there’s hardly been a peep from Russian society.
To find out why, I sent a note to Lev Gudkov in Moscow. Gudkov is the academic director of the Levada Center, Russia’s last remaining independent pollster. I last saw him in person in 2018, at his messy office on Nikolskaya Street – a ritzy pedestrian boulevard – that’s just a five-minute walk from the Kremlin, which has long considered Levada a “foreign agent.”
At 77, Lev has the weary, knowing demeanor of a man who has spent his life asking questions in a society that is increasingly wary of answering them.
The Kremlin has pressured Levada over the years but always seemed to allow it to continue its work. Even autocrats, after all, need to know what their people are comfortable saying to strangers.
“The people don’t know how many are dead and wounded,” he told me. More than 60% of Russians get their news primarily from state-controlled TV, which will shout at you about neo-Nazis in Kyiv, perverts who run Europe, or cats thrown from Russian trains – but will not tell you about the bodybags coming home from Ukraine.
People who do speak out about casualties are arrested, harassed or, on occasion, driven to suicide, which is what happened this week to a hawkish military blogger who suggested Russia had lost 16,000 troops in its recent campaign for a single Ukrainian town.
Another problem, to adapt a Vietnam-era protest line, is that the Russians dying in Ukraine “ain’t no Gazprom executive’s son.”
“The funerals are held by individual families,” says Gudkov, “and its overwhelmingly conscripts from marginalized social groups who don’t have the power to mobilize.”
A look at the casualty map bears this out. Young men in remote and relatively poor Russian provinces like Tuva or Buryatia, for example, are up to 45 times as likely to die as their counterparts in Moscow or St. Petersburg.
All of this makes perfect sense. Russians don’t know about the casualties, face huge consequences for trying to find out, and are victim to the propaganda mill that keeps support for Putin above 80% and approval of his war not far behind.
But blaming this sort of collective delusion simply on a Very Bad Autocrat™ is too easy. The reality is that it can happen in democracies too, and it does.
On the eve of the second anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, for example, I looked at a poll that showed 72% of the population approving of their government’s decision to launch a disastrous, unprovoked war.
But it wasn’t from Russia. It was from the US, and it was taken in 2003 to gauge popular support for the invasion of Iraq.
Say what you will about the failure of mainstream media to question the WMD narrative – and there is lots to say – but the US was, and is, a pluralistic paradise compared to today’s Russia.
But even so, it took four whole years of debacle in Iraq for a majority of Americans to finally decide that the invasion was a “bad decision.”
The emergence of social media in the years since has hardly helped. Nearly 20% of Americans today say pop star Taylor Swift was engaged in a Deep State psyop to sway the next election, while a third of Americans still think the last one was “stolen.” And as many as half of Hillary Clinton’s voters once believed Trump’s victory was the result of Russian tampering with vote tallies. None of the above is true.
The point is that you don’t actually have to live under the sway of a late-stage autocrat who controls the airwaves to believe bad, stupid, or crazy things.
A badly contaminated news environment can in some ways be as bad as a tightly controlled one.
2022: The trouble with autocrats
The three big international politics stories of this year – Russia’s war on Ukraine, the uprisings in Iran, and China’s bid to lockdown COVID – have something basic in common: All are the result of authoritarian leaders who’ve painted themselves into dangerous corners, and they all sit atop political systems that make these kinds of crises inevitable.
Putin’s war
Russia’s Vladimir Putin has isolated himself from dissenting voices in his country and within his government, and it appears that many senior state officials and military leaders were surprised when he ordered the invasion of Ukraine last February.
Then, Putin himself was surprised to learn that billions supposedly invested in military modernization in recent years had been stolen or wasted, leaving his armed forces entirely unfit for purpose.
And because the Russian state sharply restricts the flow of accurate information within the country and criminalizes dissent, anxious Russians are now prey to every new rumor of a pending mobilization that might send more young Russians into a military meat grinder.
