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Trump may follow Biden's line on Syria
On Saturday, not long after Syrian dictator Bashar Assad fled to Russia, Donald Trumpwrote — in all caps — that the United States should stay out of Syria: “This is not our fight,” he wrote. “Let it play out. Do not get involved.”
Trump, Vice-President-elect JD Vance, and Tulsi Gabbard, his nominee as Director of National Intelligence, are all skeptical of American military involvement in the Middle East. But experts think the next US administration will end up taking a position similar to the one taken by President Joe Biden, mostly because it is in the interest of the United States to prevent Syria from becoming a safe haven for international terrorists.
Successful rebel leader Abu Mohammad al-Golani is a former al-Qaida fighter, but he has signaled that he has no interest in transnational terrorism and has sought to give assurances to Druze, Christians, and Alawite religious minorities that the new government of Syria will respect their rights.
Secretary of State Antony Blinkenhas offered to recognize Golani’s new government if he lives up to his promises. At the same time, the US military has been carrying out airstrikes against remnants of the Islamic State terrorist group. Two congressmen have written to Blinken asking him to ease US sanctions on Syria to give the new government a chance to rebuild the economy.
Experts think that although Trump might like to wash his hands of the whole country, American interests will likely require the US government to maintain troops in Syria, at least in the short term. He ordered the withdrawal of US troops from the region during his first term and then reversed his decision when confronted by the facts on the ground.
GZERO reveals the top 10 geopolitical game changers of 2024
2024 was a year of dramatic reversals. Some came at the ballot box, where long-ruling parties took a beating, anti-establishment figures stormed into power, or strongmen managed to see off what looked like fatal challenges. Some came on battlefields, where deadlocked conflicts began to break in one direction or another. And some came in how we think about politics and geopolitics more broadly.
This week, as we hurtle toward 2025, another year that promises to be pivotal in global affairs, we profile 10 people who, for better or worse, flipped the script, beat the odds, turned the tables, or otherwise changed the game in 2024.
GZERO's No. 10 2024 Game Changer: Italy’s Iron Lady
Who is she? Giorgia Meloni, 47, is Italy’s first female prime minister and the leader of the right-wing Fratelli d’Italia – Brothers of Italy – party. A staunch nationalist, Meloni rose to power in 2022, pledging to prioritize “God, family, and fatherland.” As a student, she was active in the neo-fascist Italian Social Movement before becoming Italy’s youngest-ever minister in Silvio Berlusconi’s government in 2008.
What did she accomplish in 2024? Meloni led her party to victory in Italy’s June elections, positioning herself as the “kingmaker” in the European Parliament. Her victory was due in part to her tough stance on migrants: Last year, Italy cut illegal immigration by 64%, inking agreements with Tunisia to reduce human smuggling and encouraging the EU to do the same with Egypt.
Meloni has faced pushback from Italian courts, however, on her plan to send migrants to Albanian processing centers. Herwide-ranging constitutional reforms to enhance executive power, including allowing the direct election of the prime minister, have also raised concern about potential shifts toward authoritarianism.
How has she changed the game? Meloni's migration crackdown found favor with other European leaders, including Hungarian President Viktor Orban. At the same time, she maintained strong support for Ukraine, recently authorizing Italy’s tenth military aid package for Kyiv. “Meloni has had a good year, and her fellow EU leaders in capitals and Brussels now hope she has been fully co-opted into the European mainstream,” said Mujtaba Rahman, Eurasia Group’s managing director for Europe.
What’s next for 2025? Meloni’s big domestic challenge is economic: Italy’s GDP is poised to grow by an anemic .5% in the coming year. Parliament passed several budget measures last week, including a one-off €100 Christmas bonus to 4.5 million disadvantaged families, and will continue allowing taxpayers to pre-pay their taxes for the next two years, regardless of how much they earn.
On the foreign policy front, Meloni may have an in with the incoming US administration in Elon Musk, with whom she famously traded compliments after he introduced her at the Atlantic Council’s Global Citizen Awards in October. However, Musk was subsequently seen to overstep when he criticized Italian judges who blocked deportations. And the two notably differ on future support for Ukraine. Time will tell whether Rome and Washington enjoy la bella vita – or not.
GZERO's No. 9 2024 Game Changer: Venezuela’s Strongman
Who is he? Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro has been in power for 11 years, and over the past seven of those years, he has presided over one of the most spectacular social collapses in the world. Economic mismanagement, political repression, and tight US sanctions prompted more than seven million people to flee in a migrant exodus that has reverberated across the region, from South America to South Brooklyn.
What did he accomplish in 2024? Heading into the presidential election this past July, then, it seemed almost certain that the game was up for Maduro. His approval ratings were in the gutter. A historically splintered opposition had united behind a single, reasonably popular candidate. The polling was so skewed against him it seemed like he’d have to steal the election outright to stay in power.
And that’s what he did. Even as all available evidence – including thousands of voter rolls from across the country – suggested he had lost in a landslide, his government published figures showing that he had won a narrow victory. And since then, that has been that. Threats and enticements from the US have failed to budge Maduro. His police have cracked down ferociously on the opposition. He appears to be going nowhere.
How has he changed the game? Maduro has reset what looked like a losing game not only for himself but also for various outside powers that had hoped to see him gone.
What’s next for 2025? Perhaps the most interesting piece of this story will involve the US and the incoming Trump administration.
Trump has pledged to deport millions of undocumented migrants, and many of them are Venezuelan. Where will they go? Repatriation to their home country will require an agreement of some kind with Maduro.
Trump’s Secretary of State nominee, Sen. Marco Rubio, is a Cuban-American who is ultra-hawkish on the communist regime in Cuba as well as its “21st-century socialist” backers in Caracas. If Rubio had his druthers, both governments would be out of power, but he will now need to deal tactfully with Maduro, who has shown that he is, for better or worse, to be reckoned with rather than written off.
“While Trump’s team has hinted at space for a negotiation related to migrants,” says Eurasia Group's Latin America Director Risa Grais-Targow, “the president-elect’s specific history with Maduro, loyalty to Florida voters, and preference for US oil and gas production will limit the scope for a grand bargain and further sanctions relief.”
GZERO’s No. 8 2024 Game Changer: South Africa’s divisive populist
Who is he? It’s not often a former president continues to play a crucial role in the longer-term direction of his country’s politics, but Jacob Zuma is no ordinary former president. From 2009-2018, the charismatic Zuma led the African National Congress and served as South Africa’s president. A series of corruption allegations forced him from power, and Zuma felt he’d been betrayed by his deputy, Cyril Ramaphosa, who is now the ANC’s leader and South Africa’s president.
What did he accomplish in 2024? In 2024, three years after he served two months in prison on a corruption-related charge, Zuma came for his revenge. He formed a brand new political party — uMkhonto we Sizwe, or MK — and ran again for president. The new party didn’t come close to winning nationally, but by drawing 45% support in Zuma’s home region, KwaZulu-Natal, he helped strip the ANC of its national majority.
How has he changed the game? The ANC, Nelson Mandela’s party, the political embodiment of liberation from apartheid, saw its national vote share fall from 57% in 2019 to just 40% in 2024. That stunning result then forced the ANC to invite the largest opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, to form a government of national unity. This is the first time the ANC has had to share national political power since the end of apartheid more than three decades ago.
