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Syria'n President Bashar Assad
Once frozen out, Bashar Assad is back in
Over the past decade, few Arab leaders have been willing to go anywhere near Syrian dictator Bashar Assad. Sure, he managed to hold on to a few friends – like Iran and Russia – but for the most part, the Syrian president, broadly dubbed “The Butcher” for waging a war on his own people, has been considered persona non grata by regional bigwigs.
But Assad is now being embraced by many who had once vowed to continue treating him as a pariah. In recent weeks, Assad enjoyed the royal treatment when he attended an Arab League summit in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, for the first time in over a decade, while a top Syrian official also rubbed shoulders with international diplomats at a World Health Organization summit in Geneva last week.
In a big win for Assad, the Syrians have also been invited to attend the COP28 climate summit in Abu Dhabi later this year, giving renewed meaning to what many have called the Age of Impunity.
To be clear, this development is not so much a reflection of collective amnesia as it is of Realpolitik. Grappling with changes at home and abroad, many Arab states are now betting that embracing Assad will better serve their respective political and economic aims. But at what cost?
Recap: Assad was never supposed to rule. The second son of Syria’s longtime despotic leader, Hafez Assad, Bashar was summoned back from the UK in 1994 after his elder brother – the rightful heir – was killed in a car crash. Bashar, who trained as an ophthalmologist, ultimately took over as head of the government and military when his father died in 2000.
But the younger Assad failed to amass the widespread loyalty enjoyed by his father, and he exploited sectarian tensions to solidify his rule. In true authoritarian style, Bashar Assad, who belongs to the Alawi ethnoreligious minority, elevated loyalists from his clan and purged those deemed disloyal.
Then in 2011, he launched a brutal crackdown against mostly peaceful protesters encouraged by the Arab Spring. What started as violent suppression morphed into a civil war that to date has killed more than 500,000 people and displaced around 13 million – half of which remain in Syria.
Images of heaps of dead children frothing at the mouth from sarin gas poisoning have become a symbol of Assad’s depravity after he used chemical weapons hundreds of times during the war.
In an alliance led by the US, Gulf states poured millions of dollars into propping up Syrian opposition forces. So why are some of them now bucking their own investment?
Riyadh’s change of heart. One of the most consequential shifts paving the way to normalization with Assad has come from Saudi Arabia. While the Saudis were once one of the most vociferous anti-Assad choruses – they didn’t much appreciate Assad accusing them of birthing ISIS – the de facto Saudi leader Mohammed bin Salman recently kissed Assad’s cheeks as greeted him at the Arab summit on Saudi home turf.
There are several reasons for this change of heart, which is likely linked to the belief that regional instability undermines Riyadh’s grand economic ambitions of diversifying the economy away from hydrocarbons. Regional de-escalation, according to the Saudis, is key to luring the investment needed to get new industries off the ground and also helps explain why the kingdom recently (sort of) patched things up with archnemesis Iran.
Consider that upon assuming the role of defense minister (2015) and crown prince (2017), MBS adopted a pugnacious approach to foreign policy, as demonstrated by having launched a war in Yemen, ordered the slaying of a prominent journalist, and conducted a blockade of Qatar. But it now appears that the de facto Saudi leader has reasoned that this approach hasn’t necessarily yielded great results and that de-escalating tensions across the region will better serve his political and economic ambitions.
The recent devastating earthquake in southern Turkey and northern Syria provided the Saudis a reasonable opening to formally begin engaging with Assad on humanitarian grounds.
For Riyadh, it is also about asserting itself as a regional – and global – leader capable of fixing intractable issues that others can’t.
“Saudi Arabia wants to steal the thunder from the UEA and Turkey over who’s the mediator here and who's taking the lead on addressing the core issues in the Middle East,” says Qutaiba Idlbi, a senior fellow and Syria project manager at the Atlantic Council. For MBS, it is as much about sending a message to regional competitors – and to the US – about Saudi’s diplomatic bonafides as it is about stabilizing Syria itself.
Once Riyadh, arguably the most influential player in the Arab world, jumped on board, several states appeared more comfortable backing Assad’s reintegration into the Arab League, a largely toothless but symbolic regional bloc. Meanwhile, others, like the Jordanians, say that while they are open to the idea they want to see tangible concessions from Assad first.