The result: The lack of accurate information flowing up or down the Russian system allowed Putin to start a war he can’t finish – with resulting damage to Russia’s economy, military, and political standing that will last for decades. Yet, the world pays a heavy price with the loss of Ukrainian and Russian lives, with higher energy and food prices triggered by the war, and with money and resources devoted to the conflict that might have been invested in human potential.
Iran’s insurrection
Since the in-custody death of a young woman arrested by the Islamic Republic’s morality policefor wearing her headscarf improperly, nationwide anti-regime protests have spread. Iran’s clerical establishment, led by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, has responded to the protests mainly with brutal repression, including public executions.
Here’s a government that bases its right to rule on a revolution that an increasingly small minority of Iranians are old enough to remember. It’s a regime isolated from its own people, threatened by public dissent, and unwilling to offer citizens more than token concessions. The public unrest continues.
Xi’s lockdown
China’s Xi Jinping, who has amassed more personal power within China than any leader in half a century, insists the Chinese Communist Party has helped his country avoid the COVID carnage suffered in Western democracies. To do this, the state has sharply restricted the movement of hundreds of millions of people, compromised their privacy, and forced them into constant testing and sometimes quarantine. China’s economy has taken a severe hit, but far fewer people have died in China than have succumbed to COVID in America and Europe.
But the lockdown could never be sustained indefinitely, and it has now been abruptly relaxed – without a clear plan to manage the deadly fallout. Because Xi insists on the superiority of the Chinese system, his government remains unwilling to accept mRNA vaccines developed in the West that might better protect China’s people now that the lockdown policy has become unsustainable and the virus is suddenly freer to travel.
And because Xi’s power is built atop a perception of infallibility – “Xi Jinping thought” is now enshrined as a guiding principle in China’s constitution – it’s been impossible for the state to acknowledge the error and to reverse course in ways that limit post-lockdown damage from the virus.
Finally, as in Russia, tight state control of information creates fertile ground for dangerous rumormongering within China and undermines the Chinese government’s credibility abroad.
Looking ahead
The history of the world shows us that democratic governments are certainly capable of dumb decisions that inflict terrible harm on others, but 2022 reminds us that when dictatorships create crises, they tend to be much harder to resolve.
In Russia, Iran, and China, there is no credible opposition capable of calling these leaders to account, in some cases saving them and their people from their own bad decisions. In none of them is there a free press capable of giving leaders an accurate picture of conditions inside their country or even within their governments. There are no independent voices to provide accurate information to help citizens navigate a crisis. There are no checks in place to prevent these governments from making matters worse.
In 2023, unable to win his war or admit he’s made a mistake, Putin will make matters worse for Russia, Ukraine, and the entire global economy by continuing the conflict.
As an aging Supreme Leader brings Iran closer to a potentially dangerous political transition, Iran may face even bigger disruptions ahead.
Because there was never a credible exit strategy from Xi’s zero-COVID policy, the virus will probably infect large numbers of Chinese citizens, mutate an untold number of times, produce new variants, and then cross borders. Chinese hospitals, the global economy, and everyone infected with these variants, inside and outside China, will pay the price.
The combination of near-absolute power, demand for near-perfect political control, and the distortion of open information that goes with them will be with us through the new year and beyond.
Putin signs up for MBS' Masterclass
How do you launch a destructive war, violate human rights, and still manage to be friends with the "West"? One man knows, and Russia's president wants answers.
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Which authoritarian is “best of the worst”? Gideon Rachman's favorite strongman
Gideon Rachman, chief foreign affairs columnist at the Financial Times, has just published a new book about autocrats, so Ian Bremmer puts him on the spot on GZERO World.
Which one appeals to you the most?
"That is difficult. I wouldn't say ... I'm running desperately through my head," says Rachman, before settling on one autocrat he's not a fan of but concedes is at least "an interesting figure."
Clues: He leads a very populous country, comes from humble beginnings, and Rachman believes he's not personally corrupt like other strongmen.