Zuma’s ambitions were not the only factor that pushed down the ANC’s vote share so sharply. South Africa is still plagued with high unemployment, inflation, corruption, crumbling infrastructure, and a lack of economic opportunity for young people. But, according to Eurasia Group Africa expert Ziyanda Stuurman, “there is a direct line between Zuma’s political maneuvers [in 2024], and the emergence of a coalition government few people would have ever thought was possible.”
What’s next for 2025? It’s too early to say whether forcing the ANC to work with the opposition DA will prove positive or negative for South African politics, but it’s clear that Jacob Zuma changed the political game this year in his country. His challenges to Ramaphosa’s government will continue into 2025.GZERO’s No. 7 2024 Game Changer: Citizens who said ‘No’ to status quo
Who are they? Voters went to the polls this year in more than 50 countries with a combined population of more than 3.5 billion. A lot of them had strong messages to send their elected leaders.
What did they accomplish in 2024? In June, voters in India stunned outside observers by stripping the still-popular Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party of its majority in parliament. The result forced the BJP to turn to fickle allies to pass more of Modi’s reform agenda and limited his room for maneuver.
Also in June, voters in South Africa made history by depriving the African National Congress of its majority for the first time in the country’s post-apartheid history. With just 40% of the vote, the ANC was forced to invite the opposition Democratic Alliance to form a unity government — one that has held together contrary to expectations, it must be said.
In July, voters in France punished their centrist President Emmanuel Macron by casting ballots for enough far-left and far-right parties to gut the political center. After struggling to form a government to advance state spending reforms, left- and right-wing parties came together to force Michel Barnier, a compromise choice for PM, out of his job. France’s political crisis continues.
Also in July, fed-up voters in the UK ended 14 years of rule by the Conservative Party in favor of Labour, led by new Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer. The Conservatives' share of parliamentary seats fell from 252 to just 121, in part because Nigel Farage’s new Reform UK party drew much of the Tories’ support. And British politics has only become more combative. A November poll found that the percentage of UK adults with an unfavorable view of Starmer’s work as PM outnumbers those who approve by well over two to one.
In October, a shock election result in Japan cost the Liberal Democratic Party its majority in the Diet, the country’s legislature. The LDP has held power almost continuously for nearly 70 years.
In November, Donald Trump carried all the so-called swing states in a victory that will replace President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris with a Republican Party administration.
“Unemployment hurts a small number of people a lot, but inflation irritates everyone,” notes Eurasia Group’s Vice Chairman Gerald Butts. “Incumbents are discovering that hurting all of the people even some of the time makes the whole country angry at their government.”
GZERO’s No. 6 2024 Game Changer: Russia’s ruthless leader
Who is he? Vladimir Putin, the ex-KGB agent who has ruled Russia without interruption since the turn of the millennium, hardly needs an introduction – you know the name. But even after nearly a quarter century in power, he continues to flip scripts year in and year out, and 2024 was no different.
What did he accomplish in 2024? As recently as a year ago, Ukraine and its Western backers still held out hope that Kyiv’s forces might push back the Russian invaders who have laid waste to so much of the country since the 2022 invasion. Since then, Putin has – slowly, cynically, but successfully – shown otherwise.
Today, Russian forces are grinding their way westward in the Donbas while Ukraine suffers shortages of manpower. Kyiv’s bid to divert Russian attention from Eastern Ukraine by invading a small corner of Russia itself in August hasn’t worked out – Putin didn’t take the bait, instead calling in North Korean troops to help repel the Ukrainian incursion.
Meanwhile, US President-elect Donald Trump has questioned support for Ukraine and pledged to end the war “in 24 hours.”
How has he changed the game? By altering perceptions of what’s possible. “In 2025, Ukrainian society will be reassessing their all-or-nothing view of victory,” says Tim Mak, editor of “The Counteroffensive” in Kyiv. “As a democratic country, Ukrainians are increasingly expressing a willingness to negotiate -- and a fear that continuing the war could lead to frontline disaster due to manpower shortages.”
What’s next for 2025? Not everything is roses for Putin these days. His heavily sanctioned economy grows only because of massive military spending. Inflation is high. The population continues to shrink, as birth rates are low and hundreds of thousands of talented young people have left in opposition to the war. Russian casualties in Ukraine now dwarf those of the late Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Globally, Moscow is increasingly the junior partner to a rising China, and the Kremlin just lost Syria, its most important ally in the Middle East.
But heading into 2025, Putin has set himself up to negotiate over Ukraine, and potentially over other issues, from a position of greater strength than many had believed, or hoped, just a year ago.
Honorable Mention: Kim Jong Un
Who is he? Kim Jong Un, the 40-year-old Supreme Leader of North Korea, has been at the helm of the Hermit Kingdom since his father, Kim Jong Il, died in 2011. Following a ruthless consolidation of power, he has directed his energy and the state’s meager finances toward expanding the country’s nuclear weapons program, which he sees as central to North Korean security and sovereignty.
What did he accomplish in 2024? He concluded a mutual defense treaty with Russia while hosting President Vladimir Putin in Pyongyang in June — the first visit to the city by a Russian leader in a quarter century — that laid the groundwork for his deployment of troops to fight in Ukrainian-occupied areas of Russia. The deployment is a major escalation compared to the weapons aid he has been supplying Moscow since 2023, though thus far he has acted with total impunity. That treaty also opened much deeper cooperation with Russia to advance North Korea’s military technology, including progress on nuclear-powered submarines and a more powerful ballistic missile as well as attempts to launch spy satellites.
Kim radically overhauled his government's policy toward South Korea. In January, he renounced the goal of reunification with the South, officially removing it from the constitution. He also rather theatrically destroyed road and rail links to the south, constructed during a period of rapprochement at the turn of the 21st century.
How has he changed the game? By changing the terms on which it’s played. “The dramatic deepening of North Korea-Russia diplomatic and security ties in 2024,” says Eurasia Group expert Jeremy Chan, “has given Pyongyang more strategic optionality and greater assurance that neither South Korea nor the US will attempt an invasion.”
Seoul and Washington can’t credibly threaten military action without running unacceptable risks, and Kim’s control over domestic affairs still appears iron-clad. What’s more, by deepening relations with Moscow, Kim puts pressure on his frenemies in Beijing, who have few tools at their disposal in the relationship besides accommodation.
What’s next for 2025? If Kim has his druthers, talks with Donald Trump to secure recognition of his nuclear status. “These various nuclear and defense-related capabilities attained in 2024 will provide Kim with leverage in future negotiations with Trump,” says Chan, “while allowing Pyongyang to retain its hard-won nuclear deterrent, something which Kim has vowed will never be bargained away.”
Couple that with political chaos in the South after Yoon Suk Yeol’s attempted coup in early December, and it’s looking like the peninsula is in for a wild ride next year.
GZERO’s No. 5 2024 Game Changer: The Syrian rebel who reshaped the region
Who is he? The 42-year-old leader of the Syrian jihadist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or HTS, al-Golani, born Ahmed Hussein Al-Shara, grew up in a middle-class Syrian family. He went to Iraq in 2003 to fight with al-Qaida against the US occupation, taking his nom de guerre “al-Golani” to honor relatives displaced from the Golan Heights, an area of Syria that Israel has occupied since 1967.