Returning refugees. Syria’s civil war has given rise to one of the world’s largest refugee crises. Around 3.6 million Syrians remain in Turkey, followed by hundreds of thousands in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt. Turkey, in particular, has made no secret of the fact that it wants to return millions of refugees back to Syria, a populist message so resonant with voters that even Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the mild-mannered opposition figure who just ran and narrowly lost to populist President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, recently joined the chorus of those calling for Syrians to be repatriated.
Jordan and Egypt, both facing deep economic pressures at home, have also emphasized the need to strengthen Syria’s economy to facilitate refugee returns from neighboring countries.
Beating the drug habit. Blocked off from financial markets and searching for alternative revenue streams, Syria has emerged as the Middle East’s foremost narcostate. The regime’s star product, captagon, a speed-like amphetamine, has been funneled throughout Lebanon, Jordan, the Gulf, and beyond. Consider that more than 250 million captagon pills have been seized around the world so far this year. Meanwhile, a UK government report revealed that the Syrian drug trade is worth roughly three times that of all the Mexican cartels combined.
And the ripple effects are reverberating throughout the region. In Jordan, for instance, drug-related crimes are now the most common offenses and are causing what authorities have labeled a youth epidemic. This is such a high-stakes issue that Jordan last month launched air strikes inside … Syria, targeting a high-profile drug smuggler.
The Assad regime, for its part, recently pledged to crack down on the drug scheme, but it’s hard to take it at its word given that Assad cronies run the trade and make a mint from the stuff to the tune of more than $5.7 billion in 2021. The US, for its part, recently sanctioned two of Bashar Assad’s cousins for involvement in drug trafficking.
But at the end of the day, there’s no greater unifying force than a mutual aversion to democracy. “Ending the Arab Spring and the democracy movement’s aspirations in the Arab world” is a common theme for many Arab states in reaching out to Syria, Idlbi says. He points out that “Syria remains the only open chapter where rebels or revolutionaries still have a say in what's happening and have geopolitical support.”
Rebuilding Syria. Many analysts have claimed that Arab states are also vying for lucrative building contracts in war-ravaged Syria, but Idlbi isn’t convinced.
“There’s no appetite to invest money without a vision of return,” Idlbi says. What’s more, he adds, many governments still don’t trust Assad and fear that if they do step in to build up the country’s water, power, and agriculture systems, Assad could turn around and nationalize these companies once the country is in a more stable position.
Other interested parties. Syria is a crucial part of Iran’s “axis of resistance” against Israel and the US, used as a hub to manufacture and transfer advanced military equipment to Hezbollah in Lebanon and other proxies. Indeed, Riyadh’s acceptance of Assad as Syria’s rightful leader signals at least a tacit acceptance on the part of Arab states of Tehran’s presence there and of its role as a key regional actor more broadly.
For Russia, any move that reinforces the region’s new security structure, whereby Arab states appear to be prioritizing political pragmatism over sectarian struggle (and in the process further diluting US influence in the region) is arguably a win.
But not everyone is on board with Assad. In the Arab world, Qatar and Kuwait have rejected bilateral ties with Syria, while the EU and US also appear committed to the ongoing isolation of Assad. Still, it is notable that a US official recently urged Arab states to “get something for that engagement,” a rare acknowledgment that Assad’s reintegration into regional affairs is essentially a done deal.
So what does that tell us about the US’ commitment to Syria? For Washington, which still has troops in the rebel-held northeast, “the current situation in Syria is the solution,” Idlbi says, referring to the fact that while Assad continues to rule over much of the country, the northeast and northwest are controlled by anti-regime opposition forces. And as the Biden administration focuses its attention across the Pacific, “Washington seems to be going with a sort of ‘you touch it you own it’ approach.”
In the meantime, Assad’s fortune is no doubt sending a clear message to other dictators and autocrats around the world that if you stick it out long enough, good things might just come your way.
A woman reacts while embracing another person, near rubble following an earthquake in Hatay, Turkey.
Tragedy upon tragedy in war-torn Syria
Days after a devastating 7.8-magnitude earthquake hit southern Turkey and northern Syria, the window for rescuing victims buried in the rubble is closing. Rescue efforts – and survival prospects – are being further challenged by freezing weather conditions.
The death toll has now surpassed 11,000 – and that number will certainly rise. Thousands remain missing, and nearly 400,000 have been moved to government shelters or hotels. Some 4 million Syrians in northern Syria alone were already displaced and relying on humanitarian support.
Tragically, this crisis compounds existing regional calamities, particularly for war-torn Syria, that make recovery efforts extremely difficult.