Watch the GZERO World episode: The politics of resentment & how authoritarian strongmen gain power.
How bananas demonstrate globalization
If globalization were a fruit, it might be a banana. But while bananas are still popular, globalization not as much lately.
In recent years, part of the pushback against globalization has been led by autocrats who reject things like free trade and the liberal international order.
For them, globalization means losing control, which they don't like one bit. But the world today remains more interconnected than ever, particularly in cyberspace.
So, do they want less globalization, or rather a version that fits their narrative?
Watch the GZERO World episode: The politics of resentment & how authoritarian strongmen gain power.
Power from demonizing the “other”: the FT's Gideon Rachman on “strongmen”
Autocrats know resentment against minorities is always a good pitch to fire up the base.
Gideon Rachman, chief foreign affairs columnist for the Financial Times, explains this common tactic taken by strongmen leaders around the world, in a discussion with Ian Bremmer on GZERO World.For example, India's Narendra Modi, China's Xi Jinping, and the European far right have all built domestic support using negative sentiment against Muslim minorities.
But the European strongmen have not behaved the same way with Ukrainian migrants. Why?
"It's pointless to deny that people are more likely to feel compassion for people who maybe look a bit like them," Rachman tells Bremmer.
Watch the GZERO World episode: The politics of resentment & how authoritarian strongmen gain power.
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- Podcast: How discontent with globalization has fueled authoritarian ... ›
- The politics of resentment & how authoritarian strongmen gain power ›
The politics of resentment & how authoritarian strongmen gain power
In recent years, part of the pushback against globalization has been led by autocrats who reject things like free trade and the liberal international order.
For them, globalization means losing control, which they don't like one bit. But the world today remains more interconnected than ever, particularly in cyberspace. So, do they want less globalization, or rather a version that fits their narrative?
On GZERO World, Ian Bremmer speaks to Gideon Rachman, the chief foreign affairs columnist for the Financial Times who knows a thing or two about Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, and Donald Trump, and has just written a book about strongmen.
Rachman explains why resentment at minorities motivates both autocrats and their supporters, why strongmen use emotions to justify their nationalism and protectionism, and why Narendra Modi is the least bad of them right now.
Bonus: the global food crisis hits ... fish and chips.
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Podcast: How discontent with globalization has fueled authoritarian "strongmen"
Listen: As inflation, including as seen in rising food and commodity prices, destabilize global systems, strong leadership will appeal to more people. Part of the pushback against globalization has been led by autocrats who reject ideas like free trade and the liberal international order. Globalization is seen to equate losing control. But the world today remains more interconnected than ever. So, do those expressing discontent want less globalization, or rather a version that fits their narrative? And, after two years of unrelenting pandemic, continued rise in global temperatures, and a war in Ukraine that is not ending, has globalization benefited the world?
On the GZERO World Podcast, Ian Bremmer speaks to Gideon Rachman, chief foreign affairs columnist for the Financial Times, who knows a thing or two about the likes of Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, or Donald Trump, and has just written a book about strongmen. Rachman explains why resentment at minorities motivates both autocrats and their supporters, why strongmen use emotions to justify their nationalism and protectionism, and why Narendra Modi is the least bad of them right now.
Subscribe to the GZERO World Podcast on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Stitcher, or your preferred podcast platform, to receive new episodes as soon as they're published.TRANSCRIPT: How discontent with globalization has fueled authoritarian "strongmen"
Gideon Rachman:
A lot of these strongman appeals are sort of emotionally linked issues. So globalization and migration are not exactly the same thing, but they're related and they're to do with a sense of loss of control of the nation. That we have this nation that kind of, to some extent controlled its own destiny and now it's part of this big globalized economy. And jobs are being shipped away and disappearing, and our borders are crumbling. That sort of emotionally it is of appease.
Ian Bremmer:
Hello and welcome to the GZERO World Podcast. This is where you'll find extended versions of my interviews on public television, Ian Bremmer and on today's show is globalization. That economic, social, and political web that's connected the world for decades, on the way out? And is the era of the strongman leader here to stay? After two years of an ever-evolving pandemic and months into a war in Ukraine that shows no sign of stopping, the global order feels more fragmented than ever. But is it?