After the Syrian civil war began in 2011, al-Golani founded the anti-Assad jihadist Nusra Front group, which later rebranded as HTS.
In recent years, as he established control over northwestern Syria, al-Golani has sought to distance himself from global jihad and present himself as a statesman interested in stabilizing Syria.
What did he accomplish in 2024? In early December, HTS led a military campaign that surged across the country, capturing key cities within days. When the Syrian regime’s longtime backers in Russia and Iran failed to send more support to Bashar Assad, the game was up. In little more than a week, al-Golani’s forces had toppled the 54-year-old House of Assad.
How has he changed the game? The collapse of the famously despotic Assad regime has sent shockwaves through the region. Syria, for decades a bulwark of expanding regional power for Shia Iran, as well as Russia, is now under the nominal control of HTS, a Sunni group with links to Turkey, a country politically at odds with most major Arab powers. Israel is watching warily and has already struck at Syrian arms depots to prevent them from falling into the hands of anti-Zionist groups. Donald Trump wants the US to “stay out of it,” but he’ll inherit the nearly 1,000 US troops in Syria fighting Islamic State remnants. Iran and Russia, for their part, can hardly be expected to simply fade away.
What’s next for 2025? Al-Golani’s rule is barely a week old. He must establish order in a fractious country wrecked by more than a decade of brutal civil war. Can he? And will his vision of Syria allow the country’s sectarian minorities to live in peace and dignity? Is there a world where the 7 million Syrian refugees who have gone to Turkey and Europe since 2011 really choose to return?
In some ways, “the collapse of the Assad regime is the Middle East’s most hopeful moment in over a decade,” says Firas Maksad, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute in Washington, DC. “But it carries within it the seeds of further communal and regional conflicts that could persist for a decade to come.”
What we know for sure is that al-Golani’s forces have already smashed decades-old assumptions about the balance of geopolitical, regional, and sectarian power in a volatile region. Whatever comes next begins now.
GZERO’s No. 4 2024 Game Changer: Israel’s political survivor
Who is he? Israel’s longest-serving prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu leads the right-wing Likud Party. He grew up in Israel and the US, attended the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and worked for the Boston Consulting Group before returning to Israel, where he rose quickly through Likud’s ranks and was appointed Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations and party chairman.
He was the first Israeli prime minister elected by direct popular vote in 1996 and served until 1999. He regained the premiership from 2009 to 2021, and then again in November 2022. His latest administration has been marked by the Oct. 7, 2023 attack by Hamas, mistreatment of Palestinian groups, limiting the Supreme Court’s power, and his own legal challenges, including charges of bribery and fraud.
What did he accomplish in 2024? Netanyahu has, as he promised in the wake of Oct. 7, reshaped the balance of power in the Middle East.
He has greatly weakened Israel’s adversaries, Hezbollah and Hamas, eliminating Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar and Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah. Israel used the fall of Syria’s Assad regime as an opportunity to take control of areas in Syria beyond the Golan Heights and take out its neighbor’s military capabilities. Meanwhile, doubts about Israel’s deterrence abilities following Oct. 7 have been restored after it largely shot down all of Iran’s retaliatory missile strikes.
Eurasia Group’s Senior Analyst Greg Brew says Netanyahu’s greatest triumph was overseeing the war against Hezbollah, which decimated the group’s leadership, killed thousands of its fighters, and degraded its capacity to strike Israeli cities.
“The war has been a clear Israeli victory, though it will need follow-through to turn into a strategic success,” says Brew. “But given how real the threat of Hezbollah had appeared in the past, the fact Netanyahu was able to prosecute the war without triggering a devastating Hezbollah attack on Israeli cities is a notable achievement.”
How did he change the game? Netanyahu began 2024 with 85% of Israelis calling for his removal and officials circulating petitions calling him an “existential threat” to the country over his handling of the Gaza War. He is accused of abandoning the Oct. 7 hostages and prolonging the war for his own benefit.
He ignored US demands to treat Gazans humanely, calling Washington’s bluff over withholding military aid if Israel did not increase the flow of food and humanitarian aid. However, doing so has further alienated Israel on the global stage, leading global institutions, leaders, and human rights groups to accuse Netanyahu of committing genocide in Gaza.
Nevertheless, he is ending the year with a 47% approval rating, seeing his popularity rebound after his aggressive campaign against Hezbollah and Iran. “Netanyahu is looking much stronger than he was six months ago,” says Brew. “The war against Hezbollah, the strikes on Iran, and the decimation of Hamas has strengthened his claim to be the strongest figure ensuring Israel’s security.”
While centrist figures like Yoav Gallant and Benny Gantz have departed his cabinet, forcing Netanyahu to rely more heavily on far-right figures, “he has kept his coalition together and looks likely to do so in 2025,” explains Brew.
What to expect from him in 2025? In the year ahead, Netanyahu is likely to benefit from and be emboldened by the Trump administration. Donald Trump shares Israel’s hatred of Iran, supports the Gaza War ending on Israel's terms, and has appointed Mike Huckabee, who is vocally in support of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, as the ambassador to Israel. Netanyahu's dependence on far-right figures like Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich will constrain his options when it comes to normalizing relations with Arab states like Saudi Arabia — something Brew says is certain to be a US priority under Trump.
But with US support all but guaranteed and public sentiment back behind him, Netanyahu is likely to continue his aggressive maneuvers in the Middle East into 2025.
“Netanyahu’s foreign policy priority in 2025 will be addressing the threat posed by Iran, and specifically Iran's nuclear programs,” says Brew. “I expect this to be the focal point in his relationship with Trump, along with issues of importance to his coalition, such as confirming US support for the settlement of territory — and perhaps even the partial annexation — of the West Bank.”
GZERO’s No. 3 2024 Game Changer: Those responsible for global migration
Who are they? The migrant took many forms in 2024, driven by armed conflicts, economic downturns, and the promise of opportunity – but their numbers fell as countries clamped down and closed borders. Irregular crossings of Middle Eastern and African migrants to Europe dropped by 42% in the first nine months of the year. Latin American migrants pursued better economic prospects in the US, but their numbers also declined sharply. Asian and South Asian emigres moved to Australia and Canada for education and jobs, but those countries also cut numbers back. In Africa, South Africa implemented a points system to prioritize skilled workers, while intra-continental migration surged in the North due to unrest in Sudan.
What did the migrant accomplish in 2024? Economically, migrants played a crucial role in labor markets, filling gaps in sectors like agriculture, healthcare, and technology. In some countries, their economic impact helped stave off a recession. But some migrant groups exacerbated social tensions, notably around issues that engaged their diasporas, such as the Israel-Hamas War, and also put a strain on cash-strapped public services.
And the latter issue caused a backlash among voters. “Since the pandemic, there has been a major increase in the number of immigrants, primarily legal ones, to Canada, the US, Europe, and the UK to address labor shortages,” said Graeme Thompson, senior analyst at Eurasia Group. “The problem is that first, those numbers increased very rapidly to historically unprecedented levels, and second, that has been combined with preexisting stresses on housing and social services. And that combination has proved politically explosive."