Tragedy compounds tragedy. For the people of northern Syria, the temblors bring yet more misery after a decade of war. Crucially, Idlib and Aleppo, central to the Assad regime’s strategy of retaking the country, have been subject to heavy shelling since late 2019. Before Monday’s tragedy, at least 3.3 million people in northwest Syria (out of 4.6 million) were food insecure. Meanwhile, a deadly cholera outbreak has also spread across the country in recent months.
Assad Sam Hanna, a Syrian activist who previously worked with Syria's “White Helmets,” says this week’s tragedy is even “more traumatic for the people who escaped the war where buildings used to collapse because of bombings.” He notes that a lot of those families resettled to southern Turkey, where they “felt they were on the safe side.”
Who’s offered aid? At least 45 countries have offered to help Turkey in its recovery efforts, including dispatching 27 teams to assist with search and rescue efforts. Conversely, just a handful of states – China, Russia, Algeria, the United Arab Emirates, and cash-strapped Lebanon – have offered support to Syria, most of which is controlled by President Bashar al-Assad, considered a pariah by the West.
Since Syria’s civil war erupted in 2011, Western countries have cut the country off from international markets and imposed measures that have obliterated local industries, causing widespread poverty. Without access or logistical connections in the region, it remains unclear whether – or how – Western states are going to – or can – help the Syrian people. Washington has pledged to help those on both sides of the border but will do so through “humanitarian partners,” not by working with Assad’s regime. Assad, meanwhile, rejects any involvement that isn’t coordinated with the central government in Damascus.
The struggle to deliver aid. Control of northwestern Syria is divided between Turkey and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, a rebel group with connections to al-Qaida. Meanwhile, northeast Syria is held by a Kurdish-led group backed by the US and where most of the services are provided by NGOs. Simply put: There is no central government to enforce a coordinated response.
Making matters worse, the Bab al-Hawa border crossing, the only humanitarian artery linking Turkey and northwest Syria, has been damaged by the earthquake. That’s a big problem for the Syrian recovery effort, Hanna says, because “the only way [to deliver aid] is through the Turkish side.”
But even before the earthquake, deliveries through this safe passage had been hindered by cynical geopolitics. Consider that Russia, a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a key backer of the Assad regime, used its clout to force the closure of several humanitarian corridors, leaving Bab al-Hawa as the sole lifeline. Still, Russia recently threatened to block this route as well if the UN failed to coordinate aid programs with the Assad regime.
Retraumatization of refugees. Many people impacted by the earthquakes – on both sides of the border – had already been displaced by Syria’s civil war. While some fled to northwestern Syria from other parts of the country, around 3.6 million had resettled in Turkey since 2011. Gaziantep, the epicenter of Monday's quake, is home to around 500,000 Syrians.
Complicating matters further is the fact that anti-refugee sentiment has been on the rise in Turkey in recent years. In response to growing public concern over migration flows, Ankara had already capped at 20% the number of foreigners in some districts. Now, dealing with its own catastrophe, it will be even more difficult for Turkish authorities to accommodate a surge in Syrian migrants.
While those on the ground await political and humanitarian solutions that may never come, aid workers are racing against the clock as the prospects of finding more people alive grow bleak.
Will Israel be forced to choose between Russia and Ukraine?
Israel, the only country with close ties to Russia and Ukraine, is trying to delicately balance relations with both states. But as things continue to heat up on the Ukraine-Russia front, that's becoming much harder for Israel to do.
In a rare move Thursday, Kyiv summoned Israel's ambassador to Ukraine for a telling off, demanding an explanation following reports that Israel had reached out to Russia for help coordinating the evacuation of its nationals should Moscow escalate.
Why does Israel appear to be playing both sides, and how might things turn out if Russia invades?
A marriage of convenience. Israel and Russia have enjoyed constructive ties in recent decades. But a particular closeness was cultivated by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Russian President Vladimir Putin in recent years as Moscow took a dominant role in Syria’s civil war along Israel’s northern border. Netanyahu visited Moscow 15 times from 2011-2020.
For Israel, mitigating threats in the Syrian arena, where its arch foe Iran also yields great influence, is a national security priority. In recent years, Russia — which largely controls Syrian airspace — has allowed Israeli warplanes to target Iranian strategic assets there, including convoys trying to deliver weapons to Hezbollah in neighboring Lebanon. Russia is willing to cooperate with Israel on these aerial missions in part because it is competing with Tehran for dominance inside Syria. But the Kremlin could clamp down if Israel provokes it.