I'm joined by the Financial Times, Gideon Rachman, who just wrote a book on the world's strongmen. Let's do this.
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Ian Bremmer:
Gideon Rachman. Great to be with you man.
Gideon Rachman:
Good to be with you.
Ian Bremmer:
We've known each other for decades.
Gideon Rachman:
I know.
Ian Bremmer:
Generations.
Gideon Rachman:
It's getting on for that. Yeah.
Ian Bremmer:
Yeah. You've had like 15 years at The Economist and now 15 years at the FT, where you're the Chief Global Correspondent.
Gideon Rachman:
Foreign affairs commentator, something like that.
Ian Bremmer:
You're the lead global guy. And your new book, The Age of the Strongman, and a little depressing and we're all watching it happen and not in the sense that the populism is happening. We've seen those grassroots issues and the impact and reaction to globalization, but now we're talking about the individuals themselves, their consolidation of power, their nationalism, and their ability to undermine the institutional structures and frameworks in the countries. Tell me what of the structural factors that are making this happen, what's the one that you think is hardest to turn around?
Gideon Rachman:
Well, I think probably the one that's hardest to turn around is, how do I put it, mass migration. I think resentment at minority groups is often a big pitch for these strongman leaders. It's really striking that obviously Trump, when he came in was to sort of build the wall and even attempted to ban all Muslims from entering the United States.
Ian Bremmer:
That was the first thing he tried to do.
Gideon Rachman:
Indeed. But if you look at Modi in India, it's a very majoritarian, it's Hindu nationalism, really more even than Indian nationalism and aimed to a considerable extent at the Muslim minority. In China, they've in interned a million Uyghurs and again, it's a sort of majoritarian thing. And in Europe, I think a lot of the kind of far right figures are campaigning on the idea that the nation is at risk because of social change and migration. And yet I think migration in mixed societies are kind of the way of the world and we all have to get used to it and learn to look at the benefits of it. But there's a very sort of strong generation of strongman leaders who are finding, it's a very fertile theme for them. And so, you know, could say inequality is another driver, but it's easier to think of, well, there are economic policies, adjustments you can make to make, I mean, it's hard, but you could imagine the policy adjustments that would deal with that set of resentments.
Ian Bremmer:
But if you can demonize those people.
Gideon Rachman:
Exactly right, demonizing those people is kind of key for a lot of these strongman leaders. And those people aren't going anywhere unless you do something really kind of horrific, like a mass internment.
Ian Bremmer:
Now, it's interesting that in the case of Ukraine, we are seeing these mass numbers of migrants coming into Europe and coming into countries that have some strongman leaders and that hasn't driven them, even though they're clearly outsiders, but they're European outsiders. Is that enough?
Gideon Rachman:
Well, I think the European outsiders thing does matter. I mean, it's pointless to deny that people are more likely to feel compassion for people who maybe look a bit like them, whose lives look a bit similar and so on. Even in London, we would watch the videos from Ukraine and say, "Boy, their flats don't look so different from our flats. They're walking the dog like we are. It doesn't look like Yemen or Tigre, which seems that much further away." And I think it is there is something human mean. Why do they say the Arab world is particularly upset by the Palestinian issue more than the rest of the world? Because they feel a closeness to them. So I don't think it's that surprising that if you are Poland, even if you've been very resentful or fearful of migrations of Muslims, which really isn't happening even in Poland, but the Ukrainians are next door neighbors, plus I think they feel what's happening to them could happen to us. There's a common sense of threat about Russia.
Ian Bremmer:
One of the stats that always struck me, and I'm sure you've seen it, is when you ask Europeans how many Muslims actually are in your population? And the guesses are between five and sometimes 20 X what the numbers actually are because that demonization works so effectively in the politics.