How did the migrant change the game? This past year, the migrant shaped elections around the world. Illegal immigration was the pivotal issue in the US presidential election, as now-President-elect Donald Trump accused the Democrats of failing to control America’s borders and blamed illegals for a surge in crime. In Europe, Austria's general election campaign was dominated by migration issues, with the far-right Freedom Party advocating for stringent asylum policies, while in Germany and Italy, anti-immigration parties saw a surge in support. Immigration was a key election issue in South Africa, where the ANC lost its majority as opposition parties pushed anti-migrant policies.
What to expect in 2025? The migrant will remain a source of tension as countries continue to clamp down on illegal immigration. Trump’s deportation plans could provoke a surge of migrants to Canada, prompting the Canadian government to announce a billion dollars in spending to harden its southern border. European countries, meanwhile, have stopped processing the claims of Syrian refugees in the wake of Bashar Assad’s overthrow, and many refugees plan to return home. But it remains to be seen whether the new regime will provoke a new exodus as minority groups such as the Kurds may feel under threat. The impact of immigration on housing has become a central issue in Canada and Australia, both set to have elections in 2025. And in Africa, the ongoing war in Sudan has displaced 11 million people and doesn’t look to end any time soon.
GZERO’s No. 2 2024 Game Changer: Billionaire entrepreneur
Who is he? The CEO of X, Tesla, and SpaceX, Elon Musk is the wealthiest and possibly the most powerful private citizen in the world. He controls a revolutionary space company, America’s top electric vehicle producer, and a big chunk of the global public square formerly known as Twitter. In 2025, he’s set to be the beneficiary of the biggest political bet of 2024: spending over $100 million in donations andleveraging his 200-plus million followers on X to support a Trump win for the American presidency.
What did he accomplish in 2024? In 2024, Musk became a political kingmaker. Musk’s financial and technological backing of the Trump campaign, including his use of AI-driven voter engagement tools,upended traditional election strategies. After Trump’s victory, Musk was appointed Director of Government Efficiency, or DOGE, a newly created position that will leverage private sector innovation to streamline federal operations. He even earned the praise of arch-lefty Sen. Bernie Sanders, who said “Elon Musk is right” to want to curb wasteful Pentagon spending.
How has he changed the game? Musk’s influence on politics and governance is unprecedented. By combining his tech empire with his growing political clout, Musk has blurred the lines between private enterprise and public policy. Musk has turned up on phone calls and meetings with global leaders (Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky,Hungary’s Viktor Orban) and, closer to home, technology rivals (Google CEO Sundar Pichai).
What’s next for 2025? With DOGE, Musk plans to unveil a federal efficiency initiative targeting defense spending and bureaucratic red tape. While he’s not taking a salary, new programs could significantly benefit SpaceX, particularly in the area of military logistics and battlefield AI, raising questions of a conflict of interest. And Starlink’s satellites could replace Washington’s existing plans for hard-wired broadband infrastructure.
What does this mean for other companies seeking to do business with Washington – and for politicos seeking influence? “Getting on Elon’s good side has never been more important,” observes Eurasia Group President Ian Bremmer. “And for all the whispering in Trump circles that the White House won’t be big enough for their two personalities and wills, both men deserve credit for being extremely careful in managing relationships where their livelihood is at stake.”
GZERO’s No. 1 2024 Game Changer: MAGA in chief
Who is he? At this point, Donald Trump – GZERO’s top political game changer of the year – needs no introduction. The New York native and real estate mogul began his career in politics in 2016 when he beat Hillary Clinton to win the presidency. But he was defeated by Joe Biden in 2020 in large part because of how he handled the COVID-19 pandemic, his harsh immigration policies, and his pattern of erratic behavior.
What did he accomplish in 2024? The former president turned president-elect is set to return to the White House after winning the electoral college and the popular vote in what was meant to be a close election. Trump is backed by a Republican-controlled Congress, a conservative majority on the Supreme Court, and a cabinet of loyalists determined to implement his policy agenda.
“Trump won the closest thing you can these days that counts as a mandate, and he’s the first Republican to win the popular vote since 2004,” says Eurasia Group’s US expert Noah Daponte-Smith. “That’s a big accomplishment, and it matters to the way he’s going to govern.”
How did he change the game? Trump’s win was no inevitability. Flashback to the Republican primaries, when he faced competition from Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis and former South Carolina Gov. Nikki Haley – until, that is, voters showed that the base remained squarely in Trump’s camp.
He prevailed despite facing 34 soon-to-be-obsolete felony convictions, the fallout from the Jan. 6 insurrection, and two states attempting to kick him off their primary ballots. In fact, in many ways, Trump used those setbacks to his advantage, spinning them to rally voters to the polls.
Trump won every swing state, accumulating the most electoral college votes for a Republican since 1988. He widened the party’s base, winning 2.5 million more votes than when he ran as the incumbent in 2020.
In doing so, he revealed the country had swung to the right, turned out a record number of young male voters, and made inroads with some Democrats – increasing his support among every demographic group besides women. He survived an assassination attempt against him and used it to further rally his party around him. The GOP is now Trump’s party, and any remaining old-school Republicans who may have opposed him have been left party-less – some even crossed the aisle to endorse Kamala Harris.
An underrated contributor to Trump’s victory was his “mastery of the new information ecosystem,” notes Daponte-Smith. “Trump’s podcast blitz in the middle of the campaign baffled many at the time but in retrospect looks to have been a deft move that enabled him to make substantial inroads among demographics that traditionally don’t lean Republican.”
What to expect from him in 2025. Even before his inauguration on Jan. 20, Trump is meeting with world leaders, compiling a cabinet of loyalists, and vowing to implement punishing tariffs on America’s allies and enemies.
In conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, Trump is likely to push for temporary ceasefires to demonstrate his peacemaking abilities, which may ultimately result in the partitioning of Ukraine and expanded Israeli power over Palestine. Meanwhile, he will likely restart his “maximum pressure” campaign to heavily sanction Iran.
Daponte-Smith says he is expecting Trump to make headway in three key areas: trade, taxes, and immigration. He will likely substantially raise tariffs on China in the first year while limiting illegal immigration to the US and ramping up deportations. “The tax bill at the end of the year, which will very likely extend all of the 2017 tax cuts, will be the cherry on top for Republicans, who know that trifectas tend to be short-lived and are looking to move quickly to make the most of this one.”
- 2023 game changers that weren’t ›
- Top 10 game changers of 2023 ›
- What Assad’s fall means for Syria, the Middle East, Moscow and Washington ›
- G7 meeting: Ukraine and Meloni take center stage ›
- Netanyahu's uncompromising UNGA address ›
- How will Trump 2.0 approach foreign policy? ›
- Elon Musk and the Political Power of Young Men ›
Why Assad’s sudden fall was surprising
Ian Bremmer shares his insights on global politics this week on World In :60.
Why did you originally think Assad would be able to resist being overthrown?