Tel Aviv-based Middle East analyst Danny Citrinowicz told GZERO that Israel is not publicly supporting Ukraine because it knows it has “a lot to lose with Russia in Syria.” For both Israel and Russia, it’s a delicate balancing act in Syria, he says. “If Israel intensifies its attacks [in Syria], that could shake the stability of the Assad regime” and undermine Russia’s strategic interests in Syria and the region. Russia would not look at that kindly, just as it might punish Israel with more limited access to launch strikes against Syria if Jerusalem sided with Ukraine.
Kyiv wants a stronger commitment. Israel and Ukraine, meanwhile, are buddies that share robust trade ties, which they hope to expand with a new free trade agreement. The two countries are also closely aligned diplomatically and culturally, a bond reinforced by the fact that thousands of Ukrainian Jews emigrated to Israel.
But Ukraine wants more. For years, it has been trying to buy Israeli weapons and defense technology to boost its military might. Israel has mostly balked at the requests to avoid stepping over a red line for the Kremlin. Just this week, for example, there were reports that Israel had blocked the sale of sophisticated Iron Dome missile defense systems to Ukraine.
What’s more, because of Israel’s unique status as a “mutual friend,” Kyiv has called on Jerusalem to act as mediator in its deepening row with Moscow. But Naftali Bennett, Israel’s prime minister, is having none of it. In fact, Bennett has reportedly told ministers to “keep a low profile” and to avoid showing deference to either side. Still, Israel has called on its nationals to return to Israel and is planning to evacuate Ukrainian Jews, which suggests it anticipates some sort of Russian offensive.
The Washington equation. Israel and the US are closely aligned on global security issues, yet sometimes their immediate interests diverge. Ukraine is a case in point.
Despite saying that it won’t send US troops to defend Ukraine, the Biden administration has been working overtime to strengthen NATO and ensure a coordinated Western response if Russia escalates. For now, the US appears to be okay with Israel’s fence-sitting, but that could change if Washington wants to inflict more severe pain on Russia in the weeks ahead.
Aaron David Miller, a senior fellow and Middle East policy expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, says it’s “unlikely” that Israel will be dragged into the conflict. But if the US “pressured Israel to choose sides in the wake of a major Russian move into Ukraine, Israel would likely comply, especially if Biden asked Bennett personally,” he says.
“Moscow is important in Israel's Syria strategy; Washington is critical to its overall strategic advantage.”
What We’re Watching: Russia vs US/NATO, Twitter back in Nigeria, Syrian war crimes verdict
US/NATO-Russia talks. Did this week’s flurry of high-level diplomacy in Europe make any significant progress to stop war in Ukraine? Depends on who you ask. The Russians say the talks were unsuccessful, insomuch as Washington has not agreed to the Kremlin’s demands for NATO to not further expand into former Soviet territory. What’s more, Moscow is now threatening to send Russian troops to Cuba and Venezuela — two of its allies in Washington’s own geographical sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere — if the Americans don’t cave. The US and NATO admit “significant differences” remain between both sides, but want to keep talking. Meanwhile, Poland has warned that the risk of war in Europe is the highest it’s been since the collapse of the USSR in 1991.
Nigeria ends Twitter ban. Nigerians are finally able to tweet again after the government ended an almost seven-month ban on the social media platform. Authorities say the app was reinstated after agreeing to open a local office, pay taxes, and coordinate with the government on policing hate speech and misinformation. Nigeria suspended Twitter in June 2021 after it deleted a controversial tweet by President Muhammadu Buhari for inciting violence against Biafran separatists. Twitter is nowhere near as popular in Nigeria as the Meta-owned platforms WhatsApp, Facebook and Instagram, but the platform is influential among young Nigerians, who mostly used Twitter to mobilize the #EndSARS protests against police brutality in October 2020.
A small step for justice in Syria. Anwar Raslan, a former high-ranking Syrian officer who worked under the dictator Bashar-al Assad, was sentenced to life in prison by a German court for his role in Syria’s civil war in the first-ever criminal trial over state-sponsored torture there. Raslan, a former top dog at the notorious Al-Khatib prison in Damascus, oversaw the torture of at least 4,000 prisoners, many of them rounded up when protesting against the regime in the early years of the war. He was also charged with dozens of cases of rape, sexual assault, and murder. Raslan was granted asylum in Germany in 2014, and arrested five years later. His trial was the first opportunity for Syrian war survivors — 800,000 of whom now live in Germany — to retell their personal stories of survival in a public forum, which activists hope can be used to prosecute more offenders in the future.