Gideon Rachman:
Absolutely. And I think in France for example, actually they don't even know because the census doesn't count them-
Ian Bremmer:
Doesn't count them. Yeah.
Gideon Rachman:
... Because it's part of a sort of ideological thing. But yeah, absolutely. I think that people feed off anecdote and maybe in big cities the populations of immigrants of all sorts of Muslims and others are quite visible and so on. But it was interesting say in the UK during the Brexit referendum that the areas of the country that felt most strongly about immigration were probably the areas that had least of it. It was something that was going on in people's heads rather than London, which is a massively migrant city. I think now almost 40% of the population of London was born overseas. And if you count people like me whose parents were born overseas, you're getting up to 80%. It's extraordinary. But it voted very strongly to remain in the EU, which was the sort of pro-migration vote. Whereas areas that had less migration were much more suspicious of it.
Ian Bremmer:
Now since we're talking about migration, of course at some point you get to a tipping point in the United States, we expect the country demographically to become minority white by 2045. Now, a lot of people would presume that at some point you just don't have the numbers anymore to continue a strongman policy that's focusing on aggravated, undereducated, white men. Do you buy that? Do you think that this trajectory is just going to break at some point demographically?
Gideon Rachman:
Well, specifically in the US? Well, it would be nice to believe it, but I think that the Democrats may have put rather too much faith in that idea. Because I mean, one of the interesting things is the growth of the Hispanic vote for Trump.
Ian Bremmer:
For Trump.
Gideon Rachman:
Exactly. And so a lot of his rhetoric about illegal migration might appeal to legal migrants who say, well, I've come here legally or-
Ian Bremmer:
And some of that in Germany too.
Gideon Rachman:
Yeah. Absolutely. And in the UK, I speak to recent Indian migrants and so on who will say, well, "You can't have all these illegal people coming in." So it's a complicated issue. I mean, it's not a given that there won't be some minority support for Trumpism, I mean, I think we're actually seeing evidence to the contrary because provided it steers clear of pure racism, overt racism, and says that, "It's Americans first, the Americans who are here rather than the outsiders," I think that can appeal to recent migrants as well.
Ian Bremmer:
And do you see this as fundamentally hand in glove with a fragmentation of globalization that will also continue?
Gideon Rachman:
I think it's very closely related. Yeah. Because I think that a lot of these strongman appeals are emotionally linked issues. So globalization and migration are not exactly the same thing, but they're related and they're to do with a sense of loss of control of the nation, that we had this nation that to some extent controlled its own destiny, and now it's part of this big globalized economy and jobs are being shipped away and disappearing, and our borders are crumbling. That's emotionally, it is of appease. And so America First contains a migration element, but it also contains a very strong element of protectionism saying, "Bring the jobs back," et cetera. And then if you look at some other things that are happening in the world that aren't strictly related to it, but that feed in like the pandemic, which suddenly makes people focus on the fragility of supply chains and goodness, does it make total sense to have whatever, I can't remember the precise stat, but 80% of our personal protective equipment made in China. So those kinds of arguments are also coming in, plus the growing geopolitical rivalry where people begin to, even on the kind of liberal pro-globalization and economics, begin to say it doesn't make sense to be this dependent on a country that may be an adversary. And we've seen with Russia that actually an economic relations which were built up, which we thought probably unbreakable-
Ian Bremmer:
The Europeans, which the Europeans thought.
Gideon Rachman:
Yeah. Absolutely.
Ian Bremmer:
Americans did not, yeah.
Gideon Rachman:
... actually get broken by geopolitics. And so obviously people begin to think, well, might that happen with China?
Ian Bremmer:
Interesting. Of course, though, that is only happening with the advanced industrial democracies in Russia. It's not happening at all with the developing countries in Russia, even though those features of nationalism, protectionalism are found in those countries too.
Gideon Rachman:
Yeah, absolutely. I mean, think it's one of the most interesting things about this crisis is that our initial assumption in the West was, "Whoopee, we've united the world against Russia." And then you look around-
Ian Bremmer:
No, you haven't.