I am absolutely surprised at the sudden regime change after 50 years of the Assads being in charge. A couple of reasons for it. First is because despite HTS wanting to engage in strikes, the Turkish government, which has been supporting them militarily, had been saying, "No, no, no." And even when they supported them, it was a flashing yellow light. It was take local territory, let the Syrians have more control over their border region. It was not going after Assad. Also, because the Russians and the Iranians, though they were significantly stretched, were providing military support in the early days. So that's the reason I thought that they were likely to be able to resist, but the fact is that they imploded very, very quickly.
What led you to believe Yoon's martial law declaration would fail in South Korea?
Well, here felt a lot like January 6th in the United States, January 8th in Brazil. You had a besieged individual leader, in this case not about an election, but facing 20% approval rates and massive corruption scandals and all sorts of impeachments against members of his cabinet, just getting desperate and deciding to pull the trigger on emergency martial law illegally and without talking even to leadership of his own party. So it seemed pretty clear that there wasn't going to be support. The South Korean people, the judiciary, the parliament, and rank and file, and the military were clearly not going to be supportive. So I mean, I expected that to last very, very briefly, and it fell apart very quickly indeed. He should be out of power in short order. And I expect he's going to resign, by the way, as opposed to being impeached, but it could go either way.
What's another major geopolitical assessment you've made that played out differently than expected, and what does it reveal about the complexities of global politics?
One of the biggest ones is probably the role of technology in geopolitics. Back in the '90s, if you think about the coloured revolutions in the former Soviet republics, you think about the Arab Spring after that, technology was really the communications revolution. It was decentralizing. It gave individuals access to more information and power. It undermined authoritarian regimes, and it promoted democracy. And today, just 20 years, 25 years later, technology has completely changed geopolitically. It's much more top-down. It's much more centralizing. It's about the data revolution, the surveillance revolution. It increasingly empowers authoritarian states that know how to use it, and it undermines democracies. And that is maybe one of the biggest geopolitical changes that's happened in my political lifetime, certainly the biggest since the Soviet Union imploded back in 1989 to '91. And it just goes to show that no matter what you think about the world, if you're not constantly updating your views, you're going to be wrong at some point.
Ian Bremmer on Assad's fall
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take:
A Quick Take over the weekend. Yet again, because there is entirely too much blowing up around the world. Here, I want to focus on Syria where just a few hours ago Bashar Assad, the dictator, forced out, overthrown by a large number of militarily strong opposition forces led by the radical Islamist group HTS.
A lot to talk about here. This whole thing lasted less than two weeks, and initially the Russians and the Iranians provided military support for Assad, but his complete inability of his army to fight and offer resistance, and the distraction that the Russians have, they're stretched-thin from their fighting in Ukraine, from the Iranians providing support to resistance forces that are doing very badly against Israel, particularly Hezbollah and Lebanon, meant there wasn't all that much capacity, or even that much political will, to provide support. And so, Assad has been overthrown.
By itself that's good news, in the sense that this has been an incredibly repressive regime fighting initially a war against their own people. The pro-democracy movement that came out of the Arab Spring and has led to over 500,000 Syrians dead over the last decade, over 200,000 of them civilians, and some 6 million refugees, both fleeing into neighboring Arab states but also into Europe, into Turkey, and of course in Germany, which is part of the reason that Merkel ended up leaving her terms in ignominy. That is the initial background.
And there has been a lot of support for various opposition groups in Syria, from Turkey, most notably from the UAE, from Saudi Arabia, and from the United States, while the Assad government was being supported principally by the Russians in terms of air support, some intelligence, some cyber capabilities, and from the Iranians on the ground, particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. And that was largely enough through the majority of this war. The rebel groups by 2018 had retreated into the northwest, this Idlib region. And by that point, the rebels that were left were mostly led by ISIS, and that meant a common enemy on the part of the United States.
And Turkey had turned from Assad to the proximate Syrian part of the war on terror. And if that had failed, it had the potential to turn Syria and neighboring Iraq into a terrorist state. ISIS lost that battle. Assad consolidated most of Syria under his regime. And then about four years ago, Turkey and Russia brokered a ceasefire in Idlib, which was at that point under opposition control.
That brings us to today, and to HTS, which stands for Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham. It's a former Al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria that has since formally cut their ties with the terrorists, but they're still called a terrorist organization, labeled one by the United States and its allies in NATO. And they are the de facto leader of the armed opposition and led the now ouster of Assad. Now, they've become kind of Hezbollah-like in the sense that they're providing a lot of Syrian citizens with government services. They've managed to coordinate rebels and eliminate infighting underneath that, and they've also promised to protect Syrian Christians and Muslim Alawites and have gotten the tacit support of the Turkish Erdoğan government, who basically gave them at least a blinking yellow if not a green light to go ahead and launch this war against Assad two weeks ago.
Now, having said all of that, the likelihood that they're going to run as a secular government, Syria, seems unlikely to me. This is, we're going from Assad to what is probably going to be a radical Islamist government that'll be repressive and that'll be deeply challenging. And so I don't think that is in any way, at least at this point, something that we can call a transition that's good news or that we shouldn't feel anxiety about. But what is clear is that the Iranians and Russians have lost. So the axis of resistance is not looking like much of an axis and it's not putting up very much resistance. The Russians, Putin has said nothing about this. He's not made a public statement, and that's not surprising. Frequently when he is surprised and he faces sudden embarrassing losses, he doesn't say anything about it to his people. And if you look at Russian state media, they've been talking about France, and South Korea, and Trump, and all those things, but almost no coverage of Syria, where the Russians have lost an ally and they've lost a military base that's important to them in Tartus and they've not been able to put up much of a fight.
Now, the good news there is that if you're Putin, you should be more cognizant of the fact that there are major costs of continuing to fight an incredibly bloody war in Ukraine where you're making some gains, territorially, but you're losing huge numbers of Russian citizens. And so if Trump is coming in and says he wants to cut a deal, Putin should be more incented to do that. There's also good news on the Iranian front in the sense that Syria falling means that they no longer have a corridor to provide military support for Hezbollah. And that means that the two-month ceasefire, which has been announced by the Israelis and by the Lebanese government, is more likely to hold.
Now, if you put those two things together, kind of interesting. Looks more likely that Trump gets inaugurated, and he is indeed able to announce that the temporary ceasefire becomes a permanent end of the war between Israel and Hezbollah, and that he's able to negotiate a ceasefire between the Russians and Ukrainians that does not give up the store to Putin. The former is an easier bet than the latter, but both of them certainly look more likely on the back of Assad being ousted.
The bad news? More challenges, more humanitarian degradation for the Syrian people on the ground. Could easily see another million refugees on the back of the fighting that we've had, depending on what happens with governance going forward. There are very few hospitals that are presently functioning. There is very limited humanitarian aid on the ground, that's necessary in very short order. And it's hard to say that fighting isn't going to break out amongst the various factions that have held together in fighting a common enemy, if that's going to lead to coherent governance going forward, it depends so much on what happens when HTS becomes not the leader of a rebel group but suddenly is responsible for governance on the ground in Syria. And your guess is as good as anyone as to what is going to happen there.
So, that is the best I can tell where we are right now. It's a fascinating issue and a temporary expansion of the war in the Middle East, but hopefully one that we can see bringing a little bit of stability to some other conflicts that are happening in the region and more broadly. That's it for me, and I'll talk to you all real soon.
- Podcast: Syria, The Rise and Fallout of the House of Assad with Sam Dagher ›
- Syrian rebels reignite war, make advances in Aleppo ›
- Once frozen out, Bashar Assad is back in ›
- Do strikes on Syria signal a bolder Netanyahu? ›
- The Graphic Truth: How a decade of war has crushed Syria ›
- Tragedy upon tragedy in war-torn Syria ›
Syrian rebel forces take Aleppo
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take:
Hi everybody. Ian Bremmer here and a Quick Take, post-run, on a Sunday because the news does not wait for us to get back from our extended Thanksgiving weekend.
I want to talk about a new front in the Middle East war that has just opened up in Syria, a country that is far from stable and not really a country, really a patchwork of different controls in the best of times. But now we have active war fighting, a new front opening up with lots of territory being taken from Bashar al-Assad, his dictatorial regime from Syria Rebels, particularly a group called HTS, which is the most powerful of the military opposition groups in the country. They have swept, in a matter of hours, through the country, taking over Aleppo, the major city, and moving towards Hama. There is lots of humanitarian concern here. Not a surprise. You don't have hospitals functioning in Aleppo. You've got all sorts, thousands and thousands of people fleeing and nowhere obvious to go.
This should not be an enormous surprise in the sense that HTS has been agitating the Turkish government who support them to march on Aleppo for months. And in the same way that the Iranians had been green-lighting support for all of their proxies across the region to engage in strikes against the United States, against Israel, against shipping, all of that, Turkey did not want to do that. They didn't want to back and offensive. They were pretty split on it. The hawks inside Erdogan's government in Turkey, like the idea in order to expand opposition, put more pressure on a side, facilitate the return of more Syrian refugees from Turkey back into Syria, and also strengthen Erdogan's hand in bringing Assad back to the negotiating table for a normalization of ties under Turkey's terms. But a lot of people inside Turkey were saying that Russia would carpet bomb Turkish-backed forces and Turkish forces on the ground in Syria, of which there are thousands, which would humiliate Erdogan and cause broader tension with Russia that could well have major economic implications. We've seen that before, and this is a time when Turkey doesn't really want to afford that. They're trying to rebuild their economy from what has been a lot of damage.
It looks like now Ankara has given the go ahead to these militants in Syria, in part because the geopolitics of the region is changing. The Russians, of course, are themselves very distracted, not just with an ongoing war in Ukraine, which has been happening for three years now, but specifically because they've got two months to take as much land as possible, put the Ukrainians in the worst possible position before Trump is president and says he wants to end that war. So in other words, everything they have, they're really now putting into that fight against Ukraine.
Meanwhile, the Iranian-supported proxies across the region are getting utterly hammered, as we've seen from the United States, and more importantly from Israel and the successful war against Hezbollah in Lebanon. So in that regard, the changing of the geopolitics has really given the upper hands of the hawks in Turkey to tell HTS, "Go for it. This is an opportunity, unique time to improve your position." Still, they're not fully backing the offensive. They're not backing it directly militarily, nor are they fully backing it diplomatically as they did, for example, with the Free Syrian Army, the FSA, with number of cross border operations in Northern Syria in the past decade.
Now, Russia has been humiliated on the ground. These Syrian troops in Aleppo folded and ran away immediately. The Russians have sacked senior soldiers in charge of operations on the ground, and it looks like they are preparing to send troops into Syria directly in the next 24 to 48 hours to shore up Assad. There's a lot of land that HTS would have to take before they were a direct threat to regime. Hard to imagine they're going to be able to overthrow him. Also, the Iranians are providing support. We already see that Islamic Revolutionary Guard Core, aligned militias across the region, are saying they will enter Syria to engage in the fight against HTS in favor of the Assad regime. I expect you'll see significant numbers of actual IRGC advisors showing up as well.
So it doesn't look like this is the end of Assad, and frankly, it's hard to imagine that Turkey itself even wants to have Assad out because filling the void completely left by a weakened Iran would be challenging for Turkey and would also lead to more conflict with the Russians, rather, who importantly have a military base, a port in Tartus that is very important for them having influence in the Mediterranean. Rather, Turkey is trying to use this space to try to shape regional events to their benefits. It's very positive what's happened so far in the last 48 hours for Turkey. It weakens Assad, makes him more open to a bad deal with Turkey than he has been before, and further, HTS is also moving farther away from Turkey's border, which is a good thing because Ankara doesn't have full control over them. Again, like Iran with its proxies, a lot of weapons, a lot of diplomatic support, but that's very different from operational control on the ground. And I expect that Erdogan sees this as an opportunity for Trump where he says, "We'll, cut a deal with you. You, Trump, get to exit Syria." Still with American troops on the ground there, yet one more place you can say that the Americans don't need to be, don't need to fight and have an America First policy and one more war that you get to formally not be a part of. And we, Turkey will make sure that there's no ISIS-affiliated organizations on the ground, that the region is more stable, that Iranian influences curtailed, and the Shia crescent is severed."
So if it works, one stone, lots of birds for Erdogan. The danger of course is that it doesn't work and that the war expands and that we end up with Russia versus Turkey in a proxy war that can become direct between the two. Wouldn't be the first time that we've seen that kind of confrontation. That'd be a lot more problematic. But at this point, the one thing I can say is that this is much more about the proxies fighting in a vacuum with a changing geopolitical balance than it is about the likelihood that Assad is about to be out. He wasn't out when Obama said, "Assad must go." He's not likely to be out right now.
Okay, that's it for me. We'll keep following this and I'll talk to you all real soon.
Once frozen out, Bashar Assad is back in
Over the past decade, few Arab leaders have been willing to go anywhere near Syrian dictator Bashar Assad. Sure, he managed to hold on to a few friends – like Iran and Russia – but for the most part, the Syrian president, broadly dubbed “The Butcher” for waging a war on his own people, has been considered persona non grata by regional bigwigs.
But Assad is now being embraced by many who had once vowed to continue treating him as a pariah. In recent weeks, Assad enjoyed the royal treatment when he attended an Arab League summit in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, for the first time in over a decade, while a top Syrian official also rubbed shoulders with international diplomats at a World Health Organization summit in Geneva last week.
In a big win for Assad, the Syrians have also been invited to attend the COP28 climate summit in Abu Dhabi later this year, giving renewed meaning to what many have called the Age of Impunity.
To be clear, this development is not so much a reflection of collective amnesia as it is of Realpolitik. Grappling with changes at home and abroad, many Arab states are now betting that embracing Assad will better serve their respective political and economic aims. But at what cost?
Recap: Assad was never supposed to rule. The second son of Syria’s longtime despotic leader, Hafez Assad, Bashar was summoned back from the UK in 1994 after his elder brother – the rightful heir – was killed in a car crash. Bashar, who trained as an ophthalmologist, ultimately took over as head of the government and military when his father died in 2000.
But the younger Assad failed to amass the widespread loyalty enjoyed by his father, and he exploited sectarian tensions to solidify his rule. In true authoritarian style, Bashar Assad, who belongs to the Alawi ethnoreligious minority, elevated loyalists from his clan and purged those deemed disloyal.