Gideon Rachman:
And no, you haven't. And actually, I mean this stat that at the UN 50% of the world's population did not vote. Okay. I mean that's partly because India and China, about 40%, but significant countries that you would classify as democracies ...
Ian Bremmer:
Mexico, Indonesia-
Gideon Rachman:
... Mexico, Brazil, or South Africa, all abstaining. And I think it's for complex reasons, but I point to a couple, I mean, one is that they will say, look, you are so horrified by what's happening in Ukraine, but America invaded Iraq, there was a lot of people killed there, and there are other terrible violence going on that's not getting the headlines. So they'll say, you're being a bit hypocritical.
Ian Bremmer:
And there's some truth to that.
Gideon Rachman:
Yeah, absolutely. It's not an easy argument to completely dismiss. And they will also say, "Oh, and by the way, these sanctions that you are imposing will have a cost on us because it's raising the price of energy, the price ...
Ian Bremmer:
Well, the Europeans still buy gas.
Gideon Rachman:
... the price of food." Yeah, exactly. And I think also there's a geopolitical thing that at some level they don't really want to go back to a unipolar world. So they think if the US actually does effectively crush Russia or cut them off from the world, then even if we don't approve of what Putin's doing, he's kind of another option in the way that China's another option. And they think, well, maybe one day the US will disapprove of us and they will do the same to us.
Ian Bremmer:
So Gideon, unfair question to you, but I'm really interested in your answer because you're a guy that likes rule of law. You support globalization, free trade, all these things, with caveats. But of the strongmen leaders out there, who's the one that actually kind of appeals to you the most?
Gideon Rachman:
Gosh, that is difficult. I wouldn't say I'm running desperately through my head. I certainly don't like Putin for obvious reasons ...
Ian Bremmer:
Not who you don't, no, come on.
Gideon Rachman:
I'm waiting for one to come up that I can think I can approve of. Putin? No. Erdogan? No. Erdogan, a friend of mine has just been imprisoned for 18 years.
Ian Bremmer:
Well, that'll make you like him less. That's true.
Gideon Rachman:
Yeah.
Ian Bremmer:
I mean, no, not the friend, I mean Erdogan.
Gideon Rachman:
Xi? I can't say I'm particularly fond of. Who are we getting to, Modi? I think is an interesting figure. I mean, I actually increasingly think he's a sinister figure, but you can make a case that he is elected, he is genuinely popular. He is trying to mobilize a sense that India's on the move, is modernized and so on. And he hasn't done, the kind of worst fears about Modi have not yet been realized. There hasn't been mass communal violence or mass imprisonment, although people are concerned about it. But I think he's had a pretty negative effect on media freedom. People are a little worried about the courts in India, so it's hard to say he's entirely positive. But Boris Johnson, I was attacked for including in the book, and it was a slightly marginal call, but I think Brexit and Trump are linked phenomena. So I to, I felt that you had to kind of discuss it. Bolsonaro is a kind of bit of a joke really. It's hard to say he's a-
Ian Bremmer:
So Modi's the one that potentially appeals to you the most?
Gideon Rachman:
Yeah. But I wouldn't say even that.
Ian Bremmer:
But because he's standing up for India on the global stage? Because his economic policies have been more successful? Where is it that you'd give him credit? Where is it that you'd say, yeah, I kind of get that?
Gideon Rachman:
Look, I mean, I have to say, I'm not a fan of the guy.
Ian Bremmer:
No, I get it.
Gideon Rachman:
But I think that-
Ian Bremmer:
But no one's the villain of their own story. So I mean, when you write a book like this, you want to try to understand the narrative. And when you do that, sometimes you say, okay, I see that. Or yeah, that kind of resonates with me.
Gideon Rachman:
Okay, I think another thing you could say about Modi, and one of the reasons that he's popular, and actually one of the reasons why I think I mistakenly said in 2014 he was worth a try, and I now slightly regret having said that, but actually even Obama said that, in 2015, he was writing essays about what a great guy ...
Ian Bremmer:
And said, we should let him in.
Gideon Rachman:
Yeah. Exactly.
Ian Bremmer:
And you remember because he was on the blacklist and then they said, no, no, no, we're going to give him a visa to enter into the US.
Gideon Rachman:
Yea exactly, and said, I think he said something like, he represents the promise of a new India and all that. And I think the fact that he has come from genuinely humble background is-
Ian Bremmer:
He isn't corrupt. Personally.
Gideon Rachman:
He isn't personally corrupt. And also there was something a little odd that you had endless PMs from the Gandhi, Naru dynasty in this country of 1.3 billion people that the ruling elite was seemed to be such a narrow group of people. And I think that he's an unusual Indian leader, that he's genuinely come from the low- middle-class, and he obviously has a rapport with huge numbers of Indians. And I think that one of the arguments you can make about populism and the relationship with strongman leaders to populism is that people like me can sort of say effectively, "this is sinful." You know, "You shouldn't go anywhere near it." But they are actually identifying real sentiments out there.
Ian Bremmer:
Real demand, real grievance.
Gideon Rachman:
Absolutely. And they are often right that the globalist elite of which the two of us epitomize, are out of touch. They get something. So it was interesting ahead of the French election where people thought Le Pen might be the first female strongwoman. And I was talking to a French political analyst who again, was not going to vote for Le Pen, but he said, look, "The far right has been building and building and building in France over 20, 30 years ..."
Ian Bremmer:
And he did again in the last election.
Gideon Rachman:
... and just keep going. And he said, "Maybe in a democratic system, ultimately they have to be given a try." I'm not sure I agree, because I think that if they gave them a try ...
Ian Bremmer:
They can do a lot of damage.
Gideon Rachman:
But they say one man, one vote, one time that they can damage the system irretrievably. But that is an argument that these leaders often are popular and you've got to ask yourself why?
Ian Bremmer:
Well, there's another argument of course, which is that if you see these movements growing as a responsible leader that believes in rule of law, if you don't do anything and take the bold, courageous, maybe steps that will get you voted out to actually start providing for disenfranchised people in your country, then you are ultimately responsible for the rise of the strongman.
Gideon Rachman:
Yeah, no, and I think that democratic or liberal leaders face a series of dilemmas about what parts of these agenda should I actually try to deal with and appropriate and so on. You can see it on migration where countries like Australia and Denmark, for example, have adopted very draconian migration policies that would've appalled liberal opinion 10, 15 years ago. And do still to some extent, but I think because they say, well, this is what our populations want, and if we don't do it, somebody else, some more extreme will take up the banner. So the Danish government has adopted quite a lot of the policies that used to be labeled far right. The Australians they intern people on off-shore islands. And yeah, it's a policy which-
Ian Bremmer:
Biden on immigration. Yeah. Absolutely.
Gideon Rachman:
I mean the family breakup's still going on.
Ian Bremmer:
Absolutely. I remember when those, that bus for the kids and the migrants and the photos that were first shown when Trump was president, and the only problems that turned out the photos were from the Obama administration, but precisely because these leaders understand that there's just no way. Yeah, we saw what happened to Merkel on that issue.
Gideon Rachman:
Well, actually she did survive.
Ian Bremmer:
But it was the biggest hit she took.
Gideon Rachman:
Oh, totally. And the subsequent election, I remember talking to officials of her and they said the atmosphere, her rallies were so ugly, you know that you often couldn't hear her speak because of the sort of anti-Merkel chanting in the background.
Ian Bremmer:
Gideon Rachman. The book is The Age of the Strongman, and it's just out and you can buy it and you should. Good to see you.
Gideon Rachman:
Man. Thank you very much, Ian.
Ian Bremmer:
That's it. For today's edition of the GZERO World Podcast, like what you've heard, come check us out at gzeromedia.com and sign up for our newsletter Signal.
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