Then in 2011, he launched a brutal crackdown against mostly peaceful protesters encouraged by the Arab Spring. What started as violent suppression morphed into a civil war that to date has killed more than 500,000 people and displaced around 13 million – half of which remain in Syria.
Images of heaps of dead children frothing at the mouth from sarin gas poisoning have become a symbol of Assad’s depravity after he used chemical weapons hundreds of times during the war.
In an alliance led by the US, Gulf states poured millions of dollars into propping up Syrian opposition forces. So why are some of them now bucking their own investment?
Riyadh’s change of heart. One of the most consequential shifts paving the way to normalization with Assad has come from Saudi Arabia. While the Saudis were once one of the most vociferous anti-Assad choruses – they didn’t much appreciate Assad accusing them of birthing ISIS – the de facto Saudi leader Mohammed bin Salman recently kissed Assad’s cheeks as greeted him at the Arab summit on Saudi home turf.
There are several reasons for this change of heart, which is likely linked to the belief that regional instability undermines Riyadh’s grand economic ambitions of diversifying the economy away from hydrocarbons. Regional de-escalation, according to the Saudis, is key to luring the investment needed to get new industries off the ground and also helps explain why the kingdom recently (sort of) patched things up with archnemesis Iran.
Consider that upon assuming the role of defense minister (2015) and crown prince (2017), MBS adopted a pugnacious approach to foreign policy, as demonstrated by having launched a war in Yemen, ordered the slaying of a prominent journalist, and conducted a blockade of Qatar. But it now appears that the de facto Saudi leader has reasoned that this approach hasn’t necessarily yielded great results and that de-escalating tensions across the region will better serve his political and economic ambitions.
The recent devastating earthquake in southern Turkey and northern Syria provided the Saudis a reasonable opening to formally begin engaging with Assad on humanitarian grounds.
For Riyadh, it is also about asserting itself as a regional – and global – leader capable of fixing intractable issues that others can’t.
“Saudi Arabia wants to steal the thunder from the UEA and Turkey over who’s the mediator here and who's taking the lead on addressing the core issues in the Middle East,” says Qutaiba Idlbi, a senior fellow and Syria project manager at the Atlantic Council. For MBS, it is as much about sending a message to regional competitors – and to the US – about Saudi’s diplomatic bonafides as it is about stabilizing Syria itself.
Once Riyadh, arguably the most influential player in the Arab world, jumped on board, several states appeared more comfortable backing Assad’s reintegration into the Arab League, a largely toothless but symbolic regional bloc. Meanwhile, others, like the Jordanians, say that while they are open to the idea they want to see tangible concessions from Assad first.
Returning refugees. Syria’s civil war has given rise to one of the world’s largest refugee crises. Around 3.6 million Syrians remain in Turkey, followed by hundreds of thousands in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt. Turkey, in particular, has made no secret of the fact that it wants to return millions of refugees back to Syria, a populist message so resonant with voters that even Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the mild-mannered opposition figure who just ran and narrowly lost to populist President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, recently joined the chorus of those calling for Syrians to be repatriated.
Jordan and Egypt, both facing deep economic pressures at home, have also emphasized the need to strengthen Syria’s economy to facilitate refugee returns from neighboring countries.
Beating the drug habit. Blocked off from financial markets and searching for alternative revenue streams, Syria has emerged as the Middle East’s foremost narcostate. The regime’s star product, captagon, a speed-like amphetamine, has been funneled throughout Lebanon, Jordan, the Gulf, and beyond. Consider that more than 250 million captagon pills have been seized around the world so far this year. Meanwhile, a UK government report revealed that the Syrian drug trade is worth roughly three times that of all the Mexican cartels combined.
And the ripple effects are reverberating throughout the region. In Jordan, for instance, drug-related crimes are now the most common offenses and are causing what authorities have labeled a youth epidemic. This is such a high-stakes issue that Jordan last month launched air strikes inside … Syria, targeting a high-profile drug smuggler.
The Assad regime, for its part, recently pledged to crack down on the drug scheme, but it’s hard to take it at its word given that Assad cronies run the trade and make a mint from the stuff to the tune of more than $5.7 billion in 2021. The US, for its part, recently sanctioned two of Bashar Assad’s cousins for involvement in drug trafficking.
But at the end of the day, there’s no greater unifying force than a mutual aversion to democracy. “Ending the Arab Spring and the democracy movement’s aspirations in the Arab world” is a common theme for many Arab states in reaching out to Syria, Idlbi says. He points out that “Syria remains the only open chapter where rebels or revolutionaries still have a say in what's happening and have geopolitical support.”
Rebuilding Syria. Many analysts have claimed that Arab states are also vying for lucrative building contracts in war-ravaged Syria, but Idlbi isn’t convinced.
“There’s no appetite to invest money without a vision of return,” Idlbi says. What’s more, he adds, many governments still don’t trust Assad and fear that if they do step in to build up the country’s water, power, and agriculture systems, Assad could turn around and nationalize these companies once the country is in a more stable position.
Other interested parties. Syria is a crucial part of Iran’s “axis of resistance” against Israel and the US, used as a hub to manufacture and transfer advanced military equipment to Hezbollah in Lebanon and other proxies. Indeed, Riyadh’s acceptance of Assad as Syria’s rightful leader signals at least a tacit acceptance on the part of Arab states of Tehran’s presence there and of its role as a key regional actor more broadly.
For Russia, any move that reinforces the region’s new security structure, whereby Arab states appear to be prioritizing political pragmatism over sectarian struggle (and in the process further diluting US influence in the region) is arguably a win.
But not everyone is on board with Assad. In the Arab world, Qatar and Kuwait have rejected bilateral ties with Syria, while the EU and US also appear committed to the ongoing isolation of Assad. Still, it is notable that a US official recently urged Arab states to “get something for that engagement,” a rare acknowledgment that Assad’s reintegration into regional affairs is essentially a done deal.
So what does that tell us about the US’ commitment to Syria? For Washington, which still has troops in the rebel-held northeast, “the current situation in Syria is the solution,” Idlbi says, referring to the fact that while Assad continues to rule over much of the country, the northeast and northwest are controlled by anti-regime opposition forces. And as the Biden administration focuses its attention across the Pacific, “Washington seems to be going with a sort of ‘you touch it you own it’ approach.”
In the meantime, Assad’s fortune is no doubt sending a clear message to other dictators and autocrats around the world that if you stick it out long enough, good things might just come your way.
Tragedy upon tragedy in war-torn Syria
Days after a devastating 7.8-magnitude earthquake hit southern Turkey and northern Syria, the window for rescuing victims buried in the rubble is closing. Rescue efforts – and survival prospects – are being further challenged by freezing weather conditions.
The death toll has now surpassed 11,000 – and that number will certainly rise. Thousands remain missing, and nearly 400,000 have been moved to government shelters or hotels. Some 4 million Syrians in northern Syria alone were already displaced and relying on humanitarian support.
Tragically, this crisis compounds existing regional calamities, particularly for war-torn Syria, that make recovery efforts extremely difficult.
Tragedy compounds tragedy. For the people of northern Syria, the temblors bring yet more misery after a decade of war. Crucially, Idlib and Aleppo, central to the Assad regime’s strategy of retaking the country, have been subject to heavy shelling since late 2019. Before Monday’s tragedy, at least 3.3 million people in northwest Syria (out of 4.6 million) were food insecure. Meanwhile, a deadly cholera outbreak has also spread across the country in recent months.
Assad Sam Hanna, a Syrian activist who previously worked with Syria's “White Helmets,” says this week’s tragedy is even “more traumatic for the people who escaped the war where buildings used to collapse because of bombings.” He notes that a lot of those families resettled to southern Turkey, where they “felt they were on the safe side.”
Who’s offered aid? At least 45 countries have offered to help Turkey in its recovery efforts, including dispatching 27 teams to assist with search and rescue efforts. Conversely, just a handful of states – China, Russia, Algeria, the United Arab Emirates, and cash-strapped Lebanon – have offered support to Syria, most of which is controlled by President Bashar al-Assad, considered a pariah by the West.
Since Syria’s civil war erupted in 2011, Western countries have cut the country off from international markets and imposed measures that have obliterated local industries, causing widespread poverty. Without access or logistical connections in the region, it remains unclear whether – or how – Western states are going to – or can – help the Syrian people. Washington has pledged to help those on both sides of the border but will do so through “humanitarian partners,” not by working with Assad’s regime. Assad, meanwhile, rejects any involvement that isn’t coordinated with the central government in Damascus.
The struggle to deliver aid. Control of northwestern Syria is divided between Turkey and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, a rebel group with connections to al-Qaida. Meanwhile, northeast Syria is held by a Kurdish-led group backed by the US and where most of the services are provided by NGOs. Simply put: There is no central government to enforce a coordinated response.
Making matters worse, the Bab al-Hawa border crossing, the only humanitarian artery linking Turkey and northwest Syria, has been damaged by the earthquake. That’s a big problem for the Syrian recovery effort, Hanna says, because “the only way [to deliver aid] is through the Turkish side.”
But even before the earthquake, deliveries through this safe passage had been hindered by cynical geopolitics. Consider that Russia, a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a key backer of the Assad regime, used its clout to force the closure of several humanitarian corridors, leaving Bab al-Hawa as the sole lifeline. Still, Russia recently threatened to block this route as well if the UN failed to coordinate aid programs with the Assad regime.
Retraumatization of refugees. Many people impacted by the earthquakes – on both sides of the border – had already been displaced by Syria’s civil war. While some fled to northwestern Syria from other parts of the country, around 3.6 million had resettled in Turkey since 2011. Gaziantep, the epicenter of Monday's quake, is home to around 500,000 Syrians.
Complicating matters further is the fact that anti-refugee sentiment has been on the rise in Turkey in recent years. In response to growing public concern over migration flows, Ankara had already capped at 20% the number of foreigners in some districts. Now, dealing with its own catastrophe, it will be even more difficult for Turkish authorities to accommodate a surge in Syrian migrants.
While those on the ground await political and humanitarian solutions that may never come, aid workers are racing against the clock as the prospects of finding more people alive grow bleak.
- Biden's SOTU touts domestic wins but not foreign policy - GZERO Media ›
- Greece and other EU countries rush to help Turkey after quake - GZERO Media ›
- Why Giles Duley advocates for the forgotten victims of war - GZERO Media ›
- Syrian rebel forces take Aleppo - GZERO Media ›
- Ian Bremmer on Assad's fall - GZERO Media ›
- Can Syria rebuild to welcome returning refugees? - GZERO Media ›
Will Israel be forced to choose between Russia and Ukraine?
Israel, the only country with close ties to Russia and Ukraine, is trying to delicately balance relations with both states. But as things continue to heat up on the Ukraine-Russia front, that's becoming much harder for Israel to do.
In a rare move Thursday, Kyiv summoned Israel's ambassador to Ukraine for a telling off, demanding an explanation following reports that Israel had reached out to Russia for help coordinating the evacuation of its nationals should Moscow escalate.
Why does Israel appear to be playing both sides, and how might things turn out if Russia invades?
A marriage of convenience. Israel and Russia have enjoyed constructive ties in recent decades. But a particular closeness was cultivated by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Russian President Vladimir Putin in recent years as Moscow took a dominant role in Syria’s civil war along Israel’s northern border. Netanyahu visited Moscow 15 times from 2011-2020.
For Israel, mitigating threats in the Syrian arena, where its arch foe Iran also yields great influence, is a national security priority. In recent years, Russia — which largely controls Syrian airspace — has allowed Israeli warplanes to target Iranian strategic assets there, including convoys trying to deliver weapons to Hezbollah in neighboring Lebanon. Russia is willing to cooperate with Israel on these aerial missions in part because it is competing with Tehran for dominance inside Syria. But the Kremlin could clamp down if Israel provokes it.
Tel Aviv-based Middle East analyst Danny Citrinowicz told GZERO that Israel is not publicly supporting Ukraine because it knows it has “a lot to lose with Russia in Syria.” For both Israel and Russia, it’s a delicate balancing act in Syria, he says. “If Israel intensifies its attacks [in Syria], that could shake the stability of the Assad regime” and undermine Russia’s strategic interests in Syria and the region. Russia would not look at that kindly, just as it might punish Israel with more limited access to launch strikes against Syria if Jerusalem sided with Ukraine.
Kyiv wants a stronger commitment. Israel and Ukraine, meanwhile, are buddies that share robust trade ties, which they hope to expand with a new free trade agreement. The two countries are also closely aligned diplomatically and culturally, a bond reinforced by the fact that thousands of Ukrainian Jews emigrated to Israel.
But Ukraine wants more. For years, it has been trying to buy Israeli weapons and defense technology to boost its military might. Israel has mostly balked at the requests to avoid stepping over a red line for the Kremlin. Just this week, for example, there were reports that Israel had blocked the sale of sophisticated Iron Dome missile defense systems to Ukraine.
What’s more, because of Israel’s unique status as a “mutual friend,” Kyiv has called on Jerusalem to act as mediator in its deepening row with Moscow. But Naftali Bennett, Israel’s prime minister, is having none of it. In fact, Bennett has reportedly told ministers to “keep a low profile” and to avoid showing deference to either side. Still, Israel has called on its nationals to return to Israel and is planning to evacuate Ukrainian Jews, which suggests it anticipates some sort of Russian offensive.
The Washington equation. Israel and the US are closely aligned on global security issues, yet sometimes their immediate interests diverge. Ukraine is a case in point.
Despite saying that it won’t send US troops to defend Ukraine, the Biden administration has been working overtime to strengthen NATO and ensure a coordinated Western response if Russia escalates. For now, the US appears to be okay with Israel’s fence-sitting, but that could change if Washington wants to inflict more severe pain on Russia in the weeks ahead.
Aaron David Miller, a senior fellow and Middle East policy expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, says it’s “unlikely” that Israel will be dragged into the conflict. But if the US “pressured Israel to choose sides in the wake of a major Russian move into Ukraine, Israel would likely comply, especially if Biden asked Bennett personally,” he says.
“Moscow is important in Israel's Syria strategy; Washington is critical to its overall strategic advantage.”